



A Laboratory of Transnational History

Ukraine and Recent
Ukrainian Historiography

EDITED BY GEORGIY KASIANOV AND PHILIPP THER

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Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther



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Introduction

For almost half a century, Ukrainian history did not exist in Ukraine as an independent field of scholarly research or as a subject of instruction. After the Second World War, the “history of the Ukrainian SSR” was established as a regional subunit of the “History of the USSR.” Outside Ukraine, its history was a subject of scholarly research and ideological interpretation in diaspora historiography and in a few small university-level institutions that generally found themselves on the margins of the academic world. After 1991, public demand for accounts of Ukrainian history arose in Ukraine and abroad: in both cases, the motives were purely pragmatic and instrumental. In Ukraine, the overriding concern was to legitimize the state in ideological and “scholarly” terms and provide for the civic education of the nation, which took the form of “creating Ukrainians.” Beyond the borders of the new state, interest in its history was inspired by efforts to understand and explain the current situation: thus, most Western research on Ukraine concentrates on studies in politics, international affairs, economics, and sociology, while historical works are generally either popular outlines or highly specialized investigations.

The institutional and intellectual framework established for the study of Ukrainian history in independent Ukraine largely reflected the practical requirements of state- and nation-building. What happened, in effect, was a revival and state-sponsored diffusion on a mass scale of the standard “patriotic” historical scheme of a “nation reborn,” based on the methodological canons and cognitive models of the nineteenth century—the period in which that task was first undertaken by the Ukrainian national movement. If Soviet historiography had been oriented toward the goal of communism, the new telos was that of the nation.

This way of writing history, continuously supported and directed by the various governments of Ukraine during the 1990s, came into conflict with prevailing cultural and political realities in Ukraine itself—its diversity of cultures, religious denominations, languages, ethical norms, and historical experience and memory. Attempts to nationalize history created serious problems for the project of establishing a “civic nation.” They also drew protests from some Ukrainian intellectuals and their foreign colleagues, who were dissatisfied with this ethnicizing interpretation of Ukrainian history. Even on the political level, it may be doubted

whether national historiography will fulfill its avowed purpose. Georgiy Kasianov, who discusses the reappearance of this historiography in his introductory article, is skeptical on that score. As is apparent from other instances in modern Central and Eastern Europe, notably those of imperial Germany and interwar Poland, nationalizing and de facto ethnicizing historiographies can arouse and deepen internal and external conflicts.

Compared to other European countries of similar size and population, Ukraine exhibits a high degree of cultural, social, and political diversity. Its history has been marked by a multitude and mixture of languages, religions, and cultures. The empires that ruled Ukraine have also made a lasting impression. In traditional national historiography, diversity has been regarded as a problem rather than an asset. Whatever one's attitude to diversity, it is an essential feature of modernity, making Ukraine a prime laboratory for the study of modern politics and culture.

Historians of Ukraine can observe and analyze in their chosen area of study various and competing macro processes such as nation-building, class formation, and secularization (as well as de- and resecularization). This helps explain the increasing interest in Ukraine on the part of Western scholars who have no family roots or other ties to the country. What adds to the fascination is that in Ukraine many of these processes exhibit features commonly ascribed to postmodernity. They are not linear but discontinuous and driven by external factors, creating a low degree of cultural and social homogeneity compared to other European countries.

Without intending to essentialize the diversity of Ukraine, the editors of this volume asked the contributors to go beyond the established national paradigm and nationalizing historiography. Problems of Ukrainian history can usefully be presented from a transnational perspective, involving cultural transfers and processes of intercultural exchange. Contributors were also encouraged to get away from linear and *longue durée* causal explanations, as well as teleology, by speculating freely about conjunctures and contingencies, disruptions, and episodes of "lack of history." Instead of focusing on the traditionally dominant national units of analysis, contributors could deal with neighborhoods or cities, groups instead of classes, networks, new concepts of space, and so on. There was also scope for methods rarely encountered in Ukrainian historiography: deconstruction of grand narratives, linguistic analysis, new social history approaches, and the like.

The term that appears best suited to characterize the articles in this collection is "transnational history." This concept is borrowed from a

recent lively debate among European and American historians on ways of overcoming the limitations of national history. It is difficult to summarize the results of these debates because there is no agreement how to define or use the term transnational. The American debate is clearly inspired by a presentist impulse—the increasing economic, social, and cultural exchange on a global level involving the United States. French and German historians who have employed the term are implicitly influenced by the process of European integration.

The “advantage” of Ukraine as a case study of the paradigm of transnational history is that Ukraine did not constitute a powerful nation-state in the nineteenth and “short” twentieth centuries—a period that advanced and institutionalized national history. Although much of the recent nation-building literature is ethnocentric, it makes no sense to reduce Ukrainian history to bearers of ethnic Ukrainian identity. The history of Ukraine and of Eastern Europe in general seems to lend itself very well to the “transnational history” approach. To offer a brief definition, in our view transnational history concentrates on the relations between cultures and societies, deliberately eschewing concentration on any one culture or country. It compares sending and receiving cultures, highlighting agents of cultural exchange, and is thus oriented toward agency. Transnational history challenges simple models of diffusion. It studies the ways in which cultures use and appropriate cultural goods of distant or foreign origin. The categories of “one’s own” and “the other” are not essentialized but conceived as fluid and defined by historical perception at a given time.

This approach, along with other fruitful methods of research or models of interpretation, dominates the first section of the volume. This theoretically oriented section shows present-day historiography on Ukraine to be undergoing an experimental stage (not inappropriate to a laboratory of postmodernity). On the one hand, there is the ongoing state-sponsored production of traditional national history, which rests on the assumption that Ukraine has an age-old territorial continuity and that a Ukrainian nation has existed since time immemorial. On the other hand, there are interpretations influenced by postmodernism that question (if only rhetorically) whether Ukraine has a history at all. It remains to be seen which tendency will prove more academically fruitful and attract the interest of students and other readers.

This theoretical section of the volume is rooted in historiographic debates in Ukraine and abroad. The contributors to this collection are not, of course, the first to criticize traditional national historiography. In

Ukraine, academic and public discontent with the traditional model first manifested itself in 1993, when the genesis of the Ukrainian nation became a subject of discussion, giving rise to the first intellectual duel between “primordialists” and “modernists.” The mid-1990s witnessed a postmodern trend in the interpretation of Ukrainian history, manifested in Mark von Hagen’s provocative article “Does Ukraine Have a History?” in the *Slavic Review*. He has now reinterpreted his text, its reception, and his own subsequent research in a new article for this volume.

In the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, there emerged an “imagined community” of historians of Ukraine who sought, each in his own way, either to expand the framework of “national history” or to go beyond it. Representatives of this community do not necessarily agree with one another or observe a common research methodology or interpretive canon. What unites them is the idea of going beyond the linear, narrowly ethnic and teleological model of Ukrainian history. The editors of this volume—Philipp Ther (European University Institute, Florence) and Georgiy Kasianov (Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv)—seek to acquaint readers with the approach to Ukrainian history found in the works of members of the above-mentioned “imagined community.” Its members have produced not only interesting theoretical debates but also a considerable amount of empirical research, as exemplified in the second part of the volume, which is organized chronologically. The articles deal with periods of Ukrainian history ranging from early modern times to the nineteenth century, World War II, and the post-independence years.

Although it was not the editors’ conscious intention, what has emerged from this project is almost an *alternative reader* of Ukrainian history. We hope that it will appeal to the international academic community and to students and specialists in Ukraine. Last but not least we would like to thank the European University in Frankfurt/Oder in Germany for its financial support for our endeavor and Myroslav Yurkevich for translating the articles from our Ukrainian contributors and his invaluable assistance in editing this volume.

Kyiv and Florence, spring 2008

I. National versus Transnational History

“Nationalized” History: Past Continuous, Present Perfect, Future...

Georgiy Kasianov

This essay deals with a phenomenon that I call “nationalized history,” meaning a way of perceiving, understanding and treating the past that requires the separation of “one’s own” history from an earlier “common” history and its construction as the history of a nation. The great majority of the world’s states and nations have undergone the “nationalization” of history. The history of that phenomenon, in any particular country, coincides with the age of nationalism and the development of national states, depending on the time when the age of nationalism reaches its territory. In some countries, the nationalization of history was part of the “invention of tradition,” while in others it was an element of a so-called “national renaissance” or “national awakening.”¹

Ukraine experienced the nationalization of history in two stages. The first began in the mid-nineteenth century and reached its height in the creation of a grand narrative, Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s *History of Ukraine-Rus’*. The tradition of historical writing that emerged at this stage persisted in Ukrainian Marxist historiography until the end of the Second World War (when it was destroyed as a result of deliberate actions on the part of the authorities); in diaspora historiography it turned into a canon, a true credo. The second stage began in the late 1980s and is still continuing. It differs from the preceding one in that it is taking place under state sponsorship and is an integral part of the nationalization of that state. Secondly, unlike the previous stage, which coincided with the general European phenomenon of the “invention of tradition” and the development of nations, the present stage is unfolding in an era of globalization, the fading of cultural boundaries, and the large-scale aggression of international forms of mass culture. At the same time, it bears all the characteristics of intellectual *dějà vu*, since it is an obvious reprise of an “unfinished modernization project” and a means of carrying out intellectual and ideological tasks of the nine-

teenth century; hence its rather obvious association with an ideological and political agenda.

In Ukraine and the diaspora, the discussion about “nationalized” history, its “splendor and misery” (to use Balzac’s phrase), began as early as 1993 at an international Ukrainian studies congress where adherents of a perennialist vision of the history of the Ukrainian nation first clashed with “modernists” in an open intellectual duel.² The discussion proceeded within the framework, and according to the canons, of “nationalized” Ukrainian history.

The first serious attempt to describe the canon of “nationalized” Ukrainian history and propose alternative variants of *Ukrainian* history outside that framework was Mark von Hagen’s article “Does Ukraine Have a History?” The discussion on the pages of the *Slavic Review* showed that the American scholar was somewhat ahead of his time and that his epistle had been understood either partially or not at all, or read in a manner that precluded a productive exchange of views, since the discussion proceeded in different languages, even though it was initiated in English. Two years later another American scholar, Roman Szporluk, published an article proposing a new analytical dimension of the national history of Ukraine per se.

In Ukraine, it was Yaroslav Hrytsak who first sought to broaden the framework of nationalized history itself, but a work by Natalia Yakovenko marked the first real and relatively successful attempt to go beyond it. The intellectual evolution of other Ukrainian historians, associated mainly with the influence of the Anglo-American intellectual tradition, led to the appearance of works that criticized the dominance of the canons of nationalized Ukrainian history. Yet the first works directed toward a systematic analysis of these canons and their deconstruction appeared only in the early 2000s. This essay is a further effort to identify and systematize the basic characteristics of the nationalized Ukrainian history of the 1990s; to describe its canon and set forth its epistemology, mythology and rhetoric.

The nationalization of Ukrainian history proceeded simultaneously with the gradual detachment of Ukraine from the Soviet Union; indeed, it was an element, and to some extent a motivating force, of that detachment. In Ukraine, the era of the “detachment” of Ukrainian history per se began outside the bounds of the historical profession with addresses by political writers and representatives of the literary and artistic intelligentsia. The boom of historical and popular writing (intended mainly to fill in “blank spots,” overcome the ideological taboos of Soviet times,

and uncover the crimes first of Stalinism and then of the whole "Soviet system") began at the Soviet center. The Ukrainian SSR, to which those political writers referred as "the reserve of stagnation," was more a consumer than a producer of muckraking publicistic writing.

The period of "stressful history" entered its Ukrainian phase in the late 1980s: the scenario and rhetoric did not differ in any way from those earlier observed in Moscow. The distinction lay mainly in "local particularities," the most important of which was a tendency to "sovereignize" national history. For example, one of the leitmotifs of the review of the past—the condemnation of the crimes of Stalinism—revolved mainly around national traumas. Attention was directed at first to Soviet Ukrainian figures and military men who fell victim to political repression; then the focus shifted to the national intelligentsia (Soviet and "not quite" Soviet); at the turn of the 1990s the famine of 1932–33 was "discovered," and it became the most prominent feature of national victimology and mythology. All these were in the nature of transitional forms for the ultimate detachment of Ukrainian history from its broader context. This was a spontaneous process, to be sure, but not without its own inner logic. The principal slogan was that of a return to "authentic" history—an echo, to some extent, of the official ideological stereotype of "authentic" or "real" socialism. The source of that "authentic" history was discovered in the previously forbidden works of earlier historians that began to appear as part of the "rehabilitation" wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

It is also worth noting that the sovereignization of history (both official and unofficial) paralleled the sovereignization of the Soviet republics and the autonomization of the political ambitions of some members of local party elites. It is also self-evident that this process was stimulated by a whole series of additional factors: the attitude of part of the literary and artistic intelligentsia, which until recently had coexisted in perfect harmony with the establishment and had even belonged to it; the development of political structures that were not subordinate to the ruling party; and the gradual increase in the political power of social forces that served to catalyze a centrifugal tendency in social attitudes.

The political and ideological situation in the Ukrainian SSR programmed a corresponding response on the part of the authorities, whose initial purpose was to bring the centrifugal tendency under control and, later, to exploit it in order to relegitimize themselves as a national political elite (we are not dealing here with a political strategy but rather with a series of spontaneous reactions dictated by the logic of events in which

the objects of those events turned into subjects, and vice versa). This gave rise to a situation that reminds one yet again of the irony inherent in history: the institutional nationalization of history was undertaken on the instructions of a party that had done everything in its power, beginning in the latter half of the 1940s, to marginalize national history as such.

In January 1989, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CC CPU) adopted a resolution on the establishment of a “republican program for the development of historical research and the improvement of the teaching and propaganda of the history of the Ukrainian SSR” (for 1991–2000). It fell to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR to carry out this instruction. The program was developed in mid-1990 and ratified with no substantial changes by a resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPU dated 27 July 1990.³ According to S.V. Kulchytsky, who was responsible for organizing the development of the program, there was no direct interference in the process by the supreme party bodies.⁴ That might be considered a novelty, but it was not, of course, a matter of the party’s “democratism”; rather, the quality of this program was entirely in keeping with its expectations. Significantly, it was in July 1990 that the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the “Declaration on State Sovereignty.” All outward appearances remained unchanged: the ideological hierarchy continued to function according to the usual scenario. Only one nuance distinguished this episode from previous practice: the content of the “party’s instructions” was formulated by the individuals responsible for carrying out those very instructions, that is, scholars of the Academy of Sciences. But there was no reason to expect revolutionary ideas from that quarter. The intellectual product offered by the client/producers was created by people well versed in the nuances of the authorities’ hierarchy of values, yet sensitive enough to respond to the needs of the moment, which were ever more clearly being shaped both by politically active forces outside the communist establishment and by the most politically sensitive part of that establishment itself.

The year 1991 saw the first publication in book form dealing with the theoretical aspects of writing national history per se: *How and When the Ukrainian Nation Began to Take Form* by Valerii Smolii and Oleksandr Hurzhii.⁵ In methodological terms, the work was entirely in keeping with the spirit of the ideological and cognitive canon of that day: the history of the nation was presented in the framework of the class approach and the traditional “formational teleology,” with “nationality” assigned

to the feudal formation and the process of nation formation attributed to the era of transition from feudalism to capitalism. It might be said that using the expression "Ukrainian nation" in a book title—and an official academic publication at that—was a dubious step. But the above-mentioned methodology saved the day: under its cover the dubious subject took on a politically correct appearance, especially as the appropriate conditions had already been created at the highest level.

In any event, the trend toward the full-scale nationalization of Ukrainian history had not yet attained complete legitimacy, mainly because of the attitude of the authorities, whose autonomist ambitions had not yet turned into a clear line of conduct, and who were still seeking ways to gain control of the situation.

The year 1991 became the turning point. If until then there were ideological contradictions between the efforts of the politically active masses and part of the intelligentsia to nationalize the history of Ukraine and attempts to organize that process so as to make it acceptable to the "upper crust," those contradictions disappeared after 24 August 1991. Nationalized history began to fulfill important instrumental functions: legitimize the newly established state and its attendant elite; establish territorial and chronological conceptions of the Ukrainian nation; and confirm the appropriateness of that nation's existence as a legal successor in the consciousness of its citizens and neighbors alike. As these functions were fulfilled, a *normative* historiography began to take shape, that is to say, the intellectual product of the sector of historical studies that established and continues to establish the historiographic canon; is supported morally, politically, and materially by the state; and services the official ideology, or, as in the Ukrainian case, its simulacrum. Normative historiography began to function wholly within the framework of the particular intellectual tradition established in Ukraine as early as the turn of the twentieth century. And that was perfectly natural, for the classic "unfinished project of modernity" undertaken at that time—nation formation—would have to be completed at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The Intellectual Context

The monopoly of centralized state bodies on the formation of the national version of Ukrainian history was challenged at the beginning of the 1990s. It was probably the book *Ukraine: A History*⁶ by Professor Orest Subtelny of York University (Toronto, Canada) that first presented nation-

alized history on an intellectual level appropriate for consumers. This popular survey, written in English for a readership that knew next to nothing about Ukraine, suddenly became a historical bestseller in Ukraine itself—a development by which the author himself was quite taken aback (the survey was published three times in Ukrainian and once in Russian). With lightning speed, the work gained popularity and became something of an ersatz textbook in high schools and higher educational institutions, not only because of market conditions (the demand for general Ukrainian history courses was tremendous) but also because of the author's fluent and lively exposition and his fairly balanced assessment of certain controversial problems that Soviet historiography had either passed over in silence or interpreted tendentiously. The book was taken as a revelation not only by its mass audience but also by professionals; some went so far as to cite it as a source. Paradoxically, much of the book was based mainly on material presented in other general surveys, especially those of Dmytro Doroshenko and Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko; for that very reason, it could serve as a good example of a properly revised, “civilized” national historical project free of excessive patriotic zeal.

In any case, Subtelny's book indicated the rather attractive prospects for “historical syntheses” in the sphere of national history and became something of a challenge to official historical scholarship, which was in the throes of a deep institutional crisis and thus unable to produce a work of similar scope. It is safe to say that the first surveys written by historians employed in state research institutions were responses to the “Subtelnyization” of Ukraine's historiographic space. In particular, the two-volume *History of Ukraine: A New Vision*,⁷ written collectively at the Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, was unofficially regarded as a “response to Subtelny” (given the intellectual biography of some of its authors, wits promptly renamed it “A New Apology” [*nove vybachennia*, punning on the original *nove bachennia*]). S.V. Kulchytsky made an interesting remark on the scholarly and social importance of this work: in his opinion, its one-volume reprint “left Subtelny's textbook (completely devoid of archival sources) no prospects whatever.” This was doubtless something of an exaggeration: Subtelny's book has retained its high reputation among students and some teachers; *A New Vision* surpasses it in press runs and print quality, but certainly not in use of archival sources, to say nothing of the fact that there are no serious conceptual differences between the two works—both serve to promote the national historical project. (That Subtelny's work has become not only a hugely influential object of imita-

tion for many Ukrainian scholars but also something of a model in the development of approaches and formulations is a subject that we shall not pursue beyond these parentheses.) Nor should it be forgotten that Subtelny's book, which was also written on the basis of works by present-day Western students of Ukrainian history, served as perhaps the first bridge to those works, as well as to corresponding terminology and structuring of historical material. It is safe to say, for example, that the concept of modernization (whatever the author's treatment of it)—one of Subtelny's main "framing" motifs—was first introduced to Ukraine by his textbook, the one with "no prospects whatever." That concept is now part of "textbook" history.

After that, the shelf of writings in Ukrainian studies by foreign authors began to expand quickly: works by Zenon Kohut, Frank Sysyn, Bohdan Krawchenko, Roman Szporluk, George Grabowicz and others appeared in translation. It is safe to say that they had considerable influence on the intellectually aware members of the profession, mainly because of their way of thinking and writing, use of terminology, and professional scrupulousness. Paradoxically, they also contributed to the "nationalization" of Ukrainian history, endowing that process with greater intellectual subtlety. In this regard, a special place should probably be reserved for Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, who was—to some extent and in his own time—an intellectual guru for many of the above-mentioned diaspora scholars and posthumously became one of the most frequently cited and respected authors in Ukraine. Interestingly, Lysiak-Rudnytsky's concept of the development of the Ukrainian nation, with its stress on continuity in the sphere of ethnicity (the people as the element of continuity) and recognition of discontinuity in politics (statehood), laid the basis for a moderate version of nationalized Ukrainian history. At the same time, it should be recognized that the works of the above-mentioned authors played an important preparatory role in the revision of the standard national-patriotic historical schema, and some of those authors actively initiated that revision.

No less important an intellectual factor in the structured "nationalization" of Ukrainian history was the republication of the "classics" of prerevolutionary and émigré historiography. Reissues of particular works and excerpts from the writings of Mykhailo Hrushevsky had already begun to appear by the late 1980s. Reprints of his works were issued in the early 1990s; here, too, it is interesting that the first to appear were popular works written for the "general reader." The works of Dmytro Doroshenko (usually classified as a representative of the so-

called statist current of Ukrainian historiography) and Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko were reissued at the same time. This was followed by the republication of more fundamental works; most notably, the reissue of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was completed in 1997. All these works, written in the spirit of classic patriotic historiography, were received by the broader public and the professional community as a return to "authentic" history. Along with them, analogous ways of thinking, terminology, and analytical structures gained academic currency; owing to the above-mentioned charisma of "authenticity," these were also initially given a fairly uncritical reception.

In fairly short order, this process went on to the stage of canonization of "authentic" history, and here Mykhailo Hrushevsky's work unquestionably led the way. The return of his work to Ukraine (after decades of tacit prohibition) was triumphal indeed. On the one hand, he became persona grata to the new authorities, who were genuinely seeking heroes for the national pantheon, for which Hrushevsky seemed an excellent candidate: a political and governmental figure, one of the founders of the Ukrainian state of 1917–20, and to some extent a victim of the previous regime. On the other hand, his colossal scholarly legacy, together with the pleasing image of a "prerevolutionary intellectual," were deemed appropriate by most intellectuals seeking respectable orientations and models. All these aspirations were realized in a fairly standard metamorphosis: Hrushevsky's portrait appeared in state educational institutions (where portraits of Vladimir Lenin and Karl Marx had previously hung); monuments to him were built in Kyiv and Lviv; his works became canonical; and references to him as an undoubted authority, a "foundation," the "point of departure" of one's own thinking became something of a norm for present-day Ukrainian historians, no matter that this "foundation" had been established a century ago. The most recent example is the above-mentioned collective work edited by Valerii Smolii and Oleksandr Hurzhii (2002 edition), which enjoys official canonical status. In the introduction, Smolii notes: "The authors have worked out their own approaches to the periodization of historical processes, the establishment of authentic relations of cause and effect between events, and evaluations of historical figures. These approaches are based on the firm foundation of Ukrainian historiography of the late nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth, above all on the works of Mykhailo Hrushevsky."⁸

Thus the purely institutional factors promoting the nationalization of history were supplemented by intellectual ones: the return of "émigré"

historians, the rehabilitation and canonization of previously forbidden "classics," and the intellectual repatriation of Western scholars of Ukrainian origin. All this contributed both to the strengthening of normative historiography, which took a rather selective approach to this whole legacy, and to the stabilization of the historiographic canon.

The Canon: Basic Parameters

Let us attempt to establish the basic parameters of the canonical scheme now practiced in normative historiography with greater or lesser variations and even occasional "deviations." The preceding reflections may lend themselves to a somewhat simplified notion of a canon supposedly formulated and propagated only by ideologically committed historians who carry out service functions for ideological structures, or by professionals inspired by enthusiasm for patriotic enlightenment, or by those who consider Ukrainian history a convenient and necessary didactic instrument for implanting Ukrainian patriotism into mass consciousness. The reality is of course far more complex. Those who pursue their research in the framework of normative historiography include fairly high-quality professionals who are aware of other approaches and value them but nevertheless prefer to adhere to traditional schemas and seek ways of adapting them to contemporary requirements or defend their intellectual capacity (for example, the Lviv historians Yaroslav Dashkevych and Yaroslav Isaievych).

Naturally, such attitudes may be provoked by distaste for intellectual fashion, especially by reaction to the import of previously unknown, misinterpreted and quite often misspelled terminology and methodology, or by simple lack of interest, or, indeed, by personal preference. In any case, it is unfair to depict representatives of normative historiography as some kind of monolithic legion of professional obscurantism or methodological backwardness.

As noted earlier, the fundamental features of the historiographic canon took shape at the turn of the twentieth century on the basis of mixed traditions of romanticism (the identification of the people as the basic subject of national history *per se*) and positivism as the basic approach to the subject. In historiographic jargon that line was given the name of "populist" historiography or "the Hrushevsky school." During the early decades of the twentieth century this canon was supplemented in some measure by the so-called statist school (whose founder is traditionally considered to be Viacheslav Lypynsky), which stressed the role of elites

and the state factor in nation formation. In diaspora historiography these two orientations were cultivated as distinct schools, although there was no difference between them in principle—both promoted the realization of the “national project” and did not so much contradict as supplement each other within the framework of the national-patriotic canon. The return to “authentic” history at the turn of the 1990s led to the reincarnation of this approach and gave it active academic currency.

Let us attempt to define the basic features of this canon. Above all, it is basically *teleological*. The goal—the formation of a nation and a state—is identified with the cause, generating the idea that the Ukrainian nation and state arose naturally and were “objectively determined” or programmed. They arose because they were supposed to arise. This kind of causality manifests itself in clear-cut cognitive schemas, deviation from which is regarded as lack of patriotism at worst and methodological imperfection at best. It is worth noting that the tendency to construct linear teleological schemes within the framework of the national narrative is determined not only by ideological demand and the legitimization syndrome, or by a simple return to the cognitive and descriptive schemas of the turn of the twentieth century, but also by the wholly painless adaptation of ways of thinking and writing implanted in the consciousness of historians during the Soviet period. The transition from the teleology of socio-economic formations and class struggle to the teleology of the eternal existence of the nation and its struggle for that existence passed almost unnoticed and is unlikely to have become an object of reflection for the great majority of those who are “restoring historical justice.”

This kind of teleology is impossible without *essentialism*: the Ukrainian nation (in its various hypostases) is defined as a constantly (actually or potentially) present community that needs only to be properly identified and characterized with the aid of a well-chosen set of cognitive instruments. As a result, categories of ideological or political practice very easily take on scholarly analytical status, and the distinction between scholarship and ideology disappears, which does not, in principle, disturb the supporters and adepts of nationalized history. The outstanding example here is the category of “national renaissance,” which has fulfilled various ideological functions and continues to do so, even as it remains quite legitimately on the list of scholarly concepts. In this case, a rational explanation of “national renaissance” is conceivable and possible, but it inevitably remains secondary and subordinate to the metaphor—essentially irrational but extraordinarily potent—that asserts the exis-

tence and presence of a transcendent, timeless "nation." In periods of statelessness this is a "nation in itself," a Sleeping Beauty; when handsome princes arrive in the persons of bearded historians, philologists, ethnographers and others, it awakens and becomes a nation "for itself"; a felicitous period of statehood begins, and the vexatious need to assert its right of existence disappears. Such a worldview contains an element of the given. It is not the nation's existence that requires explanation but cases in which the nation gives no sign of life (in general, or in certain historical periods). This explanation is intended mainly for oneself. There are also explanations for others—arguments deployed in the struggle with those who question the eternal presence of a given nation (even as a project) in history and in the present.

There is an element of overpowering intellectual inertia in all this. The repetition of a scenario duplicated dozens, hundreds, and thousands of times in political writings, textbooks, scholarly works, and fiction creates an aura of self-evidence and naturalness in spite of its obvious banality.

Another basic feature of the canon of nationalized history is its *ethnocentricity*, which readily turns into *egocentricity*. Since its principal subject is the Ukrainian people, and, according to the corresponding intellectual tradition, the "Ukrainian people" is a particular ethnos or group of culturally, linguistically and even genetically related ethnos and subethnos, it is clear that national history is concerned above all with the transformation of this people and ethnos into a nation. A characteristic feature in this regard is the identification of the concept of the "Ukrainian people" with that of the "Ukrainian nation."

This gives rise to another important feature of nationalized history: its claim to *ethnic exclusivity*. The history of Ukraine is the history of ethnic Ukrainians. A number of approaches are possible here. The coarsest of them consists in ignoring the presence of other ethnos or nations in what was actually a common space and time; the denial of a whole system of mutual cultural, psychological, political, and economic influences; and the refusal of the right of other nations to exist "inside" Ukrainian nationalized history. A variant of this approach recognizes the presence of other peoples (ethnos) in nationalized history as a background required to reinforce and structure the history of one's own nation. Mention must also be made of claims to the particularly tragic and sacrificial character of Ukrainian history—an extreme and rather superficial variant of exclusivity.

Finally, one of the most prominent elements of the canon is the *linearity and absolutization of the historical continuity* of the “ethnos-people-nation.” The outstanding example is the well-known “metamorphosis” of Ukrainian history as it makes its way through various schemes of periodization. Although this construction is well known, it is worth considering once again in order to make the argument complete: first we have the presence of autochthonous tribes since prehistoric times (Trypilian culture);⁹ this is followed by the age of the early Slavs; the beginnings of statehood; the development of statehood and political consolidation in the times of Kyivan Rus’; the torch is passed to the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia; there follows the Polish-Lithuanian era, with its separate ethnoconfessional status; the Cossack era and seventeenth-century statehood; the Hetmanate and limited autonomy; the decline of the Hetmanate, with compensation in the form of cultural and territorial patriotism, as well as the “national renaissance”; the apogee of the latter in the Revolution of 1917–21 (here the names vary, from the wholly ideological “liberation struggle” or “national revolution” to the more neutral “Ukrainian Revolution”). Unity is then somewhat infringed, but not radically. Some consider the Soviet period and Soviet Ukrainian statehood a break in continuity (successfully compensated by the existence of a national-liberation movement in a variety of manifestations, which, to be sure, also underwent a “metamorphosis” from one form to another). Others think of Soviet Ukrainian statehood as an element of continuity, as recently manifested with particular acuteness by the peculiar jubilee (eighty-fifth birth anniversary) of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.¹⁰ Finally, 1991 becomes the crown of a “thousand-year history.” This is the point at which the “non-historic” nation finally turns into a “historical” one and history is activized in reverse—the existence of a state in the present begins to call for something similar in the past.

A necessary element of the canon is a *national historical myth*, that is, an array or system of notions about the national past and definitive socially significant historical symbols that possess stable moral and political value and constitute an essential normative element of national identity. Given the preceding considerations, this myth may be assumed to be ethnocentric by definition; once again, it displays a number of birthmarks common to all the historical myths of formerly “non-historical” nations that begin to assert themselves as “historical.” (Let us note parenthetically that the corresponding myths of “historical” nations possess the same features, the only difference being that they have already been taken “out of the framework” of professional historiography and

introduced as part of "textbook" history in the schools. Indeed, given the process of European integration, particular "exclusivist" elements of that myth are already being eliminated in order to promote "integrationist" components of mass consciousness. This applies particularly to the "European character" of Ukraine, an important element of the myth of its civilizational allegiance.) But this refashioning or reorientation of the myth is not working, as the idea of Ukraine's "European character" has no resonance among much of the population of eastern and southern Ukraine.

The mythological repertoire of nationalized Ukrainian history is a fairly standard one for Eastern Europe: here we find the myth of the civilizational barrier between East and West, the myth of ancient origins (again featuring the Trypilians), the myth of "historical firsts" with regard to major events and processes (let us mention at least the very agreeable but groundless myth about Pylyp Orlyk as the author of the first constitution in Europe, or exclusivist claims to the legacy of Kyivan Rus'), the myth of distinctive Ukrainian social characteristics (especially innate democratism), the myth of unbroken (continuous) Ukrainian settlement within a particular habitat, and so on.

To be sure, in speaking of the Ukrainian national historical myth one should not consider it fully formed or, most importantly, functional. However paradoxical it may seem, this myth remains quite amorphous despite certain distinct and stable features. The myths created in nineteenth-century grand narratives cannot simply be reinstalled in historiography and mass consciousness, if only because the geographic configuration of contemporary Ukraine does not allow it. Since the ethno-national myth is an element of exclusivist history intended to fulfill mainly ideological functions, it is difficult to address it to and impose it on a considerable part of the population, even within the Ukrainian ethnic community. For instance, the Cossack myth does not have powerful emotional resonance in the western regions of Ukraine, while the heroic myth of the nationalist movement and the armed struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the Second World War, which is particularly important in western Ukraine, is actively rejected in the east. Let us add to this the presence and continued functioning in intellectual space of the remains of Soviet intellectual mythology and the introduction of new, confrontational myths associated with the struggle against that Soviet mythology. These include the myth imported from the diaspora and then reconstructed in Ukraine of the deliberately anti-Ukrainian "ethnocidal" policy of the Soviet state and the powerful related thematic line of the

famines and repressive policies of the 1920s–40s. This myth (whatever the real grounds for it that can be found in the past) also serves as a powerful explanatory tool in current political debates and collective memory construction: political, economic and cultural problems are often explained as an outcome of human losses suffered by the Ukrainian people during the Soviet period.

Mention may also be made in this context of the problem of creating a national pantheon. It is almost impossible to establish a group of “all-Ukrainian” figures while remaining within the canon of nationalized history and ethnic exclusivity. Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka and Bohdan Khmelnytsky may, after all, be accepted by most of the population as symbols representative of the whole society (not only because of their “universality” but also because they belonged to the Soviet pantheon). But the figures of Ivan Mazepa, Stepan Bandera, or even Mykhailo Hrushevsky lack such broad appeal, not only because they belong mainly to nationalized history, but also because of the inertia of the selfsame Soviet mythology. Thus the inability of nationalized history to create a fully functional “all-Ukrainian pantheon” as part of an integrative civic mythology considerably undermines the realization of the very task of creating an imagined civic nation.

The rhetoric of nationalized history and, generally, its discursive practice as such deserves particular attention. Its manner of speaking, which necessarily reveals its world view and way of thinking, gives rise to a rather undemanding cognitive and categorical space in which breathing is very easy—that air, which consists of almost pure oxygen with a minimum of foreign elements, induces a euphoria of recognition and relation. It suffices to master a few standard concepts and categories (from “national renaissance,” “instinct for statehood” and “national wisdom” to “the people’s state-forming potential”) that can be used to encompass and characterize anything, any kind of “history.”

This way of speaking also highlights confrontation and drama: nationalized history consists entirely of the nation’s struggle for survival and its contest with internal and external enemies; it is constantly “othering” neighbors to produce a black-and-white high-contrast world. Closely related to this is another important feature of the linguistic practices of nationalized history—what Mark von Hagen aptly termed “lacrimogenesis.” Fetishizing the “long-suffering people”; emphasizing its losses (and consciously or unconsciously exaggerating them); intensifying the emotional stress associated with certain terrible facts and events; attempting to explain present-day failures by invoking large-scale “genetic losses,”

"elite betrayals," and "perfidious enemies"; the frequent use of invective and adjectives such as "terrible," "frightful," "murderous," "hostile," and "mortal"; as well as nouns like "terror," "losses," "treason," "perdition," and so on—all these are the first and most obvious characteristics of the classic canon of nationalized history.

No less definite a characteristic of this canon is the preponderance of metaphors over clear and substantial scholarly definitions. The concepts and categories with which the historian operates in this case require no explanation: there is an informal consensus on their content and appropriateness to the canon. In the pages of canonical works of nationalized history the reader will find no elaborate specifications: concepts and categories are completely self-sufficient and self-evident, nor is there any chance of misinterpretation, for everyone writes according to the same model. As for figurative language, it is most glaringly apparent in the excess of anthropomorphisms. In this discourse Ukraine "wishes," "is able," "suffers," "strives," "struggles," "aspires," "wins"; it is "oppressed," "plundered," and "exploited." It is a living being with its own emotions, diseases and conflicts—and in this regard it is highly tempting to draw parallels with the basic outlook of organic nationalism, for which the nation is also a living entity.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the obvious overload of archaisms in the language of this canon. The best-known example is the application of terminology from the modern era to premodern and early modern times and the archaization of related phenomena. Writers working in this mode point out that in the seventeenth century *Ukrainian peasants* were already *nationalists*; that Cossacks had already laid the foundations of a *farming economy*; that Bohdan Khmelnytsky introduced a *balanced budget* and created a *presidential form of government*; that elements of *civil society* were established on those territories, and so on.¹¹

Naturally, we are concerned first and foremost with *general typical characteristics* of the method and language of nationalized history, in which gradations from radical to moderate are entirely possible. The point here is not to draw up a list of "mortal sins" but to take a fairly detached view; not to make accusations of "backwardness" but to establish facts and render a diagnosis.

Nationalized history is a perfectly legitimate intellectual product both from the viewpoint of public demand and because of the need to "catch up" or "fill in a gap." Although it means falling into the sin of functionalism, one should admit that this kind of history does indeed fulfill an important social function associated with legitimizing the presence of a

certain nation in space and, no less important, in time. The problem is not so much nationalized history itself, with its rather archaic cognitive and classifying apparatus, its orientation on satisfying ideological demand, and its intellectual hermeticism (for it is entirely self-sufficient). The problem lies, rather, in its extensive mass self-replication, which creates conditions uncongenial to the diversification of intellectual space and to the establishment and existence of other versions of both *nationalized history* and *national histories* in the framework of Ukrainian history, to say nothing of the possibility of creating *transnational* histories of Ukraine. Solving this problem is a serious intellectual challenge to Ukrainian historians.

Notes

- ¹ Both phenomena have received accurate and in-depth treatment in works that have become classics: Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983).
- ² See *Formuvannia ukrains'koï natsii: istoriia ta interpretatsii* (Lviv, 1995).
- ³ See "U TsK Kompartii Ukraïny. Formuvaty istorychnu svidomist'," *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, 3 February 1989.
- ⁴ Interview with Stanislav Kulchytsky, deputy director, Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 19 May 2005.
- ⁵ V.A. Smolii and O.I. Hurzhii, *Iak i koly pochala formuvatysia ukrains'ka natsiia* (Kyiv, 1991).
- ⁶ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, 1988; 3d ed., 2000). The volume was translated into Ukrainian and Russian and reprinted no less than three times, with an overall circulation of no less than nine hundred thousand copies.
- ⁷ *Istoriia Ukraïny. Nove bachennia*, 2 vols., ed. V.A. Smolii (Kyiv, 1996). An updated one-volume version of the book appeared in 1999 and was reprinted in 2002 with the financial support of the state. It has become one of the most popular textbooks in institutions of higher learning, especially for the standard course on Ukrainian history obligatory for incoming students at all higher educational institutions.
- ⁸ *Istoriia Ukraïny. Navchal'nyi posibnyk* (Kyiv, 2002), p. 6.
- ⁹ President Viktor Yushchenko's innocent enthusiasm for the artifacts of Trypilian culture stands a perfectly good chance of legitimizing the "Trypilian syndrome" of nationalized history. If realized, plans for establishing a special museum complex dedicated to the subject under his supreme patronage will be an undoubted triumph of nationalized history. In that case, Ukrainians will have a chance to become one of the most ancient peoples in the world...
- ¹⁰ See the rather outspoken considerations on this subject: M. Riabchuk, "Znakuvannia politychnoho prostoru," *Krytyka*, 2003, no. 5: 4–9; Iu. Shapoval, "Dialektyka derzhavnoho poshanuvannia," *ibid.*, pp. 9–11.
- ¹¹ A real treasury of such pearls is the brochure issued by the National Institute of Strategic Studies attached to the administration of the president of Ukraine, *Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda 1654 roku: istorychni uroky dlia ukrains'koho narodu* (Kyiv, 2004).

Revisiting the Histories of Ukraine

Mark von Hagen

In a conversation a few years ago in Kyiv with a fashionable art gallery owner, I was challenged to state what I thought made Ukrainian history distinctive and interesting.

Before long I found myself refuting her notion that these distinctions were “primal” and somehow based in the genetic material of contemporary Ukrainians. This primordial reading of Ukrainian nationality is something that we scholars working in the postmodern paradigms find difficult to bear,¹ but I also have to acknowledge that I achieved next to nothing in destabilizing this Ukrainian woman’s firm conviction of her nation’s genetic superiority to others, especially the Russians. (In characteristically ironic fashion, this very conversation occurred in Russian, although both the art gallery owner and I had begun our acquaintance in Ukrainian; the Russian language was necessary to accommodate two of our fellow discussants/listeners who only knew Russian, one a German and the second an American NGO representative in Kyiv!)²

Still, even as I was arguing against such notions of biological difference and uniqueness, I also realized that my own approach to Ukrainian history had nonetheless been shaped by efforts to consider what has made it the way it is and has been over the centuries in which Ukraine has been conceivable. The question of what made Ukrainian history “Ukrainian” was no doubt behind my provocative essay title of a few years back, “Does Ukraine Have a History?”³ After all, I came to Ukrainian history (and the language) from years of work in Russian history and language and some background in Polish history and language (as well as graduate-school work in modern European history, defined as West European and mostly German, French, and British), so I have been comparing the history of Ukraine with at least those several traditions from the start.⁴

But my comparativist inclinations regarding Ukraine have even earlier roots. When I paid my first visit to the city that I knew as Kiev in 1975, it impressed me as a very Russian metropolis, a very Orthodox Christian one by its historical culture, and thereby linked in complicated ways to Russia itself. I was in the Soviet Union to study the Russian language that summer (at Leningrad State University's department of Russian language for foreigners). Kiev was the last stop on our itinerary after six weeks of study in Leningrad, followed by a week in Moscow and a few days in Tbilisi, Georgia. That summer we had also visited Novgorod and Tallinn, so my comparative approach to Ukraine was already widely cast. Tallinn and Tbilisi seemed to me to be more different from Kiev than Novgorod or Moscow. But I did not give a great deal of thought to developing this comparative framework until later years.

After earning a reputation as a moderately competent historian of Russia—more specifically, the early Soviet period—I came to feel that my background and training had left me unprepared to understand the Soviet Union as a multinational state—this several years before the end of the USSR. My first venture was in Turkic studies, but after two years of studying modern Turkish, I realized that I needed not just a few years but probably another lifetime to master the languages of the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. While I read widely in the histories of the Ottoman Empire and the Turko-Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire, I came upon an ultimately more sensible option, Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation. After all, Ukraine was the most populous republic after Russia, and Ukrainians the largest nation in the Soviet Union, after the ethnic Russians. It also became clear that for a military historian (even—perhaps especially—one like myself, who is more a historian of armies and soldiers, and the social and cultural consequences of war than the more conventional guns-and-battles specialists) Ukraine was a veritable laboratory of international and civil wars and other violent conflicts that promised some exciting findings. Incorrectly assuming that Ukrainian would come naturally to me after Russian and Polish, I began reading in the voluminous historiography of modern Ukraine, mostly from diaspora historians and their students. I was persuaded that there was still room for a sympathetic if critical outsider to make some contribution to this volatile field, especially given the prospects of greatly expanded archival access after 1989 and the opportunities for Ukrainian historians themselves to revise, if not abandon, the more and more discredited Soviet paradigm.

Perhaps my focus on conflict and battles helped shape my under-

standing of the field of Ukrainian history as well. One of the things I learned from my first foray into Ukrainian studies, the “Does Ukraine Have a History?” essay, was how contested the intellectual and political stakes have been in Ukrainian history;⁵ this is still true, and in some ways even more true, since the latest independence proclamation in 1991.⁶ I felt that I was suspected in the Ukrainian-history community of acting as a Russian imperialist wolf in Ukrainian national sheep’s wool and that I had to prove my worth as a Ukrainist—a position, by the way, with which I myself agreed, since I was quickly daunted by how much literature there was to master. But “proving my worth” often translated into a tacit demand to agree with a given historian’s view of Ukraine’s past and present, and here I found fewer allies at home and in Ukraine. I should say at once, however, that most Ukrainian historians welcomed me as one who had come to appreciate something (not always clear to them) in “their” history, even if my views were still “immature” or “underdeveloped,” that is, not informed by years of grappling with the central issues of modern Ukrainian history.

Another important context of my continual reflection on Ukraine’s history is my involvement in the late-twentieth-century profession of area studies, especially the challenges on the part of presentists and globalists to models derived from local knowledge. In the course of articulating why I believed that time and place were important “variables” in explaining the world, I realized that Ukraine, once again, was a marvelous case study precisely of the geographical and chronological determinants of social and political life. The now discredited former president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, wrote a book, *Ukraine is not Russia*⁷ (or had it ghost-written, according to most accounts), that probably garnered little more than further contempt from his intended Russian audience, but he was onto something in which all of us in the field have some stake, namely, demonstrating that place (and time) matters.

Mainstream Russian attitudes seem to have changed little after more than a dozen years of Ukraine’s independence: Vladimir Putin’s pronouncements during the hotly contested 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections included a comparison of Ukraine and Russia to East and West Germany!⁸ Meanwhile, Russian academic institutions and some politicians on the liberal-centrist part of the Russian spectrum have a more informed perspective. During the Orange “revolution” events, Russian liberals and democrats distanced themselves from their president and his team of political technologists.⁹ Ukrainian language and history are taught at Moscow State University; St. Petersburg State University has

hired one of the best young Russian scholars in Ukrainian history, Tatiana Yakovleva, a specialist on the Cossack Hetmanate (she directs the Center for Ukrainian Studies).¹⁰ The Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Slavic Studies has an active Ukrainian (and Belarusian) section consisting largely of historians, headed by Leonid Gorizontov; they recently published the second of what is projected to be a yearly collection of Ukrainian and Belarusian studies.¹¹ Despite the relatively hostile attitude of the institute's former director, Vladimir Volkov, toward Ukraine and its independence, he appears to have tolerated or at least not banned serious scholarly interest in its history and culture.¹² All these Russian developments can also be viewed in the broader context of scholarship on imperial and Soviet history, which is more and more readily (and even occasionally critically) acknowledging the multinational and imperial aspects of that past.¹³

Elsewhere, outside North America (importantly, Canada and the United States), the community closest to me geographically and therefore the subject of most of this essay, Britain, has been establishing chairs in Ukrainian studies at several universities, but these have tended to favor specialists in contemporary Ukraine. Social scientists (at least in political science, anthropology, and sociology)¹⁴ have embraced (present-day) Ukraine more easily than specialists in the traditional humanities disciplines, especially history and literature, who find it difficult to acknowledge a Ukrainian past or an autonomous Ukrainian culture. Italy has been more comfortable with Ukraine's past, though East European studies generally are not well funded and institutionalized there.¹⁵ In France since the retirement of Daniel Beauvois there has not been a major scholar working on Ukrainian topics.¹⁶ German-language scholarship has been the most actively invested of "old Europe,"¹⁷ where interest in Ukraine has a longer history dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the new scholarship is also a product of Germany's (and, to a lesser degree, Austria's) coming to terms with its own tortured modern history, the so-called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and the resulting *Historikerstreit*. Although those debates centered on the behavior of Germany and Germans during World War II,¹⁸ they also touched on broader issues of German imperial thinking and policy, especially in the Wilhelmine period and World War I.¹⁹ Indeed, a popular model of Ukraine's integration into contemporary European structures is Habsburg rule over Austrian Galicia or some modern version of Austro-Marxism. German-language scholarship is particularly strong on the former Habsburg lands of Galicia and Bukovyna.²⁰

Perhaps the most important and still somewhat surprising change in Ukraine's status in the larger world has been the dramatic change in Polish attitudes. Decades-long debates in émigré Polish and Ukrainian journals prepared the ground for a historic turnaround in Polish attitudes such that in Poland today,²¹ former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, his foreign minister, and former president Lech Wałęsa have been competing for the position of most fervent non-Ukrainian advocates of Ukraine's admission to the European Union and NATO. (The largest national association for Ukrainian studies after the Ukrainians' own is the Polish one; Polish universities have been very active and innovative in the revival of Ukrainian studies since independence, but the roots go back further.)²² As Ukraine's contemporary literature is rapidly being translated into Polish,²³ Ukraine's identity problems are subjected to fascinating analysis.²⁴ Works on Ukrainian history are also widely available in modern Poland and figure as a topic of public discussion.

What about Ukrainian history—and the context of Ukrainian studies more broadly—in Ukraine itself? The last dozen years have seen a good part of the Ukrainian historians' scholarly community integrated to various degrees into a number of international forms of collaboration and production. Established historians have had virtually unlimited opportunities for travel and research abroad; many of them are having their work translated into major European research languages and their essays included in authoritative collections.²⁵ Younger historians are not only getting their newest work published abroad or in Ukraine with international support but are also frequently teaching abroad²⁶ and, in some cases, getting training in Western universities and pursuing careers outside Ukraine.²⁷ These scholars, who are able and eager to maintain contacts with colleagues in their former native lands, serve as a very solid bridge between Ukrainian studies in Ukraine and abroad.

Thanks to a vigorous wave of republication of émigré and other formerly proscribed scholarship and the translation of important European works of the historical imagination, Ukrainian historians generally—despite severe cutbacks in state funding for universities and academic institutions—share a common pool of references and concepts with their colleagues outside Ukraine. They, in turn, are also publishing new archival sources and previously unpublished manuscripts that enable the development of new perspectives on Ukraine's past.²⁸ Indeed, in the past dozen years, Ukrainian historians of this variously described community have been moving beyond the era of rehabilitation of diaspora narratives and forging new ones based on their own experience. Histori-

ans have thus carved out some autonomous space from the nation-building mission of past generations and their assumed role as *staatstragende Elemente*, gaining the freedom to write a critical history of their state and its historical societies, and not only because the “state”—even the post-Orange state—is now largely indifferent to its past. These historians partake of a Ukrainian version of the postcolonial intellectual’s critique of national elites after the end of formal empire. While most acknowledge, for example, that Russian rule has rarely benefited the peoples of Ukraine (or Russia, for that matter), the historical record of Ukrainian elites as rulers in the modern period has been too short and mostly disappointing to date. This pertains above all to the early twentieth-century proto-governments of the Rada, Hetman Skoropadsky, and the Directory, but also to the post-Soviet governments of Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, and Viktor Yushchenko. For a historian who wants to survey current trends in Ukrainian scholarship, required reading today includes not only a rehabilitated and made-over *Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, the official journal of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Ukrainian History, but also at least three new publications that regularly feature historical works: *Ukraina Moderna*, *Ukrains’kyi humanitarnyi ohliad*, and *Krytyka*.

Finally, the dramatic outburst of studies of nationalism has made Ukraine a frequent case study, whether for modernists, who date the nation to the French Revolution, or for moderate traditionalists, who prefer the early modern period and foreground religious and regional differences, or for primordialists (who provide a scholarly rendition of my art gallery owner’s essentializing arguments), or for constructivists, who believe that nations are imagined communities, neither unchanging nor monolithic. And overlapping with these debates about the nation-state are histories of other state formations and international orders that challenge the nation-state’s claim to superiority in the organization of human societies. These histories most often focus on empires but also consider other forms of pre- and transnational order or shift focus altogether to cities and regions.²⁹

Where Are We Today?

If this self-consciously postmodern and postcolonial approach is worth anything, it must come up with a somewhat less amorphous research and teaching agenda. What follows is a survey of recent trends, mostly in historical scholarship (with some references to work in anthropology,

literature, and other related fields), that offer some interesting new directions for scholars who choose to focus on Ukraine. Most of the work responds to developments in non-Ukrainian history generally but also challenges some models originating in histories of other parts of the world in emphasizing the importance of local and historical contexts, that is, place and time.

The focus of themes covered and periods highlighted mostly reflects my teaching and research in the dozen years since “Does Ukraine Have a History?” The research has been for a book about the rise and fall of modern Ukraine at the beginning of the twentieth century and focuses on the period of World War I and the Civil War. My project has taken me to archives in Ukraine, of course, but also to Moscow, Warsaw, Freiburg, Ottawa, New York City, and Palo Alto, California. I have taught courses with colleagues on the Russian Empire and its nations; on the comparative history of the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires; on postcolonial discourses; on Ukrainian–Russian relations and interactions; and on cities in Russia, the Soviet Union, and beyond, in which Kyiv and Odesa figured prominently (alongside Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan), with some attention to Kharkiv and Lviv.³⁰ Many of the questions that shape my exploration of Ukraine’s history have emerged from those teaching and research experiences. What I have learned is reflected in the footnotes to the work of those colleagues from whom I have particularly (and gratefully) benefited.

Borderlands, Regions, and Cities as Complements to the Nation-State

Borderland studies have found a natural home in Ukrainian history; after all, the very name of the country (in most translations, “on the border,” “on the edge”) would invite such an approach. Several fascinating projects have taken advantage of Ukraine’s historic divisions and rival pulls between two or more empires or states to explore comparative history by focusing on regions. Still, many Ukrainians resist “borderland” approaches because they presume that Ukraine is conceived as a borderland of some outside power and thus not in control of its own destiny. Typically, these histories treat not only the diverse political cultures that intersect in the regions but also economic and social interactions, from smuggling and legal trade to migration and forced resettlement.³¹ Furthermore, a country perennially preoccupied with trying to create a national unit out of disparate regions has to confront the diverse imperi-

al and other (temporary) occupation histories that have shaped those regional differences. This is hardly a uniquely Ukrainian “problem” or challenge; on the contrary, in recent history, Poland (after 1918 and 1945), Italy (after 1859 and 1866), and Germany (after 1866, 1871, 1918, and 1989) have had to harmonize regions whose developmental paths had been shaped according to very different national or imperial models.³² The history of Ukraine’s neighbor to the north, Belarus, offers another variant on the borderland concept, with striking parallels and differences from the Ukrainian paths.³³ Even Russia, which has enjoyed or endured more or less continuous rule for several centuries, also confronts a challenging array of regions and a fragile federalist negotiation of national unity.

To be sure, the multiconfessional and multinational character of the borderlands has contributed to a history of ethnic violence and religious warfare. In this connection Ukraine, along with other East and Central European regions and nations, has been best known for anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic pogroms. For many, that history begins with the anti-Jewish violence of Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s social rebellion, which primarily targeted Polish elites.³⁴ Indeed, Polish–Ukrainian conflict has been another feature of the early modern and modern history of this “borderland.” Although considerable progress has been made in mutual understanding of the Polish–Ukrainian conflicts of the years of World War I, revolution, and civil war, the ethnic violence of the period after World War II, notably the Volhynian conflict and *Akcja Wisła*, remains a volatile topic in Polish–Ukrainian intellectual and political relations.³⁵ The Civil War period in general (1917–23) displays many of the most horrible downsides of life in the borderlands.³⁶ Russo-Ukrainian relations are also burdened with the legacy of several historic episodes of brutality and violence, from Emperor Peter’s brutal suppression of Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s “betrayal” and mutiny to the Moscow Communist Party origins of the famine in Ukraine, which had most if not all the features of a genocide for that “republic” and others (most notably, Kazakhstan).

Austria-Hungary and Germany, both separately and together, have a legacy of involvement with the region and all its major ethnic nations. Most directly, Germany and Austria-Hungary occupied most of today’s Ukraine at various points during World War I and World War II; this leaves aside the issue of how to view Austria’s rule of Galicia and Hungary’s over Bukovyna. The published record of archival and memoir literature from most of the important political actors and institutions

reveals a fitful dynamic in relations between Berlin, Vienna, Kyiv, and Lviv, to highlight a few sites.³⁷ Indeed, the history of occupation has clearly come to play a shaping role in the understanding of Ukraine's distinctiveness and its borderland location.³⁸ The rich archival legacy of Ukraine, despite wars, occupations, deportations, and other "interruptions" in the documentary record, very much reflects that violent history and the local unfolding of more global conflicts and wars.³⁹

Much of the activity of diaspora historians of Ukraine and their post-Soviet counterparts since independence has been organized around intellectual and historical reconciliation with the "other" communities that have shared much of the history of Ukraine.⁴⁰ And part of the efforts of these conferences and the historians associated with them has been to find alternate political and intellectual currents in the region that have sought to understand the history of the region as mutual suffering of several nations and the imperative arising from that common history to find ideas and institutions that might allow for the preservation and flourishing of diversity. Ukrainian political thought, even if we limit it to self-identifying ethnic Ukrainians, has had a strong current of multinational solidarity and defense of the rights of all ethnic minorities. From Taras Shevchenko's appeal to all oppressed Slavs to the strong support for autonomy, federalism, and minority rights in the mainstream of the Ukrainian national movement of the first decades of the twentieth century, Ukrainian thought has been similar in this transnational solidarity to that of the Poles, with their slogan of "For your freedom and ours" (*za naszą i waszą wolność*).⁴¹ Polish thought was in turn influenced by the thought of Giuseppe Mazzini, and the Poles then served as intellectual bridges of Italian nationalist thought to the Ukrainians.⁴² This was the core of much of the thinking of Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Ukrainian autonomist-federalists around Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives.⁴³ A vision of a Polish-led confederation of independent Slavic and other East European nations, free of Russian/Soviet rule, was part of the politics of Józef Piłsudski and the Second Polish Republic of the interwar years. Ukraine played a crucial role in the Polish Promethean movement, which promoted the liberation of several nations under Soviet rule.⁴⁴

This recognition of the need for an ideology of multinational coexistence was very productive in Jewish thought in "historic" Ukraine as well. Thanks to its historically large Jewish population, Ukraine has been the home of the broadest diversity of expressions of Jewish identities, from the Haskalah communities in Kyiv, Odesa and elsewhere to

the pilgrimage sites of the fundamentalist Hasidim communities to the socialist intellectuals involved in the working-class Jewish secularist Bund. The Ukrainian national movement—at least its leftist and centrist wings—sought common ground with Jewish political movements; the Rada cabinet in 1917 counted a “secretary” for Jewish affairs.⁴⁵ Odesa was also the home of Vladimir/Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who in his later years was the father of the militarized Jewish nationalism of the Likud Party but earlier gained fame (and infamy) for his cosmopolitan defense of Ukrainian nationalism in his polemics with the Russian Kadets before the revolution and then for his defense of Symon Petliura against charges of anti-Semitism during the Civil War. This early Jabotinsky interpreted his Odesa upbringing through the lens of the earlier cosmopolitan Italian nationalism of Giuseppe Mazzini.⁴⁶ This common exploration of peoples’ pasts is reflected in post-1991 tourism to Ukraine, which includes not only large numbers of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians “returning” to their “ancestral” homelands but, recently, even joint multinational tours.⁴⁷ Contemporary historians from several countries (Ukraine, Poland, Israel, Canada, and Germany, among others) seem to be able to acknowledge a long tradition of shared suffering at the hands of oppressive foreign regimes, but also of one another; rather than pursuing a logic of historical ethnic cleansing, these historians search the past for models of multiethnic and multiconfessional coexistence but also try to understand why they failed or were defeated by other forces.

In the context of Jabotinsky’s evolution toward a more exclusionary and militarized nationalism, Ukraine has other well-known examples among Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and others, from Dmytro Dontsov’s “integral nationalism” to the Polish right-wing nationalism of the National Democrats under Roman Dmowski to Russian nationalists of the early twentieth century, whose most active base was in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish borderlands.⁴⁸ Several rival armies and proto-states considered Ukraine the “Piedmont” of their state reconstitution projects. This was true of the Poles and, even more, of the Russian Whites during the Civil War, who saw Hetman Skoropadsky’s state as a temporary and transitional stage between the Ukrainian nationalism of the Rada and a restored Russia, “one and indivisible.”⁴⁹ Still, it was Ukraine that hosted the most widely representative gathering of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire at the Congress of Oppressed Peoples in Kyiv in September 1917. Such a gathering had itself become an aim of the Ukrainian national movement: Ukraine’s important role in the future transformation of the post-imperial world was acknowledged in the

election of Mykhailo Hrushevsky as chairman of the congress.⁵⁰ A few years later, in drastically different circumstances, Ukraine's communist party was key to the loose non-Russian alliance that prevented the centralizers around Stalin from restoring too much power to a Russian Moscow during the struggles over the constitution of the USSR.⁵¹

If we move from the realm of intellectual history and political thought to institutional and social history, there are several crucial institutions in Ukrainian history that are clearly shaped by Ukraine's borderland legacy, among them the Cossacks, who lived and fought on the borders of several empires and other states, and the Greek Catholic (or Uniate) Church, which is a hybrid form of Eastern and Roman Christianity and was the result of a typical borderland political and religious compromise. The remarkable life of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who left his Polonized Roman Catholic family to "recover" the legacy of his Greek Catholic ancestors, encapsulates much of the dramatic struggles of the Ukrainian church.⁵² Sheptytsky's career is also an important illustration of the key role played by Greek Catholic clergy in the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth century.⁵³ Even within the Eastern Orthodox world, the Ukrainian church played contradictory roles, one part of its hierarchy helping to forge Russian imperial institutions and ideology (represented by Teofan Prokopovych/Feofan Prokopovich and other graduates of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy), while another group of hierarchs asserted a tradition of autonomy for the Kyivan church (Oleksander Lototsky is a modern version of this alternative).⁵⁴ Moreover, the institution of lay brotherhoods in Ukraine led the Orthodox Church there to diverge at various periods from its counterpart in Russia "proper."⁵⁵

Another important distinction was that several of Ukraine's cities had the status of Magdeburg Code cities, which shaped different political and economic roles than was the rule for many (but not all) of the cities established in the Russian Empire as administrative centers.⁵⁶ City histories as such have earned a respectable if not venerable place in the history of Ukraine. Michael Hamm wrote a pioneering history of imperial Kyiv, treating it largely as a Russian provincial city but nonetheless establishing its distinctiveness among late imperial cities.⁵⁷ Another groundbreaking city history is Patricia Herlihy's introduction to Odesa from its founding to the 1917 revolutions.⁵⁸ Following in her wake, several historians have focused on specific institutions or shorter periods in that city's history.⁵⁹ Of course, Lviv, as one of Ukraine's most ancient cities, and known alternately as Leopoldis, Lwów, Lvov, and Lemberg, has long inspired historians and scholars of literature,

who highlight its multiethnic and multiconfessional pasts.⁶⁰ An American- and Canadian-trained Israeli scholar has written a definitive two-volume study of Donetsk (as Iuzovka in its Russian imperial identity) in southeastern Ukraine; this effort was followed by a more recent study of the Donbas in the Soviet period by an American-trained Japanese historian.⁶¹ And an Israeli- and American-trained historian has revisited the wartime and postwar history of Vinnytsia in an ambitiously revisionist study.⁶² Other cities have attracted less attention, particularly Kharkiv and Chernivtsi, but that situation is changing rapidly.⁶³ A British journalist took excellent advantage of this tradition of city histories to highlight the diversity and distinctiveness of Ukraine's history by using each city as a window on a set of problems and themes.⁶⁴

Cities offer intriguing possibilities of alternate perspectives on seemingly familiar events and periods. In my own recent work on World War I and the Eastern Front, I have been struck by how far Kyiv could seem from Petrograd and Moscow, even in the twentieth century. The memoirs of Konstantin Oberuchev, a Russian Socialist Revolutionary who served as army commissar and then commander of the Kyiv Military District for eight months in 1917, repeatedly refer to episodes in which residents of Kyiv, even the military command with all its telegrams and telephones, still had to guess what was going on in the imperial capital, whether during the tumultuous events of the February Revolution itself, when it was not clear what to believe from the day-old newspaper accounts arriving in Kyiv, or in the course of the Kornilov putsch in August, which nearly toppled the Kerensky regime. (And Oberuchev had only recently been in Petrograd and met with Kornilov but still was unaware of the coming crisis and what it might mean for Kyiv.) Moreover, Oberuchev, who grew up in Kyiv and identified himself with the city, found himself in the position of having to "translate" Petrograd politics and policies to his Kyivan colleagues and audiences, while also occasionally having to similarly "translate" Kyivan politics to his counterparts in Petrograd and Moscow. Because he tried so scrupulously to record in his memoirs only that which he personally saw or experienced, his frustrations and ignorance at key moments are well captured.⁶⁵ Oberuchev was not in Petrograd for the two events that were likely the most important in his life: during the February/March Revolution he was under arrest in Kyiv, and he learned of the Bolshevik coup in Sweden, while on his way home from talks in Copenhagen with the Central Powers about prisoners of war. His memoirs remind us that although the revolution and civil war in Petrograd were certainly tied to what

happened in Kyiv and, more broadly, in Ukraine, we are also dealing with two very different stories. Many of those differences have to do with the differing dynamics of revolution in the capital and the provinces, but they also have to do with the local dynamics of Russian and Ukrainian history—a point that becomes especially clear in this tumultuous period, when many previously suppressed or marginalized potential alternatives were able to challenge the “natural” status quo.

During the same year, General Pavel Skoropadsky (soon to become Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky) was also in Kyiv, where he found it difficult to understand what the Army minister and the High Command in Petrograd and Headquarters wanted him to do under the slogan of ukrainizing the 34th Army Corps. A year later, Hetman Skoropadsky desperately tried to understand what his occupation masters in Berlin and Vienna were contemplating for his future;⁶⁶ even the German occupation commander, General Wilhelm Groener, was challenged in trying to get his superiors in Berlin (and military headquarters at Spa) to understand the dilemmas in wartime Ukraine (and vice versa).⁶⁷ Skipping ahead more than twenty years to a second German occupation of Kyiv, with the presumed greater efficiency and monolithic ruthlessness of Hitler’s Third Reich, a comparison of German archival materials in Kyiv with those in Berlin archives and the conflicts between the capital and the occupation regime in Ukraine reaffirms the importance of exploring multiple sites of major historical events, be they wars, revolutions, or other important transformations.⁶⁸ The point of these biographical detours is to emphasize how important local perspectives can be in shaping historical outcomes.

The point of this review of literature on borderlands, regions, and cities is to highlight how central the fact of Ukraine as a multinational and multiregional idea has been to the history of Ukraine. To repeat, not all inhabitants of Ukraine have been able to accept it as a multinational space, and many have responded to that set of historical legacies with slogans such as “Ukraine without Russians and Jews!” “Russia for Russians!” and “Poland for Poles,” all the while laying claim to the same set of territories and populations. But for many centuries institutions in Ukraine have had to carve out a space of cultural distinctiveness in a broader, not always friendly, environment. Today one of the none too numerous positive signs to appear since the end of the Soviet empire has been the acknowledgment of a common history of imperial subjugation that includes Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and others (even Russians). This common history has been very productive of thinking and institu-

tional experimentation toward an ideal of national autonomy and federal structures, but also the protection of minority rights, above all in language, schools, and local government.⁶⁹

Diaspora History, Biography, and Some Limits of the Traditional Nation-State Model

Since independence, and even starting somewhat earlier during the liberalization of the Gorbachev reforms, the various diasporas have “returned” to Ukraine, where they have been reintegrated into the nation’s present and past in remarkable ways. In the post-Orange government, First Lady Kateryna Yushchenko (Chumachenko) and former justice minister Roman Zvarych were both former American citizens, now naturalized as Ukrainians. Even earlier, thousands of Ukrainian-Americans, Ukrainian-Canadians, and hyphenated Ukrainians from other diaspora communities were on the ground as advisors, businessmen and women, teachers, and priests, among the most prominent roles. These expatriates bring with them the attitudes and experience of their home countries and transmit this to contemporary Ukraine in a host of ways, but they also bring collective memories of a largely imagined Ukraine (most of them are second- or third-generation Ukrainians by this time) constructed for them in summer camps and scouting organizations, Saturday schools, and church educational efforts. However accurate those collective memories, even with regard to the Ukraine that was left behind long ago, the confrontation of those ideals with contemporary politics, society, and culture has encouraged native Ukrainians (and probably some of the most self-conscious expatriates as well) to try to imagine alternatives to the present that reflect global experience. One way in which the recent (November–December 2004) electoral split was cast both inside and outside Ukraine was as a choice between a more Europe-oriented future and one more integrated with Russia. In itself, that translated into a choice between a greater tolerance for the hybrid Soviet era/post-independence way of running the country with one more unambiguously committed to “Western-style” market reforms and democratization. That the votes were so evenly split nationwide nonetheless suggests that the space for imagining a different present and future has expanded considerably in the more than dozen years since independence.

What has been true of the contemporary scene is reflected dramatically in the “return” to Ukraine of the scholarship of the diaspora and of

those relegated to internal exile when their works were suppressed by successive Russian imperial and Soviet Ukrainian states. This has been especially true of history, where the Hrushevsky paradigm of Ukrainian history has virtually replaced the former reigning Soviet/Russian imperial one, which denied any genuine autonomy to events and developments in “southern Russia.” The Western diaspora played a critical role in nurturing this alternate historiographic vision, so that scholars in contemporary Ukraine did not have to start from zero in rethinking their past. Among the most popular textbooks are Orest Subtelny’s *Ukraine: A History*⁷⁰ and Paul Robert Magocsi’s *A History of Ukraine*.⁷¹ Hrushevsky himself became part of the diaspora when, as a Russian subject, he accepted a teaching position at Lemberg University in a foreign country, Habsburg Galicia, and again when he was banished by the Soviet authorities to Moscow in his final years. In a reverse transmission of Hrushevsky’s legacy, another major (largely diaspora) scholarly organization is translating and publishing handsome editions of Hrushevsky in English so that historians of Eastern Europe (and Russia) will have this important alternate reading of the region’s past.⁷² Another important Ukrainian(-Polish) scholar, Viacheslav Lypynsky, established the rival “state school” in Ukrainian history. Lypynsky also went into exile following the collapse of the proto-states of the independence period (1918–19); his legacy, too, was preserved in the emigration, where conferences were organized and volumes edited that reflected a view of Ukraine as a civic nation and a territorial state.⁷³

What these examples suggest is that Ukraine, both past and present, reminds us that people’s lives do not end when they leave the borders of their erstwhile homeland or native land, let alone when they are subject to new occupying authorities, even if they remain in their native towns and regions. Similarly, the histories of nations and nation-states do not cease to exist when they are occupied by a foreign power, however defined and perceived. Instead, much like individual biographies, those countries’ already complex histories take on new layers of complexity as they are interwoven with and interposed into the equally complex histories of a second (or, in some cases, third) country. To come back to our country of interest, Ukraine, it is important to recognize that it does have a distinctive set of pasts, and that even when Ukrainian state sovereignty has been ruptured by outside powers, the ways in which Ukrainian lands, institutions and populations interacted with the new authorities were also part of that distinctiveness. Not only was Ukraine not Russia; it also was not Estonia or Finland or Georgia or Uzbekistan, to

state the obvious. And this was true for tsarist Russia, albeit in different ways, as well as for the Soviet Union. And so Ukraine's history, while demanding and deserving its autonomy, is also intimately part of Russian history, Polish history, Jewish history, and, with diminishing prominence, other histories as well (Lithuania, Belarus, Turkey, Romania, etc.). Along these lines, perhaps we can imagine a concept of a "diaspora state" together with the more widespread diaspora nations and individuals. Emigrations in Russian history, whether the revolutionary Russia of the nineteenth century, the Silver Age "Russia Abroad" of the interwar years, or the Soviet-era dissident and ethnic emigrations, have all shaped contemporary Russia and its understanding of its past as well, though often in profoundly different ways from that of/in Ukraine.

The current acknowledgment of the relative porousness of boundaries, whether contemporary state boundaries or intellectual links with the past, has challenged the traditional insistence of the nation-state, its spokesmen and historians that the capital (whether imperial or national) controls the movement of populations, goods and ideas within the confines of its borders. While this is clearly not a complete picture of the situation today (however globalization is understood), it also has rarely been a complete picture in the past. The low level of regimes' technological capacity to secure their borders coexists with the persistent determination of local populations to smuggle goods, visit relatives, learn about other worlds, and try to survive in often harsh environments. Two of the most important constituent elements of early modern and modern Ukraine are Cossacks and Jews. The Cossacks have their origins in any number of ethnic and confessional groups fleeing enslavement in Poland and, especially, Russia. They led a characteristically borderland existence, an important part of which was refusing to acknowledge state borders (until they were defeated, deported, and integrated into more "modern" state structures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). The Jews are widely accepted as the Ur-diaspora nation; their alternate paths of assimilation and national affirmation, as well as their rich diversity of religious and intellectual traditions, are well reflected on the territory of Ukraine. Equally important, Jewish communities' ties to other Jewish (and non-Jewish) communities have helped both to sustain and undermine certain visions of Jewish (and non-Jewish) futures.

Just as nations' histories do not "end" when they are absorbed into neighboring states' borders and political systems, so too individuals' lives do not end when they leave the borders of their homelands, however defined; biography (and its relatives: memoirs, diaries, and oral

histories), a genre recently thought to be old-fashioned if not passé, provides another helpful window on the transformations that have shaped the lives of millions of inhabitants of a variety of Ukraines.⁷⁴

Conclusions

If prior to Ukraine's most recent independence in 1991 scholars involved in Ukrainian studies often regarded themselves as embattled or besieged, especially by indifferent or hostile Russianists (and, less often, Poles), the fact of Ukraine's existence is harder to deny today across a host of social-science and humanities disciplines. As befits a community embattled, the ethos of the scholarly community was often shaped by a faith in monolithic truth and resulting highly personalized and politicized arguments. Today the political and intellectual climates have changed.

To return to the conversation in Kyiv with the art gallery owner and my protest against her primordialist—if not eugenicist—reading of Ukraine's history, I want to argue that her (and others') reducing the survival and persistence of something distinctly "Ukrainian" to the realm of biology strikes me as unconsciously dismissive of—if not insulting to—the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of inhabitants of Ukraine who have toiled to build institutions and movements to organize their cultural, religious, social, and political lives. Such an emphasis on genes takes away the hard-won achievements of centuries of struggle by individuals and various forms of collectives to improve their lot and shape a better future. It is those efforts of institutional and intellectual creation and creativity, with all their forced compromises with powerful outside forces in the region, that shaped and continue to shape Ukraine's distinctive paths in the past and present. This type of struggle and achievement (and frequent defeat) can best be understood by shifting the perspective away from the imperial capitals, which, for so long, have dictated the historiographic illegitimacy of Ukraine's history, back to the region itself and to the cities and other communities that inhabit the lands that make up today's Ukraine. In so doing, historians will once again acknowledge that place and time matter in shaping distinct outcomes; that regions, cities, and other communities are worthy of study precisely because of the diversity they illustrate.

Notes

- ¹ See the history textbooks of Vitalii Vlasov for a contemporary primordialist narrative. A perspective that shares some of the features of these approaches is the promotion of the Trypilian origins of contemporary Ukrainians by President Viktor Yushchenko and his American-born First Lady.
- ² For a recent work that insightfully captures some of the politics of language choice in contemporary Ukraine, see Laada Bilaniuk, *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine* (Ithaca, NY, 2005).
- ³ *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 658–73.
- ⁴ Early in my self-ukrainization process, I read Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process* (Edmonton, 1992), which highlights the conflicting claims of Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian historiography on the history of Ukraine. Historiography has remained at the forefront of my research and teaching.
- ⁵ See especially the defensive response of Yaroslav Isaievych, then the dean of Ukrainian historians at the National Academy of Sciences in Kyiv, though a Lviv-based scholar himself. From the Russian historians' side, even the reply of my friend and colleague Yuri Slezkine was a mild form of the harsher charge I heard from Russianist colleagues that I had "betrayed" Russian history and been seduced by the false siren of the Ukrainian nationalists. Jokingly, I have been called a Banderite, Mazepist, or Petliurist by Russian history colleagues, both in the United States and in Russia itself, parodying the Russian imperial and Soviet political pejoratives for any advocate of Ukrainian national distinctiveness or autonomy (or independence). Behind the joking, though, I sensed a disapproval of my "turning away" from Mother Russia.
- ⁶ Ukraine, under one name or another, has been independent (or its ruling or would-be ruling elites have proclaimed it so) at several times in the past. Least controversial are the proclamations and policies of the governments of 1917–19 (Rada, Hetmanate, Directory); the early modern Hetmanate was independent, though some scholars dispute whether it was a real state; Kyivan Rus', the medieval East Slavic set of principalities, was also ruled by a non-modern type of state structure but was certainly an important power in the steppe and Baltic-Black Sea corridor. Not surprisingly, all these periods have generated a rich historiography that addresses several contentious issues.
- ⁷ *Ukraina—ne Rossiia* (Moscow, 2003).
- ⁸ A joke circulating in Kyiv during the summer of 2005 has the narrator challenging his interlocutor to describe the main outlines of Russia's foreign policy toward Ukraine. The answer is that Russia has no such policy because it does not regard Ukraine as a foreign country.
- ⁹ Above all, Grigorii Yavlinsky from the Yabloko faction; Yabloko's youth organization declared itself an ally of Pora in Kyiv; also Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, and several human-rights activists, ranging from the leadership of Memorial to Liudmila Alekseeva.
- ¹⁰ Serhii Plokhyy reminded me that Ukrainian history was taught at St. Petersburg (Leningrad) University throughout the Soviet period.

- ¹¹ *Belorussiia i Ukraina: Istorii i kul'tura. Ezhegodnik 2003* (Moscow, 2004); second volume issued as *Ezhegodnik 2004* (Moscow, 2005).
- ¹² See L.E. Gorizontov's survey of Ukrainian studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, "Otdel vostochnogo slavianstva Instituta slavianovedeniia RAN: vozmozhnosti, rezul'taty, plany," pp. 395–401; also M.V. Dmitriev's survey of the situation at Moscow State University, "Tsentr ukrainistiki i belorusistiki v MGU (1990–2002)," pp. 402–11, in *Ezhegodnik 2003*. The historical sections of the two national Academies of Science have organized several joint conferences, one of the latest of them in St. Petersburg, "Ukrainskii vopros' v preddverii i v gody revolutsii 1917 g."
- ¹³ See the work of historians associated with the St. Petersburg school of Boris Ananich, Rafail Ganelin and others, including Anatoly Remnev, Elena Campbell, Irina Novikova, and Katerina Pravilova; in Kazan, the work of Rustem Tsiunchuk, Elena Vishlenkova, and the journal *Ab Imperio*, which unites most of these historians; in Voronezh, Mikhail Dolbilov.
- ¹⁴ Andrew Wilson in politics at University College, London; see also a recent dissertation in anthropology on contemporary Odesa by Tanya Richardson, "Odessa, Ukraine: History, Place and Nation-Building in a Post-Soviet City" (Cambridge University, 2005). The British historian Geoffrey Hosking has also contributed to several volumes exploring Russo-Ukrainian relations.
- ¹⁵ Giovanna Brogi Bercoff (Milan) specializes in early modern Ukrainian literature; Andrea Graziosi (Naples) works on modern Ukrainian history. See the recent survey of scholarship in Italy in *Ukraine's Reintegration into Europe: A Historical, Historiographical and Politically Urgent Issue*, eds. Giovanna Brogi Bercoff and Giulia Lami (Alessandria, 2005).
- ¹⁶ See his *Le noble, le serf et le révizor: la noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masses ukrainiennes, 1831–1863* (Paris, 1985; Polish translation, Paris, 1987); *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques* (Lille, 1993; Ukrainian translation by Krytyka, Kyiv, 1998); and *Pouvoir russe et noblesse polonaise en Ukraine: 1793–1830* (Paris, 2003).
- ¹⁷ For a good survey of German-language scholarship on Ukraine, see the *Handbuch* prepared by a team of specialists at the University of Vienna's Institute of Eastern and Southeastern Europe: *Ukraine: Geographie. Ethnische Struktur. Geschichte. Sprache und Literatur. Kultur. Politik. Bildung. Wirtschaft. Recht*, eds. Peter Jordan, Andreas Kappeler, Walter Lukan and Josef Vogl (Vienna, 2000).
- ¹⁸ See Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich, 1996).
- ¹⁹ See Philipp Ther's provocative suggestion to rethink much of German history as imperial in his article "Imperial Instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires," in *Imperial Rule*, eds. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest and New York, 2004), pp. 47–66.
- ²⁰ See Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001); also

- Klaus Bachmann, “*Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland*”: *Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1914)* (Vienna, 2001). See also the various works by Marianne Hausleitner on Bukovyna.
- 21 The Polish émigré journal in Paris, *Kultura*, its publisher, Jerzy Giedroyc, and the writings of Ukrainian diaspora scholars and publicists, including Jarosław Pelenski and Bohdan Osadczuk-Korab, kept the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue alive during the period of the Polish communist state.
 - 22 Recently the University of Warsaw celebrated fifty years of its commitment to Ukrainian studies. In the spirit of this essay, see also the publications of the Lublin-based Institute of East Central Europe (Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej) under the direction of Jerzy Kłoczowski, as well as those edited by Krzysztof Jasiewicz at the Warsaw Institute of Political Studies. I thank Tim Snyder for these references.
 - 23 For example, the novels of the Ukrainian writer Yurii Andrukhovych, leader of the Bu-Ba-Bu literary group, are published in high-quality Polish translations soon after their appearance in Kyiv. They are also very popular in Germany.
 - 24 Ola Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium. Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin, 2003).
 - 25 Yaroslav Isaievych (Lviv) is the best example.
 - 26 Yaroslav Hrytsak is the best example of this; see his *Strasti za natsionalizmom: istorychni eseï* (Kyiv, 2004); his *History of Ukraine, 1772–1999: Birth of a New Nation* (in Polish; Lublin, 2000); also Oleksiy Tolochko, Natalia Yakovenko, and Georgiy Kasianov. Kasianov is one of the very few historians of the middle generation who treat the Soviet period. See his *Nezhodni: ukraïns'ka inteliheñtsiia v rusi oporu 1960–80-kh rokiv* (Kyiv, 1995). He has coedited an important volume with the dean of historians of Soviet Ukraine, Stanislav Kulchytsky, deputy director of the Institute of Ukrainian History. See *Stalinizm na Ukraïni: 20–30-ti roky*, also with V.M. Danylenko (Kyiv, 1991). Another Kyiv-based scholar of the older generation focusing on the Soviet period is Yuri Shapoval, who has published several very valuable collections of archival documents.
 - 27 Among the best examples are Serhii Plokhyy, educated at Dnipropetrovsk State University, with early training at Columbia under the IREX exchange, and later at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; Serhy Yekelchyyk, first history training at Kyiv National University, now tenured at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. See his *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto, 2004).
 - 28 Vladyslav Verstiuk's volumes on the Rada and 1917: *Ukraïns'ka Tsentral'na Rada: Dokumenty i materialy u dvokh tomakh* (Kyiv, 1996–97); *Ukraïns'kyi natsional'no-vyzvol'nyi rukh: berezen'-lystopad 1917 roku: dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv, 2003); Yuri Shapoval on the Stalin-era terror: *Cheka-GPU-NKVD v Ukraïni: osoby, fakty, dokumenty* (Kyiv, 1997); idem, *Petro Shelest: "Spravzhnii sud istoriï shche poperedu"* (Kyiv, 2003); S.V. Kulchytsky and others on the famine-genocide: *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni: ochyma*

istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kyiv, 1990); Valerii Vasil'ev and Lynne Viola, eds., *Kollektivizatsiia i krest'ianskoe soprotivlenie na Ukraine* (Vynnytsia, 1997).

- ²⁹ I surveyed much of this literature not only in "Does Ukraine Have a History?" but also in "Writing the History of Russia as Empire: The Perspective of Federalism," in *Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire*, eds. Boris Gasparov et al. (Moscow, 1997), pp. 393–410, and most recently in "Empires, Borderlands, and Diasporas: Eurasia as Anti-Paradigm for the Post-Soviet Era," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 2 (April 2004): 445–68.
- ³⁰ At Columbia University I taught with Michael Stanislawski, a specialist in Russian and East European Jewish history; with Karen Barkey, a historical sociologist and Ottomanist; with Frank Sysyn, who has a breadth in Ukrainian history that far surpasses my own in Russian history; with Richard Wortman, a distinguished historian of imperial Russia; and with Catharine Nepomnyashchy, a specialist in Russian, Slavic and comparative literature. At the European Humanities University my partner in Minsk was Walter Mignolo, who is still best known as a Latin Americanist. And finally, I thank my colleagues in a Ford Foundation-funded collaborative research project on region and territory in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, especially Jane Burbank (New York University) and Anatoly Remnev (Omsk, Russia).
- ³¹ Andreas Kappeler (University of Vienna) is leading a team of scholars studying a number of cities and regions in the Ukrainian borderlands. See the panel at the 2005 Berlin Congress of Central and East European Studies ("Old and New Borders in Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine") featuring Laurie Cohen, Anna Veronika Wendland, and Tatiana Zhuzhenko. See also recent works that successfully use a borderland paradigm: Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven and London, 2003). Cf. a recent dissertation that explores the Ukrainian-Moldovan borderland: Diana Blank, "Voice from Elsewhere: An Ethnography of Place in Chelnochovsk-na-Dnistre, Ukraine" (University of California at Berkeley, Anthropology, 2005).
- ³² There has been a recent surge of interest in regions among historians of Europe and America. See, for example, Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times," *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 1157–82; Eric Storm, "Regionalism in History, 1890–1945: The Cultural Approach," *European History Quarterly* 33 (2003): 251–65; Julian Wright, *The Regionalist Movement in France, 1890–1914: Jean Charles-Brun and French Political Thought* (Oxford, 2003); Edward Royle, ed., *Issues of Regional Identity: In Honor of John Marshall* (Manchester, 1998).
- ³³ See the issues of a new Russian-language Belarusian journal, *Perekrestki* (Crossroads), whose subtitle is "A Journal of Research on the East European Borderlands" (*Pogranich'ia*), published by the European Humanities University in Minsk and Vilnius; see also I. Bobkov, S. Naumova and P. Tereshko-

vich, eds., *Posle imperii: issledovaniia vostochnoevropeiskogo Pogranič'ia (sbornik statei)* (Vilnius, 2005).

- 34 On the ambivalent legacy of Khmelnytsky's experiment in nation- and state-building, see Bernard Weinryb, "Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 153–77; Jarosław Pelenski, "The Cossack Insurrection in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, eds. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, 2nd ed. (Edmonton, 1990), pp. 31–42. On the history of pogroms in Eastern Europe, see John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Jewish History* (Cambridge, 1992).
- 35 See Eugeniusz Misi ō, ed., *Akcja "Wisła": Dokumenty* (Warsaw, 1993); Timothy Snyder, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1999, nos. 1–2: 86–120. There is also a recent Ukrainian-language collection of original documents covering the deportation and expulsion of both Ukrainians and Poles. See *Pol'shcha ta Ukraïna u trydtsiatykh-sorokovykh rokakh XX stolittia. Nevidomi dokumenty z arkhiviv spetsial'nykh sluzhbb*, vol. 2, *Pereselennia poliakiv ta ukraïntsiv 1944–1946* (Warsaw and Kyiv, 2000). A very good and impartial overview of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict is provided by Grzegorz Motyka, *Tak było w Bieszczadach. Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943–1948* (Warsaw, 1999). Of the many publications on the Volhynian conflict, see a recent volume of the journal *І*, which is published in Lviv.
- 36 See the very thoughtful survey of the period and region in Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, pp. 205–46.
- 37 The now classic English-language work on German-Ukrainian relations during World War I and the Civil War is Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1971). Among the most important German memoirs is that of the occupation commander, Wilhelm Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen*, ed. F.F.H. von Gaertringen (Göttingen, 1957). Extensive documentation from the Austrian and German military and diplomatic archives is available in Theophil Hornykiewicz, ed., *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922: deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, PA, 1968).
- 38 On the Russian army's occupation of Galicia during World War I, see A. Iu. Bakhturina, *Politika Rossiiskoi Imperii v Vostochnoi Galitsii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voyny* (Moscow, 2000); also my recent book, *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918* (Seattle, 2007); on Germany's occupation during World War II, see the recent book by Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
- 39 See the monumental history of Ukraine's archives by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire: The Archival Heritage of Ukraine*,

World War II, and the International Politics of Restitution (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

- ⁴⁰ Peter Potichnyj has been an organizer of several conferences and editor of the resulting volumes of essays: see *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton, 1980); the already cited *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*; and *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter*, eds. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992). See also *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, eds. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon Kohut, Frank Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton and Toronto, 2003).
- ⁴¹ See the documentary collection edited by Manfred Kridl, Władysław Malinowski, and Józef Wittlin, “*For Your Freedom and Ours*”: *Polish Progressive Spirit through the Centuries* (New York, 1943).
- ⁴² On the connections between Mazzini and the Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals associated with the Young Europe movement of the first half of the nineteenth century, see Anna Procyk, “Polish Émigrés as Emissaries of the *Risorgimento* in Eastern Europe,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 25, nos. 1–2 (2001): 7–29.
- ⁴³ On Drahomanov’s ideas, see Ivan Rudnytsky, “Drahomanov as a Political Theorist,” in *Mykhailo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no. 1 (3) (spring 1952): 70–130.
- ⁴⁴ See Timothy Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine* (New Haven, CT, 2005); on Prometheanism, see Etienne Copeaux, “Le mouvement ‘Prométhéen,’” *Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, 1993, no. 16: 1–36.
- ⁴⁵ See Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); see also Moshe Mishkinsky, “The Attitudes of the Ukrainian Socialists to Jewish Parties in the 1870s,” in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, pp. 57–68; and Ivan Rudnytsky’s article in the same collection, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Thought,” pp. 69–84. Jewish-Ukrainian relations during World War II are addressed in the present volume by John-Paul Himka.
- ⁴⁶ On Jabotinsky, see Michael Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from Nordau to Jabotinsky* (Berkeley, 2001); Israel Kleiner, *From Nationalism to Universalism: Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky and the Ukrainian Question* (Edmonton, 2000); Olga Andriewsky on Jabotinsky’s polemic with Petr Struve and, by extension, with Russian liberalism on behalf of the Ukrainian cause, “*Medved’ iz berlogi*: Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Ukrainian Question, 1904–1914,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 249–67; Taras Hunczak, “A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917–1921,” *Jewish Social Studies* 31, no. 3 (July 1969): 163–83.
- ⁴⁷ See the recent announcement of a tour organized by Shimon Redlich and John-Paul Himka to explore the Ukrainian and Jewish features of Galicia. Redlich is the author of a work in this vein, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Bloomington, IN, 2002).

- ⁴⁸ On Dontsov, see Vasyl' Rudko, "Dontsov i Lypyns'kyi," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, nos. 3–4 (1985): 477–94; and Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (New York, 1980; East European Monographs, no. LXV); on Russian nationalism, see Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907–1917* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1980).
- ⁴⁹ On the Whites and Ukraine, see Anna Procyk, *Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War* (Edmonton, 1995); and the collection of "White" memoirs published as *Revolutsiia na Ukraine po memuarum belykh* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1930).
- ⁵⁰ On the congress, see Wolodymyr Stojko, "Ukrainian National Aspirations and the Russian Provisional Government," in *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), esp. pp. 28–29.
- ⁵¹ Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle* (New York, 1968); Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), esp. ch. 6; see also James Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, MA, 1983); Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the USSR, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY, 2001).
- ⁵² On the politics of the Union of Brest, see Borys A. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); on Sheptytsky, see *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi (Edmonton, 1989); Bohdan Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton, 1996).
- ⁵³ See John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900* (Montreal, 1999).
- ⁵⁴ Andre Partykevich, *Between Kyiv and Constantinople: Oleksander Lototsky and the Quest for Ukrainian Autocephaly* (Edmonton, 1998); for an important early modern Orthodox theologian, see David Frick, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
- ⁵⁵ Iaroslav Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2006; original Ukrainian edition, Kyiv, 1966).
- ⁵⁶ The Magdeburg Code promised cities under its rule a greater measure of autonomy than other royal or imperial cities. Among Ukraine's cities, Kyiv acceded to the Magdeburg community in 1494 (restored in 1797), Lviv in 1356, Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanyslaviv) in 1662, and Kamianets-Podilskyi in 1503; there were many others.
- ⁵⁷ Michael Hamm, *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917* (Princeton, NJ, 1993); see also Roman Szporluk's essay on how Kyiv became the capital of Soviet Ukraine

in his "Urbanization in Ukraine since the Second World War," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, eds. Ivan L. Rudnytsky and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 180–202; on Jewish Kiev, see Natan Meir, "The Jews of Kiev, 1859–1914: Community and Charity in an Imperial Russian City" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2003).

⁵⁸ Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History 1794–1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1986).

⁵⁹ See Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Palo Alto, CA, 1986); Guido Hausmann, *Universität und städtische Gesellschaft in Odessa, 1865–1917* (Stuttgart, 1998); Roshana Sylvester, *Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves* (DeKalb, IL, 2005); Robert Weinberg, *The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa: Blood on the Steps* (Bloomington, Ind., 1993); Tanja Penter, *Odessa 1917: Revolution an der Peripherie* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2000). See also a recent doctoral dissertation in anthropology by Tanya Richardson (cf. n. 14 above).

⁶⁰ A recent addition to this literature is the collection of essays published by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and edited by John Czaplicka, *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 2000). For the history of late imperial Lemberg and the Russian question, see Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001). See also a recent dissertation by William Risch, "Ukraine's Window to the West: Identity and Cultural Nonconformity in Lviv, 1953–75" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2001); and Tarik Cyril Amar, "The Making of Soviet Lviv, 1939–1963" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2006).

⁶¹ Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ, 1989–94); and Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbass: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); on contemporary voices of the Don region recorded by two historians, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel J. Walkowitz, *Workers of the Donbass Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989–1992* (Albany, NY, 1995).

⁶² Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, 2001).

⁶³ For example, on Kharkiv, see Rex Wade, "The Revolution in the Provinces: Khar'kov and the Varieties of Response to the October Revolution," *Revolutionary Russia* 4 (1991): 132–42; a conference at Miami University brought together historians of Kharkiv and Cincinnati, Ohio (sister cities). See also the dissertation by Mark Baker, "Peasants, Power and Revolution in the Village: A Social History of Kharkiv Province (Ukraine), 1914–1921" (Ph.D., Harvard University).

⁶⁴ Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine* (Boulder, Colo., 1997). For an approach to European history organized around city civilizations, see F. Roy Willis, *Western Civilization: An Urban Perspective* (Lexington, MA, 1973); for a recent contribution to the literature of cities in borderlands, see Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430–1950* (London, 2004).

- ⁶⁵ See two versions of Oberuchev's memoirs, one that he published himself shortly after the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government (*V dni revoliutsii: vospominaniia uchastnika Velikoi Russkoi revoliutsii 1917-go goda*; New York, 1919), and one published posthumously by his comrades-in-arms and friends (*Vospominaniia*; New York, 1930). On the Kornilov putsch and Oberuchev's expression of complete surprise at the event, despite recent meetings in Petrograd with both Kornilov and his commissar, Filonenko, see *V dni revoliutsii*, pp. 110–11.
- ⁶⁶ See Pavlo Skoropadsky, *Spohady: kinets' 1917—hruden' 1918*, ed. Iaroslav Pelens'kyi (Kyiv and Philadelphia, 1995); and my essay based on the memoirs, "I Love Russia, and/but I Want Ukraine: or How a Russian General Became Hetman of the Ukrainian State, 1917–1918," in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (summer–winter 2004): 115–48.
- ⁶⁷ Groener's memoirs were edited by W. Baumgart as *Von Brest-Litovsk zur deutschen November-Revolution* (Göttingen, 1971).
- ⁶⁸ See Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*. Berkhoff is one of the first historians to make extensive use of long-restricted German occupation materials in the Kyiv archives.
- ⁶⁹ See Mark von Hagen, "Federalisms and Pan-Movements: Reform of Empire," in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, eds. Jane Burbank, Anatoly Remnev, and Mark von Hagen (Bloomington, Ind., 2007). See also Anna Holian, "Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany" (forthcoming), for an account of the politics of Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian displaced persons after World War II.
- ⁷⁰ (Toronto, 1988).
- ⁷¹ (Toronto, 1996).
- ⁷² Frank Sysyn leads an international team of historians, archaeologists, paleographers, and linguists in offering a modern translation and one that has tried valiantly to update Hrushevsky's extensive bibliography.
- ⁷³ On Lypynsky, the key diaspora historians have been Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky and Jaroslaw Pelenski, ed., *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyn's'kyj*, special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, nos. 3–4 (December 1985). See Ivan Rudnytsky, "Viacheslav Lypynsky: Statesman, Historian, and Political Thinker," in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton and Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp. 437–46.
- ⁷⁴ There are many new and valuable additions to this literature: Serhii Plokhyy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005); and Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987); Tatiana Kardinalowska, *The Ever-Present Past: The Memoirs of Tatiana Kardinalowska* (Edmonton, 2004); Yuri Shapoval, ed., *Petro Shelest: "Spravzhnii sud istorii shche poperedu"* (Kyiv, 2003); Vladyslav Verstiuk's publication of a volume of the diaries of Yevhen Chykalenko. Another example of the return of biography is Timothy Snyder's work cited earlier, *Sketches from a Secret War*, largely a biography of the Promethean artist and political activist Henryk Józewski. For an earlier example of biography, in this case a Ukrainian nobleman active in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see Frank Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, MA, 1985).

From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History

Andreas Kappeler

At the beginning of January, the patriarch [of Jerusalem] himself, together with the local metropolitan [of Kyiv], heading a procession of a thousand horsemen, came out to greet him... Huge masses of people, the whole folk came out of the city to greet him, and the Academy [greeted him] with orations and acclamations, [calling him] Moses, deliverer, savior, liberator of his people from Polish servitude, and well named Bohdan, meaning God-given... [The other day] in church he stood in the place of eminence, and all adored him, and some kissed his feet.

Verily, God is with you—He who appointed you for the liberation of this chosen people from the slavery of the pagans, even as Moses once liberated Israel from the slavery of the Pharaohs: He drowned the Egyptians in the Red Sea, while you, with your sharp sword, destroyed the Poles, who are more wicked than the Egyptians.

The first quotation is from the diary of Wojciech Miaskowski of Lviv, a member of a Polish royal commission that visited Kyiv in January 1649, when Bohdan Khmelnytsky returned there after a successful campaign across most of Ukrainian territory. The author of the second quotation was Paul, the son of the patriarch of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine several years later. These two sources have often been cited in Ukrainian historiography, beginning with the work of Mykhailo Hrushevsky.¹

In the chronicle of the Volhynian rabbi Nathan Hanover, however, Khmelnytsky appears not as a new Moses but as an archenemy of the Jews:

I named my book *The Deep Mire* (Yeven Metzulah) because the words of the psalmist allude to these terrible events and speak of the oppressors, the Tatars and the Ukrainians, as well as of the arch-enemy, Chmiel, may his name be blotted out, may God send a curse upon him... Now I shall begin to record the brutal oppressions caused by Chmiel... Had

not God spared us one, all Jews would have perished as did the city of Sodom... Whoever failed to escape or was unable to flee was killed.²

Contemporary sources are thus irreconcilably opposed in their evaluation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian revolution of 1648. What for Ukrainians was the glorious liberation of the Orthodox from the rule of the Polish Catholic nobility was for East European Jews their first great persecution. The narratives of national historians generally followed this pattern. I quote the émigré *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (1984–2001), which reflects the so-called statist school of Ukrainian historiography:

Khmelnytsky, Bohdan. Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host... Khmelnytsky's greatest achievement in the process of the national revolution was the Cossack Hetman state of the Zaporozhian Host... His statesmanship was demonstrated in all areas of state-building... The national uprising of 1648–57, headed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, liberated a large part of Ukrainian territory from Poland...³

The prerevolutionary *Russian Jewish Encyclopaedia* defines the *Khmel'nishchina* (Khmelnytsky Uprising) as “a popular movement in Ukraine... that signified a great catastrophe in the history of Polish Jewry.”⁴ The entry on Khmelnytsky in the German-language *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1930) calls him a “Cossack hetman and leader of a Ukrainian national rebellion against the rule of Polish magnates in the years 1648–57 that was also directed against the Jews as their instruments. The persecutions of the Jews under Khmelnytsky recall the events of the Crusades and the Black Death.”⁵ Finally, the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1972) represents Khmelnytsky as a precursor of the Shoah (Holocaust):

Leader of the Cossack and peasant uprising against Polish rule in the Ukraine in 1648 which resulted in the destruction of hundreds of Jewish communities... In the annals of the Jewish people, Chmielnicki is branded as “Chmiel the Wicked,” one of the most sinister oppressors of the Jews of all generations, the initiator of the terrible 1648–49 massacres... Chmielnicki has gone down in history as the figure principally responsible for the holocaust of Polish Jewry in the period, even though in reality his control of events was rather limited.

In the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* there is also a picture of the Khmelnytsky monument in Kyiv, with the following explanation: “This 17th-century

butcher of Jews is still regarded as a Ukrainian national hero.”⁶ Thus, in Jewish collective memory, the Khmelnytsky rebellion is the first major catastrophe in a long history of suffering and persecution in Ukraine, followed by the *Koliivshchyna* of 1768, the pogroms of 1881, 1905–6 and 1919–20, and finally by the Shoah during the Second World War.

We also find negative characterizations of Khmelnytsky and his Cossacks in Polish historiography. In the Polish tradition, the Ukrainian Cossack revolt of the mid-seventeenth century has been regarded as the first blow to the stability of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, setting off an endless series of wars that finally led to the partitions of Poland. In the late nineteenth century, Józef Szujski, the founder of the Cracow historical school, described Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian Cossacks as “an impromptu entity without a national idea” characterized by “adventurism, bellicosity, and the quest for plunder.... Historical ideas whose traditions consist of nothing but butchers’ knives and massacres cannot create anything, and they can only have deleterious consequences.” The Cossacks, then, were regarded as untrustworthy barbarians and traitors to Poland.⁷

In Russian and Soviet narratives, by contrast, Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian rebels of 1648 have a positive connotation as initiators of the so-called reunion of Ukraine with Russia. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian historian Nikolai Ustrialov asserted that “the major fact in the history of the Russian tsardom was the gradual development of the idea of the necessity of reestablishing the Russian land within the borders it had under Yaroslav” (that is, in the times of Kyivan Rus’). Rus’ “repeatedly expressed its keen desire to return to the rule of an Orthodox tsar,” which resulted in the Treaty of Pereiaslav, uniting the “two Russias.”⁸ Although early Soviet historiography condemned tsarist expansion and stressed Khmelnytsky’s class interests,⁹ in the 1930s it reverted to the Russian national interpretation, which was canonized in 1954 by the “Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia”:

Three hundred years ago, by the powerfully expressed will of the Ukrainian people... the reunion of Ukraine with Russia was proclaimed. This historic act culminated the long struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against alien enslavers for reunion with the Russian people in a single Russian state... By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign subjugation and ensured their national development.¹⁰

Thus, for Soviet Ukrainian and Russian historiography, Khmelnytsky was a positive national hero.¹¹ During the Second World War, an Order of Khmelnytsky was introduced (at the initiative of Ukrainian intellectuals), and the city of Pereiaslav was renamed Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi; in 1954, the Ukrainian town of Proskuriv was renamed Khmelnytskyi.¹²

In Ukrainian national historiography, oriented on Ukrainian independence and state-building, the Pereiaslav Agreement was not accorded extraordinary significance. It “did not change the political status of Ukraine” and amounted only to a “symbolic claim of Muscovite supremacy”; “the Zaporozhian Host remained a separate, independent state known as the Rus’ state.”¹³ Debates between supporters of the Ukrainian and Russian orientations were recently resumed in Ukraine in connection with the 350th anniversary of the Khmelnytsky Uprising (1998) and the Pereiaslav Agreement (2004).¹⁴

The controversial image of Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian revolution of 1648 and the Pereiaslav Agreement is only one of many examples of competing or even exclusive national narratives and collective memories pertaining to the history of Ukraine. I could add the highly controversial figure of Ivan Mazepa, who has been variously interpreted as a national Ukrainian hero, a traitor to Russia, and a selfish feudal lord. Among Ukrainian personalities of the twentieth century, Symon Petliura has evoked contradictory judgments. The *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* praises him as a “statesman and publicist; supreme commander of the UNR Army and president of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic” who “personified, perhaps more than any other person, the struggle for Ukrainian independence.”¹⁵ According to the official Soviet view, Petliura “was the leader of the Ukrainian counterrevolutionary bourgeois-nationalist movement... who in fact led an antipopular policy of bloody anti-Soviet and nationalistic terror.” “The Petliura movement served foreign imperialists... and propagated bourgeois nationalism, instigating national hatred between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and organizing Jewish pogroms.”¹⁶ This last point is taken up in Jewish historical memory, where Petliura is presented as an exponent of a perennial Ukrainian anti-Jewish tradition started by Khmelnytsky:

Ukrainian nationalist leader held responsible for not having stopped the wave of pogroms which engulfed the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919 and 1920... In the winter of 1919... his units turned into murderous bands and perpetrated mass killings of Jews in the Ukrainian towns and townlets... Petlyura did little to stop the wave of mob violence which

became endemic within the Ukrainian army and the gangs of rebellious peasants, connected with his government... Ukrainian nationalists consider Petlyura an outstanding leader and claim that he personally could not be held responsible for the pogroms, because of the anarchical conditions of the revolutionary period.¹⁷

Again, in the historiography of the Second World War in Ukraine, we find four contradictory national narratives. The Russian narrative relies on the myth of the Great Patriotic War and on the struggle of the Soviet partisans against Nazi Germany and its collaborators. In the Polish narrative, Poland is the main victim of Nazi and Soviet rule; the struggle of the Home Army against both foreign occupants and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is emphasized. On the other hand, the (western) Ukrainian narrative heroicizes the struggle of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-Bandera) and the UPA against the Soviet forces. The Jewish narrative focuses on the Holocaust, perpetrated by the Germans and their Slavic—above all, Ukrainian—accomplices. In Russian, Polish and Jewish memories of the Second World War, at least some Ukrainians figure as collaborators with Nazi Germany—traitors and murderers in the tradition of Khmelnytsky, Mazepa and Petliura. On the other hand, in (western) Ukrainian collective memory, Soviets (Russians) and “Bolshevik Jews” are held responsible for ethnic cleansings and deportations of Ukrainians in the years 1939–41 and 1944–47. Despite some joint conferences and discussions, interpretations of this war still differ widely.¹⁸

Different Traditions in Ukrainian Historiography

Ukrainian historiography has been—and is—by no means uniform, and it still comprises different regional narratives. The extreme positions are marked, on the one hand, by western Ukrainian traditions, according to which Mazepa, Stepan Bandera and the UPA are heroes, and, on the other hand, by interpretations oriented toward Russian and Soviet traditions, in which Mazepa, Bandera and the UPA figure mainly as traitors. In a representative survey carried out in 1997, Mazepa was a positive personality for 55 percent of respondents in western Ukraine, compared with only 22 percent in eastern Ukraine. For Petliura, the percentages were 31 and 6 respectively; for Bandera, 41 and 7. By contrast, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the last first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1972 to 1989, garnered 18 and 31 percent respectively.¹⁹ These differences in collective memory reflect, at least to some extent, the politi-

cal cleavages in Ukraine between west and north on the one hand and east and south on the other. Divided memory is a reality in today's Ukraine.

The examples cited show how contradictory the interpretations of crucial figures and events of Ukrainian history are in various national narratives, which often exclude one another. Most significantly, the golden ages of national Ukrainian history coincide with the most tragic periods of persecution and suffering in the historical memory of Ukrainian Jews. Ukrainian narratives emphasizing national resistance to Polish, Russian and Soviet rule are incompatible with Polish, Russian and Soviet collective memories, which tend to regard Ukrainians as subordinate actors in their national histories. If they try to play an independent role, they are treated as representatives of destructive and treacherous historical forces. Thus the different national narratives are broadly irreconcilable: there seems to be no common history of Ukraine.

Mark von Hagen asked thirteen years ago in *Slavic Review*: "Does Ukraine have a history?" The discussion in the same issue of the journal answered his rhetorical question in the affirmative but produced no unanimous conclusion about the nature of Ukrainian history. In this contribution I shall take up some of the questions raised in that discussion, in which I also participated.²⁰ The question remains open: What should be regarded as Ukrainian history? Is it represented only by the national Ukrainian narrative, focused on the Ukrainian people and their attempts to create a Ukrainian national state? Or does it embrace the territory of Ukraine, with its multiethnic population, from antiquity to the present time? Do the other national narratives belong to Russian, Polish, Jewish and Soviet history but not to Ukrainian history? Or are there many different Ukrainian histories? Or, most radically, is Ukrainian history obsolete? In an epoch of European unification and globalization, should it be replaced by European or global history?

There are, however, good reasons for a Ukrainian national approach. Ukrainians living in empires and states dominated by Poles, Russians or Austrians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote their national history against the grand narratives of the dominant nations and empires. The construction of a Ukrainian past and of a collective memory, the invention of a national tradition, was one of the main elements of Ukrainian nation-building. In that regard, Ukrainian historians followed the general pattern of European historiographies, which universally adopted the national paradigm.²¹

Thus Mykhailo Hrushevsky presented his view of the history of Ukraine-Rus' in opposition to the "Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History" (the title of his programmatic article of 1904), which posited an unbroken sequence of reigns from Kyiv to Moscow and St. Petersburg. This imperial conception of Russian history was adopted by most foreign historians of Eastern Europe and Russia, who followed the pattern of an all-Russian history that included Ukraine and the Ukrainians. For Hrushevsky, however, Kyivan Rus' was a Ukrainian state that was succeeded by the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Cossack Hetmanate. The so-called populist school of Ukrainian historiography, of which Hrushevsky was the most prominent member, focused on the Ukrainian people, whose values and ideals were represented in the Cossack myth of freedom and equality (*égalité*). This national myth was diametrically opposed to the "aristocratic" values of the Polish nation and to the "autocratic" and "despotic" nature of Russia. After the last golden age of the Cossack Hetmanate, Ukrainian history was mostly a narrative of suffering and martyrdom under the rule of foreign elites and states. Poles, Russians and Jews living in Ukraine were perceived as agents of foreign rule and oppressors of the Ukrainian people. There was no positive place for them in the Ukrainian national narrative and in the collective memory of Ukrainians, nor is there one today.

The populist school echoed the tradition, founded by Hegel and Engels, that applied the term "non-historical" to peoples lacking continuities of state, elite and high culture. In its view, these deficits were only gradually eliminated by the national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the so-called rebirth or renaissance of the Ukrainian nation.²² The so-called statist school, founded by Viacheslav Lypynsky, disputed the populist view and strove to elaborate the history of Ukrainian elites in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire, as well as the traditions of Ukrainian statehood. Both variants of the national Ukrainian narrative, which were often intermingled, survived in the emigration. They interpreted the Soviet period of Ukrainian history as another era of foreign (Russian) rule and Ukrainian martyrdom.

In the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian historical narrative had to be adapted above all to Marxism-Leninism, the priorities of the class struggle, and party-mindedness (*partiinost'*). In the 1930s, however, official Soviet historiography took up the old imperial scheme under the new guise of Soviet patriotism and the "friendship of peoples." Of necessity,

nationalism was exploited during the “Great Patriotic War,” which saw a resurgence of ethnic and national elements in the historical narrative. Although this applied mainly to the “great” Russian people, who were considered more equal than their younger brothers and sisters, the new tendency also manifested itself in Ukrainian history. The so-called “re-union” of western Ukraine in 1939–44 united all Ukrainian territories into a single state for the first time in modern history and was lauded as the last stage (after 1654 and the partitions of Poland) of the Ukrainian people’s age-old struggle for unity and friendship with “the great Russian people.” Ukrainian historians participated actively in the construction of a national Ukrainian narrative, although they did so within the narrow limits of official ideology.²³ The Soviet period was of crucial importance for Ukrainian historical thinking and Ukrainian nation-building in general. As recent studies convincingly show, from the 1930s Soviet ideology was not only committed to historical materialism but also furthered a general “ethnicization” of society (for example, through the ascriptive category of hereditary nationality) and an essentialist ethnonational approach to history.²⁴

Thus, for post-Soviet Ukrainian historians, who had been educated in the ideologies of Leninism and Soviet patriotism, the immediate adoption of an ethnonational approach after 1991 represented no great break, for ethnic nationalism and essentialism were already inherent in Soviet ideology. But the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, established in 1991 on the basis of the Soviet Ukrainian republic and its elites, needed supplementary historical legitimization in order to deconstruct the Soviet historical myths. The traditional national approach, anterior to the Soviet Union and transmitted from North America by émigré historiography, was revived. The prerevolutionary narratives of Hrushevsky and Lypynsky, banned in Soviet times, became the new guiding concepts, and Hrushevsky became the canonized model for post-Soviet Ukrainian historians. The national myths of Cossackdom and of the thousand-year-old traditions of Ukrainian statehood (according to the Declaration of Independence of 24 August 1991) were reconstructed, as was the tradition of Ukrainian populism and martyrology.²⁵

The tradition of suffering was reinforced in post-Soviet historiography by the tragic experiences of Soviet rule, culminating in the famine of 1932–33, and by the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. The Great Famine (*holodomor*), caused by the Stalinist Soviet government and denied by the Soviet authorities until 1988, became the most important new ele-

ment of Ukrainian collective memory. It serves to delegitimize Soviet rule and counteract strong Soviet traditions. The famine was officially designated a genocide of the Ukrainian people and sometimes termed the Ukrainian Holocaust.²⁶ The implicit contention that Ukrainians had been victims of a genocide in the 1930s—one that was equated with the Nazi extermination of the Jews—is not only a major element in Ukrainian national martyrology but may also be interpreted as a response to allegations of a so-called perennial Ukrainian anti-Semitism and of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The identification of the Holodomor with the Holocaust has, however, been rejected by most non-Ukrainian historians.²⁷ It challenges the singular and exclusive place of the Holocaust and Auschwitz in the collective memory not only of Jews but also of most Western Europeans and Americans.

This very approximate picture of current Ukrainian historiography does not take into account the many differing views now current mainly among historians of the younger generation and in some regional historical schools.²⁸ Nevertheless, if we look at the contents of recent general surveys of Ukrainian history written by Ukrainians in Ukraine and abroad, the general pattern remains that of a national historical mythology founded by Hrushevsky and Lypynsky, combining the history of the Ukrainian people with that of the present-day territory of the Ukrainian state. It focuses on the history of the Cossacks, the Ukrainian national movement, and the development of a Ukrainian high culture; on the sufferings of Ukrainians under Polish, Russian and Soviet rule; and on the traditions of Ukrainian statehood from Kyivan Rus' to the Cossack Hetmanate and the People's Republic of 1917–20, culminating in the post-Soviet Ukrainian national state.²⁹ This revived Ukrainian national history, based mainly on the canonized schemes of prerevolutionary historians (*novonarodnytstvo* and *novoderzhavnytstvo*), and constituting above all a history of the Ukrainians, has its merits. It fulfills the important task of legitimizing and strengthening the new Ukrainian state and the fragile Ukrainian nation. It serves as a counterweight to Soviet traditions, still vital in the minds of many citizens of Ukraine. It also seeks to oppose the Russocentric imperial view, which includes and absorbs Ukrainians into an all-Russian history and dominates historiography not only in Russia but also in Western Europe and North America.

From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic Approach

The ethnonational narrative of Ukrainian history, however, also has its weaknesses. It remains incomplete and reflects the “incompleteness” or “deficits” of a so-called non-historical nation that lacks continuity of statehood, ethnic elites and high culture. Ukraine’s historical demographic characteristics themselves suggest a multiethnic approach. Until the Second World War, the territory of the contemporary Ukrainian state comprised numerically strong groups of Russians, Poles, Jews, Germans, Czechs, Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Hungarians, Armenians, Roma, and Sinti, as well as other ethnic groups. Only after the “ethnic cleansings” and mass murders of the war did Ukraine cease to be a multiethnic land and become a biethnic Ukrainian-Russian country, with only small minorities.

A historical narrative that excludes non-Ukrainians cannot adequately relate the history of statehood, elites and high cultures in Ukraine; the history of trade and industrialization; or the economic, social and cultural life of Ukrainian cities, which were populated by large non-Ukrainian majorities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is demonstrated in an important article by Yaroslav Hrytsak about the multicultural history of Lviv.³⁰ The virtual absence of Jews in most textbooks of Ukrainian history published before and after 1991 is especially striking. If Jews are mentioned at all, they appear as an alien element and are not integrated into the Ukrainian narrative.³¹ A strict limitation to ethnic Ukrainians restricts the narrative (at least for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) largely to peasants and agriculture, priests, and a small number of intellectuals. Similar problems pertain to the history of Ukrainian culture, which cannot be understood in an exclusively ethnic Ukrainian framework. Even such Ukrainian personalities—now mythic figures—as Petro Mohyla, Ivan Mazepa, Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Kostomarov, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Viacheslav Lypynsky, Symon Petliura, Dmytro Dontsov and many others were educated in a multicultural milieu and wrote their works in several languages. Their historical role can be adequately understood only in a multifaceted Ukrainian, East Slavic, all-Russian, Russian imperial, Polish, Habsburg-German, and/or European framework.

Thus a narrow ethnonational narrative cannot offer a comprehensive, balanced Ukrainian history. Ukrainian history cannot be presented without taking account of the history of Ukrainian Poles, Jews and Russians; Ukrainian culture cannot be understood without considering Ukrainian-

Polish, Ukrainian-Jewish and Ukrainian-Russian interrelations. I therefore plead for the opening up of the narrow mono-ethnonational approach and for a multiethnic history of Ukraine. This idea is not new. Such Ukrainian national thinkers of the nineteenth century as Kostomarov and Drahomanov already propagated a multiethnic, federalist approach to Ukrainian history. Soviet histories of the Ukrainian SSR usually avoided an overtly ethnic Ukrainian approach but underlined the cooperation of the progressive forces of all nationalities, above all the friendship of the Russian elder brother with his younger Ukrainian sister.³² The Soviet myth of the “friendship of peoples,” which meant above all friendship with the elder Russian brother, may discredit a multiethnic approach in post-Soviet Ukraine. But Soviet dogma, which selected only ideologically correct elements of history, harmonized interethnic relations, and concealed crucial events such as the man-made famine of 1932–33 and the Holocaust, cannot serve as a model for a new multiethnic history. Nevertheless, we must consider that some Ukrainians may perceive multiethnicity as a surreptitious resurrection of the slogan of “friendship of peoples,” which aimed at merging all nations into a heavily Russian-dominated Soviet people.

In non-Soviet historiography some attempts have already been made to include non-Ukrainians in the narrative of Ukrainian history. I have already mentioned Mark von Hagen’s seminal article, which pleaded for a consideration of “subnational, transnational and international processes” in order “to challenge the nation state’s conceptual hegemony.”³³ More than thirteen years ago, I tried to cover the history of non-Ukrainians at least partially in my *Brief History of Ukraine*.³⁴ The most successful attempt may be Paul Robert Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine*, which deliberately strives to overcome an exclusive ethnonational approach: “While this book also traces the evolution of Ukrainians, it tries as well to give judicious treatment to the many other peoples who developed within the borders of Ukraine, including the Greeks, the Crimean Tatars, the Poles, the Russians, the Jews, the Germans, and the Romanians.”³⁵ Despite such declarations, these and other histories of Ukraine, including mine, remain focused mainly on ethnic Ukrainians. They do not really integrate the history of other ethnic groups into the narrative but usually present it in supplementary paragraphs on minorities.

What could a multiethnic history of Ukraine look like? I asked myself whether my own *Russia as a Multiethnic Empire*, published sixteen years ago, could serve as a model. There I tried to counter the dominant Russocentric view of Russian history by adopting a multiethnic approach,

taking account of the non-Russians on the peripheries. Writing a multi-ethnic history of Russia was, however, easier than drafting a history of Ukraine, because I could use the Russian Empire as a general framework. Accordingly, the central element of Russian historical consciousness—the Russian state—was not put into question. The book was translated into Russian and favorably reviewed by Russian historians.³⁶ Ukrainian history, however, lacks such a stable political framework, and a multiethnic approach jeopardizes the very essence of the populist national idea—the Ukrainian people as the main element of national history.

Nonetheless, one could try to tell the history of Ukraine from a multiethnic perspective. Such an approach would have to take into account the contradictory images of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian revolution of 1648; Symon Petliura and the Ukrainian People's Republic; and the Second World War (including the Holocaust and the Ukrainian-Polish struggles) in the historical memories of Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, and Russians, as mentioned above. Discussions on these delicate topics have begun, especially between Ukrainian and Polish historians, but much remains to be done.

A multiethnic perspective cannot limit itself to a martyrology of the Ukrainian people, culminating in the Holodomor, but has to include the sufferings of the other ethnic groups of Ukraine under tsarist, Soviet and Nazi rule; the murder of tens of thousands of Jews in 1648–49 and 1918–20, as well as the extermination of Ukrainian Jews under German rule; the extermination and deportations of hundred of thousands of Ukrainian Poles, Ukrainian Ukrainians and Ukrainian Russians by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes; and the deportation of Ukrainian Germans and Crimean Tatars by Stalin. Instead of engaging in an ethnocentric competition centering on the questions “Who has suffered most?” and “Who had the greatest number of victims?” one should tell what is known about all the atrocities of the past, their victims and perpetrators, regardless of ethnic origin. Ukrainian historical memory, which usually represents Ukrainians only as victims, must include the narrative of Ukrainian executioners involved in mass killings of Jews and Poles. On the other hand, one should relate the stories of people of various ethnic origins who tried to oppose the atrocities and help their victims.³⁷

A multiethnic Ukrainian history cannot be reduced to the narratives of the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, Shevchenko and Franko, Hrushevsky, the UNR and Petliura, Dontsov and Bandera. It must include the so-called Little Russians (*malorosy*) from Teofan Prokopovych,

Petro Zavadosky and Viktor Kochubei to Nikolai Gogol, Vladimir Korolenko, Vladimir Vernadsky, Mykhailo Tuhon-Baranovsky and Anna Akhmatova-Horenko to Mykola Pidhorny (Nikolai Podgorny) and Petr Grigorenko (Petro Hryhorenko) and their mutable, multiple and situational identities and loyalties. The non-Ukrainian (Russian, all-Russian, Soviet) elements of their lives, activities and identifications have to be taken into account. Elites and intellectuals of premodern times and modern empires usually had multiple, situational and fluid ethnic or national identities or identifications. Many personalities of Ukrainian history cannot adequately be described as Ukrainians, Russians, Poles or Jews, but their lives and historical roles have to be told as multiethnic or transethnic stories. Additionally, a multiethnic Ukrainian history has to embrace personalities of non-Ukrainian background connected with Ukraine, among them Ukrainian Poles, such as Juliusz Słowacki, Jarosław Dąbrowski, Kazimir Malevich and Józef Wittlin; Ukrainian Russians, such as Ilia Repin, Aleksandra Yefimenko, Sergei Prokofiev, Andrei Zheliabov, Mikhail Bulgakov, and Nikita Khrushchev; Ukrainian Romanians, such as Petro Mohyla and Danylo Apostol; Ukrainian Greeks, such as Grigorios Maraslis; Ukrainian Jews, such as Israel Ba'al Shem Tov, Chaim Nachman Bialik and Sholem Aleichem; Ukrainian Russians of Jewish origin, such as Isaak Babel, Nathan Milstein, Leon Trotsky, Grigorii Zinoviev, or Lazar Kaganovich; Ukrainian Poles of Jewish origin, such as Bruno Schultz; Ukrainian Austrians/Germans of Jewish origin, such as Joseph Roth, Martin Buber, Paul Celan, and Rose Ausländer; Ukrainian Germans, such as the Falts-Fain family, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, or Sviatoslav Richter. Such a multicultural view of Ukrainian history and Ukrainian culture can open the way to communication with other cultures in Ukraine and abroad. On the other hand, Polish, Russian, Jewish, German and Austrian historical narratives must take account of the Ukrainian environment and Ukrainian cultural influences on many of their historical personalities. The most prominent example may be the divergent interpretation of Gogol in Russian and Ukrainian scholarship.³⁸

A multiethnic history cannot limit itself to a juxtaposition of different ethnonational narratives but has to analyze their interaction and interdependence; the reciprocal influences, contacts and conflicts of the various ethnonational groups. Here the recent historiographical approaches of “transnational” or “transcultural” history could provide new impulses. They are based on multiperspectivity and comparison, and they investigate interactions, communications, and overlapping phe-

nomena and entanglements between states, nations, societies, economies, regions and cultures. They aim at broadening historians' ethnocentric, nation-centered and Eurocentric perspectives. They reintroduce the category of territoriality and space at different levels (the nation-state being only one among others), in conjunction with the recent "spatial turn" in history.³⁹ For more than twenty years now, the history of cultural and intercultural transfers, the exchange of symbolic and material artifacts, and the analysis of reciprocal perceptions has been a fruitful field of research whose goal, in part, is a transnational history of Europe and the world.⁴⁰ This approach has been conceptualized in studies of *histoire croisée* (entangled history) or divided history, especially between Germany and France. Such studies address either the more traditional history of political relations or the new cultural history.⁴¹ The *histoire croisée* of Germany and East Central Europe, and especially Poland, has yet to be written, but initial conceptual contributions have been made by Jürgen Kocka and Philipp Ther.⁴² For the Russian-Polish connection, we have the studies of Klaus Zernack and Martin Schulze Wessel.⁴³ A triangular and quadrangular *histoire croisée* of France, Germany, Italy and Russia has been engaged in two collective volumes.⁴⁴ The concepts of cultural transfer and *histoire croisée* can readily be applied to Ukrainian history, which could be conceptualized as a Ukrainian-Polish-Russian-Jewish *histoire croisée*. There have been initial attempts at writing Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Jewish, and Ukrainian-German entangled histories, though mostly in collections of articles.⁴⁵ Especially noteworthy is the recent publication of three volumes on *Ukraine and Russia in Historical Retrospect* by the Institute of Ukrainian History at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.⁴⁶ A thoughtful attempt at a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian *histoire croisée* is Timothy Snyder's recent work, *The Reconstruction of Nations*.⁴⁷

A focus on migrations and cultural transfers could help explain the history of regions such as the Kuban, Galicia and Bukovyna or of émigré communities in Western Europe or America. In the case of southern Ukraine (*Novorosiia*) since the eighteenth century, a multiethnic history has to include not only Ukrainians, Russians, Poles and Jews, but also Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Germans, Tatars, Romanians, Sinti and Roma. A multiethnic turn could encourage the development of new directions in Ukrainian historical scholarship. Today most Ukrainian historians are specialists in the history of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian statehood (the Cossacks, the national movement, the Ukrainian Peo-

ple's Republic, and so on), while few are working on Poles, Russians or Germans in Ukraine and on their *histoire croisée*.

Because of the national paradigm and a virtual taboo in the Soviet era, there are still only a few specialists in Jewish history and culture in Ukraine. Although there were important institutions of Jewish studies in Ukraine during the nineteenth century and in the 1920s, among them the Zhytomyr Rabbinical College, the Jewish Historical and Ethnographic Commission, and the Institute of Proletarian Jewish Culture, today in Ukraine there is, as far as I know, no major scholarly center or university chair of Jewish studies with adequate training in Yiddish and Hebrew and in Jewish culture and religion—quite an anomalous situation in a country whose Jewish population was of crucial importance to its history and historical memory. Nevertheless, some action has been taken in the past few years. A non-governmental Institute of Jewish Studies, founded in Kyiv in 1997, has published a whole series of books on Jewish-Ukrainian history and culture and is collaborating with institutions in Israel and Russia. Among other projects, it is preparing an encyclopedia on the Jews of Ukraine.⁴⁸ In recent years a growing number of publications on Jewish-Ukrainian history have appeared, especially on the Holocaust in Ukraine.⁴⁹ In Dnipropetrovsk, the non-governmental Tkuma All-Ukrainian Center for the Study of the Holocaust organizes regular conferences and seminars.⁵⁰ One stream of Jewish studies in Ukraine was revisionist and tried to rewrite Ukrainian-Jewish history as an account of a non-antagonistic relationship. Such an interpretation is politically motivated and unconvincing from a scholarly point of view.

But these are only modest beginnings. The situation of Jewish studies in Russian universities and in the framework of the Russian Academy of Sciences is better than in Ukraine.⁵¹ On the other hand, historians in Russia do have problems with Ukrainian history. Aside from the work of individual scholars such as Mikhail Dmitriev, Boris Floria, Alexei Miller, Tatiana Yakovleva, and Lev Zaborovsky, three small scholarly centers devoted to Ukrainian history have opened in Moscow and St. Petersburg.⁵² In Poland, however, there are already well-established centers and specialists in Jewish and Ukrainian history that could serve as models for Ukrainian scholarship.⁵³

A multiethnic approach to Ukrainian history could help overcome the divided memories mentioned at the beginning of this article. They cannot and need not be bridged, nor is there any need to reach compromises. The main goal will be to promote understanding of other per-

spectives and interpretations. The bilateral Ukrainian-Polish and (less often) Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Israeli historical conferences have been important first steps. But there is much more to be done, and not only on the Ukrainian side. After seventeen years of independence and the Orange Revolution of late 2004, the political task of Ukrainian historiography cannot consist only of legitimizing the ethnic Ukrainian nation. The time is ripe to elaborate a historical narrative based on the concept of a multiethnic civic nation undergirded by the Ukrainian constitution.

From a Multiethnic to a Transnational Approach

A multiethnic approach to Ukrainian history, however, also has its shortcomings. In a postnational era that aspires to transcend the borders of national states and the limits of national histories, a focus on ethnonational issues, whether on a single ethnic group or on multiethnicity, is somewhat outdated. This also applies in some measure to “transnational studies,” *histoires croisées* and comparative studies. Although they are helpful in overcoming exclusivist national analytical frameworks and ethnonational historical narratives that focus only on one nation (the dominant model in Europe since the nineteenth century), they do not alter the very concept of the nation and/or the ethnic group and/or the nation-state, which remain their fundamental units of analysis.⁵⁴ A transnational perspective, however, could mean one that overcomes national categories.

First of all, the ethnonational paradigm, including a multiethnic or multinational one, involves the danger of essentialism—a primordialist approach in which ethnic groups and nations are projected back into history. Such an approach does not sufficiently take into account that ethnic groups and nations are constructs and processes with open beginnings and open ends. Over the course of history, ethnic and national categories were in constant flux; hence the terms Ukraine and Ukrainians, Russia and Russians, Poland and Poles, Jews or Tatars designate quite different entities embodying different meanings and modes of self-conceptualization in the thirteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth or twentieth centuries. The use of the terms “nations,” “national” and “transnational” is questionable with regard to premodern epochs.

Another weakness of the ethnonational approach is its teleological narrative, which usually begins with the homeland or with ethnogenesis, leading inexorably from the ethnic group to the nation and finally to the

ethnonational state as the crowning fulfillment of history. This scheme recalls the stages of historical materialism from the primeval formation to feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. Instead of class struggle, national or national-liberation movements are considered the main driving forces of history.

The national narrative usually does not take into account alternatives to the formation of contemporary ethnic groups and nations; in the Ukrainian case, for example, the possible formation of a Ruthenian nation in Poland-Lithuania embracing both Ukrainians and Belarusians; the possible development of a Little Russian nation in Left-Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century; or the possible creation of a Ruthenian Greek-Catholic nation (to the exclusion of Orthodox Ukrainians in Russia) in Austrian and Polish Galicia; or of a Rusyn nation in Carpathian Ukraine.⁵⁵ A counterfactual history could ask why Ukrainian nation-building was not halted at a pre-state stage, as was the case for some national movements in Western Europe, such as the Occitans/Provençals or the Bretons in France (comparisons made quite frequently by Ukrainians in the tsarist empire).⁵⁶ Such alternative views of nation-building apply, of course, not only to Ukrainian but also to Russian, Polish and Jewish historical narratives.

An essentialist ethnonational approach tends to overlook other historical forces, such as estates, social groups and classes, states and power structures, religions, and economic factors. In ethnonationalist discourse, these factors are often subordinated to ethnicity and nationalism, although ethnonational elements usually were not decisive historical factors before the nineteenth century and, in many cases, even later. It is important to overcome this essentialist ethnonational perspective and assign ethnic and national categories their proper place as historical forces. Instead of ethnonational categories, transethnic and transnational factors—social, economic, demographic, religious—should be emphasized, as should the history of mentalities and everyday life and the new cultural and gender history. In the Soviet Union, the dominant dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet patriotism hampered the adoption of alternative historiographic theories and methods. In post-Soviet Ukraine, the dominant ethnonational approach makes it difficult for non-national theories and methodologies to be accepted or even discussed. National history, however, involves the danger of isolation and provincialization. This is especially true for Ukrainian historiography, which was particularly isolated and provincialized in Soviet times. Significantly, among the numerous modern theories and methodologies of contemporary his-

toriography, in Ukraine it is mostly the concepts of nationalism that have been well elaborated.⁵⁷

As a consequence, new theories and methods such as the new cultural history, gender history, historical anthropology, historical demography, the history of everyday life, and mental mapping are used only reluctantly in the mainstream of current Ukrainian historiography. One example: In November 2000, when I co-organized a workshop on "Historical Forms of Family in Russia and Ukraine in the European Framework," I had enormous difficulty in finding any candidates from Ukraine who were well informed about international discussions in this field (including, for example, debates on the so-called Hajnal Line between the "European" and "non-European" marriage pattern) and had done new empirical studies on family history in Ukraine.⁵⁸ This surprised me because the history of the peasant family is at the heart of the populist view of Ukrainian history. The same is true for other fields of historical demography and transnational migration studies, although migrations into and out of Ukraine are a principal element of Ukrainian history.⁵⁹ Peasants, who constituted the great majority of the population of Ukraine until the twentieth century and were the protagonists of populist Ukrainian historiography, have been generally neglected. Their mentalities, daily lives, families, communes, gender relations, economic organization, education, beliefs, legal affairs and leisure pursuits have been largely ignored by scholars. This is especially true for Russian Ukraine; less so for Galicia. Because of the focus on ethnicity, interactions and similarities between Ukrainian peasants and Russian or Polish peasants have been overlooked, limiting our knowledge about the peculiarities of Ukrainian peasants and their regional groups.⁶⁰

Since the "spatial turn," mental mapping, the construction of space, and questions of territoriality have also become productive fields of research. Thus it would be interesting to have a history of the Dnipro River, the steppe, the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea, including Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian imaginations, just as we have histories of the Rhine, the Danube and the Alps. Comparisons between the (Ukrainian, Polish, Slovak, Hungarian, and Romanian) inhabitants of the Carpathians and their pastoral economies, ways of life and mentalities with mountaineers in the Alps, the Balkans and the Caucasus would be fruitful. History should not be treated only on the level of the nation and the state but also on sublevels such as towns, villages and regions, families and individuals. Microhistorical studies are one of the blossoming fields

of contemporary research, providing insights not only into local structures but general ones as well.⁶¹

On the other hand, supranational levels are becoming much more important in transnational history. Thus the history of empires has expanded in recent years. For Ukrainian history, the framework of Poland-Lithuania and of the Russian, Austrian and Soviet empires is crucial. Fortunately, some Ukrainian historians are participating in projects and contributing to journals devoted to the comparative study of empires.⁶² Nonetheless, virtually no new monographs devoted to the history of the Russian or Austrian empires and the respective place of Ukraine in their framework have been published. Another supranational level is that of culture and religion. A supranational history of Orthodoxy—not only of the Orthodox churches and clergies but also of popular beliefs and everyday religion—has yet to be written. Here again, comparisons with Russian Orthodoxy are crucial. Ukraine and its experience of several unions with the Roman Catholic Church would be of special interest to comparative religious history. It could be compared with the cases of Belarus and Romania, which also had Orthodox and Uniate churches, and with the Gregorian and Uniate Armenians. Ukrainian Orthodox and Uniates (Greek Catholics) should be integrated into the comparative history of confessions and confessionalization in Europe, which is still generally limited to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.⁶³ Ukraine should be integrated into the study of cultural transfers. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the metropolises of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Berlin, and Paris influenced architecture, theater, music, literature, and fashion in Ukraine, while Ukrainians, for their part, took their experience abroad. The transfer of knowledge and science could be another field of research, encompassing not only the impact of Polish, German, Russian and other scholars on Ukrainian universities but also the influence of Ukrainian scholars who emigrated to other countries, from Yepifanii Slavynetsky and Teofan Prokopovych (Feofan Prokopovich) to Dmytro Chyzhevsky and Omeljan Pritsak.

European and global history are other expanding scholarly fields already established as new subdisciplines of the historical sciences. In an era of globalization we realize how closely interconnected the world is. These interrelations, however, were already important in earlier periods, as shown by the examples of the Silk Road and the Pax Mongolica or the diffusion of epidemics. Global history is thus connected with

transnational history and *histoire croisée*. The interrelation of various levels of research, from the global to the local, is of crucial importance.

On a subnational level, regional transethnic history is an important focus. This applies to Ukraine, with its various historical regions that do not always coincide with political and ethnic borders but overlap them. Examples are Sloboda Ukraine on the Ukrainian-Russian border; Polisia and Podlachia in the Ukrainian-Belarusian-Polish borderlands; Galicia, with its Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish-Austrian/German traditions; Bukovyna, with its Ukrainian-Romanian-Jewish-Austrian/German inhabitants; and the Carpathian mountain region, inhabited by Ukrainians, Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians. All these regions had ethnically mixed populations that cannot be categorized in clear-cut national terms, as witness the inhabitants of Polisia and Podlachia (*tuteshni*, *tuteishi*, *tutejsi*, *polishchuky*), the Donbas (*donechchany* speaking *surzhyk*), southern Ukraine (*chornomortsy*, *novorosiiany*), Carpatho-Rusyns and others. A transnational perspective also involves comparisons between European regions. The Donbas could be compared with other centers of industrialization such as Upper Silesia, the *Ruhrgebiet* or the Dąbrowa Basin; Galicia with the Grand Duchy of Poznań or Transylvania; Bukovyna with the Banat and Bessarabia; southern Ukraine with Wallachia, the Southern Volga region or Siberia. The analysis of transnational groups such as the Sinti/Roma, Vlachs (Aromunians) and Cossacks, which did not become modern nations, could be of special interest. For Ukrainian history, the steppe frontier (*Ukraina*), extending eastward to the Volga, Yaik/Ural and Terek regions, was of crucial importance. A comparative approach to the history of frontiers and Cossacks as typical frontiersmen could yield new insights. There could be comparative studies not only of the different Cossack hosts but also of Cossacks and other frontier societies, such as those of the Uskoks and Haiduks on the Habsburg-Ottoman military border, or those on the frontiers of Asia and America.⁶⁴

One of the traditional branches of regional history is the history of towns, which also lends itself to comparative studies. For example, comparative research projects at the universities of Leipzig and Vienna include Ukrainian towns.⁶⁵

In general, comparative studies are one of the promising approaches of transnational history, especially if the comparison is not between ethnic groups and nations but between other entities. This also implies the growing importance of a transnational historiography. The traditional close relationship between historiography, the nation and the nation-

state could be overcome by intensified cooperation between historians of different nations, states and continents. Joint international projects would promote multiperspectivity and transnational approaches, while counteracting exclusive ethnonational approaches.⁶⁶

Summary

A multiethnic history of Ukraine could be an important complement to the traditional ethnonational approach. It can also be understood as a step toward the creation of a transethnic or transnational history. For two centuries, historians mostly wrote national histories focusing on ethnic groups, nations and nation-states. By and large they projected their national ideologies onto prenational epochs in which dynastic, social, regional, gender, religious and other identifications and loyalties were usually more important than ethnicity. Yet ethnonational and multiethnic approaches tend to overestimate ethnic and national forces in history and to give teleological explanations. They should be corrected by a transethnic and transnational historiography appropriate to the era of globalization and European unification. This would help relativize mutual stereotypes of “Ukrainian nationalists and anti-Semites”; “Mazepists,” “Petliurists” and “Banderites”; “Russian imperialists and despots”; “Jewish exploiters, Bolsheviks and cosmopolitans”; and “Polish lords” disdaining Ukrainian “priests and peasants.”

Such a postnational or transnational turn may be early for Ukrainian historiography, which has not yet emancipated itself fully from the Soviet, Polish and Russian national and imperial grand narratives that were dominant for centuries. Other European historiographies needed much more time to develop a postnational and transnational perspective. On the other hand, with the Orange Revolution, the first phase of Ukraine’s national consolidation may have been successfully achieved. The time could be ripe for a second phase of multiethnic or even (a third step) transnational history. All this does not mean that an ethnonational history of Ukraine will be rendered obsolete. It will serve the belated Ukrainian nation by supplying its adherents with a common past and national myths. Interest in explaining the history of the Ukrainian ethnic group, nation and statehood will persist. Studies of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Hetmanate, national movements, national ideologies, and national heroes will remain legitimate fields of the historical profession. But Ukrainian historiography of the twenty-first century needs a diversification of approaches, theories and methods. This includes multieth-

nic and transnational approaches, comparative studies, and a methodological pluralism attuned to international scholarly discussions and standards.

All this is relevant not only to the historical profession but also to politics. A multiethnic and transnational view of Ukrainian history can help create a civic society based on citizenship and the rule of law, not primarily on Ukrainian ethnicity. The Orange Revolution may have prepared Ukraine for a civic nation-state with a focus on a constitutional and not an ethnic patriotism. Such a reorientation could be an important means of integrating diverse ethnic and regional groups into a civic transethnic Ukrainian nation. As the elections from 1991 to 2007 have shown, there are cleavages between the regions of Ukraine, especially between the west, center and north on the one hand and the east and south on the other. This applies not only to political options but also to collective memories. Many citizens of Ukraine will not accept an exclusive ethnonational perspective. Personalities like Ivan Mazepa, Symon Petliura and Stepan Bandera cannot serve as national integrative personalities and myths for many Ukrainians. Perhaps only Bohdan Khmelnytsky could be an acceptable candidate. But his positive memory is not reconcilable with the negative Jewish and Polish images. Competing and divided historical memories, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this article, are often barriers to mutual understanding, not only between ethnic and regional groups within a state but also between nations and states.

It is therefore important to deal in an open and scholarly manner with all the ghosts of the past that have been praised or blamed in Soviet and Ukrainian national, Russian, Polish, and Jewish historiography. Difficult questions of Ukrainian-Jewish, Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Russian relations in the times of Khmelnytsky, the Revolution and the Second World War must be investigated from a multiethnic and transnational perspective. This applies not only to Ukraine but also to its relations with its neighbors and with other countries. The modification and diversification of the ethnonational approach to history is also important for Ukraine's integration into the European scholarly community and the European Union. Although a united Europe will not destroy ethnic groups and nations, it needs multiethnic and transnational perspectives, as well as citizens who are not blinkered by narrow ethnonational views but prepared to cooperate and listen to other arguments and perspectives.

Notes

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- ² Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair (Yeven Metzulah): The Famous 17th Century Chronicle Depicting Jewish Life in Russia and Poland during the Chmielnicki Massacres of 1648–1649* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1983), pp. 25, 34, 42–43.
- ³ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1988), pp. 469–73 (O. Ohloblyn).
- ⁴ *Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia. Svod znanii o evreistve i ego kul'ture v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 15 (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 646.
- ⁵ *Encyclopaedia Judaica. Das Judentum in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1930), col. 503.
- ⁶ *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 1972), pp. 480–81.
- ⁷ Quoted in Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992), p. 35. See also *Encyklopedyja Powszechna*, vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1861), pp. 358–63.
- ⁸ Quoted in Velychenko, *National History*, pp. 98–99.
- ⁹ See, e.g., *Èntsiklopedicheskii slovar' Russkogo Bibliograficheskogo Instituta Granat*, 7th ed., vol. 45, pt. 2 (Leningrad, n.d.), pp. 617–18.
- ¹⁰ Quoted in John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), p. 270.
- ¹¹ See, e.g., *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukraïny*, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 430–32; *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 15 (Moscow, 1974), pp. 602–3.
- ¹² Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto, 2004), pp. 35–37, 156.
- ¹³ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 2: 469–73.
- ¹⁴ Frank Sysyn, “The Changing Image of the Hetman: On the 350th Anniversary of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46 (1998): 531–45; Serhii Plokhyy, “The Ghosts of Pereiaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 53 (2001): 489–505.
- ¹⁵ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 3 (1993): 855–57 (Taras Hunczak).
- ¹⁶ *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 11 (1968), p. 92; *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukraïny*, vol. 3 (1971), pp. 371–72.
- ¹⁷ *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 340–41.
- ¹⁸ See, e.g., *Problema OUN-UPA: Poperednia istorychna dovidka*, ed. S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi (Kyiv, 2002); *Orhanizatsiia ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv i*

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- ¹⁹ Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, "Die Ukraine zwischen Ost und West. Kollektive Erinnerung und politische Zukunftsorientierung der Bevölkerung," *Österreichische Osthefte* 42 (2000): 709–40, here 727. See similar results in Andrew Wilson, "Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-National Identities," *Nations and Nationalism* 8 (2002): 31–54, here 47–48; Yaroslav Hrytsak, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Cases of L'viv and Donetsk," in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk = Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (2000): 264–81. See also Vladyslav Hrynevych, "Gespaltene Erinnerung. Der Zweite Weltkrieg im ukrainischen Gedenken," *Osteuropa* 55 (2005): 88–102.
- ²⁰ Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* 54 (1995): 658–73; discussion on pp. 679–719.
- ²¹ On Ukrainian historiography, see Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography = Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 5/6 (1957); Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987); Velychenko, *National History*; Stephen Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York, 1993); I.I. Kolesnyk, *Ukrains'ka istoriohrafiia (XVIII — pochatok XX st.)* (Kyiv, 2000); Serhii M. Plokhii, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto et al., 2005).
- ²² See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-historical' Nations," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (1981): 358–68; George G. Grabowicz, "Some Further Observations on 'Non-historical' Nations and 'Incomplete' Literatures. A Reply," *ibid.*, pp. 369–88; Andreas Kappeler, "Ein 'kleines Volk' von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900," in *Kleine Völker in der Geschichte Osteuropas. Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 75. Geburtstag*, eds. M. Alexander et al. (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 33–42; abridged English version in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18 (1993): 85–92.
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²⁴ See, e.g., David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA, 2002); Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, 2005); Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, 2001); Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53 (1994): 414–52.

²⁵ See, e.g., Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Ukrainian Historiography 1991–2001: The Decade of Transformation," in *Klio ohne Fesseln? Historiographie im östlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus*, eds. A. Kappeler, A. Ivanišević, W. Lukan and A. Suppan (Vienna, 2003) = *Österreichische Osthefte* 44, nos. 1–2 (2002): 107–26 (Russian translation in *Ab Imperio*, 2003, no. 2: 427–54); Georgii Kasianov, "Rewriting and Rethinking: Contemporary Historiography and Nation Building in Ukraine," in *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, eds. Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri (Westport, CT, 2002), pp. 29–46; idem, "Sovremennoe sostoiianie ukrainskoi istoriografii: metodologicheskie i institutsional'nye aspekty," *Ab Imperio*, 2003, no. 2: 491–519; Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine," in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY, 1994), pp. 123–45; Vladimir Kravchenko, "Boi s ten'iu: Sovetskoe proshloe v istoriograficheskoi pamiati sovremennogo ukrainskogo obshchestva," *Ab Imperio*, 2004, no. 2: 329–68; Taras Kuzio, "Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 33 (2005): 29–58; idem, "Post-Soviet Ukrainian Historiography in Ukraine," *Historische Schulbuchforschung* 23 (2001): 27–42; Valerii Vasil'ev, "Ot Kievskoi Rusi k nezavisimoi Ukraine: Novye kontseptsii ukrainskoi istorii," in *Natsional'nye istorii*, pp. 209–30; Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park, PA, 1998); Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven, 2000); "Do 50-richchia zasnuvannia 'Ukrains'koho istorychnoho zhurnalu,'" = *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2007, no. 6. See also the series *Istoriia ta istoriohrafiia v Ievropi* (Kyiv), eds. Serhii Stel'makh and Guido Hausmann, nos. 1–3 (2003–4); David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York, 2007), which was published after the completion of this article.

²⁶ Winfried Jilge, "Holodomor und Nation. Der Hunger im ukrainischen Geschichtsbild," *Osteuropa* 54, no. 12 (2004): 147–64; Georgii Kas'ianov,

- "Razrytaia mogila: golod 1932–1933 godov v ukrainskoi istoriografii, politike i massovom soznanii," *Ab Imperio*, 2004, no. 3: 237–69; *Ukrains'kyi Holokost 1932–1933. Svidchennia tykh, khto vyzhyv*, ed. Iurii Mytsyk (Kyiv, 2003). See a bibliography of 654 pages devoted to the Holodomor: Larysa M. Bur'ian and Inna E. Rykun, *Holodomor v Ukraïni 1932–1933 rr. Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* (Odesa, 2001).
- ²⁷ See the divergent interpretations of Stanislav Kulchytsky, Yuri Shapoval, Gerhard Simon and Valerii Vasil'ev published recently in *Vernichtung durch Hunger. Der Holodomor in der Ukraine und der UdSSR*, eds. Rudolf A. Mark and Gerhard Simon, *Osteuropa* 54, no. 12 (2004). See also the recent book by Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture* (Lund, 2006), and S.V. Kul'chyts'kyi, "Holodomor 1932–1933 rr.: mekhanizmy stalins'koho teroru," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2007, no. 4: 4–26.
- ²⁸ See, e.g., Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Iak vykladaty istoriiu Ukraïny pislia 1991 roku?" in *Ukrains'ka istorychna dydaktyka. Mizhnarodnyi dialoh. Fakhivtsi riznykh kraïn pro suchasni ukrains'ki pidruchnyky z istorii* (Kyiv, 2000), pp. 63–75; idem, *Strasti za natsionalizmom. Istorychni eseï* (Kyiv, 2004); Iurii Shapoval, *Ukraïna XX stolittia: Osoby ta podii v konteksti vazhkoï istorii* (Kyiv, 2001); Natalia Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoi ta rann'omodernoï Ukraïny*, 3rd ed. (Kyiv, 1997); idem, *Paralel'nyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiaвлення ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002).
- ²⁹ See, e.g., a textbook recommended by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education: *Istoriia Ukraïny. Navchal'nyi posibnyk* (Kyiv, 1997). See also Kuzio, "Nation Building," pp. 38–42; Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian Nation,'" *Nationalities Papers* 29 (2001): 325–50; Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoi ta rann'omodernoï Ukraïny*, pp. 11–16.
- ³⁰ Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Lviv: A Multicultural History Through the Centuries," in *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture*, ed. John Czaplicka (Cambridge, MA, 2000) = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24.
- ³¹ Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, "In Search of a Lost People: Jews in Present-Day Ukrainian Historiography," *East European Jewish Affairs* 33 (2003): 67–82. See also his "Reconceptualizing the Alien: Jews in Modern Ukrainian Thought," *Ab Imperio*, 2003, no. 4: 519–80.
- ³² Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory*; Tillett, *The Great Friendship*; Velychenko, *Shaping Identity*.
- ³³ Von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" pp. 670, 673.
- ³⁴ *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich, 1994), 2nd ed. (Munich, 2000); Ukrainian translation: *Mala istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2007).
- ³⁵ Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1996), pp. vii–viii.
- ³⁶ *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich, 1992), 3rd ed., 2001; *Rossiia—mnogonatsional'naia imperiia. Vozniknovenie, istoriia, raspad* (Moscow, 1997), 2nd ed., 2000; *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (Harlow, 2001); *Rosiia iak polietnichna imperiia. Vynyknennia, istoriia, rozpad* (Lviv, 2005). Reviews in: *Otechestvennaia istoriia*,

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- ³⁷ See Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (Basingstoke and London, 2000); Frank Golczewski, “Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine,” *Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939–1945*, eds. Christoph Dieckmann et al. (Göttingen, 2003), pp. 151–82; idem, “Die Revision eines Klischees. Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer,” in *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, eds. Wolfgang Benz et al., vol. 2 (Berlin, 1998), pp. 9–82; Jilge, “Politics of History”; *Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukraïny. Materialy vseukraïns’koï naukovoï konferentsii*. Kyiv, 23–24 chervnia 2005 r. (Kyiv, 2005).
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- ⁴² Jürgen Kocka, “Das östliche Mitteleuropa als Herausforderung für eine vergleichende Geschichte Europas,” *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*

- 49 (2000): 159–74; Philipp Ther, “Deutsche Geschichte als transnationale Geschichte: Überlegungen zu einer Histoire Croisée Deutschlands und Ostmitteleuropas,” *Comparativ* 13, no. 4 (2003): 156–81.
- ⁴³ Martin Schulze Wessel, *Russlands Blick auf Preußen. Die polnische Frage in der Diplomatie und der politischen Öffentlichkeit des Zarenreiches und des Sowjetstaats* (Stuttgart, 1995); Klaus Zernack, *Polen und Rußland. Zwei Wege in der europäischen Geschichte* (Berlin, 1994).
- ⁴⁴ *Transferts culturels triangulaires France-Allemagne-Russie*, eds. Ekaterina Dmitrieva and Michel Espagne (Paris, 1996); *Russie, France, Allemagne, Italie. Transferts quadrangulaires du néoclassicisme aux avant-gardes*, ed. Michel Espagne (Paris, 2005).
- ⁴⁵ *Ukraine and Russia*, eds. Potichnyj et al.; *Rossii-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, ed. A.I. Miller (Moscow, 1997); Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 2000); Shkandrij, *Russia and Ukraine*; Kappeler, “Great Russians” and “Little Russians”; *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, eds. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton, 2003); *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, 1980); *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 2nd ed., eds. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, 1990); *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, eds. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton and Toronto, 1994).
- ⁴⁶ *Ukraina i Rosiia v istorichnii retrospektyvi*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 2004), esp. vol. 1: V.F. Verstiuk, V.M. Horobets’ and O.P. Tolochko, *Ukrains’ki proekty v Rosiis’kii imperii*.
- ⁴⁷ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*.
- ⁴⁸ <http://www.judaica.kiev.ua>.
- ⁴⁹ See, e.g., Ia. S. Khonigsman, *Katastrofa evreistva Zapadnoi Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1998); F.Ia. Gorovskii, Ia.S. Khonigsman and A. Ia. Naiman, *Evrei Ukrainy (Kratkii ocherk istorii)*, pts. 1–2 (Kyiv, 1992–95); *Katastrofa ta opir ukraïns’koho ievreistva (1941–1944). Narysy z istorii Holokaustu i Oporu v Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1999; includes a rich bibliography); *Ievrei v Ukraïni. Istoriia, kul’tura, tradytsii* (Kyiv, 1997); *Ievreis’ki politychni rukhy v Ukraïni v kintsi XIX–XX stolittia. Dokumenty i materialy*, eds. Iurii Shapoval et al. (Kyiv, 2002); *Evrei Odessy i Iuga Ukrainy: istoriia v dokumentakh (konets XVIII — nach. XX vv.)* (Odesa, 2002); Oleh V. Kozherod, *Ievrei Ukraïny v period novoi ekonomichnoi polityky 1921–1929 rr.* (Kyiv, 2003). See also Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, “The Revival of Academic Studies of Judaica in Independent Ukraine,” in *Jewish Life after the USSR*, ed. Zvi Gitelman (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2003), pp. 152–72; Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukrains’ko-ievreiski stosunky v postsoviets’kii ukraïns’kii istoriohrafii,” in idem, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, pp. 169–78; Elena Ivanova, “Konstruirovanie kollektivnoi pamiaty o Kholokoste v Ukraine,” *Ab Imperio*, 2004, no. 2: 369–92.
- ⁵⁰ The Tkuma Educational and Memorial Research Center for Jewish History and Culture (<http://www.tkuma.dp.ua>).

- ⁵¹ Petrovsky-Shtern, "The Revival," pp. 155–57. See also the Jewish universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg and the Center for Jewish Studies and Jewish Civilization at Moscow State University. A historical handbook of Jewish shtetls in Ukraine has been published by the Jewish University in St. Petersburg: *100 evreiskikh mestechek Ukrainy. Istoricheskii putevoditel'*, vyp. 2, *Podoliia*, eds. Even V. Lukin, A. Sokolova and B. Khaimovich (St. Petersburg, 2000).
- ⁵² The center of Ukrainian and Belarusian studies at Moscow State University (M.V. Dmitriev), the Department of Eastern Slavs at the Slavic Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (L.E. Gorizontov; see, e.g., "Belorussia i Ukraina. Istoriia i kul'tura," *Ezhegodnik 2003* [Moscow], pp. 395–411), and a section of the department of history at St. Petersburg University (T.G. Yakovleva; see *Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii* [St. Petersburg, 2004]).
- ⁵³ These include the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw (since 1928), the Department of Judaic Studies at the Jagiellonian University (Cracow), the Mordechai Anieliewicz Center for Research and Education on Jewish History and Culture at Warsaw University, and the many interesting contributions in *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies*, which began publication at Oxford in 1986. Among the numerous Polish studies of Ukraine, I mention here only the publications of the Southeastern Research Institute (Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy) in Przemyśl.
- ⁵⁴ Kiran Klaus Patel explicitly states that the nation-state and the nation are crucial to transnational history: "Transnationale Geschichte—ein neues Paradigma?" available at <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum>; Patel, "Überlegungen"; for a more critical approach, see Ther, "Deutsche Geschichte." For a closer look at the concept of transnational history, see Philipp Ther's article in this volume.
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- ⁵⁶ See, e.g., A.I. Miller, "*Ukrainskii vopros*" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraiia polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg, 2000), translated as *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest and New York, 2003).
- ⁵⁷ See, e.g., Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys istorii Ukraïny. Formuvannia modernoi Ukraïns'koi natsii XIX–XX stolittia* (Kyiv, 1996); Heorhii Kas'ianov, *Teorii natsii ta natsionalizmu* (Kyiv, 1999); articles by Hrytsak, Ostap Sereda and Serhii Yekelchuk in *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung vor 1914 = Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 2 (2001). See O.A. Udod, "Rozrobka problem teorii ta metodolohii istorichnoi nauky na storinkakh 'Ukraïns'koho istorichnoho zhurnalu,'" *Ukraïns'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal*, 2007, no. 6: 55–67.
- ⁵⁸ See B.N. Mironov, "Mezhdunarodnyi seminar 'Formy semeinoi organizatsii v rossiiskoi i ukrainskoi istorii v sravnitel'noi perspektive,'" *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2001, no. 6: 198–203; Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Istoriï vid P'iatnyi," in idem, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, pp. 24–36.

- ⁵⁹ See, e.g., Andreas Kappeler, "Chochly und Kleinrussen: Die ukrainische ländliche und städtische Diaspora in Rußland vor 1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45 (1997): 48–63.
- ⁶⁰ See Christine Worobec, "Conceptual Observations on the Russian and Ukrainian Peasantries," in *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, pp. 256–76.
- ⁶¹ See, e.g., Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzeżany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Bloomington, IN, 2002); Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
- ⁶² See, e.g., *Skhid-Zakhid. Istoryko-kul'turolohičniy zbirnyk* (Kharkiv), vols. 1–6 (1998–2004); *Ab Imperio. Theory and History of Nationalities and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Realm*, vols. 1–8 (Kazan, 2000–2008). See also Andreas Kappeler, "The Russian Empire and its Nationalities in Post-Soviet Historiographies," in *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia*, ed. Tadayuki Hayashi (Sapporo, 2003), pp. 35–51.
- ⁶³ See, e.g., Heinz Schilling, "Der Gesellschaftsvergleich in der Frühneuzeit-Forschung – ein Erfahrungsbericht und einige (methodisch-theoretische) Schlussfolgerungen," in *Vergleich und Transfer*, eds. Kaelble and Schriewer, pp. 283–304, 293–98.
- ⁶⁴ William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, 1964); Serhii Plokhyy, "Crossing National Boundaries: The Case for the Comparative Study of Cossackdom," in *Die Geschichte Russlands im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen*, ed. Andreas Kappeler (Wiesbaden, 2004) = *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 63, pp. 416–30. See Viktor Brekhunenko, "Typolohiia Stepovoho Kordonu Ievropy i perspektyva doslidzhennia istorii skhidnoievropeis'kykh kozatstv," in *Ukraina v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi z naidavniishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.*, vyp. 6 (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 453–486, and this author's larger book project.
- ⁶⁵ See, e.g., *Stadt und Öffentlichkeit in Ostmitteleuropa 1900–1939. Beiträge zur Entstehung moderner Urbanität zwischen Berlin, Charkiv, Tallinn und Triest*, eds. Andreas R. Hofmann and Anna Veronika Wendland (Stuttgart, 2002); research project on "Multicultural Border Towns in Western Ukraine, 1772–1914" at the Institut für Osteuropäische Geschichte, Vienna University. See the first results of the latter project: Börries Kuzmany, Laurie R. Cohen and Paulus Adelsgruber, "Kleinstädte entlang der galizischen-wolhynisch/podolischen Grenze. Ein Vergleich," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 55 (2007): 210–41. A collective monograph is in preparation.
- ⁶⁶ See, e.g., the publications of the joint German-Ukrainian project "Istoriia ta istoriohrafiia v Ievropi" (History and Historiography in Europe).

The Transnational Paradigm of Historiography and Its Potential for Ukrainian History

Philipp Ther

The American historian Ronald Suny once wrote pointedly about the institutionalization of history in the nineteenth century: “History as a discipline helped to constitute the nation, even as the nation determined the categories in which history was written and the purposes it was to serve.”¹ One need only mention the name of Mykhailo Hrushevsky to confirm the validity of this statement. He was not only the most important Ukrainian historian of the nineteenth century but also a preeminent nation-builder, like the Czech historian František Palacký.² Hrushevsky’s uniqueness in the history and historiography of Ukraine is based on a structural phenomenon. Building a nation within the framework of an empire required the construction of a national history that laid claim to a particular territory and people. This task was especially difficult in the Ukrainian lands, where in the nineteenth century there was neither an uninterrupted tradition of statehood nor an established high culture with a standardized language. By general European standards, this was not an exceptional situation. The parallel with the Czech national movement has already been mentioned, but there were also similarities with the Croatian and Lithuanian movements, as well as with some West European national movements, such as the Catalanian.³

Unlike these “small” European nations, as defined by Hroch, present-day Ukraine extends across a very large and diverse territory and was ruled by various empires and nation-states. These multiple contexts make it difficult to write a compact history of Ukraine on the model of a history of the Czech lands, which, after all, have a fairly continuous history within one empire. However, this diversity has attracted Western historians, who have no personal or family links to Ukraine. Renowned specialists on Ukraine such as Andreas Kappeler and Mark von Hagen began their careers as students of the Russian Empire, while others,

such as the present author, came to study Ukraine after an initial concentration on the Habsburg Empire and Poland. Furthermore, Ukraine's diverse history makes it a highly interesting case for the study of processes such as nation-building, religion and nationalism, language standardization, empire, and emancipation. What makes Ukraine so interesting in this respect is the simultaneous existence of several national and religious movements and empires or, to be even more general, cultures and societies. That is why we have termed Ukraine a "laboratory" in the title of this collection.

As Georgiy Kasianov and Andreas Kappeler show in this volume, the independence of Ukraine in 1991 has created a new (and old) trend—the nationalization of its history. Understandably enough, political elites encourage this trend in the hope that citizens will identify themselves with Ukraine as a nation-state. This has also been a trend in the newly independent or fully sovereign countries of East Central Europe.⁴ But should historians still act like nineteenth-century nation-builders? How does this influence the academic quality of their work, and does it really help their countries of origin to become strong nation-states?

Attempts to nationalize history in the former socialist countries contrast with recent developments in the historiography of the older members of the European Union (EU). In Germany and France especially, there is a lively debate on how to overcome the national framing of historiography. That debate on "transnational history" and its potential significance for Ukrainian historiography is the main subject of the present article. But the Ukrainian case might also influence how historians of Western and Central Europe develop their own historiography and the transnational paradigm. Moreover, the case of Ukraine might also be interesting for American historians and their debate about transnational history, where the imperial past of Europe, or Eastern Europe in general, has been strangely absent.

Another issue is the conceptualization of European history, and whether and how Ukraine is included in it. Unfortunately, politicians, intellectuals, and most recent master narratives of European history often apply the present political map of the European Union to the past. In many cases this leads to the exclusion of Ukraine, which is assigned to a post-Soviet space or a Russian sphere of dominance. Transnational history can reveal Ukraine's past links with its European neighbors and thus potentially make an important impact by encouraging Western historians to understand Ukraine as a component of European history. Moreover, a transnational approach might more adequately bridge gaps

of historical memory and experience in the different regions of Ukraine than an exclusive nationalizing history based on nineteenth-century models.⁵

Definition of Terms

The terms “national” and “transnational” history require more specific definition if they are to be useful. While the various trends and methods that have developed in historiography since the age of romanticism could not convincingly be summarized under the rubric of “national history,”⁶ it is clear that the national paradigm has greatly influenced historiography. Although radical nationalism was officially banished from West European politics in the postwar period and weakened by the process of European integration, the postwar “master narratives” of history in various European countries were still written from a national perspective.⁷ The same applied to Ukraine until the late twentieth century. Orest Subtelny’s *Ukraine: A History* is a typical example of a national history that constructs a linear chronological narrative of a society or nation (“the Ukrainians” or “the Ukrainian people”) and locates it on an imagined or already acquired territory (present-day Ukraine). One of the main features of this and comparable books is continuity in terms of time, space and ethnicity.

National history is not necessarily nationalistic, but it marginalizes or excludes minorities and other non-dominant groups that inhabit the territory of a given nation or nation-state. Owing to the prevalent identification of nationhood with ethnicity in Central and Eastern Europe, national history is usually ethnocentric. This exclusivity may be observed on the level of research and narrative structures. Some authors of national history have a tremendous knowledge of the history of other countries but do not make use of it because they want to reduce their narratives.

National history is also often nationalizing. Certain persons or places are claimed for the history of a nation, although their allegiance is debatable. For example, there have been numerous books claiming that the city of Gdańsk is either German or Polish.⁸ Only since the 1970s has it been generally accepted that Gdańsk was shaped by various cultures and nations.⁹ But would Ukrainian historians find it acceptable to think of Lviv as *also* (or historically even predominantly) a Polish city? One might think that these questions belong to the age of nationalism, but they are more fundamental. Historiography is still dominated by “territorialized” thinking, which was spread by modern national move-

ments and nation-states.¹⁰ It neatly divides the map of Europe into states and nations that cover particular territories. We all know these maps from schoolbooks and academic atlases, and thus they are deeply ingrained in the mental mapping of modern Europeans. The imagination and representation of states requires borders, and so territorialized thinking necessarily results in mutually exclusive histories. At the moment, the only way out of this dilemma is to accept that there are several national versions of the history of Gdańsk or Lviv and promote dialogue among historians. Transnational history tries to overcome the bilateral approach by producing multinational histories of these ethnically mixed and disputed cities. Yaroslav Hrytsak showed how this could be done with the history of Lviv even before the term “transnational” became popular among Western academics.¹¹

Another characteristic of national history pertains to its explanatory structure. In Western Europe especially, the history of European nations and nation-states has been researched and explained from an internalist perspective: events and processes that occurred on the same territory or within the same imagined nation are used to explain subsequent developments. This internalism may be termed “methodological nationalism,” which is less common in Polish and Ukrainian historiography but has particularly influenced French and German historical writing.¹²

It should be noted, however, that national history has its advantages. It is much easier to write a national narrative precisely because of its reductionist character. Nation-states offer not only heroes and villains but also statistics and discourses. The bulk of the existing scholarly historical literature is written from a national perspective. It is easier to use this research and stay within its framework than to follow a transnational approach, which requires substantial new research. Above all, national history has a market advantage because of its popularity. In spite of the many appeals and attempts to Europeanize history in the old EU countries, most readers, especially the older generation, prefer national narratives. In the media, books that touch upon sensitive national issues get better coverage and more reviews than books with a European dimension, since the media are still mostly organized on a national level, and historiography still influences the formation and change of national identities.

Yet, since 1989–91, new and better circumstances have arisen for going beyond the perspective of national history. With small exceptions in the Caucasus and the former Yugoslavia, international borders in Europe are stable and undisputed; hence no country need fear that plu-

ralizing its “own” history might endanger its existence or territory. A discussion about the Polish past of Lviv does not trigger territorial claims to that city on the part of the Polish government. One could also argue that so many years after independence Ukraine is sufficiently consolidated not to need a mythical national history any more. Such a history might even be counterproductive, since collective memories in western, central, southern and eastern Ukraine are so different. If those memories are at odds with a narrow state-sponsored national history, the conflict between history and memory may even weaken national identity.

Another factor that supports a transnational paradigm is the process of European integration. The once dominant nation-state has lost relevance, while international politics and cultural and economic exchange are receiving greater attention. The more closely the European states are integrated, the more questions about European history are asked. This is an obvious trend among students not only in Germany and France but also in Poland and Ukraine. Although Ukraine is not (yet) a member of the EU, economic and cultural exchange with its western neighbors, especially Poland, has grown, raising interest in the common past of Ukraine and Poland. Moreover, labor migration to Italy, Spain and Portugal connects Ukraine to European countries that were inaccessible before 1991.

Europeanization is paralleled by globalization, which also deeply influences Ukraine. One need only think of Ukraine’s recent economic growth, driven in part by Chinese demand for steel produced in the Donbas region. Moreover, Ukraine has always had strong trans-Atlantic connections through the exile community in the United States and Canada.¹³ This is obviously relevant on the political level. Ukraine is the primary recipient of American political aid in the post-Soviet space, and it sent soldiers to Iraq, a country of which not many Ukrainians had heard before 1991. The connections to America are also of great importance for historiography. As Mark von Hagen shows in his article in this volume, the study of Ukraine has become an increasingly international project and process.

But there are more than presentist arguments for a transnational paradigm in Ukrainian historiography. As Charles Maier points out in his influential article about the periodization of modern history, the age of territorialized nation-states began in the 1860s and has been waning since the 1960s.¹⁴ Although nationalism had a terrible comeback in the former Yugoslavia and was a major factor in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it peaked in Europe during the first half of the twentieth

century. Precisely because Ukraine was ruled by empires for such a long time, its history cannot be written within a national framework. Thus there are profound historical arguments for a transnational approach to Ukrainian history. This may influence Western scholars, who take the existence of nation-states more for granted than Ukrainians, Poles or other East Central Europeans, and it may eventually change the historiography of Europe.

But what precisely does the term “transnational” mean? It is generally agreed that transnational history differs from international or diplomatic history. The new paradigm concentrates on relations between cultures, societies, or groups of societies and deliberately transcends the boundaries of one culture or country. It concentrates on agents of cultural exchange and is thus oriented toward agency.¹⁵ Yet transnational history also requires profound knowledge of sending and receiving cultures and thus has to be built upon structural comparisons. Transnational history refutes simple models of diffusion. It studies the ways in which cultures use and appropriate cultural goods of foreign origin.

As Andreas Kappeler observes in his contribution to this volume, there is no consensus on the definition and application of the term “transnational.” Some authors implicitly regard the transnational approach as an extension of national history. They still prefer to focus on the history of one country but propose to put it into a broader international context. This would be a minimal version of transnational history, but it might suffice to help open up Ukrainian history and internationalize master narratives in standard schoolbooks and on an academic level.¹⁶

Other historians, including the present author, criticize the national ontology of European cultures on more fundamental grounds. Europeans have become used to labeling and understanding their environment in national terms. But in Eastern Europe especially, there has always been a great divide between cities and rural areas. To a city dweller of the late nineteenth century, a peasant might seem as alien as a foreign national, and vice versa. Another obvious and well-studied distinction was that of religion. There is a danger in the very term “transnational” that all these social and cultural differences may be reduced to issues of nationality and ethnicity. Accordingly, this new paradigm should be understood in a broader sense. It can help demonstrate the connectedness and hybridity of European cultures (whether they are defined as national or not) and change the established mindset of historians. The transnational paradigm might motivate one to look abroad as much as to one’s own country or place of residence, applying “externalism” to cor-

rect the aforementioned internalism, which dominated historiography for such a long time.

There have been previous attempts to overcome national limitations or, to put it more broadly, the provincialism of historiography. These attempts, which were made long before the term “transnational” came into use and grew fashionable, have shaped the recent debate in Germany and France. I shall now go on to introduce these approaches and ask how they might be applied to Ukrainian history.

Comparative History

As early as the interwar period, the French historian Marc Bloch proposed in his article “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes” to juxtapose the histories of neighboring European societies in order to explain their specific development.¹⁷ In this sense Bloch, one of the founders of the Annales school, was close to Max Weber. The German sociologist had compared the attitudes of various world religions to explain why modern capitalism developed first and most strongly in northern Protestant countries.¹⁸ Because of this tradition, the Dutch historian Chris Lorenz concluded in his book on the theory of historiography that the main purpose of comparisons is to generate explanations.¹⁹ But besides exploring an additional explanatory potential, which Bloch most brilliantly demonstrated in his analysis of feudal societies, comparatists also connected various countries and cultures.²⁰ One may criticize Bloch or Weber as Eurocentric, yet both showed genuine interest in non-European cultures.

Weber deeply influenced the Bielefeld school of social history in postwar West Germany, which aspired to go beyond historicism and apply the tools of modern social science to history. It was not interested in “great men” or in narrow political history but in the history of society. Jürgen Kocka particularly advocated comparisons between societies. A problem of major interest was that of explaining Germany’s *Sonderweg*, the development of which led to the rise of National Socialism.²¹ Imperial and Weimar Germany was contrasted with the United States, England and France in order to generate a causal explanation for the rise of militarism and anti-Semitism in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The main approach was a comparison of social groups and societies. One of the (many) conclusions derived from this research was that Germany had a relatively weak bourgeoisie with a limited democratic consciousness that was further hampered by a mili-

taristic state and feudal elites. There were of course much more refined arguments about the *Sonderweg*, but research on it helped build up an antifeudal and antimilitaristic identity in postwar Germany and motivated several generations of historians to look beyond the boundaries of their country and culture.²²

If this research model were applied to Ukraine, one might ask why Ukraine failed to establish an independent nation-state for such a long time. One could then compare the Ukrainian and Polish elites, and a likely explanation would be that independence was hampered by the mostly peasant character of Ukrainian society in the early twentieth century. Or one might conclude that the population that could be considered Ukrainian was less affected by modern nationalism than were the Poles, who had fought wars of independence in 1794, 1830–31 and 1863. A third explanation could be that the main obstacle for the Ukrainians was lack of international recognition as a nation. The variety of possible explanations derived from such comparisons shows how fruitful this method can be. Comparative research schemes generate new questions and contribute to new insights.

Moreover, comparisons connect the study of two or more countries and thus in principle support a transnational paradigm. If one compares the politicization and nationalization of Ukrainian and Polish society in the early twentieth century, one connects the study of Poland and Ukraine. It follows that no history is unique, but all must be viewed in relative terms. Even national suffering, so prominent in the history of Ukraine, Poland, and other nations of East Central Europe, becomes less unique. This might lead to communication with neighboring countries and their historians in order to go beyond mutually exclusive martyrologies.²³ And there would be learning effects across borders. For example, it used to be a commonplace that the Germans, fascinated by the military and a strong state, were especially belligerent. But comparative research has shown that admiration for the military and radical nationalism has also been strong in France.²⁴ The conclusion of this comparative research is that prior to World War I militarism was a European problem with specific characteristics in various countries. There might also be learning effects for Polish-Ukrainian history. It has become a dogma in Poland that the People's Republic of Poland is not acknowledged as an independent Polish state. Accordingly, the interwar republic is considered the Second Republic, followed by post-1989 Poland, which is termed the Third Republic. But compared to Ukraine or East Germany, Poland was highly independent in the socialist period. Hence the

comparative study of Poland (and Ukraine) might put such common-places of national history into question.

Yet one should not overlook certain basic problems if traditional models of comparative history are applied to the study of Ukraine. The Annales and Bielefeld schools relied heavily on the nation-state as a framework for comparison. In the case of Ukraine and most Central and East European nations, there was no independent statehood for a long time, so that framework cannot be applied. Nor should one overlook the problems that "statism" created in French and German historiography. Quite often the past was inappropriately interpreted from the perspective of the nation-state. The Holy Roman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were multiethnic entities in which social stratification was much more relevant than ethnic divisions. The same problem exists in the Ukrainian lands, which were inhabited by various ethnic groups, and where nationally conscious Ukrainians were probably a minority until World War I.²⁵ In general, any large-scale spatial organization of comparisons is difficult in areas where borders moved frequently. For example, if one compares Germany and Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where would one draw the line between those two units of analysis? This might be considered a highly abstract problem, but it is relevant, for one can only compare units that are clearly defined and capable of being distinguished.²⁶

If the framework of a stable state is absent, macro-comparisons could alternatively rely on societal units of analysis. Instead of nation-states, one would compare societies or social groups. This is what Marc Bloch proposed, basically equating societies and nations. But if one compares Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian society, this again creates many problems. In the modern period one is confronted with the fact that these societies overlapped in the spatial and social sense. Moreover, for a very long time social hierarchies were more important than ethnic divisions, which also explains why many large landowners of East Slavic origin and Orthodox religious allegiance considered themselves Poles. There would also be a danger of labeling people whose national allegiance or culture we cannot verify as Poles, Ukrainians, or Russians and thus members of the respective societies. But even in the age of nationalism significant numbers of people had multiple identities. One need only mention the Szeptycki or Sheptytsky family to indicate the problem. While one brother was a Polish general, another was the leader of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. Moreover, people drew on their mixed cultural background according to context. As linguistic research in

other parts of East Central Europe has shown, use of language depended on social context.²⁷ People often spoke different languages and dialects at home, in the marketplace, and when they had to communicate with state authorities. Hence great care must be taken in using language as a marker of identity. The same is true for large parts of Ukraine, where the spread of a codified national language and the diffusion of national identities among the population occurred relatively late.

It may be concluded that the comparison of societies according to Bloch and the Bielefeld school of social history can hardly be applied to Ukraine. But one could choose units of comparisons *within* Ukraine and compare them with similar entities farther west or east. For example, Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa have many similarities with multiethnic cities such as Riga, Vilnius, Prague, and Budapest, or even Belfast and Liverpool.²⁸ Villages with a low level of literacy and politicization can be found in the late nineteenth century not only in Ukraine but also in the Balkans, Italy, or Spain. There are of course many more medium-sized units of comparison, such as institutions. Below this one could compare neighborhoods, families and smaller units. This would also be in line with recent trends in international comparative historiography, where macro-units are increasingly replaced by small or medium-range units of analysis.²⁹

The Approach of Transfer History

Another way of doing transnational history is the “cultural transfer” or “transfer history” approach, developed in France since the 1980s.³⁰ Its two main proponents, Michael Werner and Michel Espagne, were interested in foreign influences on French culture that had previously been studied mostly from an internalist perspective, meaning that major events and processes in French history were explained by previous events and processes in France. An early object of study in this regard was the reception in France of the German poet Heinrich Heine, who greatly influenced French literature. Later on, Werner and Espagne covered other areas of French and German culture that had been driven by cultural transfers. “Transfer” was used in order to avoid the term “influence” and older models of diffusion. In contrast to the latter, the “cultural transfer” approach stresses the adaptation and appropriation of imported cultural goods.

The recent discussion concerning transnational history in Germany

and France has its roots in a sometimes polemical debate, which peaked in the late 1990s, between adherents of traditional historical comparison and proponents of the model of transfer history.³¹ Michel Espagne attacked the comparatists for artificially juxtaposing isolated national cases and overlooking contacts between cultures.³² He also criticized comparisons as too static, concentrating excessively on structures instead of agency. The debate reflects the fact that most comparatists in Germany and France have a background in social history, while proponents of the model of transfer history have a propensity to cultural history and are influenced by postmodernism.

The potential of this approach has been demonstrated in many areas. One example is welfare systems, which are widely studied in comparative history. According to an internalist interpretation, the various models of the German, French or Swedish welfare state appeared to be unique national achievements. In fact, however, these welfare states developed from the late nineteenth century not only because of specific national traditions, needs and responses but also because of mutual influences and cultural transfers. It was common practice to refer to foreign models when arguing for changes in social policy.³³ Even if the reference was negative, such models served as examples and implicitly influenced other countries. Another example is that of social history as pursued during the Cold War. Despite the political confrontation between East and West, the two sides influenced each other through competition between their welfare systems. The countries of Western Europe, especially West Germany, competed with eastern countries in the establishment of social standards.

Another example of continuous and intensive cultural transfers is education. The French university system partly rejected but generally adopted the German or Humboldtian model in the second half of the nineteenth century.³⁴ Juxtaposing these social security or university systems in a traditional comparison, one would find many differences and then probably conclude that one country was more advanced than the other. Comparison might indicate an exceptional case, but then it would be hard to offer a convincing explanation of how Europe built up such a high general level of social security and public education. To date, most studies of transfer history have concentrated on France and Germany. Together with earlier comparative studies, they have shown how closely the French and Germans observed themselves and then used and adopted or rejected elements of the neighboring culture.

Similar conclusions can be drawn about Polish–German relations.³⁵ The ways in which Germans came to define themselves as a modern nation in the course of the nineteenth century, pivotal aspects of imperial German politics, and the obstacles to democratization before World War I were deeply connected with the partition of Poland and the presence of a strong Polish minority in Germany, and hence of Poles as agents in German history.

In this volume, Roman Szporluk argues convincingly for the western or Polish dimension of Ukrainian history. But one could also turn the argument around and reassess the Ukrainian dimension in Polish history. The great-power status of the Polish Commonwealth was obviously based on the possession of Ukraine. When Poland lost Left-Bank Ukraine to Russia in 1667, the balance of power shifted to Russia for almost three centuries, until 1991.³⁶ There were also many influences in the realm of culture, as exemplified in fashion, the vogue for Sarmatism, and the ideology of the borderlands (*kresy*), which were seen as the locus of true Polish culture.

Even after the partitions, the Ukrainian lands and the *kresy* remained a major point of reference in Poland. There Wincenty Pol and other intellectuals discovered their imagined homelands and the ideal of unspoiled Polish culture.³⁷ In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Polish and Ukrainian national movements began to compete, their mutual references became increasingly negative. The competition and conflict between Poles and Ukrainians shows that the very formation of modern European nations can only be understood if one analyzes the complex interaction of nationalisms and national movements. This might appear obvious, but works of national history like Subtelny's textbook usually treat the Ukrainian national movement and its ideology in a rather isolated manner. There was also intensive interaction between the imperial government and Russian nationalism on the one hand and Ukrainian nationalism on the other in the Russian Empire.³⁸ In other words, even the phenomenon of nationalism requires a transfer history approach. This is also a good basis for the study of internal communication in the Ukrainian national movement. As shown by a recent study of Ukrainian activists from both empires, public encounters beyond the borders of the Habsburg and Romanov empires shaped the ideology of the Ukrainian national movement³⁹ ("movements" may be the more appropriate term until the late nineteenth century).

The "cultural transfer" approach does not idealize contacts between two countries or cultures. It includes the deliberate exclusion and rejec-

tion of elements of culture perceived as foreign. But territorial entities and groups that perceived themselves as backward had a particularly strong tendency to look across the border and import and adapt cultural goods from abroad. "Comparing oneself" has been a driving force in East Central European and Ukrainian history since the Age of Enlightenment. This was not restricted to the realm of culture in the narrow sense. The "reforms from above" that were so typical of the states of East Central Europe in the "long" nineteenth century constituted a reaction to a perceived backwardness and were meant to help those states catch up with such cultural and economic pioneers as France or England. This resulted in major changes. Remarkably, for example, the Habsburg Empire caught up economically at least to some degree with the more industrialized countries of Europe.⁴⁰

These cultural transfers continued in the twentieth century in spite of the erection of new and less permeable state borders and ideological boundaries in the interwar and postwar periods. The countries and societies of East Central Europe kept on comparing themselves with a presumably more advanced "West," even when the Soviet Union proclaimed that it had entered upon a victorious path of development. Cultural transfers based on a broad definition of culture have also been a crucial factor in the process of transformation in the former communist countries since 1989. That transformation was driven by Western examples, their transfer to the formerly socialist countries, and the local adaptation of cultural goods. Institutions like the International Monetary Fund and individuals such as Jeffrey Sachs and the former finance ministers Leszek Balcerowicz and Viktor Yushchenko played a crucial role as agents of cultural transfer.

The *historicity of comparisons* is only one historical argument for combining the traditional comparative method with the "cultural transfer" approach. The sometimes sharp polemics between proponents of these approaches overlook the fact that both are constructivist, since they combine the study of units that have to be detached from their context and connected by the researcher. The analysis of cultural transfers requires drawing a boundary between the transmitting and receiving culture and defining "one's own" and "the other." Obviously, this is a complex task in the case of Ukraine because of its history as part of several empires, but such complexity might well serve to modify the "cultural transfer" approach itself. The cultural holism that characterizes some of the French and German literature on the subject, which speaks of *one* German or French culture, cannot be sustained in the case of

Ukraine. In the imperial period at least, one must speak of Ukrainian cultures in the plural.⁴¹

The difference on the hermeneutical level is more operational than theoretical. As noted above, it is the purpose of scholarly comparisons to measure differences and commonalities and produce causal explanations. But the latter goal can often be attained only if one takes account of previous cultural transfers. In the “cultural transfer” model, which is central to the transnational paradigm, analysis relies on knowledge of the transmitting and receiving cultures. This is necessary in order to understand why certain cultural goods were imported and then adapted. It follows that both units, the exporting and receiving cultures, have to be compared.⁴²

Both approaches, historical comparison and transfer history, have so far concentrated on national units of analysis. While in the case of comparative history the main objects of interest have been nation-states and nationally defined societies, transfer history has dealt mostly with national cultures, especially those of France and Germany. Since the mid-1990s Espagne and Matthias Middell have broadened their scope and analyzed cultural transfers to and from regions, especially Saxony.⁴³ But regions are constructed entities like nation-states and thus are not fundamentally different on a theoretical level. They still conform to territorialized thinking. Both approaches have the common goal of producing a historiography that transcends current national borders, but both are deeply rooted in a national ontology. It is therefore questionable whether they can serve as a basis for the transnational paradigm. Institutions, social groups, elements of culture, and other small or medium-sized units are better suited to the transnational approach than the traditional macro-units of analysis.

The Concept of *Histoire Croisée*

The French historian Michael Werner has concluded that comparative history and the study of cultural transfers belong to a “family of relational approaches.”⁴⁴ He introduced into the debate the term *histoire croisée*, which can be translated literally as “crossed history.” *Croiser* has two dimensions. Like Espagne, Werner argues firstly that German and French history are closely connected. This argument could also be applied to German and Polish or Polish and Ukrainian history. Secondly, Werner explicitly avows the constructivist nature of his approach. Together with his coauthor, Bénédicte Zimmermann, he has devoted

considerable thought to the historian's position vis-à-vis his object of analysis. This demand for self-reflexivity shows the influence of post-modernism.⁴⁵

The recent theoretical debate should be seen in a wider context, for it reveals interesting parallels with the political development of France, Germany, and the European Community/Union. In the 1970s–80s, when social history comparisons reached their peak, the European Community was still conceptualized (according to Adenauer and De Gaulle) as a union of fatherlands. The European political order of nation-states also influenced the structure of European history departments in the United States, which usually divided the field into chairs of French, German, English, Russian, and other national histories.⁴⁶ Hence the juxtaposition of national cases in comparative social history corresponded to the postwar political situation. In Germany, there was also a strong trans-Atlantic dimension in comparative history. The focus on comparisons with Western countries reflected the strong desire of the political and intellectual elite of the Federal Republic to integrate with the West. Consequently, German historians rarely made comparisons that went beyond the Iron Curtain and dealt with Central and Eastern Europe.⁴⁷

There is also a political background to the study of cultural transfers. As proponents of this approach stressed the connections between French and German history,⁴⁸ the two countries signed the Maastricht Treaty, which set the pace for a common currency, the Euro, and a much closer integration of Western Europe. Transfer history might be interpreted as a historical blueprint for the present integration of Germany and France and the deepening of the European Union. *Histoire croisée* suggests a historiography of European countries integrated so closely that they no longer need separate national histories. Yet the parallels between historiography and politics should not be carried too far. Michael Werner was already developing his *histoire croisée* before the introduction of the Euro and before the Bush administration provoked attempts at closer European integration. In Western Europe, historians are not subject to political dictates and sometimes write books that run counter to prevailing trends. This is apparent from older works of “transnational” history that did not use this term but pursued similar aims.

When the French historian Lucien Febvre published his book about the Rhine River more than seventy years ago, the Nazis had just taken power and were about to provoke another war with France. This work by one of the founders of the Annales school deserves special attention because it integrates both sides of a contested border region into one

transnational historical narrative.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the book is based on a regional approach and thus already went beyond the nation-state paradigm. The Czech historian Josef Pekař did not go as far as Febvre, but in some of his works he also took an approach that could now be called transnational. He argued in his programmatic book *O smyslu českých dějin* (On the Meaning of Czech History, first published in 1929) that foreign—Byzantine, West European, German, and Hungarian—influences were of paramount importance to Czech history. Pekař concluded that at times these external factors shaped the history of the Czechs more than internal developments.⁵⁰ These examples of interwar historiography show that attempts to transcend the national paradigm of history are not a novelty. Although the term “transnational” had not yet been invented, the national and then still mostly nationalist tradition of historiography was already being challenged.

Nationalism in Europe reached its peak in the interwar period; today, by contrast, few historians argue openly for the national paradigm. In Canada and the United States, sympathy for national history often takes the form of rebuking multiculturalism and political correctness and criticizing topics such as diasporas, minority cultures, postcolonialism, or world history.⁵¹ In Europe, advocacy of the national paradigm is also usually implicit or indirect. The argument is made that national history remains relevant (which is indisputable), that European history was shaped by nations, that the welfare state was built up by nation-states, and so on. As mentioned earlier, the national paradigm is also supported by conventional narrative structures and the present state of research.

In contrast to the implicit character of national history, transnational history is necessarily explicit. In his proposal for a *histoire croisée* and his empirical studies of cultural transfers, Michael Werner has in effect developed a Carolingian vision of German and French history. This is now being realized in a new book series entitled *Deutsch-französische Geschichte* (German-French History).⁵² If one carries his article and the concept of this book series further, the study of these two countries can be reconceptualized as Western or West Central European area studies.

Werner's proposal corresponds to approaches already developed for studying the history of Central or East Central Europe. This part of Europe is commonly understood to comprise countries and regions located between Germany in the west and Russia in the east. In the postwar period, the exiled Polish historian Oskar Halecki, the German historian Klaus Zernack, the Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs and other scholars expended considerable effort to define the historical region of

“Central Europe,” usually known in German as *Ostmitteleuropa* (East Central Europe).⁵³

These founding fathers of Central or East Central European history as area studies—both terms are often used interchangeably—based their definition on *Strukturgeschichte*, a framework of social and political structures. According to this view, developments in East Central Europe were driven by Western Christianization and the establishment of relatively autonomous cities governed by Magdeburg law. There was an extraordinarily long and intensive tradition of feudalism, a strong nobility, and a relatively weak bourgeoisie. Consequently, the economy remained largely agrarian, and industrialization came late. Other characteristics commonly associated with East Central Europe are long-lasting imperial rule and ethnic diversity, which resulted in nationalism, armed conflicts and wars.⁵⁴ These structural factors of East Central European history have often been viewed normatively and condemned as late, untimely, backward, superficial, distorted (and other negative terms) on a scale of time or values. These negative judgements, especially pronounced in Szűcs’s work, are based on comparisons with “normal” development in the West. Hence there are certain parallels to the *Sonderweg* argument, which accentuated the exceptionalism of Germany vis-à-vis the West.

The structural history of East Central Europe was based on comparative studies encompassing the territory from the Elbe River in Germany to the western borderlands of the Russian Empire. This obviously puts Germany and Ukraine in an awkward position. Klaus Zernack includes the northeastern part of the German Empire in the study of East Central Europe, which corresponds to the mapping of the preeminent English-language journal devoted to the region, *Central European History*.

But the aforementioned authors have also drawn a line dividing (East) Central Europe from East Slavic, Orthodox and, from 1917 to 1991, Soviet Europe.⁵⁵ This distinction was again influenced by political considerations, especially an attempt to distinguish the socialist countries in the Soviet sphere of influence from the Soviet Union itself. This obviously creates a problem for Ukraine. While its western parts can be included in East Central Europe according to the standard definition, eastern Ukraine does not share all of these structural characteristics. But how sustainable is the structural definition of East Central Europe or *Ostmitteleuropa*?

Structurally defined area studies are based on the assumption that the aforementioned characteristics shaped the history of the region from the

Middle Ages until recent times. But Bohemia can hardly be considered agrarian in the modern period: in Bohemia and Poland large landowners were a major force for modernization in the nineteenth century,⁵⁶ and even ethnic conflict was more a result of the modern nation-building process than of ethnic diversity as such. It was not the diversity of languages and cultures per se that gave rise to conflict but the interpretation of cultural and social conflict in national terms. Clearly, this structural definition of East Central Europe needs to be modified from a perspective that does not ignore the postmodern critique of *longue durée* approaches and causal explanations. This also opens up greater prospects for including Ukraine in the study of Central Europe.

In Austria there has been an additional attempt to define Central Europe. The historian Moritz Csáky has developed a cultural definition of the region that was applied to many of his special research fields, such as music theatre, everyday culture, and memory. According to Csáky, Central Europe was partly united by the aforementioned structures, but even more by culture on various levels, ranging from food to the high arts. He stresses the relevance of communication and cultural transfers within the region,⁵⁷ maintaining that there was a common cultural identification in the late Habsburg Empire.⁵⁸ Csáky's cultural concept of Central European studies has the advantage of being more flexible and inclusionary than the standard structural definition.

Such a culturally based concept of area studies facilitates the integration of Ukraine into the study of Central or East Central Europe. In the early modern period there was intensive communication with the West through Poland, shaping many areas of cultural history such as religion (Union of Brest) and public education. Often these transfers encountered fierce resistance but nevertheless provided a strong stimulus. An example of this was the establishment of the Kyiv Mohyla Collegium, which was also a counter-reaction against the activities of the Jesuits.⁵⁹ Hence cultural transfers did not necessarily create convergence but also produced conflict and resistance.

For a "cultural history" concept of Central Europe it is equally important to note that cultural transfers did not proceed in only one direction. For example, Sarmatism, a basic element of Commonwealth culture, was shaped by cultural transfers from Ukraine to Poland. These connections were so strong that one can regard Ukraine as part of Central Europe at least until the late eighteenth century.

The problem is that the standard national interpretation of Ukrainian history has reduced the Polish period to a narrative of feudal exploita-

tion, suffering and national resistance, although the Khmelnytsky Uprising could also be interpreted as an intra-elite conflict within the Commonwealth. Perhaps the time has come to acknowledge that the Commonwealth was not exclusively detrimental to the Ukrainian lands, that many nobles of Ukrainian origin chose to be integrated into it, and that this early modern state was not a nation-state bent on suppression. On the Polish side, Andrzej Kamiński has opened the door to a new interpretation with his book *A Republic of Many Nations*, while in Ukraine Natalia Yakovenko's research on medieval and early modern Ukraine has surpassed established nationalistic or anachronistic interpretations of early modern history.⁶⁰

After the partitions of Poland, the Ukrainian lands were mostly governed by Russia and hence are rarely regarded as part of East Central Europe. Yet the national movement in Ukraine was greatly inspired by the Polish example. There are also many parallels with the Czech national movement, which had to act without a strong social elite or indigenous aristocracy of the kind that existed in Poland or Hungary. The lower-class origin of the activists of the national movement was initially a disadvantage, especially for advocating interests within the institutional framework of the Russian and Habsburg empires. But the strong social component made Ukrainian nationalism attractive to the lower classes and contributed to the creation of a popular culture. The composers Bedřich Smetana and Mykola Lysenko created a unique musical culture that simultaneously attracted the masses and could be interpreted as high art.⁶¹ Within the framework of the Habsburg Empire, there were also numerous cultural transfers from the Czech to the Ruthenian and, later, the Ukrainian national movement. All this can serve as an argument for including Ukraine in Central or East Central European studies. Finally, one can use a presentist argument. The Orange Revolution of 2004 set Ukraine on the path taken by Central Europe in 1989, and the country is now developing into a pluralistic democracy.

Area studies based on communication and interaction rather than on social structures have the additional advantage that the various spaces under consideration do not have to be treated as mutually exclusive territorial units. For example, there are areas of geographical and topographical overlap between Michael Werner's Carolingian West Central Europe and a Germano-Slavic East Central Europe. Metropolises in particular functioned as centers of communication for several cultural spaces and as nodes of cultural exchange. Vienna was obviously an

important political and cultural center for East Central Europe, but it also heavily influenced German culture and politics and should therefore be integrated into Werner's Franco-German *histoire croisée*. Because of its status in music and opera production and, at times, as a political capital, Vienna is also part of Italian or South European cultural history. Metastasio, the most productive author of librettos in the history of opera, was long employed by the Viennese court.

Another example of the multispatial relevance of a metropole is the port city of Hamburg. On the one hand, it is located in western Germany and has always played a major role in exchange with the Netherlands, England, and the North Atlantic. On the other hand, Hamburg was a major port of emigration and trade for the East Elbian areas of Prussia, as well as for Bohemia and Poland. In the history of opera and theater, Hamburg closely cooperated and competed with Leipzig, Dresden, Prague, Vienna, and Budapest. Thus it was the hub of an axis of cultural transfers whose influence extended into Southeastern Europe.⁶² There was an intense exchange of composers, conductors, costumes, music scores, singers, and actors along this route.

Kyiv played a similar role in Central and Eastern Europe.⁶³ On the one hand it was a city inhabited by a strong Polish aristocracy and hence had a Polish theater with a typical repertoire for the period. Naturally, the Polish theater concentrated on Polish plays, especially comedies, but also offered Italian opera in a stagione system. After the uprising of 1863 the Russian government attempted to strengthen Russian culture in Kyiv. It invested heavily in cultural institutions and eventually built what is now the Ukrainian national opera house. However, because of its representative function, the Russian theater and other state-funded cultural institutions had difficulty in reaching a mass audience. This created an opportunity for popular Ukrainian culture, which used the vernacular and was staged in more accessible public spaces. Hence Kyiv was a crossroads of aristocratic Polish, imperial Russian, and popular Ukrainian culture. Since 2005, the Ukrainian historian Ostap Sereda has been studying this unique conjunction in a project with the working title "Musical Theatre and Cultural Politics in Russian-Ruled Kyiv in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century"⁶⁴ It remains to be seen whether the national or the social dimension of these three cultures is the main factor of differentiation.

Culturally defined area studies can contribute to a new mental mapping of Europe in which places and axes of cultural exchange, not the nation-state or other territorial units of analysis, shape the map of the

continent. It should be stressed that this vision is not driven by antipathy to nation-states but follows Charles Maier's observation that the territorialized state reached its apex between the 1860s and the 1960s. Since then, Europe and the globe have entered a post-territorial age. Moreover, the period of nation-states was delayed in East Central Europe by the long duration of multinational empires. East of Germany, some nation-states were formed in 1918, but a full-fledged system of nation-states was established only in 1989–91.⁶⁵ This is yet another, purely historical, reason why the national framing of historiography should be avoided or at least reduced in the case of Ukraine. Area studies are an already well-established way to move in that direction. Framing historiography in terms of larger European regions would be a particularly fruitful pedagogical device, producing students who know several languages and cultures.

European History as a Process

If cultural history is used as a basis for area studies, a different picture of Europe and European history emerges. For the early modern period and the “long” nineteenth century, one can distinguish partly overlapping West Central and East Central European, East European, and South European or Mediterranean cultural spaces.⁶⁶ But beyond these culturally defined areas, Europe served as a common (and disputed) point of reference and denominator for all subregions. Europe itself can be regarded as a cultural space held together by communication and interaction, even if it was conflictual. In this view, Europe is not a territorial container full of history, like nation-states full of national history,⁶⁷ but a process and a result of communication and interaction. This approach might appear to be highly constructivist at first glance, but obviously the cultural transfers also decreased in several periods of history such as the Cold War.

Regarding Europe not as a fixed territorial unit or a *telos* but as an open process can help prevent European history from becoming confined to member countries of the enlarged EU and excluding Ukraine. In the non-academic literature, as well as in most recent master narratives of European history, one finds many attempts to construct such a Europe on the basis of normatively charged elements of culture such as the tradition of the Occident, Western Christianity or the Judeo-Christian tradition, Latin literature, Roman law, the Enlightenment, secularism, overcoming nationalism, and so on.⁶⁸ This results in an affirmative understanding of Europe that may be useful politically, but not for analytical purposes.

Understanding Europe as a space of communication and interaction and focusing on cultural history would make it possible to study not only its intensive internal but also external cultural exchange, which is again of particular relevance to Ukraine. The name “Ukraine” means borderland, and indeed it bordered not only on Russia and Poland but also on the Ottoman Empire. Neal Ascherson’s work addresses some of the cultural exchange that took place across the Black Sea, which could be expanded into an eastern version of Braudel’s Mediterranean.⁶⁹ But there are also other vectors of communication and interaction with the Ukrainian lands. Through the Russian Empire, Ukraine participated in a vital cultural exchange with Central Asia. Ukrainians were recruited for the task of colonization, which on the one hand promoted their Slavic and imperial identity but, on the other, weakened their Ukrainian national identity (if formed prior to their departure for the Asian regions of the Russian Empire). Postcolonial approaches might also be applied to the analysis of Russo-Ukrainian relations.⁷⁰ The high-handed and patriarchal attitudes of past and present Russian elites toward Ukraine are reflected in the historical term “Little Russians.” These attitudes have also influenced conflicts between Russia and Ukraine since 1991.

Postcolonial studies have generally increased sensitivity to the fact that cultural relations rarely involve roughly equal partners like France and Germany. The political and social asymmetry between cultures is an urgent problem in the study of Ukraine, where nobiliary Polish and imperial Russian culture and rule were long dominant. But foreign domination also resulted in learning processes that cannot be evaluated only in terms of suffering. The inhabitants of Ukraine observed, utilized and transformed elements of Polish and Russian culture. And in spite of the great famine of 1932–33, the forced-labor camps and other components of Soviet totalitarianism, Ukraine also benefited in paradoxical ways from Russian rule within the Soviet Empire. Stalin established the present-day western boundaries of Ukraine by westward expansion of the Soviet Union at Poland’s expense.⁷¹

Throughout Europe, the amount and intensity of cultural transfers grew exponentially in the second half of the nineteenth century until World War I. This also connected Ukraine with cultures beyond those of its immediate neighbors. Ivan Franko was not only a great Ukrainian writer but also a Habsburg cultural figure who published in German, as well as in Polish.⁷² Mykola Lysenko composed in a national style comparable to that of Moniuszko or Glinka. He integrated popular harmonies, rhythms, melodies and dances into his music and thus invented a Ukrain-

ian style that was later canonized. He was also influenced by composers of the New German School (Neudeutsche Schule), especially Wagner and Smetana. This fusion of styles gave his work a unique quality with which students of Central and West European music are insufficiently acquainted. It would be an exaggeration to claim that Lysenko influenced German or Austrian composers, but the creation of national styles throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century had an impact on the development of opera and instrumental music on the continent. Music was increasingly perceived through the prism of national culture. This also affected the once universal Italian opera, which became one of many national styles, forcing Italian (and French) composers to respond with their own musical nationalism.⁷³

In the half century before World War I, cultural exchanges, which can also be observed in politics and economics, were institutionalized and transformed into networks.⁷⁴ Europe increasingly became a point of reference, a space of experience and agency (*Erfahrungsraum* and *Handlungsraum*). Among the elites, one also observes a rising European consciousness.⁷⁵ Affection for an idealized Europe was especially strong in the eastern part of the continent.⁷⁶ During the 1880s, a widely distributed Polish cultural journal in Warsaw introduced a column titled “From Europe” and was thus among the first periodicals to perceive the continent as a common cultural space.⁷⁷ This process of Europeanization and cultural exchange affected illiterate peasants in Ukraine much less and on a different level, but members of the Ukrainian elites were involved in this European cultural space. In fact, they could travel more freely through Europe than their present-day successors.⁷⁸

Thanks to these cultural exchanges, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and other cities in Ukraine became European metropolises. They acquired the attributes of European culture—a representative opera house, a concert hall, public museums, and so on. These institutions were not just a façade of European civilization but were rooted in society, supported by associations and prosperous individuals. This urban elite differed from its Central and West European equivalents in social and ethnic background, but it aspired to create a cultural and social life perceived as European. The elite was mostly destroyed after the Russian Revolution and survived only partially in western Ukraine. The Bolsheviks also interrupted most of Ukraine’s contacts with its western neighbors. Thus the process of Europeanization in the “long” nineteenth century was halted and reversed after 1917 and 1939. Yet it is one of the ironies of the Soviet era that because of the classicism of Soviet cultural policy since the late

1920s, these cultural institutions retained their central status in society much longer than in Western Europe. Ukrainian parents still try to give their children a classical education if they can afford it. Even during the worst financial crises of the 1990s, cities like Lviv renovated their opera houses and public theaters. This propensity for European high culture may fade with the rise of the *nouveaux riches*, but one can still claim that in some aspects of their values and daily life Ukrainians are more (traditionally) European than Western Europeans.

This Europeanization was not restricted to “high” culture, which is a standard topic of transfer history. It can also be observed on a different social level and historical stratum—that of migration. As Klaus Bade has put it, nineteenth-century Europe was “a continent on the move.”⁷⁹ The history of the Ukrainian diaspora in America shows that migrants often remained connected with their home places and countries. They advised relatives and friends whether to follow them, on the best means of transportation, where to look for work in cities and countries of arrival, and so on. This knowledge was communicated over great distances and contributed to patterns of migration based on gender, relatives, neighborhoods, or village communities. Studies from the Carpathian Mountains, an area of especially high emigration, have shown that even return migration was very frequent.⁸⁰ Just like agents of culture, these migrants formed networks maintained over long distances and considerable periods of time.

The Ukrainian diaspora was kept at a distance during the Soviet era, but since the independence of Ukraine it has been very active there. Diaspora historians also contributed to the nationalization of Ukrainian history, which was natural enough, since the continuous existence of a diaspora requires that its members maintain a strong ethnic and cultural identity. Yet the very existence of Ukrainian communities in the United States, Canada, Poland, and Germany adds another transnational aspect to Ukrainian history and supports a paradigm that goes beyond the territorialized nation-state.

Summary

This article begins with an introduction to the current debate on transnational history. It goes on to present a “family of relational approaches,” all of which can be used to go beyond the “internalism” of national history. The first extensively treated approach is that of historical comparison. The article emphasizes the explanatory potential of comparative

history, especially with regard to comparisons between Polish and Ukrainian history. Comparisons could also be carried out with more distant lands, connecting the study of Ukraine with that of other parts of Europe. Because of the difficulty of precisely locating and defining a Ukrainian state and society before 1991, comparisons are best pursued on a meso- or micro-level.

The second approach is that of “transfer history,” which is based on the study of cultural transfers. This approach concentrates on processes and agents of cultural exchange that are particularly relevant to Ukrainian history. Because of its history of Polish, Russian and Austrian rule and the long-lasting imperial order in East Central Europe, Ukraine was subject to multiple foreign influences. Transfer history does not, however, rely upon the term “influence.” It concentrates on processes of accommodation and utilization, investigating the ways in which local cultures use and transform imported cultural goods. Although transfer history has tended to concentrate on “high culture,” it could be applied to cultural history in the broad anthropological sense.

The approach of *histoire croisée* or “entangled history” is based on transfer history. Its added value lies in the study of two or more countries (that is, an area studies approach). The concept was developed for France and Germany (West Central Europe), but it could just as easily be applied to (East) Central European and Ukrainian history. Ukraine could also be integrated into cultural history concepts for the study of East Central Europe. To be sure, this approach is not new: it has been employed, for example, by the Institute of East Central Europe in Lublin, directed by Jerzy Kłoczowski. But the *histoire croisée* approach offers a more developed and somewhat postmodern methodological basis for area studies. Areas are defined not only on the basis of structural similarities but also on that of internal communication and interaction. This means that area studies become more flexible and less exclusive. East Central European studies that include Ukraine could be used for the development of university curricula, textbooks, and so on, making them practically relevant.

This article does not intend to prescribe ways of transnationalizing the study of history in Ukraine or the history of Ukraine as a subject. Its main purpose is to introduce recently discussed approaches that seek to overcome the “methodological nationalism” so apparent in Ukraine and other European countries. This might also be a way of integrating Ukrainian history into the European context and inspiring greater interest in the subject among international scholars.

Notes

- ¹ Ronald Grigor Suny, "History and the Making of Nations," in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk (Cambridge, MA, 2000), pp. 569–89, here 589. Since the present collection is addressed mainly to an English-speaking readership, most of my references are to English-language literature.
- ² For Hrushevsky's dual relevance as a historian and nation-builder, see Serhii Plokhyy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005); Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987). See also Prymak's more recent article, "The Hrushevsky Controversy at the End of the 1990s," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 26 (2001): 325–44.
- ³ For an almost exhaustive comparative survey of national movements in Europe, see a recent book by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 2005). This book is based on his earlier research on national movements of "small" nations, which is available in English: Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985).
- ⁴ See *Klio ohne Fesseln? Historiographie im östlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus*, eds. Alojz Ivanisevic, Andreas Kappeler, Walter Lukan, and Arnold Suppan (Frankfurt am Main, 2003).
- ⁵ The issue of nation-building through historiography is addressed by Taras Kuzio and Georgiy Kasianov in the collection *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, eds. Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri (Westport, CT, 2002).
- ⁶ For a very good history of historiography in summary form, see the work of the Dutch historian Chris Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie* (Köln, 1997).
- ⁷ See *Die Nation schreiben. Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich*, eds. Christoph Conrad and Sebastian Conrad (Göttingen, 2002).
- ⁸ On the problem of Polish–German relations and the history of conflict between these nations, see Klaus Zernack, *Preußen—Deutschland—Polen. Aufsätze zur Geschichte der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen* (Berlin, 1991).
- ⁹ See *Composing Urban History and the Constitution of Civic Identities*, eds. John J. Czaplicka and Blair A. Ruble (Baltimore, 2003); Peter O. Loew, *Danzig und seine Vergangenheit 1793–1997. Die Geschichtskultur einer Stadt zwischen Deutschland und Polen* (Osnabrück, 2003).
- ¹⁰ On "territorialization" and its development, see Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* (henceforth *AHR*) 105 (2000): 807–31. On the spatial dimension of European history, see also Karl Schlögel, *Im*

Räume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik (Munich, 2003).

- ¹¹ See Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Lviv: A Multicultural History through the Centuries," in *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture*, ed. John Czaplicka (Cambridge, MA, 2000), pp. 47–74. For an attempt to research the postwar history of Lviv from a transnational perspective, see a bilingual book based on oral history: Lutz Henke, Grzegorz Rossolinski and Philipp Ther, eds., *Eine neue Gesellschaft in einer alten Stadt. Erinnerung und Geschichtspolitik in Lemberg anhand der Oral History/Нове суспільство в давньому місті. Пам'ять та історична політика засобами oral history* (Wrocław, 2007).
- ¹² For a critique of this perspective, see the introduction to *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen, 2004), pp. 7–28.
- ¹³ This topic is addressed by Symon Narizhny in his *Ukrain's'ka emigratsiia. Kul'turna pratsia ukrain's'koï emigratsiï 1919–1939* (Prague, 1942; repr. Kyiv, 1999). See also, from a sociological perspective, Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London, 2002).
- ¹⁴ See Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century."
- ¹⁵ The main forums for the debate on transnational history in Europe have been the journals *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* and *Comparativ* in Germany and *Annales* in France. The debate has also resulted in the establishment of the Internet forum "geschichte.transnational" in H-Soz-u-Kult. Most recently H-German has opened a similar forum for the English-speaking community. There has also been an interesting debate about transnational history in the United States. Initially it was inspired by attempts to open up American history. On this debate, see *AHR* (October 1991) and the articles by Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *AHR* 96 (1991): 1031–55, and Michael McGerr, "The Price of the 'New Transnational History,'" *AHR* 96 (1991): 1056–67. These discussions were revived in the collection *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 2002). More recently, there was a debate in *AHR* on transnational history that focused more on global history and global connections, but remained rather vague in defining or operationalizing the approach. See "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," *AHR* 111 (2006): 1440–64.
- ¹⁶ See, e.g., Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Transnationale Geschichte—der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?" in *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, eds. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz (Göttingen 2006), pp. 161–174, here 173. Wehler, one of the main proponents of postwar social history, explicitly argues for keeping the nation state and national societies as key reference points for historical research
- ¹⁷ See the reprint of this article in Marc Bloch, *Histoire et historiens, textes réunis par Etienne Bloch* (Paris, 1995), pp. 94–123. A German version appears in *Marc Bloch: Aus der Werkstatt des Historikers*, ed. Peter Schötter (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), pp. 122–59.

- ¹⁸ For an interpretation of Weber with reference to historical comparisons, see *Max Weber, der Historiker*, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Göttingen, 1986).
- ¹⁹ See Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit*, pp. 231–84.
- ²⁰ For a (highly positive) account of Bloch's relevance, see *Marc Bloch aujourd'hui. Histoire comparée & Sciences sociales*, eds. Hartmut Atsma and André Burguière (Paris, 1990).
- ²¹ For a summary of the *Sonderweg* debate, see Jürgen Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German *Sonderweg*," *History and Theory* 38 (1999): 40–51. This volume of *History and Theory* is also of particular interest because it is dedicated to the theory of comparative history.
- ²² It is difficult to summarize the vast comparative research pursued by the Bielefeld school. An attempt was made by Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, who coedited the volume *Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996). A more recent interdisciplinary survey on the state of theoretical discussion is *Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichte- und Kulturwissenschaften*, eds. Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (Frankfurt am Main, 2003). See also the five articles collected in the chapter "L'exercice de la comparaison," *Annales HSS* 57, no. 1 (January–February 2002): 27–146. Discussion of comparative method has been less animated in the English-speaking world, but there is the aforementioned volume 38 of *History and Theory* and, of course, the *Journal of Comparative History*.
- ²³ As an example of how martyrology can be relativized by comparison, see Iaroslav Hrytsak, "Tezy do dyskusii pro UPA," in his *Strasti za natsionalizmom. Istorychni eseï* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 92–93.
- ²⁴ See *Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich. 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist, and Jakob Vogel (Göttingen, 1995).
- ²⁵ For the many obstacles confronting the national movement in Ukraine, especially in its Russian-ruled lands, see Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2000), pp. 129–35. See also Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* 54 (1995): 658–73. Obviously, there is much more literature about the Ukrainian national movement, but because this article concentrates on methods and approaches, its bibliography is strictly limited in this and other areas of Ukrainian history.
- ²⁶ The British historian John Breuilly has even advocated an experimental approach in which the cases to be compared would be isolated, as in a scientific experiment. Cf. John Breuilly, "Introduction: Making Comparisons in History," in his *Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History* (Manchester, 1992), pp. 1–25, here 3.
- ²⁷ On the Szeptycki/Sheptytsky family, see Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, 2003). On regionalism, see *Nationen und ihre Grenzen. Identitätenwandel in Oberschlesien in der Neuzeit*, eds. Kai Struve and Philipp Ther (Marburg, 2002). On other border regions in Europe, see *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte*

des 19. Jahrhunderts, eds. Philipp Ther and Holm Sundhaussen (Marburg, 2003).

- ²⁸ Twenty-five years ago, Patricia Herlihy was already drawing attention to Ukrainian cities as a fruitful subject of study. See her article "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, eds. Ivan L. Rudnytsky and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton, 1981). She later wrote a book about Odesa, but to date there have been no similar monographs about Lviv or Kyiv. On Lviv, see the collection of essays edited by John Czaplicka (n. 11 above); similar perspective *Stadt und Öffentlichkeit in Ostmitteleuropa 1900–1939. Beiträge zur Entstehung moderner Urbanität zwischen Berlin, Charkiv, Tallinn und Triest*, eds. Andreas R. Hofmann and Anna Veronika Wendland (Stuttgart, 2002).
- ²⁹ For this argument, see the aforementioned volume on comparative history, *Annales HSS* 57, no. 1 (January–February 2002); Philipp Ther, "Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and East Central Europe," *Central European History* 36 (2003): 45–74.
- ³⁰ Two key publications were Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, "La construction d'une référence culturelle allemande en France—Genèse et Histoire (1750–1914)," *Annales E.S.C.* (1987): 969–92; idem, ed., *Transferts. Les relations interculturelles dans l'espace franco-allemand* (Paris, 1988). Espagne summarized his earlier works in his *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands* (Paris, 1999).
- ³¹ This debate and the conclusions to be drawn from it are well summarized in a recent publication by Hartmut Kaelble, "Die Debatte über Vergleich und Transfer und was jetzt?" in *geschichte.transnational*, Forum, 8.2.2005 <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/forum/2005-02-002.pdf>. It is interesting that this element of discussion was completely absent in the *AHR* debates on transnational history. In Europe, it seems, the debate came to center more on fundamental methodological issues such as micro- vs. macro-analysis, causal explanations, and the distance between the researcher and his objects of analysis. Comparing the two debates would, however, be a topic for another article.
- ³² For a summary of Espagne's critique, see his *Les transferts*. The critique was repeated by Matthias Middell, the most prominent proponent of *Kulturtransfer* or *Transfergeschichte* in Germany. See his article "Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik—Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis," *Comparativ* 10 (2000): 7–41.
- ³³ See Sandrine Kott, "Gemeinschaft oder Solidarität. Unterschiedliche Modelle der französischen und deutschen Sozialpolitik am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996): 311–30. An earlier publication on this subject is Ernest P. Hennock, *British Social Reform and German Antecedents: The Case of Social Insurance 1880–1914* (Oxford, 1987). These studies also show that transnational studies already existed before that keyword came into fashion.
- ³⁴ Michael Werner, "Die Auswirkungen der preußischen Universitätsreform auf das französische Hochschulwesen (1850–1900)," in *Einsamkeit und Frei-*

heit neu besichtigt." *Universitätsreformen und Disziplinbildung in Preußen als Modell für Wissenschaftspolitik im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. G. Schubring (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 99–114; *L'Ecole normale supérieure et l'Allemagne*, ed. Michel Espagne (Leipzig, 1995).

- ³⁵ On connections between Polish and German history, see Zernack, *Preußen—Deutschland*; Ther, "Beyond the Nation."
- ³⁶ See Andrzej S. Kamiński, *Historia Rzeczypospolitej wielu narodów 1505–1795. Obywatele, ich państwa, społeczeństwo, kultura* (Lublin, 2000).
- ³⁷ See Jacek Kolbuszewski, *Kresy* (Wrocław, 1995), pp. 5–52.
- ³⁸ On Russian policy toward Ukraine and reactions to it, see Alexei Miller, "Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX veka), (St. Petersburg, 2000), published in English as *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest and New York, 2003).
- ³⁹ See Ostap Sereda, "Shaping Ukrainian and All-Russian Discourses: Public Encounters of Ukrainian Activists from the Russian Empire and Austrian Galicia (1860–70s)," in *Rosja i Europa wschodnia. "Imperiologia" stosowana*, ed. Andrzej Nowak (Warsaw, 2005), pp. 382–99; Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001).
- ⁴⁰ Although he still regards Central European history as "derailed," this is one of Ivan Berend's principal conclusions in his *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 2003).
- ⁴¹ See, for example, Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1996). On Ukraine's place in Europe, see also Krytyka, 2003, no. 4 (66).
- ⁴² This is the gist of Hartmut Kaelble's argument in his introduction to comparative history. See Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich: eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 19–21.
- ⁴³ On this, see the many publications in the book series *Deutsch-Französische Kulturbibliothek*, which is published in Leipzig, and Espagne's monograph *Le creuset allemand. Histoire interculturelle de la Saxe (XVIIIe-XIXe siècle)* (Paris, 2000). There have also been appeals for more regional research as a foundation for further work in European history. See Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times," *AHR* 104 (October 1999): 1157–82; Philipp Ther, "Einleitung: Sprachliche, kulturelle und ethnische 'Zwischenräume' als Zugang zu einer transnationalen Geschichte Europas," in *Regionale Bewegungen*, ix–xxix.
- ⁴⁴ See Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et réflexivité," *Annales HSS* 58 (2003): 7–36, here 8. An English version was published as: "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," in *History and Theory* 45 (2006). 30–50.
- ⁴⁵ A similar demand, absent in earlier comparative history, is also made by

Hannes Siegrist, "Perspektiven der vergleichenden Geschichtswissenschaft. Gesellschaft, Kultur, Raum," in *Vergleich und Transfer*, pp. 307–28.

- ⁴⁶ Indeed, Central and East European studies were among the few fields in which this national approach to European history was transcended in the postwar period.
- ⁴⁷ In this regard, Jürgen Kocka's three-volume history of the middle class (*Bürgertum*) in nineteenth-century Europe was a pioneering work, as it contained articles on the Czech, Polish, and Hungarian bourgeoisie. The work of German specialists on Eastern Europe also had a strong comparative dimension. See especially the publications of Klaus Zernack, who combined the study of Polish and Prussian and, later, Polish and Russian history. See Zernack, *Preußen—Deutschland* (n. 8 above); idem, *Polen und Russland: Zwei Wege in der europäischen Geschichte* (Berlin, 1994).
- ⁴⁸ For a whole genealogy of the "cultural transfer" approach, see the introduction to the Internet forum "geschichte.transnational" by Matthias Middell, "Transnationale Geschichte als transnationales Projekt? Zur Einführung in die Diskussion," in *Geschichte.transnational* (Forum), 15.1.2005. All articles in *Geschichte.transnational* quoted in the present article can be found at <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/forum/type=artikel> [last visited 03/15/2006].
- ⁴⁹ See Lucien Febvre, *Le Rhin: Problèmes d'histoire et d'économie* (Paris, 1935). The book has been translated into German under the title *Der Rhein und seine Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).
- ⁵⁰ Josef Pekař, "Smysl českých dějin," in *O smyslu českých dějin*, 3rd ed. (Prague, 1990), pp. 383–405, here 394–401.
- ⁵¹ Chris Lorenz even sees a danger of the renationalization of historiography in North America. See his article "Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (1999): 25–39, here 26.
- ⁵² This new series is edited by Werner Paravicini and Michael Werner and published by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft in Darmstadt. In addition, the book series *Deutsch-Französische Kulturbibliothek* has been published at the University of Leipzig since the early 1990s.
- ⁵³ There are political reasons for these varied approaches to historical geography. Since the term *Mittleuropa* was abused by the National Socialist regime, it has been shunned by most professional historians in Germany in the postwar period. It was revived in the so-called *Mittleuropadebatte* of the 1980s, driven by intellectuals in the successor states to the Habsburg Empire. For the discourse on *Mittleuropa*, see Tony Judt, "The Rediscovery of Central Europe," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (1990): 23–54.
- ⁵⁴ For a more comprehensive account of the structural definition, see the works by Zernack and Szűcs cited above; cf. *Westmitteleuropa-Ostmitteleuropa. Vergleiche und Beziehungen*, eds. Winfried Eberhard et al. (Munich, 1992).
- ⁵⁵ John-Paul Himka has criticized the exclusivist character of the concept of "Central Europe." See Ivan Khymka, "Z choho skladaiet'sia rehion," *Krytyka*, 2003, no. 4 (66). The article is accessible on the Internet under

- http://krytyka.kiev.ua/articles/s5_4_2003.html. Although Himka is right to be critical of Milan Kundera and the whole “revival” of Central Europe in the 1980s, the scholarly concepts of *Zentraleuropa* and *Ostmitteleuropa* in German-speaking historiography do not necessarily exclude Ukraine.
- ⁵⁶ See Michael G. Müller, “Adel und Elitenwandel in Ostmitteleuropa: Fragen an die polnische Adelsgeschichte im ausgehenden 18. und 19. Jahrhundert,” *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung* 50 (2001): 497–513.
- ⁵⁷ See the comprehensive account of his definition of Central Europe in Moritz Csáky, *Ideologie der Operette und Wiener Moderne. Ein kulturhistorischer Essay*, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1998), p. 169.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.
- ⁵⁹ On the founding of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, see Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Sevcenko, eds., “The Kiev Mohyla Academy (Commemorating the 350th Anniversary of Its Founding, 1632–1982),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8 (1985). On Ukraine’s later relations with the West, see Roman Szporluk’s article in this volume.
- ⁶⁰ See Kamiński, *Historia Rzeczypospolitej wielu narodów 1505–1795*; Natalia Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn’ovichnoi ta rann’omodernoï Ukraïny*, 2nd rev. and enlarged ed. (Kyiv, 2005).
- ⁶¹ On Lysenko, see Taras Filenko and Tamara Bulat, *The World of Mykola Lysenko: Ethnic Identity, Music, and Politics in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ukraine* (Edmonton, 2001). There is a large amount of literature on Smetana: see Marta Ottlová and Milan Pospíšil, *Bedřich Smetana a jeho doba* (Prague, 1997).
- ⁶² On this axis of cultural exchange, see Philipp Ther, *In der Mitte der Gesellschaft. Operntheater in Zentraleuropa 1815–1914* (Vienna, 2006), pp. 411–12.
- ⁶³ The cultural history of Kyiv has recently been accorded greater attention: on musical culture, see, e.g., Elena Zinkevich, *Kontsert i park na krutoiare* (Kyiv, 2003). See also the survey history of the Ukrainian capital by Michael Hamm, *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917* (Princeton, 1993).
- ⁶⁴ This individual study is part of an international research project on the “Musical Culture of European Metropolises in the ‘Long’ Nineteenth Century” (www.musikundgeschichte.de).
- ⁶⁵ On the imperial shape of the eastern half of Europe, see Alexei Miller and Alfred Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest and New York, 2004).
- ⁶⁶ In addition to Braudel’s early modern Mediterranean, the concept of Southern Europe was employed at a conference at the Berlin College for the Comparative History of Europe (BKVGE) in 2005. The title of the conference was “Der Süden Europas—Strukturraum, Wahrnehmungsraum, Handlungsraum?”
- ⁶⁷ Such a history of Europe was encouraged and financed by the European Commission in the early 1990s. See the mocking of this “Euro-history” in Norman Davies, *Europe: A History*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1996), pp. 42–45.
- ⁶⁸ See, e.g., Helmut Schmidt, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas. Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2000). Recent concepts developed for comparing civilizations (*Zivilisationsvergleich*) have also excluded Russia and

constructed an Eastern Slavonic, Orthodox or Soviet civilization that is juxtaposed with Europe. See, e.g., Jürgen Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001). The cases of Ukraine, Greece, and other zones of overlapping influence probably suffice to indicate the problems besetting such an approach.

⁶⁹ Neil Ascherson, *The Black Sea* (London, 1995).

⁷⁰ Postcolonialism has been fashionable in Russian studies in the United States and Britain. For some interesting studies and further bibliographic references, see Alexei Miller and Alfred Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest and New York, 2004). For a postcolonial perspective on European history, see Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, "Einleitung. Geteilte Geschichten—Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt," in *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. idem (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), pp. 9–49. Postcolonial approaches may also prove useful in studying Polish–Ukrainian relations in the late nineteenth century: see, e.g., Daniel Beauvois, *Walka o ziemię. Szlachta polska na Ukrainie prawobrzeżnej pomiędzy caratem a ludem ukraińskim 1863–1914* (Sejny, 1996).

⁷¹ For the role of nationalism and previous decentralization in the breakup of the Soviet Union, see Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 2000).

⁷² Franko's German and Polish writings are analyzed by Alois Woldan in "Bevormundung oder Selbstunterwerfung? Sprache, Literatur und Religion der galizischen Ruthenen als Ausdruck einer österreichischen Identität?," in *Habsburg postkolonial. Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, eds. Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, and Moritz Csáky (Innsbruck, 2003), pp. 141–52, here 146–48. Cf. the much more comprehensive study by Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoii vitchyzni: Franko ta ioho spil'nota (1856–1886)* (Kyiv, 2006).

⁷³ On the nationalization of music, triggered by composers, and their reception in Central Europe, see Ther, *In der Mitte der Gesellschaft*, pp. 360–94.

⁷⁴ For a definition of "network," see Manuel Castells, "Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society," *British Journal of Sociology* 51 (2000): 5–24, here 15.

⁷⁵ On Western Europe, see Hartmut Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001); idem and Luisa Passerini, "European Public Sphere and European Identity in 20th Century History," *Journal of European Integration History* 8, no. 2 (2002): 5–8.

⁷⁶ See Jerzy Jedlicki, *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization* (Budapest, 1999).

⁷⁷ See the *Echo Muzyczne, Teatralne i Artystyczne*, which was published in Warsaw from 1880. The column "z Europy" began regular publication in 1889.

- ⁷⁸ Mark von Hagen emphasizes the “porousness of boundaries” until World War I. See his article “Empires, Borderlands, Diasporas: Eurasia as Anti-Paradigm for the Post-Soviet Era,” *AHR* 109 (2004): 445–68, here 447.
- ⁷⁹ See Klaus J. Bade, *Europa in Bewegung. Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2000).
- ⁸⁰ Several cases of remigration are compiled in a collective volume edited by Dirk Hoerder, *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies: The European and North American Working Classes during the Period of Industrialization* (Westport, CT, 1985), here 353–434 (part II of the volume). On German emigrants, see also Karen Schniedewind, “Fremde in der Alten Welt: die transatlantische Rückwanderung,” in *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus Bade (Munich, 1992), pp. 179–85. On southeastern Europe, see Julianna Puskás, *Overseas Migration from East-Central and South-Eastern Europe 1880–1940* (Budapest, 1990).

II. Ukrainian History Rewritten

Choice of Name versus Choice of Path

The Names of Ukrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Century

Natalia Yakovenko

The very act of demarcating the real or imagined boundary of “our land” creates two geographic and cultural entities—the “land of the Other” and “one’s own” space. Establishing the name of “one’s own” living space is far from the least important step toward endowing it with meaning. Thus canonized, it is transformed by the inhabitants’ unwritten convention into the sacred name of a fatherland—a land inherited from ancestors on which objectively existing reality (territory) is infused with a series of imagined values projected onto that territory; values associated with common “blood,” interests, history, cultural tradition, and the like. In the Ukrainian case, it was the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that saw the definitive “establishment of the convention,” when the palm was awarded to the name “Ukraine” (*Ukraina*). But the contest of proposals began three centuries earlier, signaling the emergence of a “national preoccupation” in a society content until then to define itself with the vague notion of *Rus’*, at once an ethnonym and the name of the territory inhabited by Ruthenians in the Polish-Lithuanian state. The first round of that “contest,” which took place between the late sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries, is the principal subject of this essay. We shall also have to make an excursion into prehistory, for some of the competing versions were articulated much earlier in other, Greek and Roman, cultural poles of Europe. Thus, by comparing the victories and defeats of the different versions reanimated by the Ruthenians, we can obtain an indirect notion of the priorities of the consumers, who were making a choice (just like present-day Ukrainians) between “East” and “West.” In conclusion, we shall examine the fluctuations of a hypothetically native creation, the concept of “Ukraine,” which in time was to win the grand prize.

It is no easy task to give a brief account of the material on which my observations are based. References bearing on the subject are to be

encountered in practically all texts of the period, from official documents to private jottings and from scholastic verses to theological treatises. The point, then, was not so much research as selection. My main criterion was the Ruthenian origin of the authors, although, in order to tease out particular nuances, it was necessary to seek views from the sidelines; from the Polish or “Lithuanian” (more precisely, official Vilnius) perspectives. As for the intellectual grounding of this article, it comes mainly from the pioneering thesis advanced by Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, who maintains that the constitutive characteristic of Ukrainian cultural space in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was its “polymorphism,” meaning its multilayered and polyglot character, mutability, and susceptibility to external assimilative influences. In Brogi Bercoff’s opinion, this elasticity of “cultural code” may be explained both by an “immanent” tendency—dating from the times of Kyivan Rus’—to synthesize divergent traditions and, in functional terms, as a response to the threat of disintegration facing a cultural community that was not yet fully formed.¹ As regards more particular questions, my thinking has something in common with studies by Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokhyy devoted to somewhat later (late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century) changes in the naming of Ukrainian space.²

Rosia/Russia/Rus’, Ruthenia, Roxolania

The Byzantines anticipated developments by naming a territory that had not managed to come up with a general name for itself: the notion of *Rosia* (Ρωσία) was first used to denote the “land of the Rus’” in *De ceremoniis* by the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (908–59).³ But the “Rus’ people” (Ρώγες) had come to the Byzantines’ attention much earlier, and that particular form of appellation—indeed, self-designation—is recorded in the *Annales Bertiniani* under the year 839, where it is recounted that people came from Constantinople to the court of Louis the Pious and “said that they—that is, their people—were known as Rus’” (*se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant*).⁴ In the mid-tenth century, Bishop Liutprand of Cremona employed another Latin variant of the Rus’ name, *Rusii*, derived from the Greek ρωσσιοι. According to Liutprand’s *Antapodosis*, the Byzantine mercenaries included “a certain people... whom the Greeks call... Rusii... because of the strength of their bodies” (*gens quaedam... quam a qualitate corporis Graeci vocant... Rusios*).⁵

In Old Rus' writing, as we know, the self-designation *Ruskaia zemlia* or *Rus'* became the established term for the "land of the Rus'," while its inhabitants bore the political name *Rus'* (collective) and *Rusyn* (individual). This usage continued even after the disintegration of the Kyivan state: in one of the first documents of the fourteenth century, which are classified as "Old Ukrainian" on the basis of their linguistic attributes, we already encounter the word *Rusyn*.⁶ Until the mid-sixteenth century *Rus'*, *Rus'ka zemlia* and the designation *Rusyn* (no longer a political name but an ethnonym) had no competition either in the Kingdom of Poland or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as customary terms for the former Old Rus' territory and its inhabitants. As for the practice of calling Rus' *Rosia* (from the Greek *Ρωσία*), which is to be encountered in South Slavic writings beginning in the last quarter of the fourteenth century and in Muscovy from the second half of the fifteenth century,⁷ this neo-Byzantine syndrome made its way to the Ruthenians of the Polish-Lithuanian state considerably later, in the 1580s. We shall return to the initiators and circumstances of this innovation below; here, by way of preliminary comment, we shall merely note that the Greek accent of that name embodied a certain protest against the Latinization of Ruthenian culture, manifested inter alia by the dissemination of Latin names for Rus'.

This Latin nomenclature, encountered in European chronicles and documents of the papal chancery, was rather unsystematic at first, but signs of a certain "standardization" become apparent by the end of the eleventh century. Most probably, the stimulus in that direction came from the papal chancery, in whose documents a specific conceptual dualism became established: the land itself was called *Russia*, and its Ruthenian inhabitants were known as *Rutheni*. The words *Ruthenus* and *Rusyn* are phonetically akin, which ideally suited the orientation of medieval geography toward classical tradition, from which names of lands and peoples that sounded similar were drawn and applied to new realities. The Celtic tribe of the Rut(h)eni was well known in antiquity, from Pliny the Elder and Caesar to the compilers of the first century A.D. Thus adapted, the *Rutheni/Rus'* became firmly established in the land of *Russia*, recorded in chronicles and papal bulls and, from the thirteenth century, in letters and documents (especially in privileges issued by Hungarian kings and Mazovian princes),⁸ and even in travel notes, such as Willem de Ruysbroeck's description of his voyage of 1253 to the Crimea, which mentions a "tremendous number of Ruthenians" (*Ruthenos... maxima multitudo*) among the local Christians.⁹ Finally,

from the fourteenth century the amicable pair *Russia/Rutheni* became a fixture in Polish documents and chronicles and, somewhat later, in Latin documents issued by the chancery of the Lithuanian grand dukes.

These terms were also unreservedly accepted in the chanceries of judicial and administrative centers in Galician Rus', where Latin became the official language of business following the incorporation of those lands into the Kingdom of Poland. Throughout the fifteenth century, the Latin language, only just acquired by local chancery scribes, still constituted a striking instance of bilingualism—a Latin imitation of Ukrainian speech, paradoxical in its “incorrectness.”¹⁰ There is consequently no doubt that when writing *Russia*, the scribes mentally “pronounced” *Rus'*, and the *Ruthenus*-derived concepts that they employed (such as *ius Ruthenicum*, *lingua Ruthenica*, *consuetudo Ruthenicalis*, *ecclesia Ruthenicalis*, *Ruthenica fides*, *ritus Ruthenicus*, *Ruthenicale telum*, and so on) were calques of corresponding notions in Ruthenian public life: Ruthenian law, the Ruthenian language, Ruthenian customs, the Ruthenian Church, and the like. It was this very circumstance, one may assume, that made the Latinization of names nonconflictual, for both the local and the Latin names were essentially interchangeable and synonymous. This parity was shaken, however, in the middle of the following (sixteenth) century, when a designation of Rus' came into use for which no equivalent was to be found in Ruthenian speech.

Strictly speaking, there were two such names, *Ruthenia* and *Roxolania*. The first appeared episodically even earlier as a derivation from *Ruthenus* used to denote the “land of the Ruthenians,” for example, in privileges issued by Hungarian kings in 1261 and 1342,¹¹ on Pietro Visconti's portolan map of 1311¹² and, much later, in a reply of 1635 from the papal chancery.¹³ Given the conservatism of the latter institution, the word may have been in use much earlier. But *Ruthenia* failed to make a career, for it encountered a much stronger competitor, *Roxolania*.

Roxolania was not so much a linguistic product as a sociocultural one—a side effect of the triumphant entrenchment of nobiliary liberties in the Kingdom of Poland during the sixteenth century. This in turn promoted the development of a supraethnic and supraconfessional ideology for the “noble nation,” one of whose basic tenets was the conviction that the nobility and the common folk were divided by an unbridgeable abyss of “different blood.” Nor was there any lack of “historical proofs”: according to the so-called Sarmatian ethnogenetic legend,¹⁴ which arose sometime in the mid-sixteenth century, the biblical lineage of nobles

and plebs could be traced back to different sons of the forefather Noah—commoners were descended from Ham and nobles from Japheth. After long wanderings, some of the descendants of Japheth, the “warlike Sarmatians,” allegedly settled in the lands of Poland and Rus’ that they had conquered, giving rise to the “noble nation.”

For our purposes, the most important detail of this legend is that the “Sarmatians” were understood to be a “nation” of two branches, Polish and Ruthenian. The Ruthenian nobles identified themselves with the “Sarmatian tribe of Roxolanians,” brethren of the “Polish Sarmatians” and thus lawful heirs to the “Sarmatian inheritance.” The authoritative codification of just such a “division of the inheritance” was carried out by one of the best-known Polish publicists of the sixteenth century, Stanisław Orzechowski (1513–66), a nobleman of mixed Ruthenian-Polish descent, educated at the universities of Cracow, Vienna, Wittenberg, Padua and Bologna, and, most importantly, a fervent propagandist of the nobility’s “golden liberties.”¹⁵ Orzechowski took the ethnogeographic nomenclature of classical authors as his point of departure, as did his predecessors (notably Maciej Miechowski, the author of the famous *Treatise on Two Sarmatias*, which was reprinted as many as ten times in Poland and abroad between 1517 and 1582).¹⁶ Thus Orzechowski consistently identified his Ruthenian countrymen with the Sarmatians/Roxolanians, referring to himself now as a Ruthenian (*Ruthenus*), now as a Roxolanian (*Roxolanus*), and to Rus’ as *Roxolania*.¹⁷ That the identification of *Ruthenus* with *Roxolanus* was not considered axiomatic until its “codification” by Orzechowski is demonstrated, inter alia, by the binary formula in the treatise of Michael the Lithuanian (1550): in describing the subjugation of neighboring peoples by the “descendants of the Romans” (that is, the Lithuanians), he also makes mention of the “Roxolanians, or Ruthenians” (*Roxolanos seu Ruthenos*).¹⁸

The “historical legacy” concocted in this manner appeared in the right place at the right time. It was in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, after all, that the former “Lithuanian” Ruthenians of Volhynia and the Kyiv region first became closely acquainted with their consanguineous “Polish” brethren from Galician Rus’ and Podilia: in 1569, under the terms of the Union of Lublin, both Ruthenian regions became part of a single state, the Kingdom of Poland. Pooling their efforts, the intellectuals of both lands would soon proclaim their territory a direct continuation of Kyivan Rus’ and themselves “the ancient Rus’ nation of Volodymyr’s stock.”¹⁹ This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the ways and means whereby “Ruthenian history” was appropriated;

suffice it to say that in the broadest terms, the stimulus for that appropriation came from the competition arising after the Union of Lublin between two cultural systems, Ruthenian and Polish. The wave of “educational revolution” and the “reform mentality” aroused by the Reformation, which reached Poland in the second half of the sixteenth century, had a triple effect. On the one hand, resistance to Protestant “innovations” gave rise to the confessional (and therefore cultural) unification of Polish society; on the other hand, in response to this challenge, “Ruthenian” aspirations in Galician (“Polish”) Rus’ gained their second wind, and the hitherto somnolent elite of the former “Lithuanian” Rus’ was galvanized accordingly. The latter development doubtless resulted from the geographical expansion of the cultural activity carried on by Polish and Galician intellectuals. As they moved eastward, beyond the border denounced by the Union of Lublin, and sought to gratify the tastes of the fabulously wealthy new lords, these people promoted the “dehermetization” of the Ruthenian world, hitherto closed to outside observers. At the same time, that world was modified in the process of retranslation, for the narratives about it were composed according to the rhetorical standards for “historical description” and “ethnic description” already established in Polish letters.

For a particularly striking example of such “mutually beneficial cooperation,” we may turn to the creation of a genealogical program for the most powerful magnates of the former “Lithuanian” Rus’, the Princes Ostrozkys.²⁰ The first known genealogical mention, dating from 1574, is still amorphous: the Ostrozkys are simply termed descendants of “old Kyivan princes.” A few years later, their lineage is “concretized” as an unbroken genealogical line extending from Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv, the “first baptizer,” to the Galician-Volhynian king Danylo of Halych; later still, “King Danylo” was proclaimed an ancestor of the Ostrozkys dating back exactly eight generations. But even this version seemed insufficiently prestigious, and a hero from obscure and distant lands, the “primal forebear, Rus,” appeared on the horizon. This personage had long been known to educated people: Polish chronicles of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries already mentioned the three mythical heroes Czech, Lech and Rus, who sought the land promised by God, divided it, and appropriately “built three kingdoms,” naming them *Czechia*, *Lechia* (that is, Poland), and *Russia* after themselves. Rus became the key figure in the final version of the Ostrozkys’ genealogical legend, which took the form of an artless syllogism in the hands of the panegyrists: a) Rus established the state, endowing it with his own

name and leaving it as an inheritance to his descendants, b) the descendants of the “princes of Old Rus’” were the Ostrozkys; hence c) the Ostrozkys were the lawful heirs of Rus. In offering a more concrete account of the “land” that Rus had “built” and “left as an inheritance” to the princes of Kyivan Rus’, the panegyrists took no great trouble over historical accuracy. The “land of Rus” that emerged from their descriptions corresponded to prevailing conditions of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, embracing the Rus’ territories belonging to the Kingdom of Poland: Galician Rus’, Volhynia, the Kyiv region, and Podilia. Thanks to such a “grafting” of myth onto history, and of both onto the political and geographic nomenclature of the day, we are in a position to reconstruct the Ruthenians’ conception of their living space as a self-contained entity that corresponded in geographic terms to the former southern and western principalities of Kyivan Rus’, yielding nothing to the “land of Lech” (Poland) in “historical dignity,” and, in political terms, constituting one undivided realm extending from Kyiv to Lviv. The virtual nature of that “realm” was of no consequence, for the object was not political ambition but the “political legitimacy” of the Rus’ community. On the one hand, it acquired a sacralized point of origin (the “quest for land” and the “building” activity of the forefather, Rus); on the other, the existence of the Princes Ostrozky, the heirs of Rus, was manifest proof of its unbroken continuity. Developed in this fashion, the genealogical program of the Ostrozkys unquestionably provided a basis for Ruthenian identity conceived as equivalent to that of its Polish counterpart; at the same time, it gathered the hitherto divided Ruthenian lands into a common space of historical memory. This in turn was a springboard for the delineation of a new political actor, the “ancient nation of Rus’,” which had inhabited its territory (the “land of Rus’”) since time immemorial—a land “found” and “built” by the “forefather Rus,” enlightened by baptism through the agency of his descendant, St. Volodymyr, and still abiding under the patronage of the heirs of Rus and Volodymyr, the Princes Ostrozky.

Going back to *Roxolania*, we may note that the place of that name in the Ruthenian identity described above is somewhat problematic. It aptly denoted the status of Rus’ as a unit of the Kingdom of Poland endowed with equal rights, but after the assimilation of the Kyivan Rus’ legacy the word became “foreign,” as it indicated that the role of “root and source” was assigned to the Sarmatians/Roxolanians, not to the “nation of St. Volodymyr.” The dilemma of which name to choose was thus

essentially transformed into the dilemma of two versions of “Ruthenianism.”²¹ Clearly, both versions were perfectly loyal to the political fatherland, the Commonwealth, but, oversimplifying somewhat, the Roxolanian version may be identified with a tolerant attitude to all things Polish, while avoidance of it indicates distaste for Poland.

This semantic divergence becomes particularly apparent toward the end of the sixteenth century, when the word *Roxolania* was predominantly employed not by Orthodox Ruthenians but by their Polish sympathizers or by Ruthenian Catholics. Nevertheless, it is significant that even in the perception of the Orthodox community, the territorial extent of Roxolania corresponded to the Rus’ “of Volodymyr’s stock,” meaning that it did not include Belarusian territory, for which the terms “Lithuania” or “White Rus’” were reserved. In 1584, for example, Sebastian Klonowic, a native of Great Poland who later became magistrate of Lublin, dedicated the lengthy poem *Roxolania*²² to “the most illustrious Senate of the City of Lviv.” In this work, the geography of the idyllic territory that he describes is demarcated by the towns of the Kyiv, Galicia, Volhynia and Podilia regions—Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Kamianets, Peremyshl and others. The name *Roxolania* attained its peak of popularity between the 1620s and 1640s, when the Orthodox Ruthenians of Galicia, having taken over the higher ecclesiastical posts in Kyiv, became arbiters of fashion and imposed their own tastes, heavily adulterated with “Sarmatian” discourse, on Orthodox literary convention. In most Kyivan learned and scholastic texts of the day, we come across the expressions “Roxolania,” “Roxolanian nation,” “Roxolanian borders,” “our Roxolanians,” and even “the Roxolanian Church.” This is hardly surprising, for it was in that very milieu, especially in the times of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla (1632–47), that the model of the “Ruthenian nobiliary nation” was intensively cultivated as a fraternal equivalent to its Polish counterpart in the Commonwealth circle of the “noble nation.”

But such a peaceable attitude to Poland as we have just noted was not characteristic of all Ruthenians. Accordingly, the spread of the “Roxolanian” version of Ruthenian identity was accompanied by an increasingly popular alternative with a distinct “anti-Latin” (and thus anti-Polish) subtext. Its manifesto was a stress on the Greek origins of Rus’, and its banner called for the restitution of the “true” name of Rus’, *Rosiia*, which arose as a calque of the Greek *Ρωσία*. As noted above, “neo-Byzantinism” of this kind already had precedents in South Slavic and Muscovite letters, but it would appear that they did not provide the stimulus in this case. There is no doubt, after all, that the newborn *Rosiia*

had a Lviv pedigree, and a burgher rather than a nobiliary one at that. Moreover, the background to its appearance was provided, on the one hand, by the visits of Eastern patriarchs to Lviv in the 1580s²³—the first such visits in the whole history of the Ruthenian church, which blew the breath of life into the feeling of confessional affinity with the “mother church”—and, on the other hand, by the “Greek accent” in the burst of educational activity on the part of the Orthodox confraternity, newly established by the Lviv burghers. (An attempt has also been made to explain the reanimation of the name *Rosiia* as a consequence of the realization of the “indivisible and common heritage” of Kyivan Rus'.²⁴ To my mind, this explanation is anachronistic, since the first text that might conditionally be termed a “realization of a common heritage,” and that only from a dynastic perspective, did not appear until a century later. This was the anonymous *Synopsis*, published by the printshop of the Kyivan Cave Monastery in 1674 and reissued with addenda in 1681).²⁵ As for the Lviv confraternity, having obtained a charter of confirmation in 1586 from one of the eminent guests, Patriarch Joachim I of Antioch, it established its own school of “Greek and Slavic letters,” and it is in the statute of that school that we first encounter the concept of the “Rossian nation” as a designation for the Ruthenians. The Greek bent of the school was strengthened by its first rector (1586–88), the Greek Archbishop Arsenios of Elasson, and by 1591 the confraternity printshop had already published its own grammar of the Greek language, compiled, according to the introduction, by teachers and students at the school.²⁶ Heightened interest in the Greek matrix of Ruthenian culture spread to other centers of schooling as well. Thus, some scholars surmise that the future patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril Lukaris, taught at the Ostrih school (contemporaries called it a “trilingual”—Greek, Latin and Slavic—“lyceum”) in 1594 and that the Greek Emmanuel Achilleos²⁷ taught there in 1595. Greek was also taught at the confraternity schools of Kyiv (est. 1615) and Luts'k (est. 1619).²⁸

As we see, the educational groundwork for the adoption of the “anti-Latin” name *Рωσία/Rosiia* was perfectly adequate. A fair amount of additional kindling for “anti-Latin” sentiments was supplied by the agreement of several Orthodox hierarchs to union with the Roman Catholic Church, which was proclaimed at Brest in 1596. As has been noted more than once, it was after the Union of Brest that confessional intolerance began its precipitous rise. As an authoritative contemporary student of the problem, Mikhail Dmitriev, has expressed it, “From now on the ‘conscious’ Orthodox were greatly afraid of turning into

Catholics (Uniates), while the Catholics and Uniates feared infection by the ‘schism’; both the former and the latter began to guard themselves diligently against Protestant influence.”²⁹

The ground was thus cleared for a Greek designation of Rus’, and the word *Rosiia* made a triumphant breakthrough into the usage of the conscious Orthodox elite.³⁰ Among the early instances of its painstakingly conscientious use, it is worth citing the verses written by pupils of the Lviv Confraternity School to welcome Metropolitan Mykhailo Rohoza on the occasion of his visit in 1591. Clearly, the schoolboy muse labored to excess: there are no fewer than seven mentions of *Rosiia* and *rosiis’kyi narod* (Rus’ people) in the brief text, and the metropolitan is called “*Rosiia*’s only eye.”³¹ Once the learned circle at the Kyivan Cave Monastery burst into activity in the 1620s, followed by the newly established Kyiv Mohyla Collegium in 1632, *Rosiia* became the trademark of the Orthodox intellectual in general. It made no difference whether he wrote in Ruthenian, Polish or Latin, or to what degree he tolerated all things Polish—the fashion for an “authentic,” “truly Orthodox” name for Rus’ took precedence. Accordingly, the Latin *Roxolania* coexisted in perfect harmony with the “anti-Latin” *Rosiia* on the pages of Kyivan publications—ideology was one thing; the trademark quite another. Here are just a few examples of such inconsistent attitudes: in the writings of one of the supreme authorities of Kyivan learning, Zakhariia Kopystensky, “orthodox *Rosiia*” is settled now by the “Roxolanian nation,” now by the “Rossian nation,” the latter abiding “in love and concord with the Polish and Lithuanian nations” (1621);³² in the funerary verses of 1622 written by the rector of the Kyiv Confraternity School, Kasiian Sakovych, on the death of the Cossack hetman Petro Sahaidachny, *Rosiia* honors a hero who faithfully served the king;³³ in his treatise of 1638 on miracles at the Kyivan Cave Monastery, Afanasii Kalnofoisky includes a verse epitaph (clearly of his own authorship) for a hero of the Kyivan borderland, Semen Lyko, who was “begotten by the Roxolanian and Polish land” (*Roxolańska z Polską ziemia, z której spłodzon*);³⁴ in a school declamation in honor of one of the curators of the Kyiv Mohyla Collegium, Adam Kysil, the collegium itself is called the “Lyceum of the Roxolanian Palladium” (*Roxolanae Palladis Lycaeum*), and the public importance of the benefactor is emphasized by the fact that “*Rosiia* calls you father and Poland calls you father” (*Rossia te patrem canit atque Polonia patrem*).³⁵ And so on and so forth.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, Kyivan literary convention was not averse to confusing *Rosiia* with *Roxolania*, even though

the city was now part of a new state, with new heroes and new ideological priorities (I remind the reader that after 1654 Kyiv came under the protectorate of Muscovy, while the Orthodox Church was transformed from an *ecclesia militans* into the dominant religious institution). The formerly Latin *Roxolania*, having lost its pro-Polish subtext, turned into an element of “high style” sanctified by tradition. This is particularly apparent from the titles of courses in philosophy and rhetoric offered at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy in the latter half of the seventeenth century, which are addressed now to the “Roxolanian,” now to the “Rossian” reader—*Roxolanae iuventuti, auditore Roxolano, Rossiaco oratoribus*, and so on.³⁶ With the passage of time, however, *Rosiia* became ever more strongly entrenched. That name had the highest frequency of use in Kyivan texts of the latter half of the seventeenth century, where we encounter *Rossia/Rosiia* and derivative concepts at every turn—“Rossians” (*Rossiacci*), the “Rossian nation” (*gens Rossiaca*), the “Rossian fatherland” (*patria Rossiaca*), and the like. Serhii Plokyh has remarked on “the Mohylan tradition of using ‘Russia’ predominantly, if not exclusively, to denote the lands of the Kyiv metropolitanate.”³⁷ I would make this observation more specific: it was not a question of the whole metropolitanate, extending across the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, but only of its “Polish” (that is, Ukrainian) portion, not including Belarusian territory. In other words, the *Rosiia* of Kyivan intellectuals of the second half of the seventeenth century retained the meaning it had had at the moment of its birth in the late sixteenth century; like its partner/opponent *Roxolania*, it denoted the land “of the nation of Volodymyr’s stock.” In the eighteenth century, to be sure, the name *Rosiia* was fated to undergo certain mutations, but that is beyond the scope of the present essay.³⁸

All the same, the imposing career of *Rosiia* was limited to the territory that came under the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar after 1654. In texts written by Ruthenians of the Commonwealth, the concept vanished as suddenly as it had appeared—clearly, it was tainted by association with the hostile Russian state. The members of the Lviv Orthodox confraternity, for example, enumerating their complaints yet again in their declaration of 1649, locate “our people” not in *Rosiia*, as before, but “on the whole extent of Rus” (*in toto ambitu Russiae*),³⁹ although at times, on ceremonial occasions, they still refer to the church itself as “Rossian.”⁴⁰ For a certain period, the titulature of metropolitans was a kind of “reservation” for the word *Rosiia*, which is understandable, as none of them abandoned the hope of heading the whole Kyiv metropoli-

tanate, including the lands that had come under Muscovite jurisdiction. Yet even here one may note a characteristic ambiguity. In Ruthenian documents, the metropolitans generally used the formula “of all *Rosiia*” in referring to themselves, but in Polish documents it was replaced by the accustomed *wszystkiej Rusi* (of all Rus’), although, as certain exceptions demonstrate, linguistic usage permitted both *usiiei Rusi* and *wszystkiej Rusi* as equivalent terms.⁴¹ For evidence that the “choice of name” was consciously made, we may turn inter alia to a letter of 1689 from Bishop Yosyf Shumliansky of Lviv to the Tsarina Sofia. Requesting financial support from the Muscovite ruler, Shumliansky chose the term that would sound “more correct” to the Muscovite ear: the Turks, he wrote, had devastated “the land of our *Rosiia*.”⁴²

Finally, the word *Rosiia* is completely absent from the discourse of Ruthenian Catholics. The best example here is the immense (more than 750 pages of printed text) diary of Vasyl Rudomych, a learned Ruthenian from Zamość, a professor of the Zamość Academy, initially an Orthodox and subsequently a Catholic.⁴³ In making daily entries from 1656 to 1672, this “Ruthenian patriot”—and ardent advocate of reconciliation between Ruthenian Orthodox, Ruthenian Uniates, and Ruthenian Catholics—never once used the word *Rosiia*, although he exchanged friendly correspondence with the archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery, Inokentii Gizel, and was godfather to the child of the Cossack hetman Pavlo Teteria, a friend of the Orthodox bishop of Lviv, Afanasii Zheliborsky, and a frequent guest of the Krekhiv Orthodox Monastery.

Little Rosiia

The birth of *Rosiia* at the end of the sixteenth century called another Grecism, “Little *Rosiia*,” into existence. As in the case of *Rosiia*, it was the neo-Byzantine syndrome—the drive to renew “true” Orthodoxy—that served as the stimulus for its appearance, while the precedent was supplied by the above-mentioned visits of Eastern patriarchs to Lviv in the 1580s. Given the growing interest in the Byzantine sources of the Ruthenian Church, the Greek designation for the Kyiv metropolitanate, *Μικρὰ Ρωσία* (Little *Rosiia*), was also reanimated. It is generally agreed that one of the earliest mentions of this concept occurs in a bull issued by Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus in 1347 on the liquidation of the Halych metropolitanate and in the confirmation of that act by the patriarchal synod in the same year.⁴⁴ The complete “comprehensibility” of the term to the inhabitants of the metropolitanate is established by the

even earlier use of its Latin version (1339) in the title of the Galician-Volhynian prince Bolesław-Yurii: "By the grace of God, native-born prince of all Little Rus'" (*Dei gratia natus dux totius Russie Mynoris*).⁴⁵

Given the Greeks' rather amorphous notions of Rus', *Μικρά Ρωσία* initially encompassed only the Volhynian and Galician eparchies, but by 1354 the patriarch was already mentioning Kyiv as the "first archepiscopal seat" in *Μικρά Ρωσία*.⁴⁶ After the division of the Kyiv metropolitanate into Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian halves in the mid-fifteenth century, the patriarch's documents began to style the Kyivan hierarch "Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus'"; even later, in the first third of the sixteenth century, the defunct Galician ecclesiastical unit was added to his title: "Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and All *Rosiia*."⁴⁷ The recognition of the formula "of all *Rosiia*" as part of the metropolitan's title did not, however, spell the end of "Little *Rosiia*." After all, according to Byzantine notions of space, that concept entailed a binary opposition: if "Little *Rosiia*" was the center, then there had to be a large borderland territory, "Great *Rosiia*," corresponding to it (indeed, in the opinion of Anna Khoroshkevich, it was precisely because of a patriarchal missive of 1561 that "Great *Rosiia*" made its way into Muscovy's self-designation).⁴⁸ Once the patriarchate of Constantinople recognized the Muscovite church in "Great *Rosiia*" in 1589, the other term of the forgotten pair, "Little *Rosiia*," was also logically reanimated. For instance, in a letter of 1594 from Patriarch Meletios Pigas of Alexandria to Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, there is a blessing to the Orthodox "of all Little *Rosiia*," not "of all *Rosiia*," as the formula of the Kyivan metropolitan's titlature would have required; similarly, an anonymous Greek participant in the Council of Brest (1596) who left an account of it indicates that the council was held "at the initiative of bishops in Little *Rosiia*."⁴⁹

A "Greek trace" is also apparent in the first known instance of the use of "Little *Rosiia*" by Ruthenians. In a letter of 1592 from the members of the Lviv confraternity to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich requesting financial support, we encounter the formula "Great and Little *Rosiia*,"⁵⁰ that is, the Greek binary spatial opposition that had not figured in Ruthenian discourse up to that point. This letter must have been written "at the dictation" of one of the Greek visitors, for in the following year Patriarch Meletios Pigas also asked the tsar to support the Lviv confraternity, which indicates the "coordinated" nature of the action. As for the introduction of the Grecism "Little *Rosiia*" into Ruthenian discourse per se, the initiative was probably taken by Ivan Vyshensky, a monk at one of the monasteries on Mt. Athos who came from the vicinity of Peremyshl.

An ardent propagandist of “pure” (that is, Greek) Orthodoxy, Vyshensky addressed an epistle to his Ruthenian kinsmen ca. 1599–1600 calling upon them to beware of “Latin enticements.” Frequently using the expression “Little *Rosiia*,” the Athonite nevertheless reduced its scope: in his missive, it did not denote the whole Kyiv metropolitanate extending across the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland but only its “Polish” (that is, Ukrainian) portion. As Vyshensky writes, he learned “from the Liakh land, that is, Little *Rosiia*” that “evil heresies had befallen” its inhabitants.⁵¹

Judging by texts available today, the concept of “Little *Rosiia*” was forgotten until the appearance of the next Eastern hierarch, Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem, on the Ruthenian horizon. In 1620, on his way through Kyiv, Theophanes consecrated a metropolitan and several bishops. The corresponding patriarchal missive announced their installation on the “thrones of Little *Rosiia*”; at the same time, the patriarch issued two pastoral blessings to the Kyiv confraternity “in Little *Rosiia*.”⁵² Subsequent isolated instances of the use of this concept until the mid-seventeenth century are recorded exclusively in the Kyivan ecclesiastical milieu. More particularly, the formulas “Great and Little *Rosiia*” reemerge with the rise of the Kyivan idea of all-Rus’ (Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian) kinship, analyzed by Serhii Plokhyy,⁵³ while in letters from Kyivan metropolitans addressed to Moscow, their titulature is embellished with the politically correct formula “of all Little *Rosiia*.”⁵⁴ The exclusively “export-oriented” character of this formula is indicated by the invariable omission of the word “Little” in internal use, so that the metropolitan title retained its old form, “by the grace of God, of all *Rosiia*” or “of all Rus’.”

With the outbreak of the Cossack uprising of 1648, the concept of “Little *Rosiia*” gained a powerful second wind. The basic impulse for this came from the addition of appeals in defense of the “Greek faith” to the demands of the insurgents: as Serhii Plokhyy has persuasively shown, the augmentation of the Cossacks’ social demands with the religious slogan made it possible to justify rebellion against a legitimate ruler and thus lent legitimacy to the Cossack war in the eyes of the non-Cossack population.⁵⁵ In intensive relations with “coreligious” Orthodox Muscovy, these appeals began to be embellished inter alia with the “politically correct” name of the Cossack Hetmanate, “Little *Rosiia*.” Nor is it to be ruled out that the concept of “Little *Rosiia*” appeared in the Cossack lexicon under the influence of the Eastern patriarchs, who were perhaps the main promoters of the idea of uniting “Great” and “Little”

Rosiia. In the summer of 1648, for example, it was none other than Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem who figured as Bohdan Khmelnytsky's first "lobbyist" at the tsar's court.⁵⁶ Upon the acceptance of the Muscovite tsar's protectorate in 1654, which augmented his title with the formula "Great, White and Little Rus'," the designation of the Hetmanate as "Little *Rosiia*" took over completely in Muscovite official discourse, and the special agency established in 1662 for relations with the Hetmanate received the name "Little Russian Department."

The Cossack officers were also gradually drawn into this nomenclatorial tradition, although in their usage it was at first clearly "export-oriented," for use in relations with Moscow, while internally the territory of the Hetmanate was called "Ukraine" and its inhabitants collectively dubbed the "Ruthenian nation" (for example, in the proclamations of Bohdan Khmelnytsky the expression "Little *Rosiia*" does not appear even once, while *Ukraiina* is used as many as ten times).⁵⁷ Clear evidence that in the eyes of the Cossack officers the newborn "Little *Rosiia*" had already lost its prewar ecclesiastical meaning—that is, it had come to denote not the Kyiv metropolitanate but the territory of the Cossack Hetmanate—comes from the minutes of negotiations between the Cossack chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky and the Muscovite diplomat Vasiliï Kikin in August and September 1658. According to Kikin's testimony, Vyhovsky complained that he had received no thanks from the tsar for his faithful service and for having "brought Little *Rosiia* into submission under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty." Henceforth, Vyhovsky allegedly said, "Let Great *Rosiia* be Great *Rosiia* and Little *Rosiia* Little *Rosiia*, for there is an invincible army in Little *Rosiia* as well."⁵⁸

On the other hand, the bloody contest for all the Rus' territories of the Commonwealth ("as far as the Ruthenian language and faith extend") that lasted from the late 1650s to the 1670s sometimes received ideological justification from appeals to the legacy of the "Ruthenian nation of Volodymyr's stock," and in such instances that territory was ceremoniously named "Little *Rosiia*." For example, in Hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky's instruction to Cossack envoys dispatched to the Little Russian Department, we encounter an extensive list of reasons why "Little *Rosiia*" cannot belong to the "Liakhs": they took it over by guile, although it once had a "hereditary monarch" of its own and was enlightened by holy baptism not by the Polish king but by "Tsar Volodymyr, the equal of the apostles."⁵⁹ Another characteristic instance of the identification of "Little *Rosiia*" with the old principality of Kyivan Rus' is the titlature of Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky, "Prince of Little Rossian Ukraine

and Chieftain of the Zaporozhian Host.”⁶⁰ Archimandrite Inokentii Gizel of the Kyivan Cave Monastery, commenting in a letter of 1677 to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych on Yurii Khmelnytsky’s appearance on the political horizon, writes that the latter had “taken the Little Russian Principality upon himself” and, in his letters, was even using “the seal of the ancient princes of Rus’.”⁶¹

Nostalgia for a “Little *Rossian*” territory greater than the Hetmanate is also apparent in texts from ecclesiastical circles. At the same time, they show clearly that by “Little *Rosiia*” their authors also understood not the whole Kyiv metropolitanate extending across the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland but only its “Polish” (that is, Ukrainian) portion. For example, in painstakingly setting down the names of places where miracles of Nativity icons had taken place, Archimandrite Ioanikii Galiatovsky of the Chernihiv Monastery refers to all settlements in Podilia and Galician Rus’ as “Little *Rosiia*,” giving them the same status as the towns of the Cossack Hetmanate in which he himself resided. For analogous instances on the territory of Belarus, however, Galiatovsky consistently uses the identifier “Belarusian town” or town located in the “Lithuanian Principality.”⁶²

Indeed, “Little *Rosiia*” in its restricted hypostasis as the territory of the Cossack Hetmanate even penetrated the conservative vocabulary of the Eastern hierarchs: in his pastoral letter of 1678, Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem addressed himself to the Orthodox of “Little *Rosiia*, Polonia and Lithuania.”⁶³ As we see, in the eyes of the Eastern hierarchs the former “Little *Rosiia*” (the Kyiv metropolitanate) was already divided into Cossack “Little *Rosiia*” (incorporated into Russia) and a Polish-Lithuanian portion (incorporated into the Commonwealth).

Concurrently, in “high-style” texts produced on the territory of the Hetmanate during the second half of the seventeenth century, “Little *Rosiia*” progressively supplants *Ukraina*, which is evidently regarded as too colloquial. The vicissitudes of the civil war endow Cossack “Little *Rosiia*” with the added status of “our lamented mother-homeland,”⁶⁴ and this becomes the source of the long-term phenomenon of so-called Little Russian patriotism and Little Russian identity, which soon (in the eighteenth century) acquires both a definitive form and ideological motivations.⁶⁵

Ukraina

The etymology of the word *Ukraina*, first used by an Old Rus' chronicler under the year 1187, is not entirely clear. Aside from its ostensibly transparent identification with the concept of "borderland" (*okraïna*), there are other hypotheses according to which this word may be derived from the Old Slavic *kraĭъ or *ukraj, that is, "separate part of a territory," "country." Proofs of just such a meaning were adduced by Serhii Shelukhyn, who compared a Gospel translation of 1561 from Volhynia with Gospel texts in Greek, Latin and Czech. In this case, the equivalents of the concept of *Ukraina*, which the translator used many times, are the Greek *χώρα* (country, land), the Latin *regio* (country, region), and the Czech *krajina* (land, country)⁶⁶ (one might also add the Church Slavonic *strana*, which Shelukhyn does not mention). The lack of relevant monuments makes it impossible to confirm or disprove such an extended meaning of the word *Ukraina* in contemporary speech, but its content in official political and geographic nomenclature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries does indeed correspond to the concept of "borderland," which is understandable: from the viewpoint of the Lithuanian or the Polish capital, the lands of the future Ukraine were regarded as nothing other than distant borderlands. Adhering strictly to the "language of the sources," older historiography used the term to denote only the Dnipro region bordering on the steppe (as we shall see, this is not entirely correct). Mykhailo Hrushevsky, endowing the concept of *Ukraina* with a new and expanded meaning in 1898 in his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, found it necessary to comment on that innovation:

In the sixteenth century this ancient term, which during the Old Rus' period had meant "borderland," was applied exclusively to the middle Dnipro region... The name "Ukraine" assumed particular significance in the seventeenth century, when this region of eastern Ukraine became the center and symbol of the Ukrainian revival, and... concentrated in itself the aspirations, dreams, and hopes of modern Ukraine... During the literary renaissance of the nineteenth century, the name "Ukraine" became a symbol of Ukrainian national life. As awareness of the continuity and uninterruptedness of ethnonational Ukrainian life grew, the Ukrainian name gradually came to encompass the entire history of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁷

Hallowed by Hrushevsky's authority, the use of the name *Ukraina* in its new ethnogeographic meaning steadily established itself in the first third of the twentieth century, and in time it wholly supplanted the pre-

vious historiographic terms, which had “sliced” the territory of Ukraine into *Rus’*, Little *Rosiiia*, and *Ukraïna* itself. Commenting in the introductions to their works on the divergence between the name in use and the “language of the sources,” historians are generally agreed that until the Cossack wars of the mid-seventeenth century *Ukraïna* was used to denote the southeastern borderland of the Commonwealth, that is, the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates.⁶⁸

But the “language of the sources” is not so easily understood, for with the passage of time the concept of *Ukraïna* not only broadened, as scholars have established,⁶⁹ but also took on specific “pulsing” meanings depending on the viewpoint from which the authors of various texts observed or perceived *Ukraïna*. As for the word itself, as far as one can tell from the sources that have been preserved, it reemerged in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the fall of Kyivan *Rus’*. Scholars have noted that in its early period of use, from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century, the official (“Ruthenian”) language of the chancery of the grand dukes of Lithuania was subject to the contrary influences of both the south Ruthenian and Smolensk-Polatsk paradigms.⁷⁰ Nor can one rule out the influence of Pskov and Novgorod literary discourse, in which we find the word *ukraina* used to denote borderlands in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.⁷¹ In any event, the early chancery books of the Lithuanian grand dukes (in which the Ruthenian language was used, as is well known) already refer to these regions bordering on the steppe in the plural as *ukraïny* and to their inhabitants as *ukraïnnyky* or *liudy ukraïnni*.⁷² At the same time, the concept of *Ukraïna* could be extended to mean the whole southern part of the state. Thus, in a letter of 1500 to the Crimean khan Mengli Giray, the grand duke of Lithuania refers to the lands of Kyiv, Volhynia and Podilia as “our *ukraïny*,”⁷³ and a privilege of 1539 for the construction of a castle in Kyivan Polisia (that is, fairly distant from the border *per se*) is justified by the utility of such castles “in *Ukraïna*.”⁷⁴ The concept becomes even broader in a document of 1567 from the grand-ducal chancery, where officials of the border zone not only in the southern steppe but also in the Muscovite east—the fortresses of Slutsk, Rechitsa and Rogachev, located on the upper reaches of the Dnipro—are called vicegerents of “border (*ukraïnni*) castles.”⁷⁵

In the Polish state, by contrast, the tradition of referring to the borderlands as *Ukraïna* did not come into general use until the Union of Lublin (1569), when the *ukraïny* of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania came under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Poland. This is apparent, inter

alia, from a comparison of the geographic nomenclature in a memorandum written by Bernard Pretwicz, a paladin of the Polish–Tatar borderland in Podilia (1550), with the nomenclature of the early post-union period. In describing his campaigns, Pretwicz does not yet localize them “in *Ukraina*” but “on the border,” which is marked in his text by numerous “small border castles,” rivers, Tatar routes and fords. There is only one mention of “border (*ukraïnni*) villages” laid waste by Tatar raids.⁷⁶ One of the first Polish cartographers, Waclaw Grodecki, in publishing his map of the Kingdom of Poland in Basel (1558), shows the Tatar borderland but, unlike later cartographers, refers to it as “border localities” (*finitimarumque locorum*), not as *Ukraina*.⁷⁷ Nor is the word *Ukraina* known to a certain anonymous Pole who left irate marginalia on a map entitled *Polonia et Hungaria nuova tavola*—an appendix to a Venetian edition of Ptolemy’s *Geography* (1562). Commenting on the errors perpetrated here, he refers to the steppelands between the Buh and Dniπρο rivers as the “Lithuanian plains” and to those between the Buh and Dnister as the “Crown plains.”⁷⁸

In striking contrast to this is a proclamation of 1580 by King Stefan Batory, from which we see how far Polish attitudes had advanced toward the acceptance of “Ukrainian” geographic nomenclature in the decade following the Union of Lublin. This document was addressed to the “lords and knights residing in Russian, Kyivan, Volhynian, Podilian and Bratslavian Ukraine” (*panom i rycerstwu na Ukrainie ruskiej, kijowskiej, wołyńskiej, podolskiej i bractławskiej mieszkającym*).⁷⁹ As we see, the word *Ukraina* appears here as a synonym of a generalized name of all the Ruthenian palatinates, not only those annexed to the Kingdom of Poland under the terms of the Union of Lublin (the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav and Volhynia), but also those that had long been part of Poland (Podilia and Rus’). So sudden an effect of “Ukrainization” is hard to explain, as the royal chancery was accustomed to the names of “its own” palatinates, which had not hitherto been associated with borderland *ukraïny*. Thus it may be assumed that the “Lithuanian” name was imported by the scribes of the Ruthenian department of the Crown Chancery, established in 1569 to serve the needs of the newly annexed territories and dubbed the “Ruthenian Metrica.”⁸⁰ Between 1569 and 1586, the Ruthenian department was headed by the Bratslav nobleman Lavrin Pischynsky, and the name of Mykolai Vaskovsky, a noble from Kyivan Polisia, has been preserved from among its officials.⁸¹ It is to these people, especially Pischynsky, that one may cautiously “ascribe responsibility” for having introduced the new terminology into

the official discourse of the Polish higher circles. I have also managed to find a somewhat later corroboration that the broader meaning of the word *Ukraina*, synonymous with the notion of *Rus'*, was especially current among the inhabitants of the former "Lithuanian" *Rus'*. In 1621, commenting on a royal proclamation in which all the "border (*ukraiinni*) palatinates" were ordered to assist the Crown army, the Volhynian Roman Hoisky notes that it would be difficult to comply, for all the *ukraiinni* palatinates had been overrun and devastated by the Tatars: among the latter, he enumerates the Kyiv, Bratslav, Podilia, Volhynia and *Rus'* palatinates.⁸²

Concurrently with this broader notion of "all *Ukraina*," the latter could be divided into a series of "Ukraines" that did indeed mark the borderland location of its territories: "Podilian," "Dnipro," "Kyivan," "Bratslavian," "Trans-Dnipro," and "Buh" (that is, located on the Southern Buh River) Ukraines. At times, the borderland of Galician *Rus'* also figured on this list: for example, in 1600 the palatine of Belz, Stanisław Włodek, referred to the southern regions of the *Rus'* palatinate (Syniava, Terebovlia and Halych) as "local *Ukraina*."⁸³ It would appear that the writer's place of residence was by no means the least important factor in the above-mentioned pulsation of the *Ukraina/okraina* concept: the farther he was from the borderland, the more amorphous his notion of *Ukraina*. To an inhabitant of Little Poland, for instance, even the neighboring lands of the *Rus'* palatinate, with its capital in Lviv, were *Ukraina*. Walerian Nekanda-Trepka of Cracow, a tireless unmasker of "false nobles," places one of his antiheroes "in *Ukraina* near Sambir,"⁸⁴ that is, almost on the Polish border. Not knowing where the "false noble" was living at the moment, Nekanda simply waved his hand eastward: "He has gone off somewhere to Podilia, or to *Ukraina*."⁸⁵

By the same token, from the viewpoint of Lviv *Ukraina* receded even farther eastward. Appealing to Prince Karol Ferdynand in the autumn of 1648 for protection against the "Cossack rebellion," the members of the Lviv municipal council referred to the whole territory east and south of the borders of the *Rus'* principality as *Ukraina*. To make their point even more persuasively, they enumerated the principalities of Kyiv, Podilia, Bratslav, Chernihiv and Volhynia in their letter.⁸⁶

Such a list would hardly have pleased the inhabitants of Volhynia, who also distanced themselves from *Ukraina*, by which they meant only the palatinates bordering on the Tatar steppe—Kyiv, Bratslav and Podilia. For example, in 1593 the local dietine resolved to postpone a court session because of the Cossack revolt, of which the Volhynians, according

to the document, received reports “from *Ukraina*, from the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates.”⁸⁷ Even in a common cause—the struggle against the church union, in which the “Ruthenian nation” formed a united front—the Volhynians refer to *Ukraina* as a separate entity: “in Volhynia, in *Ukraina*, in Podilia,” “throughout Lithuania, Rus’, Volhynia and *Ukraina*,” “all Volhynia and *Ukraina*,”⁸⁸ and so on. On the other hand, in the Volhynians’ perception *Ukraina* emerges not merely as a borderland but as a territory with particular associations—if not with the Tatar threat, then definitely with Cossackdom. Both threatening factors merge and come to the fore at the beginning of the war of 1648, calling forth an emotional comparison of “peaceful Volhynia” with “dangerous *Ukraina*.” The Volhynian Adam Kysil, describing the outbreak of the war, writes about it as follows: “not only the settled areas but all the towns were deserted; [the Volhynian towns of] Polonna, Zaslav, Korets and Hoshcha became *Ukraina*.”⁸⁹ Later as well, we encounter a similar comparison in an instruction to delegates of a Volhynian dietine (1667): “*Ukraina* has turned into a Crimea, and Volhynia into an *Ukraina*.”⁹⁰ Finally, for a signal instance of decisive separation from *Ukraina*, we may note that the Orthodox Volhynian Danylo Bratkovsky did not use the word even once in a collection of verses that he published in 1697, while Volhynia was associated in his mind either with Poland or with Rus’ (“among us in Poland,” “among us in Rus’”).⁹¹

In contrast to this, the inhabitants of border regions did not refuse to identify themselves with *Ukraina*. Thus, for the priest Ivan Hrabyna of Sharhorod in Podilia, his town is “already *ukrainne* (of the borderland),” and his relative, the soldier Samiilo Loiovsky, a native of Podilia, writes with conviction that he comes “from *Ukraina*.”⁹²

Nevertheless, the “Ukrainian” identity of the Podilians pales by comparison with the analogous identity of inhabitants of the Kyiv region. The latter identified themselves with *Ukraina* whatever the situation; moreover, they consistently reserved that concept for their own territory in the Dnipro region, admitting no one else to the “Ukrainian club.”⁹³ It is not to be ruled out that this exclusivity of territory was identified in the inhabitants’ perception not only with the borderland but also with the “historical memory” of the Kyiv principality. Although evidence of this is scarce indeed, one should not neglect scattered references. In 1595, for instance, the petty noble Olekhno Zakusylo declared to the Volhynians that he came from the “Ovruch castle of the Kyiv principality.”⁹⁴ For evidence of how vitally residents of the Kyiv principality experienced their living space as a kind of “continuation” of that polity,

we may also adduce a later mention in a protestation of the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv, Iov Boretsky, against the hierarchs of the Uniate Church (1621). In substantiating the justice of his claims, Boretsky appeals *inter alia* to the rights and liberties of the Orthodox community, allegedly ratified by the “constitution of the union of 1569 between the Principality of Kyiv and the Crown [Kingdom of Poland].”⁹⁵ In a funerary poem of 1585 on the death of the castellan of Kyiv, Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, the Kyivan territory was called “Dnipro Ukraine” (*Poddnieprska Ukraina*).⁹⁶ The poem clearly exalts the “inhabitants of the Dnipro region,” above all the Volhynians and Podilians, as defenders of the region—and of the whole Commonwealth—against the Tatars. We encounter a similarly superior attitude in the so-called Kyiv Chronicle, which was compiled ca. 1616, probably by the Kyivan burgher Kyrilo Ivanovych. Mentioning the False Dmitrii’s stay at the Kyivan Cave Monastery, the author throws in the characteristic remark, “And he came from Volhynia, there is no telling from where.”⁹⁷

Still, the rigorism of the Kyivans’ “Ukrainian” identity softened after the Cossack wars of the middle and second half of the seventeenth century reduced not only the Kyivan nobility but also that of the Bratslav and Chernihiv regions to the condition of impoverished emigrants. United by common misfortune, refugees from all three palatinates began, as a token of solidarity, to call themselves “Ukrainians” and to refer to their lost fatherland as “Ukraine.” Here are some characteristic episodes from Diet diaries of 1669 and 1670:

...Lord Olizar, an assistant judge from Kyiv, read an article from the Ukrainian palatinates in the course of his speech.... And then all the delegates of the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Bratslav palatinates rose from their places and departed in protest.⁹⁸

...The delegates of Bratslav, Kyiv and Chernihiv angrily assaulted the Lord Standard-Bearer of Chersk... There was a great tumult on the part of the Mazovian delegates and, reciprocally, on the part of the Ukrainians.⁹⁹

An anonymous author of the latter half of the seventeenth century conveys the nobiliary vision of the territory of “tripartite Ukraine” even more precisely: “Ukraine is a Polish land consisting of three palatinates—Kyiv, Bratslav and Podilia—situated from sunrise on the Muscovite border, then the Tatar border, and farther on to the Moldavian border in the south.... And this land is called Ukraine because it has its location near the edge of foreign boundaries.”¹⁰⁰

Concurrently with the concretization of the nobles' idea of *Ukraina* as the territory encompassing the three eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth, yet another "Ukraine" emerged as a self-contained land. This was the *Ukraina* over which Cossack jurisdiction had been established, consisting at first of the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Bratslav regions and ultimately of territory on the Left Bank of the Dnipro only, where the Cossack Hetmanate occupied part of the Kyiv palatinate and all of the Chernihiv palatinate. The emergence of a Cossack state on the native soil of "Dnipro" Ukraine in the mid-seventeenth century automatically legitimized its name in the eyes of the residents of the Hetmanate. Even so, Cossack "Ukraine" was still considered an organic part of Rus' for quite a long time. For example, the panicky rumors that spread among the nobility at the outbreak of the war of 1648 identified the emergence of the Cossack Hetmanate with an attempt to create a "Cossack" or "Rus' principality."¹⁰¹ The unrealized Treaty of Hadiach (1658), which provided for the return of the Hetmanate to the Commonwealth, also refers to the territory of this autonomous entity as the Principality of Rus', which attests to the identification—from the viewpoint of the Cossack elite, at least—of *Ukraina* with Rus' territory in general. One more clear attestation of this was left by an outside observer who was by no means familiar with local onomastic nuances. I have in mind the report of the Swedish envoy Gottard Veling, who held negotiations in February 1657 with Ivan Vyhovsky (*zum Canzler*). According to Veling, Vyhovsky demanded the cession of all the territories of Galician Rus' occupied by the Swedish and Cossack forces: "rights to all ancient Ukraine, or Roxolania... as far as the Vistula" (*jus totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae... biss an die Weixel*).¹⁰² The insertion of the Latin phrase into the German text is a direct quotation of Vyhovsky's words, which lends even greater credibility to Veling's statement. Thus the expression "all *Ukraina*," which we often encounter in Cossack declarations, might appear situationally as a synonym of the concept of "all Rus'." Here, for example, is how Petro Doroshenko, hetman of the Cossacks who were not subordinate to the Muscovite tsar, defines his intentions in 1667: to take over "not only this side of Ukraine, where we currently reside [the Right Bank of the Dnipro], but the whole Principality of Rus', which was bounded by Peremyshl, Yaroslav, Halych, and Volodymyr."¹⁰³

As we know, the Cossack officers' efforts to unite "all Rus'" under their authority proved unavailing. The Cossack Hetmanate was reduced to territory on the Left Bank of the Dnipro, and this made the identification of Cossack Ukraine with "all Rus'" senseless, while the successful

career of the new designation “Little *Rosiiia*,” as noted above, steadily and completely erased all reminiscences of Rus’ from the collective memory of the inhabitants of the Hetmanate.

In such a dual hypostasis—as the *Ukraina* of the southeastern palatinates of the Commonwealth extending along the Right Bank of the Dnipro and as the *Ukraina* of the Cossack Hetmanate under Muscovite protection along the Left Bank of the Dnipro—did these territories enter the eighteenth century. Yet there was a name held in reserve for each of these “Ukraines”—*Rus’* in the Commonwealth and “Little *Rosiiia*” in the Cossack Hetmanate. As we now know, both these names stayed on the reserve bench, for the game was ultimately won by *Ukraina*.

Being well aware how tentative any explanation based on a back-to-front knowledge of history must be, I shall venture some conclusions nevertheless. The first of them will contradict the notion, well established in Ukrainian historiography, that the stimulus to the formation of early modern Ruthenian identity was provided by the church union of Brest (1596) and the interconfessional struggle associated with it, which, by refining the arguments of the polemicists, called into being an unprecedented stream of reflections on “history” and “nation.” In actual fact, the “name contest” that indicated the emergence of a need for a more precise self-definition and territorial designation began long before the church union and took its origin from the initiative of the Ruthenian Catholics, who made a place for their own land, *Roxolania*, in their political fatherland, the Kingdom of Poland. But *Roxolania* was the product of a nobiliary identity that was too loyal to the Polish world. It was by no means attractive to the Orthodox Ruthenians of Lviv, artisans and merchants, who found themselves obliged to defend their place in the sun in far from fraternal competition with the Polish residents of Lviv. Consequently, the alternative to *Roxolania* became the “true,” “authentically Orthodox” name of their land, *Rosiiia*, which was “invented” there (also prior to the church union). Making their way eastward from Galician Rus’, both “inventions” transformed the amorphous Rus’ space into a “territory with a history,” and both found sympathizers and opponents alike until the outbreak of the Cossack war of 1648, now competing with each other, now peaceably lending themselves to joint use in those same reflections on “history” and “nation.” The war, and the ensuing confrontation between Muscovy and the Commonwealth, which lasted almost half a century, put an end to that idyll. On the territory of the Cossack Hetmanate, Orthodox religious intolerance not only

brought about the complete victory of the name *Rosiia* but also reinforced it with an ecclesiastical accent, producing the form “Little *Rosiia*,” which was loyal to Muscovite authority. By contrast, the Ruthenians who remained in the Commonwealth renounced the word *Rosiia* as tainted by association with an enemy state and returned to the old, traditional name of their territory, *Rus’*.

What place between these two “inventions” of the two versions of “Ruthenianness” fell to *Ukraina*? Surfacing here and there, disintegrating and rolling its way through the sources, for all the world like a drop of mercury, the name *Ukraina* remains the greatest puzzle to the historian. Unfortunately, we shall never be able to ask the translator of the Gospel of 1561 what he had in mind when he used the word *ukraina* to render the Church Slavonic *strana*, the Latin *regio* or the Greek *χώρα*. Nor will we get an answer from Ivan Vyhovsky, who demanded a century later that the Swedes cede “all ancient Ukraine, or *Roxolania*.” The superficial ease with which this word suggests an analogy with *okraina*, reinforced by the official discourse of the capitals of the states for which the Ukrainian territories were indeed a “borderland”—a discourse reproduced thousands of times in the speech of the very inhabitants of those selfsame “borderlands”—renders the matter hopelessly confused. All that remains is to shrug one’s shoulders cautiously, making the mental declaration (as there is no sound basis to say it aloud): perhaps that word was indeed the native name of Ukraine-Rus’, and that is why it won the “name contest” in the end.

In conclusion, I shall return to Giovanna Brogi Bercoff’s proposal, mentioned at the beginning of this article, to consider the “polymorphism” of Ruthenian cultural space in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not as a sign of “underdevelopment” but as the key element of a “cultural code” that manifested itself in the fluctuations of external influences and internal stimuli; in linguistic and confessional pluralism; in concepts that were mutable and multilayered. In my view, the foregoing observations on a specific topic clearly confirm that hypothesis, showing how the “dilemma of choice” became an “organic” aspect of a world view and cross-cultural ties were assimilated to the native cultural landscape. After all, in the process of “trying on names,” which turned amorphous Rus’ into a “territory with a history,” the nuances of historical memory were variously recoded depending on individual/group choice, but the integrating function of “memory” itself was not thereby diminished, because the opponents fixed their attention for the first time on one and the same subject—“our” land and “our common” past.

Notes

- ¹ Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, "Rus', Ukraina, Ruthenia, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie, Rzeczpospolita, Moskwa, Rosja, Europa środkowo-wschodnia: o wielowarstwowości i polifunkcjonalizmie kulturowym," in *Contributi italiani al XIII congresso internazionale degli slavisti*, eds. Alberto Alberti et al. (Pisa, 2003), pp. 325–87.
- ² Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: Storia, cultura, società*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), pp. 39–53; Serhii Plokhyy, "The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovych," *ibid.*, pp. 333–66.
- ³ E.A. Mel'nikova (note 3 to chapter 9) in Konstantin Bagrianorodnyi, *Ob upravlenii imperiei. Tekst, perevod, kommentarii*, eds. G.G. Litavrin and A.P. Novosil'tsev (Moscow, 1991), p. 308.
- ⁴ E.A. Mel'nikova and V.Ia. Petrukhin (note 1 to chapter 9), *ibid.*, p. 292.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 295.
- ⁶ Letter of 1352 from Lithuanian-Rus' princes swearing allegiance to King Casimir III of Poland in *Hramoty XIV st.*, comp. M.M. Peshchak (Kyiv, 1974), p. 31.
- ⁷ A. V. Solov'ev, "Vizantiiskoe imia Rossii," in *Vizantiiskii vremennik*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1957), pp. 134–46.
- ⁸ For citations of Hungarian and Mazovian documents of the first half of the thirteenth century containing words derived from *Ruthenus*, see especially Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 369, 501; vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 33, 515, 516.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 2: 515.
- ¹⁰ See the linguistic analysis in V.M. Myronova, *Hramatychni osoblyvosti latyns'koï aktovoï movy XV–XVI st. v Ukraïni (na materialy hrods'kykh i zems'kykh sudovykh aktiv Halyts'koï, Sianots'koï, Peremyshl's'koï i L'vivs'koï administratyvnykh okruh Halyts'koï Rusi)*, abstract of Candidate diss., Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, 1999.
- ¹¹ Cited according to Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: p. 459; 3: p. 517.
- ¹² L.A. Bagrow [Bagrov], *History of the Cartography of Russia up to 1600*, ed. H.W. Castner (Wolfe Island, Ontario, 1975), pp. 22, 27.
- ¹³ Instruction to Nuncio Mario Filonardi in *Acta Nuntiaturae Poloniae*, vol. 25, *Marius Filonardi (1635–1643)*, bk. 1 (12 II 1635–29 X 1636), ed. Theresia Chynczewska-Hennel (Cracow, 2003), p. 3.
- ¹⁴ On Sarmatism as an ethnogenetic legend and ideology, see the following works: Tadeusz Ulewicz, *Sarmacja. Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej XV i XVI wieku* (Cracow, 1950); Stanisław Cynarski, "Sarmatyzm—ideologia i styl życia," in *Polska XVII wieku. Państwo—społeczeństwo—kultura*, ed. Janusz Tazbir (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 220–43; Stanisław Grzybowski, *Sarmatyzm* (Warsaw, 1996); M.V. Leskinen, *Mify i obrazy sarmatizma. Istoki natsional'noi ideologii Rechi Pospolitoi* (Moscow, 2002).
- ¹⁵ The most recent work about Orzechowski is Dmytro Vyrs'kyi, *Stanislaw Orikhovs'kyi-Roksolan iak istoryk ta politychnyi myslitel'* (Kyiv, 2001).

Unfortunately, the author failed to take note of Orzechowski's role in the creation of *Roxolania*.

- ¹⁶ First published as M. Miechovita, *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis, Asiana et Europiana, et de contentis in eis* (Cracow, 1517).
- ¹⁷ The frequency of such designations is particularly apparent in Orzechowski's letters: see S. Orzechowski, *Opera inedita et epistolae, 1543–1566*, vol. 1, ed. Joseph Korzeniowski (Cracow, 1891), pp. 440, 512, 515, 526 passim.
- ¹⁸ Michalonis Litvani, *De moribus Tartarorum, Litvanorum et Moschorum* (Basel, 1615), cited according to the reprint in *Arkhiiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii, otnosiashchikhsia do Rossii* (Moscow, 1854), p. 44. On the date of composition of the treatise and its authorship, see the introduction to Mikhailon Litvin, *O nravakh tatar, litovtsev i moskvitian* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 6–56.
- ¹⁹ An appeal to Prince Volodymyr as “first baptizer” of Rus’.
- ²⁰ For a detailed discussion, with relevant sources, see Natalia Iakovenko, “Topos ‘z’iednanykh narodiv’ u panehirykakh kniaziam Ostroz’kym i Zaslavs’kym (Bilia vytokiv ukraïns’koï identychnosti),” in idem, *Paralel’nyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiaavlenn’ ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 231–69.
- ²¹ On other versions of the “national” identity of the Ruthenians in that period, see Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (New York, 2001), pp. 153–65. Cf. also the comparison of different versions of “Ruthenianism” of that day in Frank E. Sysyn, “Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos. 3–4 (1986): 393–423; David A. Frick, “‘Foolish Rus’’: On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred, and Kasijan Sakovyč,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18, nos. 3–4 (1994): 210–48.
- ²² Sebastiani Sulmircensis Acerni *Roxolania* (Cracow, 1584). For a reprint of the original text, accompanied by a translation, see S.F. Klonowicz, *Roxolania—Roksolania czyli Ziemie Czerwonej Rusi*, ed. and trans. Mieczysław Mejor (Warsaw, 1996).
- ²³ They are considered in detail in Borys A. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).
- ²⁴ P. Tolochko, “Rus’—Mala Rus’—rus’kyi narod u druhii polovyni XIII–XVII st.,” *Kyivs’ka starovyna*, 1993, no. 3: 3–14.
- ²⁵ See the survey of scholarly literature on the *Synopsis* in Hans Rothe's introduction to his facsimile edition: *Synopsis, Kiev 1681: Facsimile mit einer Einleitung* (Cologne, 1983). On the conceptual tendency of the work, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing: 1620–1690,” *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 306–9; Zenon E. Kohut, “The Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600–1945*, eds. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton and Toronto, 2003), pp. 57–86.

- ²⁶ This was the so-called *Poriadok shkol'nyi* of 1586, cited according to its most recent publication in *Pam'iatky brats'kykh shkil na Ukraïni. Kinets' XVI—pochatok XVII st. Teksty i doslidzhennia*, eds. V.I. Shynkaruk, V.M. Nichyk and A.D. Sukhov (Kyiv, 1988), p. 38.
- ²⁷ For a survey of the evidence, see I.Z. Myts'ko, *Ostroz'ka slov'iano-hreko-latyns'ka akademiia (1576–1636)* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 82, 98.
- ²⁸ For a survey of the evidence, see E.N. Dziuba, *Prosveshchenie na Ukraine. Vtoraia polovina XVI—pervaia polovina XVII v.* (Kyiv, 1987), pp. 34–35, 49–50.
- ²⁹ M.A. Dmitriev, *Mezhdru Rimom i Tsar'gradom. Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 gg.* (Moscow, 2003), p. 285.
- ³⁰ Cf. the observations in Frank E. Sysyn, “The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, pp. 117–18. See also Plokhyy, “The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovyč,” pp. 343–44.
- ³¹ Cited according to the reprint in *Pam'iatky brats'kykh shkil na Ukraïni*, pp. 170–78.
- ³² The treatise *Palinodiia*, published in *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury v Zapadnoi Rusi*, bk. 1, Russkaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1878), cols. 319, 606, 1134, 1146.
- ³³ *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb zatsnoho rytsera Petra Konashevycha Sahaidachnoho* (Kyiv, 1622), cited according to the reprint in *Ukraïns'ka literatura XVII st.*, ed. O.V. Myshanych (Kyiv, 1987), pp. 221, 234.
- ³⁴ *Τερατουργημα lubo cuda... Ojca Athanasiusa Kalnofojskiego...* (Kyiv, 1638), cited according to the reprint in *Seventeenth-Century Writings on the Kievan Caves Monastery*, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, Texts, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA, 1987), p. 160.
- ³⁵ Fr. Theodosius Baiewski, *Tentoria venienti... Adamo de Brusilow Kisiel...* (Kyiv, 1646).
- ³⁶ Ia.M. Stratii, V.D. Litvinov and V.A. Andrushko, *Opisanie kursov filosofii i ritoriki professorov Kiev-Mogilianskoi akademii* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 30, 39, 168, 175, 181.
- ³⁷ Plokhyy, “The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovyč,” p. 344.
- ³⁸ That question is addressed particularly in Serhii Plokhyy's article mentioned in the preceding footnote and in Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture.”
- ³⁹ Lviv, 10 January 1649, in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (henceforth *Arkhiv IuZR*), no. 1, vol. 10 (Kyiv, 1904), p. 191.
- ⁴⁰ Letter on the election of a new metropolitan (Lviv, 3 October 1663), *ibid.*, p. 629.
- ⁴¹ See the pastoral epistles and letters of Dionisii Balaban dating from the years 1657–59 (*Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 12), Antonii Vinnytsky (1667), and Yosyf Neliubovych-Tukalsky (1669) in *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (henceforth *Pamiatniki*), vols. 2, 4 (Kyiv, 1859–98).

- ⁴² Lviv, 25 May 1689, in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 10, p. 757.
- ⁴³ The diary was written in Latin and published in Polish translation: Bazyli Rudomicz, *Efemeris czyli Diariusz prywatny pisany w Zamościu w latach 1656–1672*, trans. Władysław Froch, eds. Marian Lech Klementowski and Władysław Froch, pt. 1 (1656–1664), pt. 2 (1665–1672) (Lublin, 2002).
- ⁴⁴ Ihor Ševčenko, “The Policy of the Byzantine Patriarchate in Eastern Europe in the Fourteenth Century,” in idem, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), pp. 77–78.
- ⁴⁵ Hrushevs’kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 137.
- ⁴⁶ Ševčenko, “The Policy of the Byzantine Patriarchate,” pp. 77–78.
- ⁴⁷ Hrushevs’kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 4: 408, 415.
- ⁴⁸ A.L. Khoroshkevich, “Gerb,” in *Gerb i flag Rossii X-XX veka*, ed. G.V. Vilinbakhov (Moscow, 1977), p. 195.
- ⁴⁹ *Documenta Unioni Berestensis eiusque auctorum (1590–1600)*, comp. Fr. Athanasius G. Welykyj OSBM (Rome, 1970), pp. 28, 344. The Polish translation of the second document uses the expression *w Małej Rusi*, but there is no doubt that the word in the Greek original was *Rosii*.
- ⁵⁰ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 4 (1588–1632) (St. Petersburg, 1851), p. 48. For a commentary on this letter and a reference to earlier literature, see Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, pp. 283–84.
- ⁵¹ Ivan Vyshens’kyi, *Vybrani tvory*, comp. V.L. Mykytas’ (Kyiv, 1972), p. 57.
- ⁵² *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 5, p. 4; *Pamiatniki*, 2: 395, 400.
- ⁵³ Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, pp. 287–91.
- ⁵⁴ Cf. such letters from Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky, dating from 1622 and 1626, in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1954), pp. 27–28; *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 6, p. 577, and from Petro Mohyla, dating from 1640, in *Pamiatniki*, 2: 427.
- ⁵⁵ Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, pp. 179–90.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 308–9.
- ⁵⁷ *Universal Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho*, comp. Ivan Kryp’iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1998).
- ⁵⁸ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi Komissiei* (henceforth *Akty IuZR*), vol. 4 (1657–1659) (St. Petersburg, 1863), p. 145.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 5 (1659–1665), pp. 237–38.
- ⁶⁰ Letter to King Jan Sobieski (from camp at Bendery, 5 May 1678), published by Yurii Mytsyk in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 233 (Lviv, 1997), p. 375.
- ⁶¹ Kyiv, 20 March 1677, in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 12 (1675–1678), p. 101.
- ⁶² Ioanikii Galiatovsky’s treatises *Nebo novoie* (Lviv, 1665) and *Skarbnytsia potrebnaiia* (Novhorod-Siverskyi, 1676), cited according to the reprints in idem, *Kliuch rozuminnia*, ed. I.P. Chepiha (Kyiv, 1985), pp. 294, 197, 306, 311 *passim*.
- ⁶³ *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 5, p. 12.

- ⁶⁴ This shift of world view is analyzed in greater detail in the chapter on the birth of the Cossack-Ruthenian fatherland (“Narodzhennia kozats’ko-rus’koï vitchyzny”) in my book *Narys istoriï seredn’ovichnoi ta rann’omodernoï Ukraïny* (Outline History of Medieval and Early Modern Ukraine; Kyiv, 2005), pp. 430–32.
- ⁶⁵ On the formation and manifestations of Little Russian identity, see Zenon E. Kohut, “The Development of the Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding,” in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos. 3–4 (1986): 559–79; Serhii Plokhyy, “The Symbol of Little Russia: The Pokrova Icon and Early Modern Ukrainian Political Ideology,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, no. 1–2 (summer–winter 1992): 171–88; idem, “The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovyč,” pp. 351–66; Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture.”
- ⁶⁶ Serhii Shelukhyn, *Ukraïna—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavnishykh chasyv* (Prague, 1936), pp. 117–19. For a different interpretation of these parallels, see Ia.R. Rudnyts’kyi, *Slovo i nazva “Ukraïna”* (Winnipeg, 1951), pp. 55–57. However, Rudnytsky’s view was not supported by so authoritative a linguist as George Y. Shevelov: in his review of Rudnytsky’s book, Shevelov essentially accepts Shelukhyn’s hypothesis. See George Y. Shevelov, “The Name *Ukraina* ‘Ukraine,’” in his *Teasers and Appeasers: Essays and Studies on Themes of Slavic Philology* (Munich, 1971). The review was written in 1951.
- ⁶⁷ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, eds. Frank E. Sysyn et al. (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. 1–2.
- ⁶⁸ Cf. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985), p. 35; Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. xiii–xiv; Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich, 1994), pp. 17–21; Piotr Borek, *Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach i pamiętnikach. Bohaterowie, fortece, tradycja* (Cracow, 2001), pp. 9–13; P.M. Sas, “Vid ‘Rusi’ do ‘Ukraïny,’” in *Istoriia ukraïns’koï kul’tury*, vol. 2, *Ukraïns’ka kul’tura XIII — pershoï polovyny XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 795–800.
- ⁶⁹ See the survey of mid-twentieth-century opinion in Rudnyts’kyi, *Slovo i nazva “Ukraïna,”* pp. 7–31; for surveys of later literature, see Borek, *Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach i pamiętnikach*, pp. 9–13; A.L. Khoroshkevich, “Labirint politiko-ětno-geograficheskikh naimenovanii Vostochnoi Evropy serediny XVII v.,” in *Z dziejów kultury prawnej. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi Bardachowi w dziewięćdziesięciolecie urodzin* (Warsaw, 2004), pp. 411–32.
- ⁷⁰ The most recent review of the literature known to me is U. Sviashynski, “Ab statuse belaruskai i ukrainskai moŭ u chasy Vialikaha Kniastva Litoŭskaha,” in *Metriciana. Dasledovanni i materyialy Metryki Vialikaha Kniastva Litoŭskaha*, vol. 2 (Minsk, 2003), pp. 132–63.
- ⁷¹ Examples in Rudnyts’kyi, *Slovo i nazva “Ukraïna,”* p. 49.

- ⁷² Cf. diplomatic correspondence of the 1490s in *Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506)*. *Knyga nr 5*, ed. Egidijus Banionis (Vilnius, 1993), pp. 66, 73, 117, 118, 131 etc.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- ⁷⁴ *Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga nr 25 (1387–1546)*, eds. Darius Antanavičius and Algirdas Baliulis (Vilnius, 1998), p. 114.
- ⁷⁵ Knyshyn, 28 January 1567, in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 8, vol. 5, p. 158.
- ⁷⁶ Cited according to the text as published by Andrzej Tomczak in *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* (Warsaw) 6, no. 2 (1960): 343.
- ⁷⁷ L.S. Bagrov, *Istoriia kartografii* (Moscow, 2004), p. 195.
- ⁷⁸ Iaroslav Dashkevych, “Pokraini notatky pro ukrains’ki stepy u ‘Heohrafiï’ Ptolemeia 1562,” in *Boplan i Ukraïna. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats’* (Lviv, 1998), p. 83.
- ⁷⁹ Warsaw, January 1580, in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 3, vol. 1, p. 12.
- ⁸⁰ For a study of its work, see Petro Kulakovs’kyi, *Kantseliariia Rus’koï (Volyns’koï) metryky 1569–1673 rr. Studiia z istoriï ukrains’koho rehionalizmu v Rechi Pospolytii* (Ostrih, 2002). For a register of documents issued by this chancery during its period of activity, which lasted more than a century, with an exhaustive introduction by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, see *Rus’ka (Volyns’ka) metryka. Rehesty dokumentiv Koronnoï kantseliarii dlia ukrains’kykh zemel’ (Volyns’ke, Kyïvs’ke, Bratslavs’ke, Chernihivs’ke voievodstva), 1569–1673*, comp. H. Boriak, H. Vais, K. Vyslobokov et al. (Kyiv, 2002).
- ⁸¹ Kulakovs’kyi, *Kantseliariia Rus’koï (Volyns’koï) metryky*, pp. 140, 154.
- ⁸² Letter to the Kyivan palatine Tomasz Zamoyski, dated Yarychiv, 8 October 1621 (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich [henceforth AGAD, AZ], MS 725, no. 67).
- ⁸³ Letter to Crown Grand Hetman Jan Zamoyski, dated Syniava, 7 May 1600 (AGAD, AZ, MS 703, no. 18).
- ⁸⁴ W. Nekanda Trepka, *Liber generationis plebeanorum (“Liber Chamorum”)*, ed. Rafał Leszczyński, 2nd ed. (Wrocław, 1995), p. 459, no. 2355.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 302, no. 1477.
- ⁸⁶ Lviv, 15 September 1648, in *Pamiatniki*, 1: 296.
- ⁸⁷ Volodymyr, 29 January 1593, in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 3, vol. 1, p. 49.
- ⁸⁸ Quotations taken from Meletii Smotrytsky’s works *Verificatia niewinności* and *Obrona verificaciey* (both 1621) and *Elenchus pism uszczypliwych* (1622), cited according to the reprints in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 1, vol. 7, pp. 324, 376.
- ⁸⁹ Hoshcha, 7 June 1648, cited according to Karol Szajnocha, *Dwa lata dziejów naszych. 1646, 1648. Opowiadanie i źródła*, vol. 2, *Polska w r. 1648* (Lviv, 1869), p. 337.
- ⁹⁰ Lutsk, 7 February 1667, in *Arkhiv IuZR*, no. 2, vol. 2, p. 211.
- ⁹¹ D. Bratkowski, *Świat po części przezyrzany* (Cracow, 1697), cited according to the reprint: Danylo Bratkovs’kyi, *Świat po części przezyrzany. Fototypichne vydannia. Pereklad. Dzherela. Studii* (Lutsk, 2004), pp. 150, 320, 324.

- ⁹² Both entries are written in the authors' own hands in the "Book of Miracles" of the Zhironvichi Monastery: Hrabyna's is dated 5 March 1626 and Loiovsky's 6 August 1634 (Vasyl Stefanyk Scholarly Library of Lviv, Manuscript Division [henceforth LNB], f. MV-393 [Basilian Library in Lviv], pp. 20, 82–83).
- ⁹³ For a more detailed discussion, see my article "Zhyttieprostir *versus* identychnist' ukrains'koho shliakhtycha XVII st. (na prykladi Iana/Iakyma Ierlycha)," in *Ukraina XVII st.: suspil'stvo, relihii, kul'tura*, ed. Larysa Dovha (Kyiv, 2005).
- ⁹⁴ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, f. 25, op. 1, spr. 46, fol. 118^v.
- ⁹⁵ The text of the protestation has been published by the Rev. Yurii Mytsyk in *Zapysky NTSh* 225 (1993): 325–27. The reference to the Kyiv principality in this protestation has also been noted by Serhii Plokyh (*The Cossacks and Religion*, p. 158).
- ⁹⁶ The funerary poem *Epicedion* was published in Cracow in 1585; it was reprinted as an appendix to A.V. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki* (Kyiv, 1904), pp. 163–220.
- ⁹⁷ Text in V.I. Ul'ianovs'kyi and N.M. Iakovenko, "Kyivs'kyi litopys pershoi chverti XVII st.," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1989, no. 2: 107–20; no. 5: 103–14. Discussion of authorship and time of the text's appearance, *ibid.*, no. 2: 109–13; quotation, no. 3: 109.
- ⁹⁸ "...p. Olizar, podsedek kijowski, mówiac czytał artykuł wo[jewó]ctw ukraińskich... A zatym wszyscy posłowie kijowskiego, czernichowskiego i braclawskiego wo[jewó]ctwa z miejsc ruszyli się i wyszli z protestacją." *Diariusz sejmu koronnego 1669 r.*, eds. Kazimierz Przyboś and Marek Ferenc (Cracow, 2004), p. 34.
- ⁹⁹ "...porwali się Braclawianie, Kijowianie i Czernichowianie cum insultu na p. chorążego czerskiego... Hałas wielki od posłów mazowieckich powstał et vicissim od Ukraińców." *Diariusz sejmu nadzwyczajnego 1670 roku*, eds. Kazimierz Przyboś and Marek Ferenc (Cracow, 2004), p. 49.
- ¹⁰⁰ "Ukraina jest kraj polski z trzech województw, kijowskiego, braclawskiego i czernichowskiego składający się, od wschodu słońca przy granicy moskiewskiej, potem tatarskiej, dalej ku południowi wołoskiej leżący... I dla tego Ukrainą ten kraj przeżywa się, że przy kraju cudzych granic ma swoje położenie." "Opisanie wojny kozackiej, to jest buntów Chmielnickiego," LNB, f. 5 (Ossoliński), file 2098/II, fol. 22^v. Cited according to Borek, *Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach i pamiętnikach*, p. 12.
- ¹⁰¹ For a brief critical review of these rumors (contrasting with recent attempts to interpret them as evidence of Khmelnytsky's "state-creating program"), see Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 3, pp. 11–12.
- ¹⁰² *Arkhiv IuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 205.
- ¹⁰³ Chyhyryn, December 1667, in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 6 (1665–1668), p. 241.

Fellows and Travelers:

Thinking about Ukrainian History in the Early Nineteenth Century

Oleksiy Tolochko

The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which thinking about Ukrainian history evolved during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Although this period is not considered important for the shaping of Ukrainian historical thought, I would argue that it was crucial in many respects. By the end of the period, the romantic vision of the Ukrainian past was already fully formed and was slowly giving way to more academic study. Major syntheses, however, present the final results of intensive developments whose details remain largely obscure. It is my aim to go beyond the texts normally featured in studies on historiography in order to uncover the inner workings of historical thought.

“Long” vs. “Short” History

The modern master narrative of Ukrainian history is a “long” one, beginning with the “Cimmerian darkness” of prehistory and proceeding without interruption through a number of “periods” until recent times. It is not sufficiently appreciated that this “long history” is a product of the late nineteenth century, first presented in Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus’*. Hrushevsky significantly expanded the scope of what could be imagined as Ukrainian history by claiming a number of early periods for it. In length and scope, this new narrative of Ukrainian history was comparable to those of neighboring nations and thus “normal” by the standards of the time. Hrushevsky and his followers considered the long narrative indispensable in order to make the Ukrainian past competitive with the histories of other nations and ensure its eventual acceptance at home and abroad. Only the long narrative could fulfill the nation-building mission assigned to it by “scientifically” documenting the nation’s past and restoring to the Ukrainian

people (still thought of as an “ethnographic mass”) the historical consciousness that they had once possessed and subsequently lost.

Although the long version is dominant today, Ukrainian history as a narrative distinct from Polish and Russian history first emerged in short form as the history of the “Cossack nation.” The Cossacks were regarded as an ancient people, but the natural focus of their history was on the martial deeds of Cossackdom, which culminated in Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s wars of the 1640s and 1650s. While this history was significantly shorter than the one that eventually replaced it, it fulfilled all the tasks normally associated with national history, making it possible to carve out a unique historical experience of a distinct people that sets it apart from neighboring nations. Historical development on this model could not be assimilated into the histories of the region’s dominant nations. Ironically, this short history, later deemed inadequate, was better equipped for its intended task than the long version. It defined a historical “territory” that no other history could claim, while laying no claim to the territory of other narratives. Its legitimacy could not therefore be contested, unlike that of the long history, whose authority was undermined by disputes over particular episodes of Polish-Lithuanian and Russian history. Thus the short history avoided collision with the historical accounts of neighboring nations, into which the long history was boldly driven by Hrushevsky.

Hrushevsky’s generation rejected the short history mainly for ideological reasons, but it was also encouraged by new trends in thinking about history that had emerged in the course of the nineteenth century. The post-Herder “discovery of the people” called into existence a whole new set of disciplines specifically designed for the study of popular phenomena. Ethnography, folklore studies, physical anthropology and comparative linguistics promised to document “popular history” even if it had hitherto gone unrecorded in written sources and generally accepted narratives. The new disciplines maintained that everything associated with “the people” had a most venerable lineage going back to antiquity. They all claimed that the reconstruction of successive stages of “popular history” was technically possible, in effect projecting the beginnings of any nation’s history into the indefinite past. By incorporating the achievements of these disciplines, historiography could define itself as a “modern” and “scholarly” enterprise based on hard “scientific” data, not on dubious “tradition.” In anthropology, linguistics, and not yet discredited racial theories, nineteenth-century positivism discerned the means of rescuing history from the domain of art and literature and turning it

into one of the “sciences.” Comparative linguistics was indeed making impressive progress: languages were being described and grouped into “families” with identifiable “parents.” Similarly, anthropology was examining human populations and classifying them into groups according to physical appearance, revealing their supposed biological ancestors. Allegedly, the history of any human collective and, indeed, of all mankind could be represented as a genealogical tree. The prospect of delineating the evolution of languages and their bearers (with their customs and laws, folklore, and so on) was all the more impressive because it accorded with a major recent teaching on the descent of the natural world—Darwin’s theory of evolution.

For a historian striving to construct a long history for a “non-historic” nation, these new disciplines (to which one should, of course, add archaeology) offered a tool of extraordinary power. The idea of gradual evolution conceived as an endless genealogical tree on which each nation could be assigned its place and its particular ancestors virtually eliminated the problem of discontinuity. Biology and linguistics lent continuity to national history. Science also taught that all peoples were equally “ancient.” The Holy Grail of Ukrainian history seemed within reach.

As historians of science would discover a century later, both theories, linguistic and evolutionary, borrowed their basic metaphor from the traditional discipline of genealogy, with its image of the family tree and its postulate of origin from a common ancestor.¹ What appeared to be hard science turned out to be a modern version of the story of Babel.

No one today would dare to write Ukrainian history in a short version. The long narrative has dominated Ukrainian historical writing for a century and is still regarded as the only “scientific” account of the past. Yet the preceding remarks would suggest that the choice between the two is ideological rather than scholarly.² Whatever their differences, both the long and the short narratives occupy common epistemological ground. In spite of all the pressure to reconcile them, that task has not been accomplished, nor has the short history been quite digested. It is still widely believed, both by the public at large and in academic historiography, that it was the “Cossack period” that endowed Ukrainians with a unique historical experience shared by no other nation (unlike the “Kyivan” or the “Lithuanian” and “Polish” periods).³ Consequently, the tension between the two versions of Ukrainian history is still felt.

In this essay I will try to sketch the key ideas about local history that were current when the short history still had the potential to become the Ukrainian national narrative. I shall also try to explore the reasons why it failed.

Methodology

Historiography normally deals with published texts, preferably classics of the genre, so that filiations of ideas can be presented as a series of chronologically arranged titles. It is believed that books somehow make their way to a broad readership, thereby shaping popular historical consciousness. The channels whereby a refined idea descends to lower levels of awareness to become a conviction and a cliché are rarely scrutinized.

But what do we make of a period that produced no major historical synthesis, or even historical literature in the accepted sense? Must we assume that people did not bother with history and had no awareness of their past? This is precisely the Ukrainian situation during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Such periods are virtually closed to historiographic study and thus considered irrelevant.

The situation can be remedied, at least in part, by introducing an anthropological dimension—historiography understood not as a row of books on the shelf but as a series of recurring human activities. In this essay I focus on two parallel developments. Neither of them is what historiography would consider its primary subject, yet I would argue that both profoundly influenced the ways in which the history of the region has been regarded ever since. The first is the activity of the local *szlachta* as it sought to enter the ranks of the Russian nobility. The networking of the Ukrainian gentry and the drafting and circulation of historical memoranda within that network, as well as the subsequent petitioning of the authorities, can reveal how the vision of history was shaped and channeled in this “dark age.” “Ukrainian tours”—the second focus of the essay—may be considered an equivalent of what Benedict Anderson has termed “pilgrimages”: repetitive journeys whose cumulative effect is to circumscribe a particular space and establish a lasting image of it. People would travel the standard routes and visit the same sites, “recognizing” them and validating their preconceived notions. They would experience essentially the same emotions and make predictable observations. These experiences are documented by numerous travelogues, letters written en route, memoirs and journals. In the field of Ukrainian studies, this literature, hugely popular at the time, has not been treated as a potentially valuable source for the study of historical writing. Both developments, however, can show historiography developing from the grassroots as a collective effort of numerous agents, not yet obscured and overshadowed by an imposing title.

Fellows

The abolition of the Hetmanate's political structures and the introduction of direct imperial administration turned the Ukrainian nobility (*szlachta*) into members of the imperial gentry (*dvorianstvo*).⁴ The authorities soon discovered problems: the number of those claiming noble status was unusually high; traditional privileges associated with that status were not quite compatible with those enjoyed by the Russian *dvoriane*; and, most troubling, it was not easy to determine just who was eligible for admission to the *dvorianstvo*. As a result, the process of integrating the Ukrainian *szlachta* into the *dvorianstvo* dragged on for several decades, well into the nineteenth century. It is the final stage of this process that is of special interest for our purposes. The Heraldry Office (*Gerol'dmeisterskaia Kontora*) established certain new terms on which the Ukrainian nobility could claim *dvorianstvo* status. Ukrainians found themselves disadvantaged by the new conditions: service in Hetmanate institutions conferred no automatic admission to the *dvorianstvo*, and, in addition, many lacked documentary proof of *szlachta* descent.⁵

The Cossack military elite, which became the country's de facto privileged class after Khmelnytsky's wars of the mid-seventeenth century, enjoyed an amazing rate of social advancement in the Russian Empire. During the wars, military commanders were recruited from socially and ethnically diverse individuals, mostly of rather humble extraction. Rapidly advancing through the ranks and getting richer on the way, they soon came to think of themselves as nobles similar in all respects to the Polish *szlachta* that had just been eliminated, choosing a corresponding standard of living and even developing a rudimentary group ideology. The Moscow government tacitly recognized the Cossack elite as the Hetmanate's ruling class, confirming its status with land grants, the bestowal of Russian ranks, and other favors. Setbacks notwithstanding, the Russian government's position was consistent, so by the eighteenth century, descendants of parvenu ancestors—now landowners educated in European universities—thought of themselves as the territory's traditional ruling class.

The Ukrainian gentry regarded service in the Hetmanate as the source of its status, and virtually anyone who had held any rank claimed noble origin. The autonomy of the Hetmanate and the central authorities' lenience resulted in an explosive growth of the *szlachta*. As one contemporary noted in the early 1800s, it was something of a miracle that

two tiny Ukrainian gubernias had produced some one hundred thousand nobles.⁶ Although the figure is probably too high,⁷ it attests to an unprecedented transformation of “rebels” and commoners into a “noble nation” in the course of a mere century.

With the change in government policy, the Ukrainian gentry discovered that what it considered its privilege and advantage, and cherished as its special status, had turned into a liability. The gentry did not quite fit the imperial pattern, either in numbers or in the nature of its service. There were several problems. Few could present documents (whether authentic or forged) vouching for their noble origins, and those who could had done so years previously. The Ukrainian *szlachta* insisted on being accepted as a corporate order that had served the Hetmanate. Yet it was unclear just how Ukrainian offices corresponded to those listed in the imperial Table of Ranks and what precedents had been established by earlier practice. Moreover, Ukrainian offices were not mentioned in the Charter to the Nobility, and the Heraldry Office maintained that only those who had been granted proper Russian military or civil ranks were eligible for admission to the *dvorianstvo*.

The Ukrainian gentry felt that its “nation” and “national ranks” (to use the words of a contemporary), as well as the “dignity of its ancestors” and the “memory of national leaders,” had been insulted. Yet they also sensed the weakness of their legal status.

The Ukrainian side responded by shifting its ground from purely administrative considerations to historical ones. The Ukrainian nobility argued that it was eligible for admission to the *dvorianstvo* because it was a traditional class whose origins went back to the “pre-Russian” times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and its privileges were derived from the grants of Polish kings and military service to Cossackdom. Since Russia had taken over the country with its hereditary military class and availed itself of its knightly services, it was obliged to recognize the privileged status of that class.

The need to counter the provisions of the Heraldry Office aroused strong emotions and galvanized Little Russian society as a whole. People began to collect Polish charters, treaties between tsars and hetmans, land grants issued by Russian authorities—any documentation that would vouch for their ancient corporate origins. More importantly, individuals set about composing historical memoranda, circulating them to their acquaintances, and petitioning the authorities with them. Persons competent in historical studies entered into correspondence to exchange findings and opinions. This led to the rapid emergence of a network pre-

occupied with history and the elaboration and discussion of different versions of the past.

Unfortunately, there has been little advance in our knowledge of this milieu and the texts it produced since the publication of Dmitrii Miller's seminal study.⁸ He was among the first to deplore the pitiful state of the once rich documentation that was largely lost with the private collections of the Hetmanate's nobility. Yet even the little that survived to the end of the nineteenth century allowed Miller to reconstruct the story of the Ukrainian gentry's standoff with the government in some detail.

Let us briefly sketch the sequence of events on the basis of Miller's findings. New governmental provisions were issued in 1805. In the same year Tymofii Kalynsky presented the assembly of the Chernihiv gentry with his "Opinion on Little Russian Ranks and Their Superiority." In January 1806, the gentry of the Chernihiv gubernia convened for elections. Official decrees were read out and countered with memoranda prepared by "patriots." After some discussion, it was decided to appeal to the governor general to intercede with the authorities. The local marshal drafted a petition, apparently based on an earlier one composed by Markovych. Miller suggests that this memorandum was not the only one of its kind. In subsequent years, the Chernihiv gentry apparently drew up several more. A special commission was elected and entrusted with the task of composing a new version, and in 1809 Prince Aleksei Kurakin received another petition from the Chernihiv gentry.

Meanwhile, the gentry of another Little Russian gubernia, Poltava, made itself heard. Activity began there while S. M. Kochubei (himself the author of several memoranda on Ukraine,⁹ but known primarily as the publisher of the famous *Eneida* by Ivan Kotliarevsky) served as local marshal (1802–5), and the affair was in an advanced stage under Mykhailo Myloradovych, but it was only under the administration of Vasyl Charnysh (1809–12) that the Poltava gentry finally formulated its position on the matter. The principal actors here were Vasyl Poletyka, Andriian Chepa, Tymofii Kalynsky, Mykhailo Myloradovych, and Charnysh. Their collective efforts produced several memoranda.

While Myloradovych was in charge, he started to look for competent people within the gubernia and beyond its borders. He turned to an acquaintance, Roman Markovych, who had already written on the subject. Through him Myloradovych made the acquaintance of Tymofii Kalynsky, who began to collect historical materials for Myloradovych and sent him a memorandum of his own authorship about Ukrainian offices. Kalynsky entered into a correspondence with Myloradovych

(one copy of which bears the title “Correspondence between Patriots of This Country toward the Common Good”) and finally, in 1808, produced an expanded version of his memorandum. In the same year the marshal of the Romny district, Vasyl Poletyka, wrote a memorandum of his own.¹⁰

After Vasyl Charnysh was elected gubernia marshal in 1809, the local gentry entrusted him with the task of drafting new memoranda. He, too, applied to the “patriots” for assistance. As Miller points out, the first draft was circulated among interested parties to read and suggest corrections and additions. The above-mentioned Andriian Chepa, a noted local antiquarian, received a copy and augmented it with a substantial historical commentary.¹¹ The gentry’s petition was then forwarded to Vasyl Poletyka, who approved Chepa’s work and sent him a memorandum of his own on the same topic. This activity set off a correspondence between Chepa, Charnysh and Poletyka.¹²

In 1809, the issue was finally considered in St. Petersburg. It stirred high hopes in Little Russia and produced another burst of correspondence between the “patriots” but was not resolved to their satisfaction. The government was soon preoccupied with other concerns; the War of 1812 served as further distraction, and not until 1819 was the issue reopened. In the autumn of 1819, the Poltava gentry assembly decided to petition the authorities with a new memorandum. This time they found a friendly sponsor in the governor general, Prince Nikolai Repnin, who forwarded the gentry’s petition to St. Petersburg, supplementing it with his own supportive introduction. In 1827 Repnin again energetically petitioned the authorities, explaining the peculiarities of Ukrainian offices as the result of particular historical experience. His interventions had unexpected consequences: the Senate instructed the minister of the interior to make further independent inquiries into the matter of Little Russian ranks. Someone associated with the ministry had to read the already published *Brief Chronicle of Little Russia* by Vasilii Ruban, the *History of Little Russia* by Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamensky, and other historical tracts, as well as the materials supplied by Repnin.¹³ None of this sufficed to resolve the issue, which dragged on well into the 1830s.

Even this cursory account testifies to the impressive networking activity of the “patriots” and the Little Russian gentry as a whole. People who lived in different parts of Little Russia and had never met in person began to forge acquaintances and enter into learned correspondence, exchanging “opinions,” books and manuscripts. All of a sudden, it came

to public attention that certain individuals had been collecting materials on the Ukrainian past for decades and knew the history of their country. They had lived in relative obscurity and published little, if anything, having considered their pursuits a private matter. Now they found themselves in the midst of a very important public debate and, thanks to their expertise, virtual leaders of the whole movement. They clearly considered their historical research a “patriotic” endeavor, inspired by love of the homeland and concern for the “common good” of the country. Even if their circle appears to have been quite narrow, it should be remembered that their “memoranda” were discussed in public gatherings of the local gentry and made known to local authorities; they even obliged supreme imperial agencies to engage in the reading of Ukrainian history. Their influence extended to a much broader public.

Of greatest interest to us, of course, is the content of the papers produced in the course of the debate and the image of Ukrainian history articulated in them. It must be admitted at the outset that these are not masterpieces of historical writing. This can be explained to some extent by the limited resources of their authors, who were, after all, collectors and lovers of the past, not historians professionally prepared for the task. In part, the very genre in which the “patriots” had to work accounts for the deficiencies of their writings. These were not texts intended as historical accounts but official “position papers” written for the imperial bureaucracy and drafted according to certain conventions. The idea was to communicate a legal message, not to shed light on the past. The “patriots” tried to be as pragmatic as possible in making their arguments. They discussed various legal documents issued by the imperial authorities in the course of the eighteenth century, their defects, and the precedents they had established. Yet, given the patriots’ strategy of representing those who had served in Hetmanate offices as a cohesive corporate order, they could not possibly have done without history.

And indeed, history was their most powerful argument. All the memoranda are written according to a common model. They all appeal to the origins of Cossackdom and the privileges and grants received from the Polish kings and confirmed by the Russian tsar when Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his Cossack Host came under the protection of Muscovy. They rehearse the provisions of the Zboriv Agreement and subsequent “articles” presented by the hetmans and approved by the tsars. They recall military campaigns waged by knightly Cossacks.

Staying within the limits of seemingly legal discussion, the “patriots” managed to drive home their point: the Polish kings had created the

Cossacks as a class of chevaliers, recognizing and treating its members as *szlachta*. According to Kalynsky, there were many Cossacks in Little Russia whose lineage went back to the Polish *szlachta*, and the Zboriv articles provided that Cossacks whose names were listed in the register were to enjoy *szlachta* status. In Polish times, members of the petty landed *szlachta* were called *ziemianie*, while under the rule of the hetmans they came to be known as Cossacks, and there were still large numbers of them in Poland and White Russia. Thus:

From the Russian sovereigns, Polish kings and Lithuanian princes, the Cossack had enjoyed in this country an affirmation of his chivalric station and noble rank (*chin rytsarskii i stan shliakhetskii*), according to which he held a title and received an office; therefore, in all matters and elections, even that of the hetman himself, he had his say; and thus any distinguished Cossack was eligible for some position of authority (*starshinu*) or any office, and he has also had a right to nobiliary land grants (*shliakhetskogo imeniia*).¹⁴

In Kalynsky's view, Ukrainian ranks were inherently superior to Russian ones, since they had come down from ancient times. The hetman, he maintained, was not only equal in rank to a field marshal but also tantamount to a sovereign prince. His rank had existed here for a thousand years, as evidenced by the historical examples of the "hetmans" Duleb and Viatko.¹⁵

Another "patriot," Roman Markovych, maintained in his "Commentaries on the Privileges of the Little Russian Gentry" that Ukrainian officers had not only carried out duties equal to those of Russian officers but also those specific to their country. And this was the custom "not of some barbarous land but of Little Russia, which had enjoyed the honor of possessing the very capital of the whole state and is now second among the imperial provinces, for in the sovereign's title Great Russia is followed immediately by Little Russia."¹⁶

Andriian Chepa, too, begins his "Memorandum on the Advantages of the Little Russian Ranks" with a summary of the Ukrainian past:

Little Russia is part of the Russian state or the Great Principality of Kyiv. The nation that dwells here is of ancient Russian origin. In 1240 the Tatars tore away this country; it remained in the Kingdom of Poland until 1654... It reunited with the all-Russian state, maintaining its military government and chivalry or the military ranks established under Polish rule by King Stephen Báthory.¹⁷

He goes on to say that:

while in Poland, Ukrainian officers together with the rest of the “Little Russian” army served as a shield against the Tatars and Turks, and by their martial exploits they earned confirmation of their ancient privileges from the Poles and equal rights with the *szlachta*; they also received a special law book, the Statute; yet, after having suffered oppression, in thirty-six bloody battles, together with the rest of the Cossacks, they threw off the oppressive yoke of the Poles and returned Little Russia, this ancestral land of Russian sovereigns, to their throne.¹⁸

Chepa then proceeds to discuss numerous military campaigns (against the Tatars, Turks, Poles, Persians, Swedes, and others) in which the Cossacks made sacrifices and loyally served Russian sovereigns. The Cossacks had constituted themselves as a military class and their services were welcomed—sufficient proof that the government had recognized them as a nobiliary corporate order.

Apparently, the writer most disposed to the historical argument was Vasyl Poletyka. It ran in the family: he was the son of a great collector and amateur historian. His “Commentary on the Source, Origin and Dignity of the Little Russian Nobility” (1808–9) is an erudite discussion of Ukrainian history tailored for the occasion. Poletyka starts with the assertion that the ruling of the Heraldry Office, so degrading to the Little Russian nobility, stems from deep misconceptions about Ukraine, its history and the nature of its society. Ukraine enjoyed special rights, privileges and freedoms that were its historic heritage gained under Polish rule (he lists in minute detail the privileges issued by Polish kings). The recognition of these rights and liberties was the major condition of accepting Muscovite protection (a long list of confirmations follows).

After these opening remarks, Poletyka shifts to pure history. Its first episode is the Mongol conquest of the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Pereiaslav principalities (which made up the Little Russia of Poletyka’s day). After the period of Mongol rule, Little Russia was partly conquered by the Lithuanians and accepted their rule to some extent, while retaining privileges equal to those of other citizens of the Grand Duchy. Soon afterward, King Casimir the Great of Poland conquered Red Rus’ and took over the rest of Little Russia from the Lithuanians. He then convened the Diet and extended to Rus’ the same rights and liberties as those enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland. Throughout the subsequent vicissitudes of history, the Little Russians maintained their privileges, of which they received numerous confirmations. The Little Russian nobles became members of the two principal estates, the sena-

tors and the *szlachta*, which ruled the Polish republic together with the king. For all their equality with regard to liberties, rights and privileges, the Little Russians were nevertheless oppressed by religious injustice. Consequently, after the wars waged by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Little Russian nation disregarded offers from many sovereigns and deliberately chose to unite with the all-Russian state. It was a voluntary union “according to treaties” confirmed by every successive tsar.

Since that time, the Little Russians had proved loyal to the throne, rendering heroic service in all the campaigns against the Tatars, Turks, Persians, Poles, and Swedes. Generosity of heart and a courageous spirit were handed down from generation to generation and became hereditary traits of the Little Russians.

To be sure, the “patriots” made errors and stretched evidence too far. They also tried to write as concisely as possible; hence their history is but a sketch. Yet the similarities between their texts are striking. They managed to produce and refine a concordant version of the country’s history. This is not surprising or accidental: it was a result of the intensive networking that went on between 1806 and 1809. The account of Ukrainian history given by the “patriots” conforms to the short version. Little Russia is a country that emerged after the Mongols and evolved during the periods of Lithuanian and Polish rule. The Little Russian nation descended from the *szlachta* of Polish times, which turned Cossack after joining Muscovy. The major focus of this history is on the wars waged by the Cossacks against various enemies in the course of the seventeenth century and the greater part of the eighteenth.

Once created, this image of Little Russian history proved very powerful and resilient. The memoranda and “notes” composed toward the end of the 1820s reproduce essentially the same set of ideas. Even a memorandum written and submitted in 1827 by the governor general, Prince Repnin, seems to quote from the earlier ones, explaining the particular privileges of the Little Russian nobility by invoking the country’s unique historical experience.¹⁹

Naturally, the authors of all these memoranda and position papers set down only as much as was useful for the purpose of persuading the government. But their reading of history must have been much more extensive, and the image of history shaped by such reading more nuanced.

Some of the “patriots” tried their hand at composing longer narratives of Ukrainian history. We learn of a work on Little Russian history that was being prepared by Vasyl Poletyka.²⁰ It is believed that this systematic account either remained unfinished or was lost. Andriian Chepa,

too, hinted that his collection of historical materials might one day serve as a basis for a longer account to be written by himself or someone else.²¹

All this activity was part of a struggle for acceptance. Ironically, by reinforcing the legitimacy of a separate historical account, it contributed to the “othering” of Ukraine.

If the activity of the “patriots” still seems a minor footnote to modern Ukrainian historical writing, which began later and had nothing to do with the campaign for noble status, let us consider the following. The “patriot” milieu has long been suspected of having been the seedbed for the new version of “Cossack” Ukrainian history that culminated in the famous and enigmatic *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus’) in the late 1810s or early 1820s. Until now, the major obstacle to a positive identification has been chronological. The *Istoriia Rusov* is believed to have appeared between 1822 and 1829 (reportedly, the first manuscript was discovered in 1828).²² Yet it seems out of place in this setting of the late 1820s: many perceptive students of the question have felt that the work belonged to an earlier epoch. Some (Gorlenko, Lazarevsky) even suggested one of the patriots, Vasyl Poletyka, as the most plausible author.

Now the conjecture of an early date has received additional support. As Serhii Plokhyy has recently suggested, the anonymous history textbook with which the author of the *Istoriia Rusov* polemicizes in his preface must have been Maksym Berlynsky’s *Kratkaia rossiiskaia istoriia dlia upotrebleniia iunoshestvu* (Brief History of Russia for the Use of Young People). It was published in 1800 and was apparently the only book of its kind printed in Ukraine about that time. By identifying the target of the prefatory remarks, Plokhyy narrows the time of composition of the *Istoriia Rusov* to a period no later than the first decade of the nineteenth century.²³

Other evidence can be adduced to support this hypothesis. The quest for the author of the *Istoriia* has left no name of any merit in Little Russia unmentioned. Yet the most plausible author suggested so far remains Vasyl Poletyka, who was engaged in writing a “Ukrainian history” of some kind at the very height of the controversy. The argument for Poletyka’s authorship is based on striking similarities in tone and ideology between his “Commentary on the Little Russian Nobility” and passages in the *Istoriia Rusov*.²⁴ From Poletyka’s correspondence with Andriian Chepa we learn that Poletyka inquired about Maksym Berlynsky, who, coincidentally, had just sent his textbook to Chepa. The latter supplied Poletyka with extensive information about Berlynsky and his manuscript writings and published works, and it is quite possible (considering

Poletyka's interest in Berlynsky) that Chepa provided Poletyka with his copy of the textbook.

Whatever the true authorship of the *Istoriia Rusov*, it is tempting to believe that it grew out of the Little Russian "patriot" activity. Be that as it may, the whole episode affords a unique opportunity to see what leads up to the appearance of a famous title—historiography at work, so to speak—from the initial impulse to the formation of a network, the development of channels of communication, the transmission and refinement of opinions en route, and their influence on forging a vision of the Ukrainian past.

For obvious reasons, the "patriots" identified themselves with the short version of Ukrainian history, which soon formed the core of the romantic vision of the Ukrainian past and is most responsible for what is known as the "national awakening." This is not to say that without the short Cossack version there would have been no rise of Ukrainian nationalism in the nineteenth century. We may imagine Ukrainian "awakeners" finding some other historical frame of reference for their claims, although this is quite problematic. My point is that the Cossack version proved to be the most effective tool at their disposal: none suggested later even approaches it in quality.

Travelers²⁵

About the same time as the Little Russian "patriots" were fighting their battle for admission to the Russian nobility, another important development took place—what might be called the Russian "discovery of Ukraine." Educated people from the northern capitals began to travel south. Traveling was a fashionable activity at the time, and by the end of the eighteenth century the Grand Tour of Europe was already a firmly established institution. Those who took the tour did so in order to marvel at the classical past in Italy and, somewhat later, also in Greece. Russia, however, picked up the habit rather late, and soon Europe was engulfed in the Napoleonic wars, which made the Italian tour all but impossible. The "Russian south," featuring Ukraine as its major destination, emerged as a convenient substitute for the Italian journey. It offered a comparable experience: southern nature to admire, ancient ruins to discover, and the ultimate source of one's own identity to lay hands on. Many would imagine Ukraine as the "Russian Italy" and the "Russian Hellas."

A different company traveled to Little Russia. The overwhelming majority of them were pilgrims from all over Russia, heading for Kyiv to worship at its sacred places. Whatever its fortunes, Kyiv never lost its appeal as one of the most important religious centers of Orthodox Slavdom. It was among the major pilgrimage destinations for all of Eastern Europe and annually attracted tens of thousands of devotees from all parts of the Russian Empire. In a sense, it was these religious pilgrimages that led to the secular discovery of Kyiv, and the early travelers were both pious believers visiting the most treasured religious sites and tourists interested in historical rarities. Kyiv thus came to be regarded as a place where one could search for the ultimate origins of both the Russian faith and Russian history.

The “discovery” of Little Russia came at a peculiar time in Russian history. Although technically the province had increasingly been incorporated into Muscovy (and, later, the Russian Empire) since the 1650s, it actually constituted the autonomous Ukrainian Hetmanate until the 1760s. Not until the late eighteenth century did the province enter the Russian public’s field of vision. The continuous administrative reforms of that period, the partitions of Poland, and the annexation of the territories of the Crimean Khanate to the south created a whole new setting for Little Russia. It came to be viewed almost as an extension of the new imperial possessions. Emperor Paul I restored the unity of the Little Russian province, and under Alexander I the old law code, the Lithuanian Statute—generally regarded as an extension of Polish legislation—was reinstated as the provincial code. Until the partitions of Poland, the provincial capital of Kyiv remained the only Russian possession in Right-Bank Ukraine among the territories of the Kingdom of Poland. As such, the city was considered a remote frontier town. Little Russia was thought of at one and the same time as an extension of the Polish past and of the Oriental world of the steppes. These new territories had a dubious status in the Russian mind: obviously they were not quite “Russian,” but at the same time it was generally believed that Russian history had first taken root there. Thus the discovery of Kyiv, this “cradle” of Russian history, was part of a broader movement to reclaim the origins of Russia and appropriate Ukraine as part of Russian history.

Travel to Ukraine produced a substantial literature. Judging by the number of titles and the frequency with which they appeared in the rather weak Russian book market, it must have been hugely popular. Travelogues took various forms: journeys were described in journals, letters and reports. For the historian, this literature is of particular inter-

est: by tracing the course of a journey, a travelogue shows how sites were added to the route, what the traveler thought of a particular site, and what emotions he experienced while contemplating the scenery. They also reveal the traveler's background—what he had read on the subject before his journey and how his preconceived notions were confirmed or altered by actual experience. Intended for the public at large, travel literature is full of commonplaces, clichés and conventional observations. In short, like no other genre, travelogues can expose the process whereby the image of a territory's past is shaped. They are also important because, unlike serious writings on history, travelogues were widely read and served many people as their only source of historical knowledge.

People traveled for a variety of reasons: piety, curiosity, or simply to keep up with fashion. More and more travelers, however, began to embark on the journey to discover the vestiges of Kyivan Rus' in the newly annexed territories. They would travel to validate the image of the Kyivan past that they had formed by reading historical accounts. What they actually encountered was startlingly foreign: no ancient Byzantine-style structures; no traces of historical memory of the "first princes." The territory on which the Russian mind located the most treasured episodes of its early history—indeed, its very beginnings—proved remarkably barren of any visible traces. The Kyivan past in this disappointingly alien country was covered with a thick layer of recent Cossack history that had little to do with the Russian past.

In effect, Russian travelers discovered Ukraine, a pleasant southern land with picturesque landscapes, gentle inhabitants, and a heroic, if martial and ruinous, Cossack history. Ukraine was imagined simultaneously as an ancient and a recently created country whose people, the "noble savages," were completely unaware of being heirs to a glorious civilization, or else were of a different race that came late and inherited the country without ever knowing its past. This discovery contributed to the fashion for things Ukrainian in Russian literature of the time. It also legitimized the Cossack version of Ukrainian history within the imperial setting.

Yet potentially—and most travelers never parted with the idea—the Kyivan past was still present beneath the overlay of "Ukraine," only waiting to be discovered by the enlightened eyes of those equipped for the task. Travelers, always more competent than aboriginals, knew where and how to look. If they lacked authentic vestiges of Kyivan history, they used their imagination. To be sure, ancient churches had been

remodeled in the “Polish fashion” not to resemble their Byzantine prototypes, but they still stood on the sites designated by Princes Volodimer and Yaroslav. Ancient ruins were invisible, but one could always visit the sites of famous events and conjure up the past while contemplating “authentic” scenery. People would draw “historical maps,” resurrecting forgotten place-names from the chronicles, and some even made the first attempts to unearth artifacts by means of archaeological digs.

Slowly, thanks to collective effort, “Kyivan Russia” reemerged from beneath “Ukraine.” This suggested that “southern Russia” did, after all, possess a certain unity. Even if its various historical provinces now differed in many important respects, one could imagine the region as a coherent space, for it rested on the hidden continent of “Kyivan Rus’.”

Travel to the south had one more important consequence for visions of Ukrainian history. Rarely would the traveler limit himself to Little Russia alone. He would go beyond it, venturing into the newly incorporated steppes of New Russia, where its recent Oriental history was still felt, and into Right-Bank Ukraine, that undeniably “Polish” province. All travelers noted the crossing of boundaries and sensed the difference between territories. Yet the journey had a peculiar effect on those who undertook it. For the traveler it constituted a single experience, and somehow the territories visited came to possess a certain unity. The reader of a travelogue who follows in the footsteps of an explorer—reliving his journey, as it were, by reading a report—is left with a similar impression.

As a result of these developments, one vision of the territory’s past was superimposed on another—the still visible “Cossack” history on the invisible but no less real “Kyivan Rus’” history. The tension between the two would soon become obvious, and Ukrainian history has struggled with the problem ever since.

Some implications

The territory we think of today as Ukraine was not so designated at the turn of the nineteenth century. What now seems homogeneous was gradually stitched together from scraps of very different historical provinces. Cossack Little Russia, the Oriental steppes of Tavriia, and the “Polish” Right Bank each had its own story, with very bleak prospects of integration into one account. Significantly, nothing in the prevailing Ukrainian narrative suggested that the whole region could be united around the “Cossack” vision of the Ukrainian past. What, then,

made it possible in just two generations to imagine “Ukraine” as a region possessing undeniable unity of history and national identity?

Roman Szporluk has convincingly argued that despite all the existing boundaries, real and imagined, the region did possess a unity in the nineteenth century—that of Polish culture stretching eastward as far as Kharkiv University. It was within this space and in competition with it that the Ukrainian project evolved. I suggest that it possessed an additional dimension. Russian “pilgrimages” to Ukraine created an imagined space of the “Kyivan past” extending as far westward as Lemberg and Przemyśl. These pilgrimages effectively claimed the same territory for another type of historical narrative and launched, as it were, an intellectual *reconquista* of the region in favor of a broadly understood “Russian” (that is, non-Polish) history. The Ukrainian historical narrative benefited, for, confined until then to a tiny Left-Bank “Little Russia,” it was able to cross the Dnipro and claim the Right Bank as well. And that development suggested for the first time that Ukrainian history might have a longer version. The complex interplay between the short Cossack history and the long Kyivan one led to their amalgamation in the modern narrative of Ukrainian history as we know it.

Notes

- ¹ See Stephen G. Alter, *Darwinism and the Linguistic Image: Language, Race and Natural Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore and London, 1999).
- ² Limitations of space preclude a discussion of other problems of long national histories identified in the literature on nationalism and nation-building.
- ³ It is probably no accident that in modern neo-paganism (tapping into racial theories and generally into the popular version of nineteenth-century science) the Cossack phenomenon is directly linked with pagan times as the only other experience unique to Ukrainians.
- ⁴ For a general survey, see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
- ⁵ D. Miller, “Ocherki iz iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kazatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo,” *Kievskaiia starina*, 1897, no. 4: 1–47.
- ⁶ This is the anonymous author of the “Notes concerning Little Russia,” whose opinion of the Ukrainian *szlachta*’s claims was harshly critical (for the text, see *Chteniia v Obshchevstve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, bk. 1 [Moscow, 1848], pp. 11–24). Although the “Notes” are generally considered “unpatriotic” because of the author’s critical attitude, he was in fact advocating the interests of the aristocracy, which wanted to restrict admission to the Russian *dvorianstvo*, reserving it for prominent families already enjoying that status and those who had held high office in the former Hetmanate.
- ⁷ See the estimates in Miller, “Ocherki,” pp. 25–27.
- ⁸ Miller, “Ocherki”; also useful are the biographical sketches in Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukraïny* (Ostrih and New York, 2000). For the most recent treatment of the issue, see Volodymyr Sverbyhuz, *Starosvits’ke panstvo* (Warsaw, 1999), pp. 165–198; the appendix includes Ukrainian translations of some important documents. Unfortunately, this publication came to my attention after the present essay had been completed.
- ⁹ Published in Bohdan Hal’ and Hanna Shvyd’ko, “‘...Mysli o krae sem...’ (S.M. Kochubei i ioho zapysky pro Malorosiïu),” *Skhid-Zakhid* (Kharkiv), 2004, no. 6: 109–30.
- ¹⁰ Published under the title “Zapiska o malorossiiskom dvorianstve marshala romenskogo poveta Vasiliia Poletiki,” *Kievskaiia starina*, 1893, no. 1, supplement.
- ¹¹ Published under the title “Zapiska o malorossiiskikh chinakh Adriana Ivanovicha Chepy (1809),” *Kievskaiia starina*, 1897, no. 4.
- ¹² See V. Gorlenko, “Iz istorii iuzhno-russkogo obshchestva nachala XIX veka (Pis’mo V.I. Charnysha, A.I. Chepy, V.G. Poletiki i zametki k nim),” *Kievskaiia starina*, 1893, no. 1: 41–76. Apparently this was only the tip of the iceberg. From occasional remarks we learn that Arkadii Rigelman, the son of the not-

ed historian, and Maksym Berlynsky, an important historian of Kyiv and Little Russia, were engaged in correspondence.

¹³ Miller, "Ocherki," pp. 45–46.

¹⁴ Cited according to Miller, "Ocherki," p. 20.

¹⁵ These are the mythical forefathers of the Slavonic "tribes" of the period of migrations. In sixteenth-century Polish chronicles (one of which definitely served as a source here) they are referred to as "hetmans," meaning "leaders."

¹⁶ Miller, "Ocherki," pp. 15–16.

¹⁷ "Zapiska o malorossiiskikh chinakh Adriana Ivanovicha Chepy (1809)," p. 15. In his copious footnotes Chepa treats at length the conditions on which Hetman Khmelnytsky submitted to Aleksei Mikhailovich and the particular documents recognized by the tsar.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁹ Miller, "Ocherki," pp. 42–44.

²⁰ See Poletyka's letter of 1809 to Chepa in *Kievskaiia starina*, 1893, no. 1: 52–53.

²¹ See his letter to Poletyka in *Kievskaiia starina*, 1890, no. 5.

²² A. Lazarevskii, "Otryvki iz semeinogo arkhiva Poletik," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1891, no. 4: 113; Gorlenko, "Iz istorii iuzhno-russkogo obshchestva," p. 61.

²³ Serhii Plokyh, "Ukraine or Little Russia?" in his *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, 2008), pp. 49–65.

²⁴ This was first noted by V. Gorlenko, who indicated almost literal correspondences between the texts.

²⁵ This section is based on my more detailed treatment of the subject in "Kyievo-rus'ka spadshchyna v istorychnii dumtsi Ukraïny poch. 19 st." in *Ukraïna i Rosiia v istorychnii retrospektyvi. Ukraïns'ki proekty v Rosiis'kii imperii*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 2004), which allows me to keep endnotes to a minimum.

The Latin and Cyrillic Alphabets in Ukrainian National Discourse and in the Language Policy of Empires

Alexei Miller and Oksana Ostapchuk

Language is one of the most important elements in the symbolism of ethnicity. The transformation of ethnic consciousness into national consciousness is accompanied by a rethinking and ideologization of the relation between language and ethnos.¹

The struggle for the consolidation² and emancipation of the Ukrainian language offers particularly rich material for research in this field. In the nineteenth century, we see two “stages” on which intensive arguments and political battles developed concerning that question—Galicia, which was subject to the Habsburgs, and the combined Dnipro Ukraine, Little Russia and Sloboda Ukraine, which were subject to the Romanovs. These arguments and battles went on among elites that identified themselves as Ruthenian, Little Russian, and/or Ukrainian, belonged to various confessions, and sprang from a variety of social groups. But those battles also involved “external,” “non-national” actors who held dominant or ruling status in relation to local associations on the peripheries of empires, that is, traditional Polish noble elites and imperial authorities, as well as ecclesiastical centers, most notably the Vatican. An adequate examination of these subjects cannot therefore be confined to the limits of a narrowly defined national narrative concentrating mainly on “national” actors.

It should particularly be stressed that developments on these two stages on both sides of the imperial border were closely related. In other words, we are dealing with the very pronounced specifics of a contested borderland, entailing the variety of identity projects and loyalty strategies characteristic of such situations and shaped by the interaction—involving both conflict and cooperation—of local and imperial actors. In any period and any situation, whether in Galicia or in “Russian” Ukraine, the number of those actors was greater than two, and, at least

from the mid-nineteenth century, actors from both empires were usually involved.³

The alphabet and, above all, the question of choosing between Latin and Cyrillic scripts was one of the important elements of that battle, along with questions of orthography, the choice of sources for borrowings, and the status of the language and its use (or prohibition) in a variety of spheres.⁴ The alphabet (and sometimes the script, as in the case of Cyrillic and *hrazhdanka* in Galicia) constitutes a highly ambiguous symbol imbued with significant ethnocultural and ethnoreligious content. It has often played and continues to play a key role in identity formation, especially in ethnocultural borderlands. In the history of the Ukrainian literary language, the problem of the alphabet has never been considered purely and simply a technical matter of convenience and adequacy.⁵ (A recent example is the broad public discussion in conjunction with plans for the reform of Ukrainian orthography in the years 2000–2002.) The subject of this article, then, is the struggle over the alphabet waged between various actors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The borderland situation of the Ukrainian lands at the junction of two civilizational and cultural/linguistic areas—Slavia Latina and Slavia Orthodoxa—determined the fundamentally “open” character of Ukrainian culture as a whole, which took shape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because of overlapping linguistic boundaries and sociocultural divisions. One of the manifestations of that openness was the coexistence—and competition—of a variety of religious and cultural discourses, languages and alphabets in the same cultural space.⁶

On the one hand, the boundaries of the cultural and communicative competence of languages in the old Ukrainian bookish tradition were mobile: often one comes across fragments in one and the same text written in various languages (aside from texts in which the choice of language itself had functional and stylistic significance, as in theatrical interludes and polemical literature). On the other hand, in sixteenth-century publications there is a fairly close connection between language and graphic code. The most important function of the alphabet in that period was to serve as a boundary marker: a change of language necessarily presupposed a change of alphabet and, naturally, a change in level and type of discourse. In the Uniate tradition, the interpenetration of graphic systems became possible in the seventeenth century: not infrequently, the Latin alphabet was used to record not only “Ruthenian” texts but also Old Church Slavonic ones.⁷ Like multilingualism in gen-

eral, this practice continued at least until the end of the eighteenth century. The parallel use of two alphabets for Ukrainian texts was common at printshops in Right-Bank Ukraine, especially Uniate ones, including the printshop of the Pochaiv Monastery.⁸ Naturally, Ukrainian quotations (whether longer or shorter) and textual fragments in Polish-language texts were also recorded in Latin script.⁹ Throughout the eighteenth century, the Latin alphabet was used rather widely to set down the Ukrainian language in writing in various parts of Ukrainian ethnic territory (mainly those bordering on regions where the Latin script was widespread). Furthermore, in most cases the “Latinization” of writing was not considered in ideological terms.¹⁰

Gradually the problem of the alphabet took on ideological significance. A conflict of alphabets as different forms of ethnocultural expression on the Right Bank became apparent in a propaganda campaign on the eve, and in the course, of the Polish uprising of 1830. An appeal from Polish insurgents written in Ukrainian and addressed to the peasantry was initially drawn up in Polish, then translated into Ukrainian and set down in Latin script, but later transliterated into Cyrillic out of practical considerations.¹¹

Even after 1831, the Latin alphabet remained dominant for purposes of rendering Ukrainian speech, whether it was a matter of recording folklore texts or composing original works in the Ukrainian language. For authors descended from the local gentry, for whom Polish was the main (native) language, the use of Latin script to render Ukrainian speech was a means of integrating the Right-Bank territories into the all-Polish cultural and linguistic space. The first efforts to introduce the Ukrainian language into the sphere of literary creativity in Right-Bank Ukraine are generally associated with the name of Tymko Padura, who created his own orthographic system, approximating Ukrainian phonetics as closely as possible.¹² In neighboring Belarus, at the printshop of the Vilnius Roman Catholic eparchy, an unknown author printed a Belarusian-language catechism in Latin script in 1835, furnishing it with the Polish title *Krótkie zebranie nauki Chrześcijańskiej dla wieśniaków mówiących językiem polsko-ruskim wyznania Rzymskokatolickiego* (Brief Compendium of Christian Lore for Villagers of the Roman Catholic Denomination Speaking the Polish-Ruthenian Language). Let us note the formula “Polish-Ruthenian language,” whose subsequent analogue in the discourse of Russian nationalism was the concept of the “Little Russian dialect of the Russian language.” Some time later, between 1838 and 1846, a former Philomath and close friend

of Adam Mickiewicz, Jan Chachot, published his collections of Belarusian folk songs. There, *inter alia*, Belarusian songs recorded in Latin script are to be found.¹³

Ukrainian folklore texts recorded in Latin script were also published in the Ukrainian lands of Austria-Hungary, fulfilling (consciously or unconsciously) the very same function of marking “one’s own” civilizational space. One of the best-known examples is the folklore collection compiled by Waclaw Zaleski (the future governor of Galicia).¹⁴

A confrontation between supporters of the Latin and Cyrillic scripts in Galicia arose in the mid-1830s in connection with a proposal formulated by the Uniate clergyman and civic figure Yosyf Lozynsky to introduce the Latin script in order to render the vernacular. By way of carrying out his project, he published the first ethnographic description of a Ukrainian wedding to appear in Galicia, including folk songs recorded in a Polish-based Latin script.¹⁵ In the course of the polemic aroused by these publications, Yosyf Levytsky and Markiiian Shashkevych formulated the thesis that the Cyrillic alphabet was a sacred national treasure and religious symbol.¹⁶

Competition between languages and alphabets became even more intense during the political struggles of 1848 in Galicia. It was then that the opposition between the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets in Galician cultural discourse took the form of a conscious confrontation of national attributes—Polish and Ukrainian, respectively. Texts of openly ideological content (appeals, proclamations, propagandistic verses), as well as Latin-alphabet periodicals—such as the organ of the Polonophile Ruthenian Council, *Dnewnyk ruskij* (Ruthenian Daily), published by Ivan Vahylevych—intended to help substantiate a pro-Polish political, cultural and civilizational orientation, were published in Ukrainian, using the Latin alphabet.¹⁷ A comparison of Cyrillic- and Latin-alphabet political appeals addressed to the inhabitants of Galicia shows that the confrontation pertained not only and not so much to the alphabet as to different linguistic models and types of literary standards associated with diverse political and developing national discourses.¹⁸ While the Latin alphabet was used mainly to set down the vernacular, approaching actual conversation as closely as possible (that is, speaking [*narechie*], talk [*govor*]), Cyrillic signaled the introduction of a text much more traditional in form, with a large number of Church Slavonicisms, in which the alphabet and all other linguistic resources were intended to manifest a link with cultural and ecclesiastical tradition (Uniate, with its origins in Slavia Orthodoxa). The striving for literary emancipation of the ver-

vacular, which is apparent in both instances, proceeded from fundamentally different positions. In the first, the vernacular was employed as a means of addressing the lower social orders. Only in the future could it attain the level of literary treatment.¹⁹ In the second, the appeal to tradition as such constituted a “pass” for the vernacular into the literary sphere.²⁰ The Galician “alphabet war” of the mid-nineteenth century was decided in favor of Cyrillic,²¹ which thus became the basic graphic instrument for setting down Ukrainian speech in writing in that region. Vienna’s position on the question is largely explicable by its perception of the Ruthenians as allies in the struggle with the Polish movement. For a time, the focus of the orthographic discussion shifted from the problem of script (Cyrillic in its Church Slavonic variant or *hrashdanka*) to the choice of orthographic principle, etymological or phonetic.

However, the alphabet again became a subject of fierce struggle in Galicia in the late 1850s. In May 1858, at the behest of the governor of Galicia, Count Agenor Gołuchowski, a special commission was established to oversee the Galician Ruthenians’ switch from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin. An attempt was made to introduce the Latin alphabet by legislation in the Galician schools where the “Ruthenian” language was taught.²²

With the blessing of the Austrian authorities, the Czech Josef Jireček, who held an important post in the Austrian Ministry of Education, drafted a scheme for rendering Ukrainian speech in Latin script.²³ A brochure giving an account of Jireček’s proposal was printed at the beginning of 1859 as an official, but de facto internal, publication; it was not offered for sale. In his draft, Jireček deliberately combined the principles of phonetic and etymological orthography and, not by accident, chose a Czech and not a Polish model for a Ukrainian Latin script, foreseeing a possible negative reaction on the part of the local elites. But such a reaction was inevitable in any case. Upon its appearance, Jireček’s proposal mainly aroused suspicion that the Czech viewpoint was being imposed,²⁴ but ultimately the link between the Latin alphabet and the tradition of Polish letters, having become a distinctive stereotype, proved more durable in linguistic consciousness: by no coincidence, it was often called the “abecedarium” (the Polish *abecadło*).²⁵ Thus Jireček’s efforts to produce a Latin script cleansed of national connotations proved futile, and the practical advantages of the new system of orthography remained unappreciated.²⁶ Jireček, for his part, made no secret of the ideological motivation behind his proposal. A member of the Czech Conservative Party and a supporter of Austro-Slavism, he

was concerned not only that the Cyrillic (that is, Church Slavonic) script could not be adapted to the needs of the vernacular. It also troubled him that as long as the Galician Ruthenians used Cyrillic for reading and writing, they would be biased in favor of Church Slavonic and thus of “Russianism.”²⁷ Here his opinion fully coincided with that of the Austrian authorities, who, given the crisis in relations with St. Petersburg after the Crimean War, were concerned about the spread of “Russophile” sentiments. Evidently it was this concern that became the basic reason for the establishment of the commission. In this respect, Vienna’s interests intersected with those of the local Poles, who were attempting to hinder the development of greater and lesser national projects competing with the Polish one.

Having considered Jireček’s proposal, the specially convoked commission rejected it. The commission’s membership included representatives of a variety of Galician ideological currents.²⁸ However, when it came to dismissing the very possibility of Latinizing Ukrainian script, they were unanimous. They gave the same justification: “both the spirit of the Ukrainian people and the faith will perish.”²⁹ Even those members of the commission, such as Bishop Spyrydon Lytvynovych, who did not deny the practical utility of the Latin alphabet for rendering Ukrainian speech were in accord on that point. The evolution of Yosyf Lozynsky’s views is highly instructive in this regard. In the mid-1830s, when he was an extreme “modernist,” he provoked the first round of the “alphabet war” with his Latin-alphabet publications; but, by the 1850s, he had renounced the possibility of using the Latin alphabet for Ukrainian writing and, indeed, the idea of the literary emancipation of the vernacular, going over to the camp of the traditionalist “Russophiles.”³⁰

Even though Jireček’s brochure was not offered for sale, it became an item of public discourse in fairly short order. Galician public opinion reacted sharply to his proposal.³¹ Bohdan Didytsky, a leader of the “traditionalists” who had actually taught Jireček Ukrainian at one time, offered the most detailed formulation of the objections to his proposal. Having given a fundamental analysis of the virtues and faults of both alphabets, he declared Cyrillic the “sole approach to the temple of God’s exalted truths.”³² Didytsky formulates the basic arguments of the opponents of Latinization. The first is the danger presented by an “alphabet war” to the unity of the Galician “Ruthenian” movement: “general confusion and endless dispute over the alphabet.” The second is a breach of the local tradition of letters: “the disintegration of our literature.” In that connection, Didytsky mentions only the western Ukrainian traditions in

Bukovyna, Galicia and Transcarpathia, making no appeal to the idea of unity with the traditions of Little Russia and Right-Bank Ukraine,³³ which may have been a case of self-censorship at a time when Vienna's position on the "Ukrainian question" was not yet entirely clear to him. Thirdly, it was a breach with cultural and religious tradition: "a forcible breach between Ruthenian literature of the present day and Ruthenian literature of past centuries." Finally, Didytsky drew his principal conclusion, which essentially coincided with that of the commission convoked to deliberate on Jireček's proposal: "The Latin alphabet not only creates great confusion here but also sows dissension and division in the brotherhood of a single tribe... A breach in the spiritual life of the whole nation is the most painful grief that the world has ever known! [...] We shall not fall prey to it, for it has never existed among us!"³⁴

Thus the basic reason for the defeat of those who favored switching the Ukrainian script to the Latin alphabet was the ideologization of the problem of the alphabet as a means of influencing national discourse. This did not mean, by the way, that practical efforts to make use of the Latin alphabet disappeared entirely. Thus, in 1861, Anton Kobylansky and Kost Horbal formulated a proposal in their "Slovo na slovo dlia redaktora 'Slova'" (Word in Response to a Word for the Editor of *The Word*) to promote the use of the Czech version of the Latin alphabet (with the addition of certain Polish letters). A polemical response soon appeared in the form of a parodistic brochure, *Holos na holos dla Haličiny* (A Voice in Response to a Voice for Galicia), written in the Czech version of the Latin alphabet and published as a supplement to the newspaper *Slovo* (Word).³⁵ Even later, the Galician "Polonophile" camp published Ukrainian verses in the Polish version of the Latin alphabet.³⁶ The Latin alphabet was also invariably used in the 1870s in the official publications of the proceedings of the Galician Diet to render the speeches of Galician deputies.

Thus we see that by the end of the 1850s the problem of an alphabet for the language of the Galician Ruthenians had ceased to be a subject of intra-Galician dispute. As a result of Vienna's involvement, it became a matter of imperial policy. This did not go unnoticed in Russia, whose rulers did not yet have much experience in regulating the linguistic sphere.

Until the uprising of 1830–31, the Romanov Empire sought to obtain the support of local elites and had recourse to indirect forms of rule in the western borderlands. Its intervention in the linguistic situation there was minimal, and after the partitions the standing of the Polish language in the western gubernias improved. Even in the early nineteenth centu-

ry, when the authorities, seeking to enhance their control, required that their Jewish subjects discontinue the use of Yiddish for part of their official documentation and switch to a language more accessible to officialdom, they left it to the Jews themselves to choose between Russian, Polish and German. In other words, language concerned them as a medium, not as an instrument of identity formation. It was only after the uprising of 1830–31 that the authorities ceased to consider the Polish nobility a loyal regional elite and considerably limited the use of Polish in the Western land. In the period between uprisings, Nicholas I and his senior officials discussed the possibility of switching the Polish language completely to the Cyrillic alphabet.³⁷

Although St. Petersburg was alarmed by the specter of Little Russian separatism, especially after the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius was uncovered in 1847, the imperial authorities practically did not interfere in the development of the Ukrainian language until the very end of the 1850s.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the center for the formation of the new Ukrainian literary and linguistic canon was the Left Bank, where all the most important texts that served as a basis for the codification of the vernacular, beginning with Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneïda* (1798), were written and/or published. The publication of popular folklore and original texts in the "Little Russian dialect" immediately raised the problem of how to render the specifics of Ukrainian speech in written form. In fairly short order, an opposition arose between supporters of a script approximating actual Ukrainian pronunciation as closely as possible and those who insisted on the use of an orthography based on Russian and adapted to the needs of Ukrainian speech—but capable of reflecting the commonality in the development of both languages. The essence of the dispute did not, of course, lie in purely technical matters but (like the "alphabet war" in Galicia) reflected the process of choosing a model of literary and linguistic expression and the search for a paradigm on which the written standard could be based. The orthographic discussion would remain significant throughout the nineteenth century: in total, more than fifty orthographic proposals were drafted in that period.³⁸

In Left-Bank Ukraine, the principle of phonetic orthography had already been articulated by the author of the first Little Russian grammar, Oleksii Pavlovsky: "I intend to write all Little Russian words using the exact letters with which they are pronounced there (including *i* instead of *o*, *xв* instead of *ф*, *чя* instead of *ча*, and *i* instead of *iat'*)."³⁹

For a long time, however, he remained in the minority. Much more authoritative were the voices of those who supported an orthography based on the principle of historical etymology. The weightiest opinion among them was undoubtedly that of Mykhailo Maksymovych, who took the orthography of the first editions of Kotliarevsky as a model for two reasons. First, it allowed the link with tradition (all-Russian tradition first and foremost) to be maintained: “In all the first editions of the *Eneïda* one still felt some kind of link with previous literature, which was absent, for example, in the first Ukrainian grammar of Pavlovsky (1818), who admitted much that was arbitrary into his orthography.”⁴⁰ Second, an etymological orthography made it possible to avoid copying regional speech (that is, to avoid the “coarseness” of Little Russian words, for which the publishers of *Vestnik Evropy* [European Messenger] excused themselves in 1807):

Our Little Russian orthography must not, nor can it now any longer be a simple, external copy of the sounds of the language in letters. It must necessarily, aside from its [the language’s] historical tendency, more or less express the internal etymological laws and characteristics of our language. Indeed, without that there can be no orthography of our language, which must extend to all its varieties on the lips of the nation that speaks it—from the Carpathian Mountains to the Trans-Don steppes and the banks of the Kuban... When I read anything in Little Russian published according to the acoustic or phonetic orthography, it seems to me that the publisher is writing deliberately and mocking the Little Russians!⁴¹

The orthographic system developed by Maksymovych, based on historical etymology, introduced diacritics over the vowels *o*, *e*, *y*, and *u* when they were pronounced /i/, as well as the parallel use of *и* and *u* to denote the Ukrainian *u*. This system, which Maksymovych employed in publishing his Ukrainian folklore collections (1827), was generally accepted and actively used in the Russian Empire. For our purposes, the important point in this connection is that both of Maksymovych’s arguments (traditionalism and a certain orthographic supraregionalism) were subsequently used by the imperial authorities. This argumentation was perfectly suited to the notion of an “all-Russian” language, allowed for the maintenance of the historical link between Russian and Ukrainian words and sounds, and impeded the excessively active literary emancipation of the “Little Russian” dialect and the regionalization of the literary language. Attempts to influence the formation of the orthographic

norms of literary Ukrainian at the moment of its creation and communicative emancipation thus became one of the most important aspects of language policy.

The colloquial Ukrainian vernacular recorded in the Latin alphabet remained the principal means of literary expression in the circle of Right-Bank Polish authors of noble descent during the period between uprisings. One of the most striking figures among them was Anton Szażkiewicz, the leader of the *balahuly* (nobiliary youth who imitated peasant manners). His Ukrainian verses written in the manner of folk poetry saw publication much later,⁴² but the very possibility of issuing Latin-alphabet Ukrainian publications in the Russian Empire did not come into question until the 1850s, as evidenced particularly by the editions of the verses of Spiridon Ostaszewski.⁴³ The same holds true for Belarusian. Between 1855 and 1857, with no problem whatever, Wincenty Dunin-Marcinkiewicz published four Latin-alphabet books in the Belarusian language in the Russian Empire.

In 1859, however, a Latin-alphabet Belarusian translation of Adam Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz* was seized precisely because of the alphabet used in the edition. *Pan Tadeusz* itself was not banned in the Russian Empire. The authorities even compensated Dunin-Marcinkiewicz for the losses he had suffered, as the press run was completed before they adopted a resolution declaring that "the printing of characters containing the application of the Polish alphabet to the Russian language" was forbidden from that day forward. The censorship circular specified particularly that a rule should be established to the effect that works in the Little Russian dialect, especially for distribution among the common people, should not be printed otherwise than in Russian letters.⁴⁴ After 1859, there was no further legal opportunity to publish Latin-alphabet books in Belarusian and Ukrainian in the Russian Empire until the twentieth century.⁴⁵

The initiative to ban the use of the Latin alphabet in the Ukrainian language came from the Kyiv censor (*otdel'nyi tsenzor*) Novitsky.⁴⁶ On 14 March 1859 O. Novitsky sent a letter to the administrator of the Kyiv school district, N.I. Pirogov, noting the dissemination in the empire of "manuscripts in the Little Russian dialect, but written in Polish letters," as well as the import from Galicia of books "in the Red Ruthenian dialect, also printed in Polish letters." The immediate motivation for Novitsky was probably his encounter with the "Nova ukrainska azbuka" (New Ukrainian Alphabet), written in the Latin alphabet, which was presented to him in order to obtain permission to print it.⁴⁷

The censor wrote in particular:

Considering that with the imminent liberation of the peasants literacy will, in all likelihood, spread and increase among them; that the peasants of the western gubernias, encountering books here that are written in the Little Russian language but in Polish letters, will naturally have a greater preference to learn the Polish alphabet than the Russian one... that, because they understand the Polish language owing to contact with the Polish population of this land, they can very easily go over to reading Polish books per se and thereby become exposed to the influence of Polish literature alone, with consequent alienation from the spirit and tendency of Russian literature; and, finally, that in Galicia... the local Polish population is deliberately and insistently striving to promote the exclusive use of the Polish alphabet instead of the Cyrillic one among the indigenous Russian population in order to suppress the Russian nationality by means of literary influence and gradually turn it into the Polish nationality, which tendencies may spread to our western gubernias by the same means... Will it not be considered useful, in order to protect the Russian nationality among the Russian population of the western gubernias, to resolve for the future that works in the Little Russian language be printed in Russian letters within the boundaries of Russia, or, where it should prove necessary, in Church Slavonic letters, and that texts in the Red Russian dialect, published abroad in Polish letters, not be allowed to be imported into Russia in any considerable quantity of one and the same work?⁴⁸

On 5 May 1859, on the basis of this letter, Pirogov wrote a memorandum to the minister of education, Count E.V. Putiatin, and by 30 May Putiatin had already issued a circular (no. 1296) establishing that very prohibition.⁴⁹ Similar measures were taken with regard to the Belarusian language. On 19 June 1859 Pirogov sent a directive on the application of that circular to the censorship agencies subordinate to him. That is to say, a mere three months passed between the moment when the Kyiv censor Novitsky formulated his proposals and their implementation as an official instruction of the Ministry of Education.

Novitsky's letter contained a clear formulation of all the reasons that might inspire caution among the authorities with regard to the dissemination of the use of the Polish alphabet in the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages. Clearly, the events of 1858–59 in Galicia were by no means the least important factor here. Infuriated by Austria's conduct during the Crimean War, St. Petersburg now paid close attention to Vienna's

every move, and the reaction to “alphabet games” in Galicia was not slow in coming. This is all the more curious because at that point the imperial bureaucracy had no clear idea on questions pertaining to the status of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire, particularly on the possibility of using it in the schools, for the translation of Scripture, and for publishing journals. These problems were discussed intensively right up to 1862, and the ominous notion that the Poles wanted to “take the initiative into their hands in the matter of educating the common folk in the Southwestern land in order to propagate the Polish nationality” remained an important element of those discussions.⁵⁰

The Polish uprising of 1863 accelerated not only the process of adopting bureaucratic decisions with regard to language policy in the western borderlands of the empire but also the crystallization of the project of the “all-Russian nation.” In the summer of 1863, the Valuev circular, understood as a temporary measure, prohibited the translation of Scripture into Ukrainian and the use of Ukrainian in schools and in publications “for the common folk.” In that context, Galicia figured as the center of a competing project, first Polish and then purely Ukrainian. With regard to the Ukrainian language, imperial policy posited various levels of regulation of the linguistic sphere. Concurrently with the authorities’ efforts to permit no enhancement of the status of the language and stave off the literary emancipation of the “dialect,” the linguistic system as such came under pressure. The goal was to prevent formal isolation from the Russian language at all levels of the system. The decision of 1859 to prohibit the Latin alphabet for the “Little Russian dialect,” which was originally a reaction to developments in Galicia and to the efforts of the Poles, as well as pro-Polish Ukrainians and Belarusian activists, to disseminate the Latin alphabet among the peasants of the western borderlands, now became part of an extensive set of measures intended to assimilate the East Slavic population of the empire into one nation.

In this connection, it is interesting to investigate the use of language in Polish propaganda in the course of preparations for the uprising of 1863.⁵¹ Unlike in 1830–31, the propaganda texts, including appeals to the peasantry, were published either in Polish⁵² or in Ukrainian, but the latter now appeared exclusively in the Cyrillic alphabet. Particularly significant in this respect is a document as well known as the *Golden Charter*, which was disseminated across the whole territory encompassed by the uprising. The insurgent leaders did not rule out the possibility that the peasants might rise against the rebels and sought to pre-

vent the peasantry of the western borderlands from perceiving the uprising as a *szlachta* and “Polish” affair. “For that very reason, the insurgent leaders avoided Polonisms, as in the text of the *Golden Charter*, so in its outward appearance.”⁵³ The *Charter* attests to the definitive consolidation of Cyrillic as a Ukrainian national attribute—in Polish consciousness as well as Ukrainian.

But this holds true only for the Ukrainian case. At the same time (in May 1863), the underground insurgent government issued a special manifesto addressed to “the Belarusian brethren.” This document was printed in the Belarusian language, using the Latin alphabet. As in the Ukrainian case, the linguistic appearance of the appeal was carefully considered. The use of the Latin alphabet was evidently associated with the identity of the addressees of the propaganda texts: naturally, the insurgents expected to find allies mainly among Belarusian Catholics. A second possible reason for the insurgents’ use of “their own” graphic code in addressing the inhabitants of the Belarusian lands may have been the greater (than in the case of Ukraine) vagueness of the cultural and civilizational boundary, which is associated, *inter alia*, with the later formation of a purely Belarusian national (and linguistic and cultural) discourse. There were no “alphabet wars” involving the Belarusian language, and no rigid anti-Latinist position developed on the Belarusian side.

Having accepted the challenge of the Polish insurgents, the Russian authorities attempted to organize counterpropaganda and issued a series of Cyrillic-alphabet brochures in Belarusian, addressing them, as the Poles did, to the peasantry.⁵⁴ In the Belarusian case, representatives of both the Russian and the Polish projects continued to exploit the conflict of alphabets: as long as conditions remained indefinite, the issue was an integral part of the struggle for identity.

Soon after the suppression of the uprising, in 1865, the Russian imperial authorities also introduced a ban on the Latin alphabet for the Lithuanian language. A comparison of this measure with the prohibition on the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages in 1859 makes it possible to discern differences in the goals pursued by the authorities when adopting measures that seem identical at first glance.

Imperial authorities are less concerned than those of nation-states about the homogeneity of populations, especially in border regions. By no means—even when resolving questions of language—are imperial authorities invariably guided by nationalist logic, that is, making cultural and linguistic homogenization the goal of one project or another. Not

infrequently, the priority for an imperial power is loyalty, meaning the establishment of a version of local identity compatible with loyalty to the empire as a polity heterogeneous by definition, including civilizational loyalty. It is not always possible to distinguish national and civilizational factors in official policies with perfect clarity, but the matter deserves detailed consideration. The image of the Russian Empire as a particular civilizational space where the borderlands were loyal to the center, not only as the focus of power but also as a center of civilizational attraction, certainly existed as an ideal in the minds of the imperial elite. The term “drawing together” (*sblizhenie*), often used at the time, by no means always meant Russification in the nationalist sense—assimilation and the inculcation of Russian national identity. Thus, Nicholas I’s consideration of the possibility of switching the Polish language to the Cyrillic alphabet in the period between uprisings was associated rather with the hope of establishing among the Poles a version of Polish identity compatible with loyalty to the empire and the dynasty.

The prohibition of the Latin alphabet with regard to the Lithuanian language was also directed toward acculturation, not assimilation, into the Russian Empire. The goal was not to turn the Lithuanians into Russians but to put maximum distance between them and the rebellious Poles. Such policies were not restricted to the western borderlands. In 1858, mass conversions of Kriashens to Islam in the Volga-Kama region gave rise to a system worked out by the well-known missionary and Orientalist N.I. Ilminsky. In 1862 he prepared a Tatar translation of a primer and prayer book for the Kriashens, using the Cyrillic alphabet. Ilminsky adopted the same principle of translating religious literature into local languages, using Cyrillic script, when dealing with a number of peoples in the Volga-Kama region, including Bashkirs and Kazakhs. New words lacking in local languages were borrowed from Russian. Two circumstances must be noted here. Back in the early 1850s, Ilminsky, placing missionary activity above linguistic Russification, planned to develop writing systems for a number of local languages using Arabic script. Only under the influence of the more experienced Orientalist V.V. Grigoriev, who convinced him of the danger of spreading Tatar influence (and, with it, ideas of Islamism and Pan-Turkism) among neighboring peoples, did Ilminsky settle on Cyrillic.⁵⁵ Time and again, his activity was criticized by supporters of linguistic Russification, who maintained that by developing writing systems for local languages, Ilminsky was impeding that process. One of Ilminsky’s counterarguments was that the Tatar assimilationist project had considerable poten-

tial at the time, and his activity in developing local languages blocked that danger, while the Cyrillic alphabet was a prerequisite for the easier acquisition of Russian in the future.⁵⁶

Thus, for all the differences in these situations in the imperial borderlands, we observe a number of common features. In every instance, the authorities feared that a certain border group was sufficiently strong in material and cultural terms to try to undertake its own assimilationist project with regard to weaker groups. The sources of that threat were considered to be Polish influence in the Western land, German influence in the Baltic provinces, and Tatar influence in the Volga-Kama region. In every instance, the authorities strove to prevent the realization of such a project, and in every instance one of their instruments was the more or less insistent imposition of Cyrillic script. Ilminsky's experience shows that this was not always the result of a straightforward desire for Russification: after all, he even developed writing systems in local languages instead of seeking to impose Russian exclusively. In the Western land, the Lithuanian instance is rather an example of that category in which the priority was struggle against a competing influence and a desire to establish a version of identity compatible with loyalty to the empire, perceived *inter alia* as a civilizational space.

In the Western land, the rival of the Russian Empire was the Polish movement, which lacked a state of its own; in the Baltic provinces, the threat was directly linked to the growing power of Germany; and in the Volga region it was associated with the Ottoman Empire as an alternative center of attraction for Muslims and Turkic peoples. But if we consider that Polish policy in Galicia enjoyed the support of Vienna, it becomes apparent that one may speak of language policy in every instance as part of a complex system of competition between neighboring empires.

With regard to the East Slavic population of the western borderlands, in the early 1860s the authorities worked out a view according to which literacy was to be acquired in the "all-Russian" literary language. Ukrainian and Belarusian were to remain at the level of dialects—languages for "domestic use," for the publication of fictional works dealing with local concerns and monuments of history and folklore. Polish efforts to employ the Latin script for Ukrainian and Belarusian were regarded as nothing other than attempts to win the Ruthenians over to their side, and those who were already thinking in nationalist terms discerned in them a desire to "split" the emerging all-Russian nation. It is no accident that the prohibition of the Latin script for Ruthenian (1859) already spoke of Polish letters, not Latin ones. Clearly, policy with

regard to the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages combined a desire to neutralize Polish efforts to establish a civilizational boundary along the Commonwealth border of 1772—making use of the alphabet among other instruments—with an assimilationist plan to unite all Eastern Slavs in the empire within the framework of an “all-Russian nation.”

The last attempt to revive the problem of the alphabet in Ukrainian public discourse and pose it on another level is associated with Mykhailo Drahomanov’s ideas concerning the introduction of the Latin alphabet into works published in Galicia and Geneva. In 1881–82 he proposed a theoretical basis for the use of the Latin alphabet in Ukrainian publications. Along with the traditional arguments of the Galician “Latinizers” (the broad distribution of the Latin alphabet; the establishment of contact with European culture, which would “bring us closer to the more civilized world”), Drahomanov notes that in Galicia “people speak Ruthenian but know no script other than the Polish.”⁵⁷ It was the latter, practical consideration that became the basic one for him. In Geneva he issued a Latin-alphabet edition of Taras Shevchenko’s poem “Maria” in order to disseminate the book in an environment where Cyrillic was unknown.⁵⁸ Considering that Ukrainian writing should use an “all-European but reformed” alphabet, Drahomanov sought to unite a variety of graphic systems in his proposal—Polish and Czech, along with the introduction of Cyrillic letters into the Latin alphabet to denote hushing sounds—but, in practice, never worked out a single Latin-script system.⁵⁹ Drahomanov did not succeed in reintroducing the Latin alphabet into general use in Galicia. Nevertheless, his constant correspondent in Galicia, Mykhailo Pavlyk, tried to put the Latin alphabet to use, pleading the “practical costs of the matter.”⁶⁰ In 1882–83 Drahomanov also planned to publish a Latin-alphabet Ukrainian newspaper in Lviv as a supplement to the Polish *Praca* (Labor).⁶¹ It should be stressed that Drahomanov’s proposals for the Latinization of Ukrainian writing did not involve a complete renunciation of Cyrillic; the main consideration was a desire to reach as broad an audience as possible. Being well aware of all the complications involved in a reform of the alphabet, Drahomanov was nevertheless convinced that “one cannot make a sacred cow of orthography, as Ukrainians do with the so-called Cyrillic alphabet; one cannot make a fetish of it and impart that fetishism to the people.”⁶² But Drahomanov did not succeed in removing the problem of Latinization from the traditional Galician context of Ukrainian-Polish antagonism. As was only to be expected, the Geneva edition of “Maria” aroused accusations of disrespect for tradition and Polonizing intentions.⁶³

Drahomanov's experiments may be considered a marginal phenomenon for the period. From the 1860s, the central question for Ukrainian national discourse was which system of orthography, phonetic or etymological, was to be used in Ukrainian publications. That question was directly linked to the conflict between the "all-Russian" and "Ukrainian" nations. In the course of the orthographic discussion that developed in St. Petersburg, Kyiv and Kharkiv publications, etymological spelling became not only a symbol of tradition but also a sign of its unity and all-Russian character; phonetic orthography, in turn, became not only a vehicle of specifically linguistic modernization but also of national emancipation.

Given the opposing ideas of tradition and modernization, the antithesis between the ecclesiastical and civil Cyrillic script also came up as a subject in the orthographic discussion of the 1860s. It became particularly acute in Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia. If in the Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire it was the phonetic system of writing that fulfilled the function of a boundary marker, here it was the ecclesiastical script that served as a more distinct indicator of "one's own" cultural and civilizational space under conditions of unrelenting Polish influence. Those who opposed the introduction of the civil script for Ukrainian texts in the western lands regarded the traditional orthographic system above all as a symbol of civilizational unity of the sphere of Orthodox culture and union with "the rest of the Rus' world."⁶⁴ They also sought to arm themselves with "modernizing" arguments against the civil script, which in their view was "at variance with the vernacular."⁶⁵ For our purposes, the important point is that the link between the civil script (*hrazhdanka*) and the Russian language proved a significant drawback to supporters of all versions of the purely Ukrainian linguistic idea—as for traditionalists (Hattuk), so for modernists, who supported the introduction of a phonetic orthography.⁶⁶ The gradual phoneticization of Ukrainian orthography—as in the Russian Empire, so in the western Ukrainian lands⁶⁷—meant the gradual formation of a purely Ukrainian linguistic and national project.

The rethinking of the orthographic discussions in national terms that took place in the early 1860s aroused a perfectly natural reaction on the part of the authorities. After the uprising of 1863 and the adoption of the Valuev circular and the Ems instructions of 1876,⁶⁸ which severely restricted the use of the Ukrainian language, the authorities continued their efforts to regulate Ukrainian linguistic space, but now with regard to questions of orthography. The censors instructed publishers that the

etymological orthography of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Sobranie sochinenii na malorossiiskom narechii* (Collected Works in the Little Russian Dialect; Kyiv, 1875) was to be adopted as an orthographic model.⁶⁹ Where Ukrainian was permitted, the authorities sought to regulate questions of orthography, striving to prevent any increase in the distance between Russian and Ukrainian norms. To that end, among other things, they artificially established the Ukrainian norm at an earlier stage of development (the first edition of Kotliarevsky, 1798). The Ems instructions placed a special ban on the so-called *kulishivka*, the phonetic orthography developed by Panteleimon Kulish.⁷⁰ From the viewpoint of the authorities, it represented nothing other than a widening of the gap between the "all-Russian" language and the "Little Russian dialect" by means of formal graphic resources.

If in the Russian Empire the question was decided "from above" until 1905, in Galicia discussion of the orthographic problem continued within the framework of a national language program. Orthographic discussions flared up with new intensity in the mid-1880s in connection with the initiative of Professors Stepan Smal-Stotsky and Theodor Garnier of the University of Chernivtsi, who addressed the Ministry of Education with a proposal to introduce a phonetic script for schools. Having received support from Vienna, they prepared a school grammar, consistently applying the phonetic principle to render Ukrainian speech.⁷¹ The "modernists'" position was actively supported by Mykhailo Drahomanov. From 1878 he published works in Cyrillic, using his own system of orthography, which satisfied the consistent demand for literal phonetic correspondence (one sound—one letter).⁷² In the course of discussion during the 1880s, he formulated an appeal to renounce the "caste-bound archaic language," expressing the desire to "disseminate knowledge among the Ruthenians in the simple folk vernacular and by means of a simple, phonetic orthography."⁷³ Drahomanov's favorite argument—practicality, suitability for a popular audience—came up here as well: "A phonetic orthography makes it easier for every child to learn to read and write; for every peasant to retain orthography in his head once and for all; not to fear grammatical mistakes; to do without a letter writer, and so on!"⁷⁴ Reacting against modernist proposals to phoneticize Ukrainian writing, some "populist" publications, such as *Dilo* (The Deed), moved away from the principles of phonetic orthography in the direction of etymology, but in principle the Ukrainian nationalists resolved the question of the form of linguistic expression precisely to the benefit of phonetics.

Clearly, St. Petersburg's efforts to intervene in the sphere of language bore different fruits in various parts of the Western land. The reason for this should be sought, among other things, in differences of culture and traditions of writing, which determined the forms of open or covert resistance to imperial language policy. In the Lithuanian case, a tradition of using Cyrillic was lacking in principle, and Cyrillic was regarded as a symbol of a wholly foreign culture, which predestined the failure of the imperial project to shift Lithuanian writing to the Cyrillic alphabet. The repeal of the ban on the use of the Latin alphabet in 1904 may be considered a forced recognition of defeat.

In the Belarusian case, regardless of the official ban on Latin-alphabet publications, the tradition of use of that alphabet turned out to be quite tenacious. The competition of two cultural and civilizational traditions in the Belarusian linguistic milieu resumed as early as the turn of the twentieth century, after the weakening, and then the removal, of a number of censorship restrictions. Thus, of twenty-five periodical publications appearing in Belarus between 1901 and 1917, nine were published in Latin script, while *Nasha Dolia* (Our Fate) and *Nasha Niva* (Our Field) appeared in both. Up to 1918, Belarusian-language texts appeared in 423 book publications, of which 129 were printed in Latin script, while some contained both Latin-alphabet and Cyrillic texts.⁷⁵ The difference in principle from the Ukrainian case (despite the initially similar tradition of the use of Latin script) was determined by the specifics of the confessional and social structure of Belarusian society: a significant part of the peasant population in the Belarusian lands identified itself with Catholic (Latin) culture, and the Latin alphabet was a component of its sacral world. Belarusian nationalists could not fail to take account of this in their efforts at the national and linguistic mobilization of the peasantry. That fact in turn hampered the ideologization of the problem of the alphabet in Belarusian national discourse; by the same token, considerations of practical expediency prevailed.⁷⁶ The principal task—that of the literary emancipation of the Belarusian language—was not accomplished. Under such conditions, the Belarusian nationalists assigned an auxiliary, subordinate role to the alphabet.⁷⁷ Having failed to become a tool for the implementation of national language policy, the Latin alphabet nevertheless remained an important fact of language use that ran counter to the all-Russian language project. But the defeat of the “unifying” efforts of the authorities in Belarus with respect to language proved temporary.

During the first decades of the Soviet Union's existence, policy with regard to various alphabets underwent the strangest variations.⁷⁸ The policy of *korenizatsiia* (taking root), implemented in the USSR in the 1920s, was based on the ideology of decolonization and promoted local languages in administration and education. Cyrillic was perceived as one of the symbols of Russian imperialism and Russification. Even before an official position on language questions had been worked out, a number of peoples went over to the Latin alphabet from Cyrillic (the Yakuts in 1920 and the Ossetians in 1923). In quite a few cases, however, ethnic groups such as the Komi, Mordvinians, Chuvashes and Udmurts rejected efforts to introduce the Latin alphabet, preferring to reform the Cyrillic system that they already had. The Kalmyks went over from Mongol writing to Cyrillic. The Khakases, Assyrians, Roma, Oirots and several other minorities chose the Cyrillic alphabet. It may be said that in "free competition" between the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets neither gained a clear advantage over the other.

The question of introducing the Latin alphabet was discussed with particular intensity among the Muslim population. The movement to establish a "new Turkic alphabet" based on Latin script was initiated in Azerbaidzhan in 1922. A Turkological Congress that approved a plan of reform was held in Baku in 1926. In 1927 this initiative received the sanction of the Politburo and financing from the state budget. The Bolshevik leadership considered that the transition to the Latin alphabet would undermine the influence of Islam, which was closely associated with the Arabic script. Moscow was not unduly worried about the Pan-Turkic aspect of the project at the time. By 1930, thirty-nine languages had been switched to the Latin alphabet. Some of them made that transition from Cyrillic, which the authorities, having proclaimed Great Russian chauvinism the principal danger, did not consider reprehensible in any way. A campaign to switch the Finno-Ugric languages to the Latin alphabet was undertaken in the late 1920s and early 1930s with the full support of the central authorities. By 1932, a total of sixty-six languages had been switched to the Latin alphabet in the USSR, and another seven were being prepared for the process. In the late 1920s, preparations were even made to switch the Russian language to the Latin alphabet.⁷⁹ We see that, given a change of ideological outlook and political priorities, the central authorities in the new empire, the USSR, could make a cardinal policy change with regard to alphabets, unlike the authorities in the tsarist empire.

Against this background, the fate of Latinizing projects in the Belarussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR—the former western borderlands of the Russian Empire—is particularly instructive. The main task of language building in Ukraine in the 1920s was to create a single orthography for all the Ukrainian lands, taking account of the language's historical development. The task was entrusted to a State Orthographic Commission attached to the People's Commissariat of Education, established on 23 July 1925.⁸⁰ A total of sixty proposals (thirty-seven of them from Galicia) were presented for its consideration, and the commission's work resulted in the publication of a composite draft titled *Ukraïns'kyi pravopys* (Ukrainian Orthography; Kharkiv, 1926), which particularly stressed the task of setting the alphabet to rights (p. 4). The culminating stage of discussion was the convocation in 1927 of an all-Ukrainian conference on the question of systematizing orthography, which took place in Kharkiv with the participation of representatives (seventy-five in all) from western and eastern Ukraine. The pronouncements of the republican leadership evinced an awareness that, as before, external actors were involved in the orthographic discussions: "Here it is necessary to avoid deviations in two directions that present themselves in connection with the publication of a Ukrainian orthography: a desire to use orthography to differentiate the Ukrainian language from Polish or Russian, depending on one orientation or the other that is to be found among representatives of our scholarly and social thought."⁸¹ Following stormy debates at the conference and supplementary work on the part of the commission's presidium (whose members included Antin Prykhodko, Ahatanhel Krymsky, Oleksa Syniavsky and Serhii Pylypenko), *Ukraïns'kyi pravopys* was ratified by the commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk, in September 1928. Somewhat later, in May 1929, the orthography was approved at a meeting of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv,⁸² marking an important stage in the establishment of a single Ukrainian norm.

The orthographic discussion also provided grounds for returning to the question of the applicability of the Latin alphabet to the Ukrainian language, which appeared to have been settled definitively. In this case, the project of Latinizing Ukrainian writing was associated with the conception of Marrism, which also entailed switching the Russian language to the Latin alphabet. In that context, Latinization was the foundation for the unification of languages and scripts on the basis of one Latin alphabet as the most widespread, and thus an urgent task of communist construction.⁸³ It was the writer and journalist Serhii Pylypenko who

formulated the idea of the unification of alphabets as applicable to the Ukrainian language in 1923. In his Latin-alphabet “Odvertyj lyst do vsix, xto cikavyt’sja cijeju spravozu” (Open Letter to All Who Are Interested in This Matter), he declares: now or never.⁸⁴ Rebuffing possible accusations on the part of Russophiles (“cutting oneself off from Russian culture, the culture that should be the first to copulate with the Ukrainian”) and Ukrainophiles (“cutting oneself off from Galicia and, to some extent, from Polonization”) alike, in the practical sphere he proposed a gradual transition to the Latin alphabet in the schools and to printing newspapers in two parallel alphabets. Pylypenko’s proposal was supported by Mykhail Yohansen, who took up the idea of the “Latin, and now international, alphabet.”⁸⁵ A radical scheme of Ukrainian orthography based on a reformed Latin alphabet was implemented in practice by a Kyiv Futurist group known as “Semafor v maibutnie” (Semaphore to the Future). However, in the course of discussion at the orthographic conference of 1927, the proposal to switch Ukrainian writing to the Latin alphabet was rejected. Similar proposals remained peripheral to public and linguistic attention as well, relegated to the background by the more pressing task of unifying western and eastern Ukrainian orthographic (Cyrillic) traditions. Nevertheless, the very fact of their appearance is a good reflection of the generally reformist spirit of the era of “Ukrainization.” The well-known Ukrainian dialectologist and lexicographer Yevhen Tymchenko formulated his ideas on refashioning orthography in a reformist key, proposing the use of certain letters of the Latin alphabet in order to convey specific Ukrainian sounds.⁸⁶ Some of these proposals (presented by Mykola Skrypnyk) were initially approved by the conference, and it was only the intervention of the republican party authorities that prevented their appearance in the final version of *Ukraïns’kyi pravopys*.⁸⁷

Analogies to the Ukrainian situation are easy to find in Soviet Belarus of that period. The *korenizatsiia* policy offered extraordinarily propitious conditions for establishing a consistently phonetic orthography for the Belarusian language. An academic conference on systematizing Belarusian orthography took place somewhat earlier than the Ukrainian conference, in 1926. The question of the possible use of the Latin alphabet in Belarusian writing was raised there as well, with more fundamental argumentation in favor of such a measure than in Ukraine. Aside from declarations in a revolutionary Marxist spirit on the Latin alphabet as the graphic system and international alphabet of the future, the argu-

ments of supporters of Latinization included vindications of its advantages for rendering the phonetic peculiarities of Belarusian speech in writing. They also appealed to the existence of an enduring tradition of the use of the Latin alphabet in the peasant Catholic milieu.⁸⁸

The conviction that radical changes in graphic forms of language were untimely,⁸⁹ as well as the view that proposals for the introduction of the Latin alphabet masked yet another attempt at Polonization, predetermined their failure in Ukraine and Belarus alike. Wholly typical in this regard was the pronouncement of one of the ideologues of language policy in Ukraine during the era of Ukrainization, the people's commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk. In formulating the conclusions of the orthographic discussion, he associated the idea of Latinization in various historical periods primarily with the theme of a "foreign" national threat:

There were other attempts as well to establish the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian language. The most prominent spokesmen for the introduction of this tendency were, on the one hand, a group of Polonized Ukrainian writers of the 1830s and, on the other, the leaders of the colonization of Western Galicia in the 1870s and 1890s, and, in recent times, the leaders of Czechization in Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Romanian government, which in Bessarabia and Bukovyna is now forcibly introducing the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian population of Bessarabia and Bukovyna.⁹⁰

These arguments were subsequently exploited by the authorities, who hastened to intervene and carry out a political investigation. As early as 1929, accusations of planning to introduce the Latin alphabet and of pro-Polish attitudes figured in the arrests of Ukrainian and Belarusian linguists. Renouncing the idea of introducing the Latin alphabet did not save them from accusations of nationalism and of an orientation on "Polish and Czech bourgeois culture" formulated by a commission of the People's Commissariat of Education of Ukraine to inspect work on the language front, headed by Andrii Khvyliia.⁹¹

Our discussion of this subject shows that the choice of alphabets for the Ukrainian language in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was invariably an object of political struggle. Both "national" and "external" actors took part in that struggle, and in many respects the strategies of the "national" actors were determined by the external context.

The subsequent fate of the Belarusian and Ukrainian orthographies (now considered outside the context of opposing alphabets) exemplifies the conscious planning of orthographic norms in order to limit the growth of national projects by influencing the practice of codification. From the mid-1930s, the logic of language building proceeded not so much from the need to neutralize external influence on languages closely related to Russian as from the desire to prevent the opening of a breach between the national and Russian norms. That intention is declared openly in *Ukrains'kyi pravopys* (1933):

The basic corrections pertain to the liquidation of all rules that oriented the Ukrainian language toward the Polish and Czech bourgeois cultures, deformed the present-day Ukrainian language, and erected a barrier between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. In this regard, *a*) nationalist rules on the spelling of foreign words have been liquidated; *b*) forms that littered the Ukrainian language with archaisms, unnecessary parallelisms, and provincialisms have been discarded from the orthography.⁹²

According to the logic of purging “nationalist growths on the language front” from the Ukrainian alphabet of 1933, the letter *r* (*g*) in particular was eliminated as superfluous and even harmful. Draft changes to the Belarusian orthography were also ratified in 1933 by a resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Belarusian SSR. It marked a certain departure from consistently phonetic orthography. Other interventionist measures in the sphere of codification were analogous to the Ukrainian case: standardization of the spelling and pronunciation of words of foreign derivation (*klub* instead of *kliub*), elimination of parallel morphological forms that did not exist in Russian, and rejection of terms and lexemes closely associated with particular regional traditions. Exhortations for the unification of norms were repeated right up to the 1980s, becoming more insistent over time.⁹³

By way of an afterword to our subject, we may take a glance at efforts to make use of the Latin alphabet in contemporary newspapers, advertisements and other publications in Ukraine. Latinized texts are not only a striking example of postmodernist language games (or games with language?)⁹⁴ but also fit wonderfully into the context of the “alphabet wars” of the past. Clearly, the practice of the Lviv journal *ĭ* or the newspaper *Postup* (Progress) with regard to the use of the Latin alphabet, which is conditioned by practical goals, simultaneously evokes associa-

tions with the nineteenth-century tradition of the use of the Latin alphabet in the region and tends to produce a local (regional), almost exotic, color. Once entrenched in ethnolinguistic consciousness, negative experience with language often gives rise to a process of reethnicization and to the establishment of a new link with the alphabet when external pressure weakens.⁹⁵ Under these new conditions, the link with the Latin alphabet is being reconsidered in Ukrainian cultural discourse. It is no longer regarded in terms of opposing national projects (Ukrainian and Polish) but has been integrated into a purely Ukrainian national tradition, becoming a vehicle of regional and/or historical stylization.

Notes

- ¹ J.A. Fishman, "Language and Ethnicity: The View from Within," in *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics*, ed. Florian Coulmas (Cambridge, MA, 1997), p. 339.
- ² By consolidation, we mean not only the purely philological aspects of working out a single literary norm but also the process of establishing a political consensus on the question of linguistic unity. The Yugoslav example (i.e., the Serbian and Croatian languages) demonstrates the possibility of a different development in a similar situation. For more detail on this point, see n. 6 below.
- ³ For a more detailed argument that the formation of identities and loyalties in contiguous continental empires should be analyzed not in the framework of separate empires but in that of a particular macrosystem of continental empires, see A. Miller, "Between Local and Inter-Imperial: Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 2004, no. 1: 5–19; A. Miller and A. Rieber, "Introduction" to *Imperial Rule*, eds. A. Miller and A. Rieber (Budapest and New York, 2004), pp. 1–6; also A. Miller, "The Value and the Limits of a Comparative Approach to the History of Contiguous Empires on the European Periphery," in *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, no. 13: 19–32. The subject examined in this article may serve as an exemplary illustration of that thesis.
- ⁴ The authors of this article, each from his/her own perspective—that of a historian (A. Miller) and a philologist (O. Ostapchuk)—have dealt with this subject in various publications: A. Miller, "*Ukrainskii vopros*" v politike vlastei i ruskom obshchestvennom mnenii (St. Petersburg, 2000), translated as *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest and New York, 2003); idem, "Iazyk, identichnost' i loial'nost' v politike vlastei Rossiiskoi imperii," in *Rossii i Baltiia. Ostzeiskie gubernii i Severo-Zapadnyi krai v politike reform Rossiiskoi imperii. 2-ia polovina XVIII — XX v.* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 142–55; O. Ostapchuk, "Faktor polilingvizma v istorii ukrainskogo literaturnogo iazyka," *Slavianskii vestnik* (Moscow), vol. 2 (2004): 257–69; idem, "Looking for Friends and Enemies: Borrowings in Language Ideology, Language Building and Usage in Modern Ukraine," in *Ukraine's Reintegration into Europe: A Historical, Historiographical and Politically Urgent Issue*, eds. G.B. Bercoff and G. Lami (Alessandria, 2005), pp. 181–196.
- ⁵ The purely technical aspect has been omitted from our article. In general, it may be said that from a strictly philological viewpoint the Latin alphabet is no less (and sometimes even more) capable of reflecting the peculiarities of Ukrainian living speech in writing. This is confirmed especially by a linguistic analysis of monuments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

N. Malinevs'ka, *Fonetychna systema ukraïns'koï movy XVII—pochatku XVIII st. i latyns'ka hrafika* (Olomouc, 2005).

- ⁶ On the openness of Ukrainian culture, see L. Sofronova, “Funktsiia granitsy v formirovanii ukrainskoi kul'tury XVII–XVIII vekov,” in *Rossiiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 101–13. The Ukrainian situation is no exception in this respect. Thus, in Serbian culture the coexistence of the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets has produced relations of simultaneous contact and competition. The Cyrillic alphabet has symbolic meaning as one of the most important national characteristics and is associated with the sphere of “one’s own” “native” culture. Conversely, the Latin alphabet, associated with the Catholic world, is identified with the Croatian language and culture. Today, however, even in the consciousness of bearers of Serbian ethnolinguistic culture, the Latin alphabet enjoys fairly high status and is coming into ever greater practical use. See P. Piper, “Kirillitsa i latinitsa v verbal'nykh assotsiatsiiakh serbov,” *Slavianskii vestnik*, vol. 2, *K 70-letiiu V. P. Gudkova* (2004): 269–79.
- ⁷ On the translation of Uniate liturgical texts into the Latin alphabet as an aspect of cultural Polonization, see A. Bolek, “Polska grafika w XVII-wiecznych unickich tekstach liturgicznych (na przykladzie Ecphonemat P. Ohilewicza),” paper delivered at the Sixth International Congress of Ukrainian Studies, Donetsk, 28 June–1 July 2005. On multilingualism generally in that period in comparative perspective, see Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, “Plurilinguism in Russia and in the Ruthenian Lands in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Case of Stefan Javors'kyj,” in *Speculum Slaviae Orientalis: Muscovy, Ruthenia and Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages*, UCLA Slavic Studies, new series, vol. 4 (Moscow, 2005), pp. 9–20.
- ⁸ For a fragment of I. Lenkevych's housekeeping manual, with an identical text in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, see an illustration in Ia. Isaievych, *Ukraïns'ke knyhovydannia: vytoky, rozvytok, problemy* (Lviv, 2002), p. 394.
- ⁹ Thus, the “Заявление, в котором православные Западной России жалуются на страдания, претерпеваемые от униатов и свидетельствуют, что хотят пребывать в православии” (Declaration in which the Orthodox of Western Russia Complain of the Sufferings That They Are Enduring Because of the Uniates and Attest That They Wish to Abide in Orthodoxy) is written in Polish, while the signatures are given in Ukrainian rendered in Latin script. For example: “Błahoczestywaho Trojeckaho Motreninskago manastera ihumen Melchisdek z bratyjeju. W niebytność otca namistnika monastyra błahoczestywaho Moszenskaho podpysałysia: Jeromonach Ewstraty duchownyk, Jeromonach Michaił ekonom, Monach Sylwester...” (Hegumen Melchisedek and brothers of the Pious Trinity Monastery of St. Motria. In the absence of the pastor of the pious monastery of Moshna, the following have signed: Hieromonk Yevstratii, priest; Hieromonk Mykhail, steward; Brother Sylvestr...), and so on. Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans Preserved at the Holy Synod in St. Petersburg, book 10, no. 595; cited according to

Dokumenty, ob" iasniaiushchie istoriiu Zapadno-russkago kraia i ego otnosheniia k" Rossii i k" Pol'she (Documents servant à éclaircir l'histoire des provinces occidentales de la Russie ainsi que leurs rapports avec la Russie et la Pologne) (St. Petersburg, 1865), pp. 430–31. We encounter the opposite situation among speakers of Polish dialects in Ukraine of that day, with Polish texts recorded in Cyrillic script. Cf. a fragment from a manuscript collection of religious songs: "На погрзѣб. Боже вшехмоцний / пшез ктупего заслуг люцких душ до тебе Пане з серцем розжальоним / за браці (сьоостру) наших подносими глос..." (For funerals. God Almighty / through whom the merits of human souls / to Thee, O Lord, with grieving heart / we raise our voice for our brothers [sister]...).

¹⁰ Thus, in the Transcarpathian lands, the adaptation of Magyar script in order to render texts of economic content was based entirely on practical motives. Cf. texts of the late eighteenth century: "Novem puncta interrogatoria" ("Czi maje szije szelo urbariu? Koli maje, jaka je i od kotroho csaszu posala sza?" [Does this village have a cadastral register? If so, what kind is it, and when did it begin?]) and "Fassiones colonorum possessionis Bubbi-liska" (1773) ("Kaszdy (kazsdy) kmity u zimi, u oszeny, u jaru muszit odrobi-ti dva dni panszc(s)ini kaz(s)doho tezsnya" [In winter, autumn and spring every peasant must do two days of corvée labor every week]) in the collection *Vybor" iz" staroho rus'koho pys'menstva Podkarpattia (ot" naidavnishikh' pochatkov' do seredyny XIX v.)*, Nikolai Lelekach and Mykhayl Hryha, comp. (Ungvar, 1943). The collection opens with a comparative table of letters in the Cyrillic, *hrazhdanka* and Latin alphabets (e.g., ж = ž; s = dz; i, ĭ = i; oy = y = u; x = ch; ы = y; ять — ji, i, ě).

¹¹ Cf. Czartoryski Library, Collection 3940 IV. The archive contains manuscripts of letters, appeals and manifestos pertaining to the uprising of 1831. The appeal "Do Włościan" (Panowie gromada chrześciance w poddaństwie) ("To Peasants" [Enserfed Christian Community]), taken from a collection of texts titled "Do Mieszkańców Gubernii Nowo Rossyjskich" (To Residents of the New Russian Gubernias, pp. 103–214), is preserved in three variants: Polish, Ukrainian in Latin script, and a third version with a parallel text: *Panowe hromada chrestyane w poddaństwi i w podusznom okładi buduszczye!* Cf. *Панове громада крестіянє въ подданьствѣ и ѹъ подоушномъ окладѣх будующіє* (Enserfed Peasant Community Subject to Poll Tax). Materials supplied by Dr. Artur Czesak of Cracow.

¹² In particular, he introduced a special sign to indicate a sound halfway between *e* and *y* (*u*): "In southern pre-Dnipro Ukraine, where the locals speak the most beautiful dialect, they most often use *Y* instead of *E* and say *Y* instead of *I*; I have therefore placed a diaeresis above those vowels to show the difference in the pronunciation of the language" (*Ukrainky z nutoju Tymka Padurky* [Warsaw, 1844], pp. 125–26). He began to write Ukrainian verses in the manner of folk songs as early as the mid-1820s, but they were first published after the uprising of 1831.

- ¹³ Especially in the fourth volume of *Piosnki wieśniacze znad Niemna i Dzwiny z dołączeniem pierwotwornych w mowie sławiano-krewickiej* (Peasant Songs from the Niemen and Dzvina Regions, with an Appendix of Originals in the Slavo-Krivichian Language), published in 1844. For a more detailed account, see S. Tokt', "Latinitsa ili kirillitsa: problema vybora alfavita v belorusskom natsional'nom dvizhenii vo vtoroi polovine XIX—nachale XX veka," *Ab Imperio*, 2005, no. 2.
- ¹⁴ Wacław z Oleska, *Pieśni polskie i ruskie ludu galicyjskiego* (Lviv, 1833).
- ¹⁵ Reference is to the texts "O wprowadzeniu abecadła polskiego do piśmiennictwa ruskiego" (On Introducing the Polish Alphabet into Ruthenian Letters), *Rozmaitości*, 1834, no. 29, and *Ruskoje wesile opysanoje czerez J. Łozinskoho* (A Ruthenian Wedding Described by J. Łoziński) (Przemyśl, 1835), where the injunction to "take the language from the lips of the common people" is combined with the principle "write according to common pronunciation." See M.L. Khudash, "Alfavitno-pravopysni pryntsypy Iosypa Lozyns'koho," in I. Lozyns'kyi, *Ukrain's'ke vesillia* (Kyiv, 1992). His motive was entirely practical: "The Ruthenian language, which has not yet acquired a written form, is free to choose an alphabet best suited to the cognizance of its sounds and most useful for its development. I consider the Polish alphabet to be such." Cited according to I. Franko, "Azbuchna viina v Halychyni 1859," in *Istoriia ukrain's'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia. Khrestomatiia* (Kyiv, 2004), p. 210; full text in *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 114, no. 2 (1913): 81–116; 115, no. 3: 131–53; 116, no. 4: 87–125. Yosyf Lozynsky (1807–1889) is also known as the author of one of the first grammars of the Ukrainian language, *Gramatyka jazyka ruskiego (maloruskiego)* (1846). He later abandoned the notion of Latinizing the Ukrainian script, as evidenced by his article "O obrazovanii iazyka ruskoho" (1850) and his activity as a member of the commission to examine the Jireček proposal.
- ¹⁶ "The greatest deception—indeed, unpardonable sin—in this matter is that the writer, having rejected the native Ruthenian Alphabet, accepted Liakh letters, which are completely unsuitable to our language. Is it fitting to desecrate a sacred treasure? [...] For us, St. Cyril's alphabet was an invincible heavenly fortress against complete decrepitude; it was the stoutest pillar, the immovable rock on which holy Rus', cruelly aggrieved for so many centuries, stood firm." Cited according to Markiiian Shashkevych, "Ruskoie vesilie opysanoie cherez I. Lozins'koho v Peremyshly—v typohrafiyi vladychnii hr. kat. 1835," in *Istoriia ukrain's'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 64–68; first published in *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* (Buda, 1837), pp. 130–33. Cf. also J. Lewicki, "Odpowiedź na zdanie o wprowadzeniu Abecadła polskiego do piśmiennictwa ruskiego w Przemyślu 1835"; M. Shashkevych, *Azbuka i Abecadło. (Uwagi nad Rozprawą). O wprowadzeniu Abecadła polskiego do piśmiennictwa ruskiego* (Przemyśl, 1836).

- ¹⁷ Highly revealing in that regard is a quotation from a work by D. Kochindyk (under the pseudonym Rusyn z Drohobyczzi) titled *Rusyn do Rusyniw* (A Ruthenian to Ruthenians; Lviv, 1848): “The Ruthenian and the Pole are two bodies/ That the strength of one heart/ Animates from birth/ And whoever tells us differently/ Is our enemy; he misleads us/ To our detriment!” (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv (TsDIAL), fond 474, Documents on the Polish Uprisings of 1830–31 and 1848, op. 1, spr. 18, Verses on the Polish National-Liberation Movement of the Second Quarter of the Nineteenth Century Written under the Influence of the Revolution of 1848 in Europe, fols. 45–46). There we also find the fables of Antin Liubovych, published in Ternopil in 1848 and containing analogous ideas (ibid., fols. 89–90), etc.
- ¹⁸ See, for example, the Ukrainian-language appeals written in Latin script and preserved in TsDIAL, fond 474, op. 1, spr. 15: “Appeals, Addresses and Proclamations of Polish and Ukrainian Sociopolitical, Student and Religious Societies and Organizations in the City of Lviv during the Period of Revolution in 1848”: a) Ohłasenyje Mychajła Popela do wsich Rusyniu wo Samborskoj radi na 25 (hreczysk. Kal. 13) maja 1848 r. po Chr. (Bratia Selane! [...]) (Announcement of Mykhail Popel to All Ruthenians at the Sambir Council on 25 [Greek Calendar 13] May 1848; fols. 3–6); b) Łyst do bratiw Rusyniw, a peredwsim do tych, szczo pidpysały proźbu do Cisara 11ho maja 1848 r. (Lwiv 23 maja 1848, J.H.?) (Letter to Ruthenian Brethren, Above All to Those Who Signed the Petition of 11 May 1848 to the Emperor [Lviv, 23 May 1848, J.H.?]; fols. 25–26); c) Do moich Bratej Rusyniw! (Iwan Kowal z Towmacza Kawećkyj, obywatel Hałyćkij; 28 bereznia 1848 hodu Towmacza) (To My Ruthenian Brethren! Ivan Koval of Tovmach Kavetsky, Resident of Galicia; 28 March 1848 in Tovmach; fols. 27–28). Here we also come upon a text that differs fundamentally in style and linguistic form: “Do vsĭkh” hromad” Arkhīdiētsezal” nykh”. Odozva” (To All Communities of the Archdiocese. An Appeal; Lviv, 6 June 1848), signed by Hryhorii Yakhymovych and Mykhailo Kuzemsky; the latter would subsequently become a member of the commission to examine Jireček’s proposal and head the Galician-Ruthenian Cultural Society, established in 1849. The “Appeal to the Ruthenian People” in the first issue of *Zoria Halytska* (Galician Star, no. 1, May 1848), the organ of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, was also printed in Cyrillic. For a linguistic analysis of the Ukrainian texts issued by the Polonophiles, see M. Moser, “Das Ukrainische (“Ruthenische”) der galizischen Polen und Polonophilen zwischen 1830 und 1848/1849,” *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie* 62, no. 2 (2003): 311–58.
- ¹⁹ Instructive in this regard is a quotation from a programmatic text by one of the most notable Galician Polonophiles, Kasper Cieglewicz: “I do not say that Ruthenian is not capable of development... But no one denies that the Polish language has the requisite features to be a suitable instrument of education. Red Ruthenian does not have those features; it must therefore first be

cultivated. It has only folk songs and the songs of Padura as a literary vehicle" (*Rzecz czerwono-ruska 1848 roku przez Kaspra Cieglewicza*). A natural consequence of this position was the treatment of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) language as a dialect of Polish, attested particularly by the equalization of the linguistic "roles" of the Ruthenian and the Masurian in Cieglewicz's interlude *Rusin i Mazur. Dyalog przez Baltazara Szczuckiego* (Lviv, 1848), pp. 3–13.

- ²⁰ Cf. Paul Magocsi's proposal to divide the participants in the Galician linguistic discussion into "modernists" and "traditionalists": "One can observe in eastern Galicia basically two factions: the traditionalists, who wanted to maintain the Slaveno-Rusyn book language, written in etymological script; and the modernizers, who saw in the vernacular... a potential language that could effectively represent and strengthen the national movement." P.R. Magocsi, "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, eds. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, MA, 1982), pp. 220–38, here 226.
- ²¹ The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Austrian Empire officially established Cyrillic as the alphabet to be used for printing laws and official announcements "in Ruthenian": see I. Nahaievs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï derzhavy dvadtsiatoho stolittia* (Kyiv, 1994; reprint of the Rome edition of 1989), p. 26. From 1848 the "Ruthenian language" was established in Galician schools for "Ruthenian" communities: see the reply of 9 May 1848 to the Supreme Ruthenian Council signed by Minister Pillersdorf under the title "An die ruthenische Versammlung in Lemberg" (Ivan Franko mentions the document in his article "Azbuchna viina v Halychyni 1859 r.").
- ²² V. Kubaichuk, *Khronolohiia movnykh podii v Ukraïni (zovnishnia istoriia ukraïns'koï movy)* (Kyiv, 2004), p. 47.
- ²³ Published separately under the title *Ueber den Vorschlag, das Ruthenische mit lateinischen Schriftzeichen zu schreiben. Im Auftrage des K.K. Ministerium fuer Cultus und Unterricht verfasst von J. Jirecek* (Vienna, 1859). On Jireček's proposal and its general context, see Iaroslav Rudnyts'kyi, *Movna ta pravopysna sprava v Halychyni* (Lviv, 1937), p. 5.
- ²⁴ For suspicions of a "Czech" intrigue, see Mykhailo Malynovsky's remark in a letter to Hryhorii Shashkevych: "Among the Slavs, the Poles, Russians and Czechs are fighting for dominance; for primacy. The Czechs want to impose their rule on us, and we, just as we want nothing to do with the Poles and Russians, so we do not want Czech primacy." Cited according to V. Moiseienko, "Pro odnu sprobu latynizatsii ukraïns'koho pys'ma," *Ĭ, nezalezhnyi kul'turolohichni chasopys* (Lviv, 1997), no. 9: 140–47, here 146; cf. also *Ukraïns'ko-rus'kyi arkhiv*, 7, p. 33 (letter VI, dated 9 June 1859).
- ²⁵ Cf. A. Iu. Kryms'kyi, "Narys istorii ukraïns'koho pravopysu do 1927 roku," in his *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 3, *Movoznavstvo i fol'klorystyka* (Kyiv, 1973), p. 296.

- ²⁶ From a purely philological viewpoint, the proposal was well thought out: it consistently implemented the principles of phonetic orthography, made use of the available experience of reforming Slavic alphabets, and, in essence, was a fairly successful attempt to synthesize a variety of Latin scripts. Franz von Miklosich (Franc Miklošič) may be considered the source of Jireček's "ideological" inspiration as regards the practical aspect of the proposal. The Czech version of the Latin alphabet was first used to render written Ukrainian examples in *Vergleichende Lautlehre der slavischen Sprachen* (Vienna, 1852). True, in the second edition of his work (1874) Miklosich expressed himself in favor of using Cyrillic, reformed according to the Serbian example, for rendering Ukrainian speech. It cannot be ruled out that this change of opinion may have been influenced by the result of the discussion on Jireček's proposal. For more detail on the philological virtues of Jireček's proposal, see Moiseienko, "Pro odnu sprobu latynizatsii."
- ²⁷ For a detailed analysis of Jireček's argumentation, see Moiseienko, "Pro odnu sprobu latynizatsii," p. 143.
- ²⁸ On the commission's membership, see O. V. Huzar, *Pravopysna systema Halychyny druhoi polovyny XIX — pochatku XX st.* (Lviv, 1994), p. 12. Its members included Spyrydon Lytvynovych, Mykhailo Kuzemsky and Hryhorii Shashkevych.
- ²⁹ Moiseienko, "Pro odnu sprobu latynizatsii," p. 145.
- ³⁰ Lozynsky set forth his own conception of the development of the "Ruthenian" literary language in Galicia in his article "O obrazovanii iazyka rus'koho" (On the Formation of the Ruthenian Language, 1850). Generally speaking, such an evolution of views was no rarity in that period, which saw the crystallization of the national project in Galicia: it suffices to recall the example of the "Ruthenian Triad," consisting of Ivan Vahylevych, Markiiian Shashkevych and Yakiv Holovatsky. These initiators of the first publication in the "local [vernacular, dialectal] language" (1837) and propagandists of cultural "Ukrainism" subsequently chose diverse political (i.e., national) identifications: Holovatsky became a prominent activist among the traditionalist Rus-sophiles, and Vahylevych chose a pro-Polish orientation; only Shashkevych remained in the camp of the "modernist populists." For more detail on this, see Peter Brock, "Ivan Vahylevych (1811–1866) and the Ukrainian National Identity," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism*, pp. 111–24.
- ³¹ As evidenced in particular by a quotation from a letter written by Ivan Hushalevych to Yakiv Holovatsky: "All hearts have become congealed with blood" (cited according to Franko, "Azbuchna viina v Halychyni 1859 r.>").
- ³² *O neudobnosti latinskoj azbuki v' pis'mennosti ruskoi. Rozsuzhdeniie Bogdana A.D.* (Vienna, 1859), p. 20. Among the virtues of Cyrillic, the foremost was its capacity to express the "root derivation of words," while the main fault of the Latin alphabet was that it "does not permit us to express the Slavic derivation of Ruthenian words." Didytsky polemicizes with supporters of the Latin alphabet, considering Latinization a mere illusion of an

approach to European progress and civilization and seeing in it a blind imitation of foreign tradition. He derogates the significance of an existing tradition of the use of the Latin alphabet (Padura), perceiving in it nothing more than “a desire to acquaint Polish tribal relatives with the folk songs of Rus’.”

- ³³ In present-day Ukrainian linguistic tradition, the Latin alphabet is considered precisely one of the obstacles to the formation of a single literary norm and the unification of literary traditions: “Efforts to Latinize Ukrainian script proved hopeless, as that graphic system was unnatural to the Ukrainian nation. It would have broken too sharply with the written traditions of the Ukrainian language, alienating the Galician ‘Ruthenians’ from other Ukrainians, who were already divided by political boundaries” (Huzar, *Pravopysna systema Halychyny*, p. 20).
- ³⁴ *O neudobnosti latynskoi azbuki*, pp. 37–40.
- ³⁵ See V. Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova (latynysia, drahomanivka)* (Prague, 1932), p. 173; Moiseienko, “Pro odnu sprobu latynizatsiï,” p. 140.
- ³⁶ An example is January Późniak, *Pisny z dawnych lit* (Lviv, 1877); for the Cyrillic text, see Ianuarii Pozniak, “Pisn’ naridnaia,” in *Ukraïns’koiu muzoiu natkhennii (pol’ s’ki poety, shcho pysaly ukraïns’koiu movoiu)* (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 84–85.
- ³⁷ B.A. Uspenskii, “Nikolai I i pol’skii iazyk (Iazykovaia politika Rossiiskoi imperii v otnoshenii Tsarstva Pol’skogo: voprosy grafiki i orfografii),” in his *Istoriko-filologicheskie ocherki* (Moscow, 2004). After the uprising of 1863, Nikolai Miliutin, no longer counting on a rapprochement with the Polish nobility, hoped to cultivate the spirit of loyalty among the Polish peasants, and Uspensky notes that the efforts undertaken at that time by the civil administration of the Kingdom of Poland to introduce Russian letters into Polish script (with no full prohibition of the Latin alphabet) were meant to influence the peasantry first and foremost (*ibid.*, p. 141).
- ³⁸ I. Franko, *Etymolohiia i fonetyka v iuzhnorus’kii literaturi* (Kolomyia, 1894).
- ³⁹ Cited according to Ol. Pavlovskii, “Grammatika malorossiiskago narechiia,” in *Istoriia ukraïns’koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 39–54, here 41; first published as A. Pavlovskii, *Grammatika malorossiiskago narechiia* (St. Petersburg, 1818). For the western Ukrainian tradition, that principle was first formulated by the compilers and authors of the almanac *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* (1837): “We hold to the principle ‘write as you hear and read as you see.’” See “*Rusalka Dnistrovaia*” in *Istoriia ukraïns’koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, p. 60.
- ⁴⁰ Cited according to N.K. Grunskii, “Iz proshlogo ukrainskoi orfografii,” in *Ukrainskoe pravopisanie, ego osnovy i istoriia*, 2nd ed. (Kyiv, 1919), p. 25.
- ⁴¹ Mykhailo Maksymovych, “O pravopisanii Malorossiiskago iazyka: Pis’mo k” Osnov’ianenku,” in *Istoriia ukraïns’koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 88–106, here 91; taken from M.A. Maksimovich, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1880), pp. 312–28.

- ⁴² See *Pieśni Antoniego Szaszkiewicza wraz z jego życiorysem wydał Stefan Buszczyński* (Cracow, 1890). The publisher wrote in the introduction: "Various circumstances stood in the way of my publishing this collection until now... The name of A.S., who loves the Fatherland, that hero of the struggle for independence who shed his blood for the fraternal people, will become, along with the names of Tomasz Padura, Spiridon Ostaszewski and other bards of Rus', a new link uniting the association of the United States of Poland, which is more than five centuries old" (p. 31). On Szaszkiewicz, see especially I. Franko, "Korol' balahuliv. Antin Shashkevych i ioho ukrains'ki virshi," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv u 50-ty tomakh*, vol. 35 (Kyiv, 1982).
- ⁴³ *Piu kopy kazok. Napysau Spiridon Ostaszewski dla wesoloho Mira* (Vilnius, 1850). Two of his Polish books were published in Kyiv at the same time: *Ojciec córkom. Przez Spiridona Ostaszewskiego*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1851) and *Miłośnik koni przez obywatela Ukrainy Spiridona Ostaszewskiego*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1852).
- ⁴⁴ Russian State Historical Archives, fond 772 (Main Censorship Administration of the Ministry of Public Education), op. 1, spr. 2, item 4840.
- ⁴⁵ Tokt', "Latinitsa ili kirillitsa."
- ⁴⁶ In 1862–63 Novitsky played an important role in the preparation of the well-known Valuev circular, which banned popular publications in the Little Russian dialect.
- ⁴⁷ The "Azбука" is mentioned in the school district administrator's correspondence with the Ministry of Education. See the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (TsDIAU), fond 707 (Bureau of the Kyiv school district administrator), op. 261, item 7, fol. 3.
- ⁴⁸ TsDIAU, fond 707, op. 261, item 7, fol. 1–1v.
- ⁴⁹ TsDIAU, fond 707, op. 261, item 7, fols. 3v, 7, 7v.
- ⁵⁰ The minister of education, Putiatin, wrote to the chairman of the Censorship Committee, Baron A.P. Nikolai, on this matter, with a reference to the minister of internal affairs, Valuev (TsDIAU, fond 707, op. 261, item 7, fol. 5). Concerning discussions on the status of the Ukrainian language, cf. Miller, "Ukrainskii vopros," pp. 63–110; also Ricarda Vulpius, "Language Policy in the Russian Empire: A Case of Translation of the Bible into Ukrainian, 1860–1906," *Ab Imperio*, 2005, no. 2.
- ⁵¹ On the propaganda activity of the leadership of the uprising, see M. Jaeger, *Działalność propagandowo-informacyjna władz powstańczych (1794, 1830–1831, 1863–1864)* (Lublin, 2002), pp. 181–89.
- ⁵² A series of Ukrainian-language documents is known to have been published in the Latin alphabet, but these were not propaganda texts for mass distribution. See, for example, a letter of 4 May 1863 from E. Różycki to the dean of the town of Polonne in the Novohrad-Volynskyi district, I. Niemiłowski: "Reverend Dean, Having in our hands your report about your brethren, we could deal with you as martial law provides. But we wanted to apprise you that we wish to respect ecclesiastics to the utmost as servants of God. But

now we are again informed that you are threatening the people; that you are inciting them against us, promising something ill when we leave. We beg you, Reverend Dean, not to set us at odds; you would do better to bless us, just as we wish you good fortune with all our heart. Otherwise, be it as you wish, but we shall act according to martial law. Signed: Provisional Government in Rus'." Central State Historical Archives, fond 796, 1863, spr. 1023, fol. 8, cited according to *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine 1863–1864* gg., 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1978), 2: 102.

- ⁵³ V. M. Zaitsev, *Sotsial'no-soslovnyi sostav uchastnikov vosstaniia 1863 g. (opyt statisticheskogo analiza)* (Moscow, 1973), p. 205.
- ⁵⁴ The brochure *Biaseda staraha vol'nika z novymi pra ikhniae dzela* (The Conversation of an Old Freeman with New Ones about Their Affairs; n.p., [1861], 31 pp.) was published in Mahilioŭ in 1861. For a detailed discussion, see Tokt', "Latinitsa ili kirillitsa."
- ⁵⁵ N. Knight, "Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851–1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?" *Slavic Review* 59, no. 1 (2000): 74–100.
- ⁵⁶ On the situation in the Volga-Kama region see the following: Wayne Dowler, *Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities, 1860–1917* (Montreal, 2001); R.P. Geraci, *Window to the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca and London, 2001); P.W. Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca and London, 2001); Alexei Miller, "Imperiia i natsiia v voobrazhenii russkogo natsionalizma," in *Rossiiskaia imperiia v sravnitel'noi perspektive*, ed. A. Miller (Moscow, 2004), pp. 265–85.
- ⁵⁷ For a detailed account of Drahomanov's arguments in favor of Latinizing Ukrainian writing, see his *Chudats'ki dumky pro ukraiinsku natsional'nu spravu*, 2nd ed. (Lviv, 1892), p. 280.
- ⁵⁸ *Marija maty Isusowa. Wirszy Tarasa Szewczenka z uwahamy M. Drahomanowa* (Geneva, 1882). Cf. a passage of the introduction that directly indicates the practical goals involved in the Latinization of Ukrainian writing: "Let all kinds of people read Ukrainian books printed in Polish script; let Poles, Ruthenians and Jewish artisans become accustomed to community and not to enmity. Given good thoughts like those of Shevchenko, this community will not result in Poles and Jews lording it over Ruthenians or poor Poles, Ruthenians and Jews being in thrall to lords-plutocrats-Jews, Orthodox priests, rabbis and Roman Catholic priests, but in being free brethren" (pp. vi–vii). Compare other Latin-alphabet publications of Shevchenko's works in the Polonophile *Dziennik literacki* (Literary Daily; 1861), nos. 60, 62, 64 and *Siolo* (Village; 1866), nos. 2–3, in Galicia, edited in complete conformity to tradition; further detail in *Povne vydannia tvoriv Tarasa Shevchenka*, vol. 16, *Bibliohrafiia. Pokazhchyk vydan' Shevchenkovykh tvoriv ta spys bibliohrafichnykh prats' pro Shevchenka*, comp. Volodymyr Doroshenko (Warsaw and Lviv, 1939).

- ⁵⁹ Thus, in correspondence with Mykhailo Pavlyk (a full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and its librarian; coeditor of the monthly *Hromads'kyi druh* [Friend of the Community]; subsequently coeditor of *Hromada* [Community], published in Geneva), Drahomanov used a combined Latin alphabet beginning in 1879 (details in Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova*, p. 16 [158]); the alphabet used in the edition of "Maria" (1882) was based on Polish; the one in his "Pys'mo v redaktsiiu *Pracy*" (Letter to the Editors of *Praca*, 1882) was a combination of Polish and Czech letters (see M. Drahomanov, *Lysty do Iv. Franka i ynshykh: 1887–1895* [Lviv, 1908], pp. 4–11).
- ⁶⁰ "We posit the principle of speaking to anyone only about what is of interest to him and, moreover, in a language understood by the greatest number of people... in matters of interest to the Ruthenian people, in the Ruthenian language, but in Latin letters, which will facilitate the understanding of the ideas in our publications for the Poles, Gal[icians] and Jews, Czechs, Serbs, Slovaks, etc. and provide learned Europe with a clear photograph of the sounds of our language" (cited according to Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova*, pp. 31–32 [173–74]).
- ⁶¹ There were plans to call it *Robota* (Work), and then *Wilna Spilka* (Free Union). "For all that, our future newspaper in Galicia will have to be printed according to Polish orthography, although I am still hesitant about this" (from one of Drahomanov's letters of 1882; cited according to Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova*, p. 32 [174]).
- ⁶² *Chudats'ki dumky pro ukraïnsku natsional'nu spravu*, p. 280; cf. Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova*, p. 13 (155); cf. also "We have never made matters of principle out of matters of form. We consider the alphabet and orthography an important matter, but still one of form, and, if need be, we would even be prepared to write in hieroglyphs." Cited according to M. Drahomanov, "V spravi reformy nashoji pravopysi" (1887), in *Istoriia ukraïns'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, p. 162, as published in Drahomanov, *Lysty do Iv. Franka i ynshykh: 1887–1895*.
- ⁶³ Omelian Partytsky, a prominent "traditionalist" who wrote one of the harshest reviews of "Maria" (*Zoria*, 1882, nos. 10, 15 [27]: v), became Drahomanov's principal opponent: cf. *Vol'noe slovo*, 1882, no. 36; on other reviews of the edition, see *Povne vydannia tvoriv Tarasa Shevchenka*, vol. 16.
- ⁶⁴ Hence arguments such as the following: "From this alphabet itself, when one knows and reads it well, everyone will easily proceed to the Psalter and read Holy Scripture." Cited according to Mykola Hattsuk, "Ukraïns'ka abetka" (1861), in *Istoriia ukraïns'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 82–88, as published in M. Hatstsuk, *Ukraïns'ka abetka* (Moscow, 1861). Transcarpathian activists were also aware of the threat posed to Slavic unity by the development of separate systems of orthography. "Publishing new grammars for the above-mentioned dialects (e.g., the Serbs for theirs) would only mean alienating them even more one from another and from the pure Rus' lan-

guage and hastening the time when the Rus' peoples will understand one another even less than they do today" (Ivan Fogarashii [1786–1834], "O pis'mennom iazyke ugorossov," in *Vybor iz staroho rus'koho pys'menstva*, comp. Lelekach and Hryha, p. 110).

- ⁶⁵ "Its principal drawback consists in the superfluity of completely worthless letters and in the lack of certain signs that are absolutely essential to the demands of our living vernacular. Moreover, the Great Russian alphabet and orthography, having assimilated particularities more appropriate to the Great Russian language, run counter to Ukrainian in many cases, to the detriment of its characteristics" (Mykola Hatstsuk, "O pravopisaniiakh, zaiavlennyykh ukrainskimi pisateliami s 1834 god po 1861 god," *Osnova* [St. Petersburg], 1861, no. 4).
- ⁶⁶ "The *hrazhdanka* was useful in that it forced us to reject certain egregiously unnecessary Old Slavonic orthographies; however, the *hrazhdanka* gave us an even closer etymological 'link' with Muscovy. Moreover, Peter [I's] *grazhdanka* was adopted more on the Left Bank, which was subject to Moscow, than on the Right Bank, which was subject to Poland, and at the time it brought a certain inconsistency into the development of orthography in Ukraine" (Kryms'kyi, "Narys istorii ukrains'koho pravopysu do 1927 roku," p. 289).
- ⁶⁷ For a survey of the gradual "phoneticization" of orthography from a purely philological perspective, see V. Nimchuk, "Perednie slovo," in *Istoriia ukrains'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 6–9; Huzar, *Pravopysna systema Halychyny*, pp. 9–15.
- ⁶⁸ For the texts of both documents, see Miller, "Ukrainskii vopros."
- ⁶⁹ Russian State Historical Archives, fond 776, op. 11, item 61a, fol. 41^v.
- ⁷⁰ From the findings of the commission "To Put a Stop to Ukrainophile Propaganda" (1875): "To prohibit the publication in the Empire, in that same dialect, of any original works or translations whatsoever, with the exception of historical monuments; on condition, however, that the latter, if they belong to oral folk literature (such as songs, tales, and proverbs), be published with no deviation from all-Russian orthography (i.e., that they not be published in the so-called *kulishivka*)." Cited according to *Natsional'ni protsesy v Ukraïni. Istoriia i suchasnist'. Dokumenty i materialy. Dovidnyk*, 2 parts, pt. 1 (Kyiv, 1997), p. 261.
- ⁷¹ "The orthography presented here is phonetic in its main points, for it is based on the rule: Write according to correct pronunciation. Pronouncing correctly means avoiding all local (dialectal) properties." Cited according to Stepan Smal'-Stots'kyi and Fedir Harntner, "Ruska hramatyka," in *Istoriia ukrains'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 106–22; first published in Lviv in 1893. On the role of the Ministry of Education in establishing the phonetic orthography in Galicia, see Huzar, *Pravopysna systema Halychyny*. In their orthographic proposal, Smal-Stotsky and Garntner drew on earlier phonetic systems, including the *zhelekhivka*. For more details on the

progress of orthographic codification in Galicia in this period, see Nimchuk, “Perednie slovo,” pp. 10–13.

⁷² This demand also figured in Josef Jireček’s proposal. The first publication to employ the *drahomanivka* was an edition of Taras Shevchenko’s *Kobzar* (Geneva, 1878; 2nd ed., 1881). The identifying characteristic of Drahomanov’s orthography was his use of the letter j in Cyrillic to render the iotated vowels я, ю, є, ї — ja, jy, je, ji.

⁷³ “The clerical aristocracy or bureaucracy constantly requires a caste-bound archaic language with a corresponding orthography, and so it must constantly oppose the ‘simple’ language and an orthography of the same kind outside the church walls as well” (cited according to Mykhailo Drahomanov, “V spravi reformy nashoji pravopysi,” p. 166).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ This included 245 Belarusian-language books published between 1901 and 1917, 158 of which appeared in Cyrillic and 87 in Latin script. Data in Tokt’, “Latinita ili kirillitsa,” drawing on S. Kh. Aleksandrovich, *Putsiaviny rodnaaha slova: Prablemy razvitsia belaruskai litaratury i druku druhoi palovy XIX — pachatku XX stahoddzia* (Minsk, 1971), p. 163; *Kniha Belarusi. 1517–1917. Zvodny katalog* (Minsk, 1986), pp. 206–63.

⁷⁶ Wacław Iwanowski, the possible coauthor of a Latin-alphabet Belarusian primer (1905) along with Marian Falski, saw the problem of using two scripts in Belarusian book publishing as follows: “We all know that among us Polisiens, Belarusians, or, as we also call ourselves, locals, there are Catholics and Orthodox; Catholics are more accustomed to Latin letters, which they incorrectly call Polish; the Orthodox are more accustomed to Slavic or, as they say, Russian letters. Those Russian letters are our immemorial Belarusian ones, but the whole world now writes in Latin letters. Arguments often arise among us: a Catholic encounters an Orthodox, and they start to argue—ah, one says, you are a Pole, and you are a Muscovite. And neither knows what he is talking about: neither is the one a Pole nor the other a Muscovite; although they are of different faiths, they belong to one people, for both grew up in this same local Polisian-Belarusian land of ours and heard their first words from their relatives in our native language, and they argue only to their own detriment and shame, making themselves a public laughingstock. We are therefore publishing this primer in two scripts: choose the one you like; just let everyone know that even though the letters are different, the sounds, syllables and words are the same; the language is the same; and the people who speak the same language are brothers by birth” (cited according to J. Turonek, *Wacław Iwanowski i odrodzenie Białorusi* [Warsaw, 1992], p. 41).

⁷⁷ Tokt’ dwells on this point in detail in the conclusion to his “Latinita ili kirillitsa.”

⁷⁸ Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca and London, 2001), pp. 182–207, 422–29.

- ⁷⁹ They were halted only in 1930 by a special instruction from the Politburo.
- ⁸⁰ On the efforts of Ukrainian scholars in that direction before 1925 and on the commission's work, see Nimchuk, "Perednie slovo," pp. 14–17. The basic orthographic codices of the day are also listed there: *Holovnishii pravyla ukrains'koho pravopysu* (The Principal Rules of Ukrainian Orthography, 1918; Ivan Ohienko); *Naiholovnishii pravyla ukrains'koho pravopysu* (The Most Important Rules of Ukrainian Orthography [Kyiv, 1921]; Ahatanhel Krymsky); *Pravopysni pravyla, pryiniati Naukovym Tovarystvom im. T. Shevchenka u L'vovi* (Rules of Orthography Adopted by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv [Lviv, 1922]). The same volume, *Istoriia ukrains'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, includes excerpts from these orthographic manuals.
- ⁸¹ Cited according to Andrii Khvyliia, "Vykorinyty, znyschchyty natsionalistychne korinnia na movnomu fronti," in *Ukrains'ka mova u XX storichchi. Istoriia linhvotsydu*, ed. L. Masenko (Kyiv, 2005), p. 128; first published in *Bil'shovyk Ukraïny*, 1933, no. 7–8: 42–56, incorporating an extract from an introductory article by the editors of a translation of Lenin's *Two Tactics* (Kharkiv, 1926) signed by Mykola Skrypnyk. These pronouncements of Skrypnyk's were later used against him: "Clearly, Comrade M. Skrypnyk also held to the 'orientation' of differentiating the Ukrainian language from Russian by means of the Ukrainian orthography" (ibid., p. 128).
- ⁸² Huzar, *Pravopysna systema Halychyny*, pp. 20–21.
- ⁸³ A.A. Moskalenko, "Pytannia hrafichnoi normalizatsii ukrains'koi movy pislia Zhovtnia. Pryntsyropy orhanizatsii pravopysu ukrains'koi movy pislia Zhovtnia," in his *Istoriia ukrains'koho pravopysu (radians'kyi period)* (Odesa, 1968), p. 9. These ideas are reminiscent of Drahomanov's assumption, expressed earlier, that "all people will use the same letters for writing, and those will doubtless be the present-day Latin letters" (cited according to Simovych, *Pravopysni systemy M. Drahomanova*, p. 14).
- ⁸⁴ "This matter presents itself almost as a dilemma: now or never. 'Almost,' for I am firmly convinced that the unification of alphabets is a matter of inevitability—and one of the not too distant future. The twentieth century must solve this problem along with a great social restructuring. The human race should write in the same way so as to waste less time on familiarizing itself with other languages... Can anyone deny that, if learning foreign transcriptions was a waste of time for the so-called 'higher' strata, it would be an excessive luxury for the toiling masses? And it is these very masses that are confronted with the problem of international unity as the most pressing task of the moment... communist construction. And, finally, is the Latin alphabet not... the best vehicle for unifying the writing of various peoples most quickly and efficiently?" Cited according to Serhii Pylypenko, "Odvertyj lyst do vsix, xto cikavyt'sja cijeju spravoju," in *Istoriia ukrains'koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 348–51; first published in *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1923, nos. 6–7: 267–68.

- ⁸⁵ “Such, in brief outline, is the draft of the simplified orthography that we propose for use. The slight feeling of unfamiliarity with the sign *ê* disappears once even this very missive has been read aloud. With a certain amount of surprise, the reader will note how closely this denotation corresponds to his own pronunciation (if his pronunciation is good, of course!).” Mexajlo Johansen, “Prystosuvannia latynytsi do potreb ukrains’koï movy,” *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1923, no. 9: 167–69.
- ⁸⁶ Ie. Tymchenko, ““Desiderata” v spravi nashoho pravopysu,” in *Istoriia ukrains’koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, pp. 341–47, first published in *Ukraina* (Kyiv), 1925, no. 4: 188–92. In his draft he proposes the introduction of the Latin letters *s* and *z* to replace the digraphs *дз* [dz] and *дж* [dzh] in order to mark Ukrainian fricatives; he also revives Drahomanov’s idea of changing *ň* to *j* and writing *ja*, *ju*, *je*, *ji* instead of *я*, *ю*, *є*, *ї*.
- ⁸⁷ “A discussion arose at the conference in connection with the proposal by a fairly significant group of conference participants to introduce the Latin alphabet into the Ukrainian language instead of Cyrillic, as heretofore. Understandably, this would establish a barrier between the Russian and Ukrainian languages; understandably, this plays into the hands of the Ukrainian nationalists. Even when these proposals were rejected by vote, the alphabet affair was not over. Comrade M. Skrypnyk presented a resolution to introduce two Latin letters in order to denote the sounds *дз* and *дж*... The Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, under the leadership of L. M. Kaganovich, condemned such a line of introducing new Latin letters into Ukrainian orthography. The conference annulled its previous decision on *дз* and *дж*.” Cited according to Khvyliia, “Vykorinyty, znyschchyty natsionalistychne korinnia na movnomu fronti,” p. 123; first published in *Bil’shovyk Ukrainy*, 1933, no. 7–8: 42–56. Cf. Skrypnyk’s pronouncements on the practical impossibility of introducing individual Latin letters: “Thus, for example, the proposal to substitute the Latin *j* for our current letter *ň* would require changing this letter in all our printshops, refashioning all our typewriters, and so on, which would amount to a loss of several hundred thousand for Ukraine’s economy... Wasting such a sum of money to satisfy the desires of those who would like to bring our alphabet closer to Latin would be a completely superfluous and abject loss.” Cited according to Mykola Skrypnyk, “Pidsumky pravopysnoï dyskusii,” in *Istoriia ukrains’koho pravopysu XVI–XX stolittia*, p. 428.
- ⁸⁸ On the proceedings of the conference, see M.K. Musaev, “Belorusskii iazyk,” in *Opyt sovershenstvovaniia alfavitov i orfografii iazykov narodov SSSR* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 200–207.
- ⁸⁹ “Indeed, the introduction of the Latin alphabet is a fact among all the Turkic peoples of the USSR today. It is also true that the Latin alphabet would considerably simplify Ukrainian orthography, but the authors of that proposal

have failed to take into account, first and foremost, that millions among our peoples already know our customary alphabet. So the point is not to reeducate people who already know the customary Ukrainian alphabet to use a new alphabet but to teach those who know no alphabet whatever to write as soon as possible.” Cited according to Skrypnyk, “Pidsumky pravopysnoï dyskusii,” pp. 422–23; first published in *Visty* (Kharkiv), 19 June 1927, no. 137 (2027): 2–3.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 418.

⁹¹ In 1933, Antin Prykhodko and the initiator of Latinization, Serhii Pylypenko, both of whom were presidium members of the Orthographic Commission, were subjected to political repression (Ahatanhel Krymsky and Oleksa Syniavsky suffered the same fate somewhat later). The committee’s findings were as follows: “The new commission considered the orthography and cardinally reworked it, rejecting the artificial separation of the Ukrainian language from the Russian, simplifying the orthography, and liquidating the nationalist rules of that orthography, which oriented the Ukrainian language toward Polish and Czech bourgeois culture.” Signed: V[olodymyr] Zaton-sky. “Postanova Narodnoho komisara Osvity USRR vid 5-ho veresnia 1933 r. pro ‘Ukraïns’kyi pravopys,’” in *Ukraïns’ka mova u XX storichchi. Istoriia linhvotsydu*, p. 108, as printed in *Ukraïns’kyi pravopys* (Kharkiv, 1933).

⁹² A. Khvyliia, “Do vydannia novoho ukraïns’koho pravopysu,” in *Ukraïns’ka mova u XX storichchi. Istoriia linhvotsydu*, p. 108, as printed in *Ukraïns’kyi pravopys* (Kharkiv, 1933).

⁹³ “In 1977 the Yakub Kolas Institute of Linguistics of the Belarusian SSR prepared an improved set of rules of Belarusian orthography and punctuation, taking account of such a vital phenomenon as Belarusian-Russian bilingualism. At the stage of developed socialism a defining characteristic of which is the interaction of the languages of the socialist nations in the presence of a language of international communication—a role being played successfully by the Russian language—it would be unjustified not to take this situation into account in working out rules of orthography. This circumstance requires that identical or similar phenomena in both languages be reflected identically in writing, which should serve to improve the general level of literacy and stabilize orthographic standards in schools, book publishing, and everyday usage” (Musaev, “Belorusskii iazyk,” p. 206).

⁹⁴ Cf. John Dunn’s thesis on the emergence of postliterary languages in the contemporary Slavic world, formulated in a paper presented at a special Warsaw session of the Association for the Study of Nationalities in 2004 (J.A. Dunn, “The Emergence of Slavonic Post-Literary Languages: Some Preliminary Observations,” Special Warsaw Convention ASN, 2004).

⁹⁵ “It does seem that if the Soviets had permitted their captive nations to adopt the Turkish strategy in connection with their own Cyrillic scripts, instead of forcing a uniformly Russian-Cyrillic system upon most of them (e.g., not

only on Moldavian, Tatar, Kalmik, Uigur, etc., but even upon Ukrainian and Byelorussian), there might be fewer efforts today to return to something more ‘authentically’ pre-Communist (i.e. non-Russian in appearance). Barring substantial annihilation, it takes much longer for an elite to indigenize a writing system that has been forced upon it ‘against its will’ than it does to adapt and indigenize one that is less identified with a historic rival, enemy and oppressor... Where... *negative* ethnolinguistic consciousness... is transmitted intergenerationally... it tends to foster re-ethnification and/or relinguification of the speech community” (Fishman, “Language and Ethnicity: The View from Within,” p. 340).

Victim Cinema

Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II—The Untold Story

John-Paul Himka

This article explores the collective memory of World War II in the Ukrainian diaspora in North America, focusing on the construction of a victimization narrative. This is a topic I have already broached elsewhere, primarily on the basis of an analysis of texts appearing in *The Ukrainian Weekly* and E-Poshta.¹ In the present study, I focus on a film about Ukraine in World War II that emerged from a much more liberal and much more intellectual milieu: *Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II—The Untold Story*.

The 58-minute documentary was the product of Toronto-based intellectuals, members of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (UCRDC). The script committee included a number of academics: Wasyl Janischewskyj, professor of engineering at the University of Toronto; Jurij Darewych, professor of physics at York University; Andrew Gregorovich, former librarian at the University of Toronto; and Wsevolod Isajiw, professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Toronto. The historical advisor to the film was Orest Subtelny, professor of history at York; other historical consultants were Peter J. Potichnyj, professor emeritus of political science at McMaster University; Wolodymyr Kosyk, professor of history at the Sorbonne; and Roman Serbyn, professor emeritus of history at Université du Québec à Montréal. For the most part these are scholars who have made significant contributions to the articulation of the collective memory of World War II in Ukraine. Subtelny is the author of a survey of Ukrainian history that was influential not only in North America but also in Ukraine, where its “Ukrainocentric”² account of World War II had a major impact in the immediate aftermath of independence. Subtelny has also used his historical knowledge to aid the defense of Wasyl Odynsky, a Ukrainian Canadian accused of war crimes.³ Potichnyj is coeditor of *Litopys UPA*, a multivolume collection of sources on the Ukrainian

Insurgent Army (UPA). He also gave the University of Toronto Library about one hundred thousand pages of documents relating to the UPA (The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine).⁴ Kosyk has published two volumes of documents on Ukrainian-German relations during the 1930s and the war.⁵ Serbyn has been speaking in North America and Ukraine for some years about the need to develop a more Ukrainian-oriented perspective on the Second World War, one that would discard the Soviet concept of the Great Fatherland War and would refuse to acknowledge the reconquest of Ukraine by the Red Army as a victory.⁶ Subtelny, Potichnyj, and Serbyn also contributed to the landmark collection on Ukraine during World War II prepared in response to the formation of the Deschênes Commission, whose mandate was to investigate and prosecute war criminals in Canada.⁷ Thus the film under analysis here is not the expression of a haphazard historical viewpoint but of one that flows from a larger, loosely collective project of narration.

The director and producer of the film is Slavko Nowytski, who also directed what was probably the most successful historical documentary produced in the diaspora, *Harvest of Despair: The 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine* (1984).⁸ *Between Hitler and Stalin* is not as well crafted as the earlier film. A reason for this is that Nowytski was able to work full time on *Harvest of Despair* but could only work evenings on *Between Hitler and Stalin*. He worked on it for about ten years (1993–2003).⁹ As is typical of Nowytski's style, the World War II film contains some powerful interviews with eyewitnesses. The narration is by the veteran Hollywood actor of Ukrainian origin, Jack Palance. The initial script was written by Kristi Wheeler of Macalester College (St. Paul, Minnesota). The musical selection and mix, which some will find irritating, are the work of Toby's Tunes (Minneapolis). A rather unexpected credit is the postproduction by an outfit called Left of Center Productions Inc.

The film premiered in Toronto on 28 September 2003. Two days before the premiere, more than four hundred people attended a fundraising prescreening.¹⁰ Since then the film has been shown to many Ukrainian communities in North America, from Edmonton, Alberta, to North Port, Florida.¹¹ It has also been shown at the fourth International Documentary Film Festival—Humanity in the World (Stockholm, 2005), where it was one of only thirty-five films chosen from more than three hundred submissions.¹² It was also a finalist in the Film and Video Competition of the New York Festivals in 2005 (altogether there were over 700 entries and 241 awards, including 103 finalists).¹³ The film

was not run commercially in North America, nor did it appear on any national television or cable network. A Ukrainian-language version of *Between Hitler and Stalin* was slated to be premiered in Kyiv on 18 April 2005 at the KINO film theater. Five hundred persons were invited to attend the premiere, which was being organized by the Kyiv Memorial Society. On 3 May the film was broadcast on the national television network UT-1, and on 9 May on Channel 5.¹⁴

Apart from press releases by those involved in making the film, there has been little published discussion of it. I have seen no reviews outside Ukrainian-diaspora media. The only substantive review I have been able to find, two pages in length, is by Andrew Sorokowski in the newsletter of the Washington Group. He found it “hard-hitting,” “a skillful composite of graphics, still photographs, interviews and, of course, archival as well as contemporary footage,” “crisp and well edited,” “candid,” “neither dumb-downed nor sentimentalized,” “a clear, orderly presentation,” and “abundantly persuasive.” “It is a film particularly suitable for college students. Indeed, every major university film library in the English-speaking world should have a copy.”¹⁵ Although his review was overwhelmingly positive, Sorokowski also offered some criticisms, which I shall cite and amplify in the analysis that follows.

In sum, *Between Hitler and Stalin* is a serious piece of work that seeks to explain what happened in Ukraine during the Second World War. Although the film’s “untold story” was intended for the wider public and meant to correct its misperceptions about Ukrainians, the impact of the film was primarily within the diaspora community itself. It is, then, a site of discourse on collective memory, produced by memory experts and consumed by members of an identity group who are supposed to identify themselves with the historical memory that it constructs.

Victimhood

The film emphasizes the suffering of Ukrainians during the Second World War. Before the title appears, there are opening scenes of bombs, a tank, a peasant woman in mourning, and the corpses of children and an adult. While these are being shown, the narrator intones: “The whole titanic struggle was first of all a Ukrainian war. No single European country suffered deeper wounds to its cities, its industry, its farmland, and its humanity.” A few minutes later, after the opening credits and two interview excerpts, the narrator again makes the same point: “In 1945

American war correspondent Edgar Snow visited Ukraine and wrote: ‘It was not till I went on a sobering journey into this twilight of war that I fully realized the price which forty million Ukrainians paid for Soviet and Allied victory. The whole titanic struggle was first of all a Ukrainian war. No fewer than ten million people had been lost to Ukraine since 1941.’” Only a small part of Russia, he continues, was occupied by the Germans. In fact, the brunt of the violence of the Eastern Front was felt in Poland, Belarus, and especially Ukraine, which was “trampled and terrorized by the armies of two brutal invaders: Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.” Ukraine was “laid waste by both Soviets and Nazis.” The rest of the film demonstrates this point.

Between Hitler and Stalin also mentions the other major occasion of Ukrainian suffering besides the war: “By the spring of 1933 seven million Ukrainians had starved to death in the man-made famine-genocide. This, however, was only the first act in Ukraine’s twentieth-century holocaust.”

The narrative of suffering is interpreted in terms of sacrifice for a higher cause, namely the independence of Ukraine. Early in the film, shortly after the opening credits, the narrator says: “After seventy years of brutal Soviet rule, Ukraine won her independence without, it was said, shedding a single drop of blood. But in fact the blood of millions was shed through centuries for the freedom of Ukraine. For hundreds of years the history of Ukraine has been written by her conquerors...” In an interview, the director said:

We wanted to show that Ukraine had always sought independence, that Ukraine did not become independent “without shedding a single drop of blood” as some people claim but that many, many people died. We also wanted to show that Ukraine was not merely a victim but that in World War II, even though it was caught between the two most brutal regimes in history, was able to assert its aspiration for independence.¹⁶

In what follows I will concentrate on the presentation of victimhood in the film without reference to this theme of the struggle for independence. It is necessary to point out, however, because the distinction is elided in both the film and statements surrounding it, that victimhood and self-sacrifice, victims and martyrs, are not identical. Overwhelmingly, the millions of victims of the famine of 1932–33 and the millions of Ukrainian military and civilian casualties in World War II did not perish in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood. They were no more martyrs for this cause than the victims of the Holocaust were martyrs for Israeli state-

hood, even though Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists formed a fraction of the victims in both cases.

The Intensification of Victimhood

At a number of points the film takes rhetorical and visual liberties in order to intensify the sense of Ukrainian victimhood during the war.

As historical background on Ukrainians' sufferings prior to the war, the film informs viewers about the persecution of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. "By 1930 almost 3,000 priests and 32 bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were exiled or executed." There is no mention that this particular institution was a small minority church in Ukraine.¹⁷ Also, there is no mention that the majority church in Ukraine, the church of the Moscow patriarch, suffered as much persecution as the Ukrainian autocephalists.¹⁸ In fact, the only reference to the latter church comes later in the film, in connection with the immediate postwar period: "Ukrainian Orthodox believers were forced to join the Russian Orthodox Church controlled by the KGB and the Soviet state." The film creates the impression that only Ukrainian Orthodox were singled out for martyrdom, but that was not the case. In fact, while the narrator reads the words about the persecution of the Ukrainian autocephalous church, the screen shows monks being marched under arrest, and then a monk being divested of his monastic garb. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, however, was hostile to monasticism, and the monks who appear on the film belong to the same Russian patriarchal church that is being passed over in silence.

Another example of omission to intensify the impression of Ukrainian suffering occurs in connection with the description of the fate of Soviet POWs in German captivity: "...Hitler ordered Soviet prisoners of war confined in open-air camps, where millions died of exposure and starvation during the winter of 1941–42." What is not mentioned is that in 1941 it was German policy to release Ukrainian POWs on parole, and about 278,000 of them returned to their home villages and cities to work.¹⁹ Many Ukrainian prisoners still died or came close to death in the German POW camps, but the situation was more complex than the film's victimhood narrative proved able to accommodate.

The next example is different. It shows a myth created during the war for propaganda purposes that still maintains a hold on the diaspora imagination. I refer to the mutilated corpses witnessed by the population

of Lviv in the summer of 1941. Before the Germans took Lviv at the end of June 1941, the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, massacred thousands of political prisoners. When the Germans came, they secured the prisons, had most of the bodies carried out for public display, and left a few corpses in the prison for people to see. Eyewitness accounts of the time spoke of horrible mutilations and even a crucifixion of a priest on a prison wall. In *Between Hitler and Stalin*, one of these eyewitnesses (Serhiy Pushchyk), speaking more than half a century later, says: "Tongues cut out, noses and ears cut off, women's bodies with breasts cut off, hands and feet twisted and broken, obviously during interrogations, hands bound with barbed wire. All this was laid out." However, there is convincing evidence that these mutilations occurred only after the Germans took the prisons. The Soviets had been in a hurry to kill their prisoners before the Germans arrived, and they did much of the killing with hand grenades and machine guns, departing from their usual method of a pistol shot to the back of the head. They did not have time to waste on torture and mutilation. Moreover, initial reports of the scene in the prisons made no mention of mutilations or crucifixion. They are only mentioned by those who saw the subsequent public display. The whole spectacle was deliberately arranged to incite as much anger as possible, which the Germans were able to turn against local Jews. The evidence points to tampering with the corpses between the time the Germans examined the prisons and the time they encouraged the population to see what the Bolsheviks and the Jews had done. Bogdan Musial has suggested that a task force of Ukrainian nationalists was entrusted with the preparation of the corpses.²⁰ Perhaps the scholars who worked on the script were unaware that the mutilations were a hoax, or perhaps they did not accept the evidence that they were.

The last example of the rhetorical and visual intensification of victimhood concerns the famine of 1932–33. When Nowytski's film on the famine, *Harvest of Despair*, was released, it became the target of criticism by pro-Soviet leftists. They were able to show that the stills ostensibly of the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s were fakes, generally deriving from photos of the famine that ravaged Ukraine and Russia in 1921.²¹ One of the researchers for the film, Marco Carynnyk, had previously discovered that the photos published by the Hearst newspapers and Ewald Ammende were fraudulent and urged Nowytski not to use them.²² It is therefore surprising to find that *Between Hitler and Stalin* again makes use of fake photographs, mostly from Ammende's *Muss Russland Hungern*?²³ I can only assume that the filmmakers saw no problem

in using such photos, just as they saw no problem in showing Russian Orthodox monks to illustrate the persecution of the Ukrainian autocephalous church.

Victimhood Theft

Between Hitler and Stalin is careful to disaggregate well-known sites of the Jewish Holocaust and to point out that other peoples, including Ukrainians, perished there. Thus we learn that the victims at Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) were “Jews, Ukrainians, Gypsies, and others,” while at Auschwitz 1.4 million people were murdered, about 800,000 of them Jews and 600,000 others, including Poles and Ukrainians. However, the film is not so careful when it goes the other way, assimilating non-Ukrainians to the Ukrainian body count.

Referring to the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939–41, the narrator says: “During the less than two years of Western Ukraine’s Soviet occupation, more than 10,000 were imprisoned and executed and over half a million were deported to concentration camps in Siberia.” The viewer is left to understand that these were Ukrainian victims. For the most part, however, they were Poles. Even the number of Jews was greater than the number of Ukrainians. According to an NKVD document, there were 210,271 deportees from the western oblasts in the GULAG as of August 1941. Of these, 117,800 were Poles, 64,533 were Jews, and 13,448 were Ukrainians.²⁴

Referring to the NKVD massacres of the summer of 1941, the narrator says: “According to NKVD records, a total of 9,706 Ukrainian political prisoners were shot by the Soviet secret police in prisons in the first month of the war.” A little earlier, an interview with the historian John A. Armstrong tells a slightly different story: “The KGB, as we now call it, NKVD at the time, killed a lot of their prisoners, whenever they let them. And these prisoners included some Zionists, a great many Ukrainian nationalists, and a lot of people who were picked up just for being prominent and not cooperating with the Soviets.” The truth, however, is that though the majority of the victims were Ukrainian, there was also a sizable percentage of Poles, as well as Jews. Lists of the victims have been published, and it is easy to find the many Simkhas, Józefs, and Jaceks who met death with the Vasyls, Ivans, and Mykhailos.²⁵

Referring to the victims exhumed at Vinnytsia in 1943, the narrator speaks of “12,000 bodies of Ukrainians massacred by the NKVD.” We

know, however, that although the majority of the victims were Ukrainian, there were also Russians, Poles, and Jews in the graves.²⁶

The presentation of these victims as exclusively Ukrainian goes back to wartime propaganda, when Russians, Poles, and Jews were all *nationes non gratae*. Numerous articles in Ukrainian newspapers published under Nazi occupation set the precedent for the total Ukrainization of these dead.²⁷

The most bizarre moment of victimhood theft, however, occurs in the sequence that presents the sites of major mass murders, including the massacres of 1941 in Lviv, Vinnytsia, Demianiv Laz, and Bykivnia. Between Demianiv Laz and Bykivnia, an exhumation of a mass grave is shown with the subtitle “Katyn.” Nothing is mentioned to indicate that this is a place where primarily Poles were murdered. All the narrator says is: “Other Soviet atrocities committed during and after World War II continue to be unearthed to this day.” I was reasonably certain that there must have been some ethnic Ukrainians among the Polish officers executed in Katyn, but I had never realized there were very many of them. I checked the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* for the entry “Katyn” but did not find one. I went back to the wartime Ukrainian newspaper *Krakivs'ki visti* and checked to see what it had to say about Katyn. It reported on the exhumation but had nothing to say about any Ukrainian victims there.²⁸ The Soviet internal affairs document from early 1940 that recommended the Katyn murders said that the number of intended victims was 14,736, and “by nationality they are more than 97 percent Poles.”²⁹

Silence on Perpetration: The Other Side of Constructing Oneself as Victim

It is difficult for a narrative of victimization to accommodate moments of perpetration. This is evident to anyone who has followed the Polish debates over the murder of the Jewish community of Jedwabne. The Ukrainian victimization narrative is also resistant. In addition, one of the reasons that the Ukrainian diaspora cultivates a sense of victimization and attempts to win recognition of victimhood status is to counter-balance accusations that Ukrainians collaborated willingly in the mass murder of Jews during the Second World War. The sociologist Vic Satzewich has argued that one of the reasons for the promotion of the Ukrainian famine as a defining element of diaspora consciousness is that it is part of a complicated strategy “to combat the idea that Ukrainians are ‘genetically’ anti-Semitic and that their participation in war crimes was disproportionately high.”³⁰ *Between Hitler and Stalin* is rep-

representative of this diaspora discourse: it also emphasizes victimization at the expense of frank acknowledgment of perpetration.

A relatively minor example is the film's treatment of Symon Petliura. Images of him appear at several points in the film, and twice he is explicitly discussed, once in connection with the efforts to win Ukrainian independence in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution and again in connection with his assassination by Shalom Schwarzbard. In neither case does the film mention the many pogroms against the Jews committed by Petliura's troops.³¹ Schwarzbard claimed that he killed Petliura to avenge those pogroms, but the film identifies the assassin only as a Bolshevik agent.

In the matter of Ukrainian collaboration in the Holocaust, the film says the following: "The Germans organized police units from various ethnic groups and ordered them to assist the Nazis in rounding up Jews. Some former POWs, among them Ukrainians, served as concentration camp guards." This statement, which takes 15 seconds, precedes 2 minutes and 25 seconds devoted to Ukrainians who rescued Jews. The depiction of Ukrainian collaboration is minimalist. As Sorokowski notes, the film contains "no acknowledgment that anti-semitism existed among Ukrainians..."³² It does not disclose that some prominent Ukrainian intellectuals wrote anti-Semitic articles in the occupation press,³³ that there were close ties between some police units and Ukrainian nationalists,³⁴ and that some Ukrainians took part in murderous pogroms against the Jews in the summer of 1941.

The latter point requires amplification. The Germans exploited the NKVD massacres of the summer of 1941 to incite mob violence against Jews. Jews were forced to remove the bodies from prisons and to clean the streets and courtyards in the vicinity. In the course of these actions, many were beaten to death. Although *Between Hitler and Stalin* spends considerable time on the NKVD massacres, it makes no mention at all of the pogroms that inevitably accompanied them and that resulted in thousands of victims.³⁵ The film even shows Jews carrying corpses out of a prison but never identifies them as Jews nor suggests what fate might have awaited them.

The film also lionizes the nationalist partisans, the UPA, whom it depicts as fighting against the Germans and Soviets. Although the basic facts are well known, the filmmakers decided to pass over in silence the UPA's murder of tens of thousands of Polish civilians during its ethnic cleansing actions in Volhynia.³⁶ The UPA also killed tens of thousands of fellow Ukrainians, including political opponents, suspected traitors,

and collaborators with the reinstalled Soviet regime.³⁷ Nor is there any mention of cooperation between UPA units and the Germans.³⁸

The film also omits to note that there were Ukrainians implicated in the crimes of the Red Army and Soviet apparatus in Ukraine. It proudly claims that seven million Ukrainians fought against Hitler in the Red Army and even quotes Volodymyr Demchuk, a Division veteran of the Battle of Brody, to the effect that perhaps a fellow Ukrainian put a bullet in him in 1944. Yet when that same army is called a brutal invader in the film, it is identified as the army of Soviet Russia, and there is no suggestion here that Ukrainians also implemented the scorched-earth policy and even participated in the NKVD massacres.

Conclusions

In 1998 the Ukrainian American Professionals and Businesspersons Association of New York and New Jersey organized a conference on the future of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America. The president of the association, Bohdan Vitvitsky, opened the conference with a speech that addressed the mission of the diaspora. He cited the case of a small UPA unit of four that held out for more than a month under siege and then committed suicide in preference to surrender. "I think we owe it to that small contingent," he said, "—and to all of the millions upon millions of other Ukrainians, whether in the 1940s and 1950s, or in the 1910s and 1920s, who fought and died to preserve that which was handed down to us—to stay the course and keep our blood- and tear-soaked heritage and traditions alive both for our children and grandchildren."³⁹ *Between Hitler and Stalin* is part of this program.

I believe that it is time for a reexamination. A sense of collective victimization can be useful for the establishment and mobilization of a group identity, but it involves some serious drawbacks. There are many blood- and tear-soaked heritages and traditions being handed down in today's world. I do not see anywhere that their positive contributions outweigh their negative consequences. The Ukrainian victimization narrative is morally and intellectually flawed to the extent that it exaggerates its own historical victimization and obstructs a realistic examination of the past. The gap between what educated people know and what the Ukrainian diaspora believes is widening. This will not work to the benefit of the diaspora over the long term. More balance, more honesty, more thought—and less self-pity—would have made *Between Hitler and Stalin* a more interesting and more persuasive film.

Notes

- ¹ "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora," *Spaces of Identity* 5, no. 1 (April 2005). http://www.univie.ac.at/spacesofidentity/_Vol_5_1/HTML/Himka.html. See also John-Paul Himka, "A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America," *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006): 17–31.
- ² Vladyslav Hrynevych, "Mit viiny ta viina mitiv," *Krytyka* 9, no. 5 (91) (May 2005): 5.
- ³ "Report by Dr. Orest Subtelny in the case of The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration vs. Wasył Odynsky," 26 October 1998. This text was once posted on the web site of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association but is no longer there.
- ⁴ For a description, see <http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/pjpc.html>.
- ⁵ Volodymyr Kosyk, ed., *The Third Reich and Ukraine*, trans. Irene Ievins Rudnytsky (New York, 1993); idem, ed., *Ukraïna v Druhii svitovii viini u dokumentakh*, vol. 2, *Zbirnyk nimets'kykh arkhivnykh materialiv (1941–1942)* (Lviv, 1998).
- ⁶ Serbyn presented, for example, the 39th annual Shevchenko Lecture in Edmonton on 10 March 2005 on "Myth and Memory: The 'Great Fatherland War' and the Formation of a Soviet Ukrainian Identity." For a summary of his views, see Roman Serbyn, "The Myth of the 'Great Patriotic War,'" *Ukrainian Weekly*, 7 May 2000, online at <http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2000/190012.shtml>.
- ⁷ Yury Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath: A Symposium* (Edmonton, 1986).
- ⁸ This documentary was sponsored by the forerunner of the UCRDC, the Ukrainian Famine Research Committee.
- ⁹ "Director Nowytski Reflects on the Significance of New Documentary," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 November 2003; Larysa Briukhovets'ka, "Slavko Novyts'kyi: 'Pro doliu ukraïntsiv povynen znaty svit,'" <http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/pub/KTM/2002/5/slavko.html>.
- ¹⁰ Oksana Zakydalsky, "Documentary 'Between Hitler and Stalin' Offers Untold Story of Ukraine," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 November 2003. Oksana Zakydalsky was also on the UCRDC script committee.
- ¹¹ Atanas T. Kobryn, "Our Neighbors—The Ukrainians," *Sun Herald*, 20 October 2004 (<http://www.sun-herald.com/newsarchive2/102004/np9.htm>). A quick survey on the Internet and in the Ukrainian-diaspora press also revealed showings in Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis.
- ¹² See http://www.interkulturforum.org/film05/filmer_en.html; Oksana Zakydalsky, "'Between Hitler and Stalin' Documentary Featured at Film Festivals," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 6 March 2005.
- ¹³ Zakydalsky, "'Between Hitler and Stalin' Documentary Featured at Film Festivals." The number of entries was provided by Tara Dawn of New

- York Festivals in an e-mail letter to me (17 August 2005). The number of awards and finalists comes from the web site of the New York Festivals: <http://www.newyorkfestivals.com>.
- ¹⁴ Oksana Zakydalsky, "'Between Hitler and Stalin' to Air in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 April 2005. *Vikipediia* s.v. "Mizh Hitlerom i Stalinom—Ukraina v II Svitovii viini" <http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/> (last viewed on 26 April 2008).
 - ¹⁵ Andrew Sorokowski, "Telling the Untold Story," *TWG News*, winter 2004; available online at <http://www.thewashingtongroup.org/PDFs/TWG%20NEWS%20Winter%202004.pdf>.
 - ¹⁶ "Director Nowytski Reflects."
 - ¹⁷ Of a total of 8,939 Orthodox parishes and 6,481,805 Orthodox faithful in Ukraine in 1925, only 11 and 10 percent respectively belonged to the autocephalous church. Gregory L. Freeze, "Subversive Atheism: From Dechristianization to Religious Revival in the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s," paper presented at the Conference on "The Modern History of Eastern Orthodoxy: Transitions and Problems" (Harvard University, 26–27 March 2004).
 - ¹⁸ See Friedrich Heyer, *Kirchengeschichte der Ukraine im 20. Jahrhundert: Von der Epochenwende des ersten Weltkrieges bis zu den Anfängen in einem unabhängigen ukrainischen Staat* (Göttingen, 2003).
 - ¹⁹ Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich, 1997), pp. 120–21; Truman Anderson, "Germans, Ukrainians and Jews: Ethnic Politics in *Heeresgebiet Süd*, June–December 1941," *War in History* 7, no. 3 (July 2000): 340; L'vovianyn, "Zvil'ennia ukrains'kykh polonenykh," *Krakivs'ki visti*, 2 October 1941; Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2003), pp. 90, 92–93, 105–7.
 - ²⁰ Bogdan Musial, "Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen": *Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin, 2000), pp. 262–69; Hannes Heer, "Lemberg 1941: Die Instrumentalisierung der 'Krakivs'ki visti'-Verbrechen für den Judenmord," in *Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. Wolfram Wette and Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt, 2001), p. 170.
 - ²¹ Douglas Tottle, *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard* (Toronto, 1987), esp. pp. 78–79. Tottle's entire book is available as a pdf file on the Internet: <http://www.rationalrevolution.net/special/library/famine.htm>. Cf. Jeff Coplon, "In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: A 55-Year-Old Famine Feeds the Right," *Village Voice*, 12 January 1988.
 - ²² I recently queried Carynnyk about famine photos. He replied (22 July 2005): "I haven't published anything about photographic evidence of famine, but I did spend much time in the 1980s searching for and studying photographic evidence of the 1932–1933 famine and feel confident in saying that there are no known photographs of famine in the early 1930s. There are photographs from this time, of course, but they show collection of grain in the country-

side or bread queues in cities and don't provide evidence of famine. On the other hand, those photographs that do show famine scenes were all taken in the early 1920s, when the Soviets welcomed foreign aid. They come for the most part from the records of the American Red Cross at the Library of Congress and were published ten years before the second famine occurred. None of this is to deny that there was famine in 1932 and 1933, only that our evidence for it doesn't include photographs..."

- ²³ There is an English edition: *Human Life in Russia* (London, 1936). Photos used in *Between Hitler and Stalin* appear opposite pp. 96 and 161.
- ²⁴ Iurii Slyvka, ed., *Deportatsiï. Zakhidni zemli Ukraïny kintsia 30-kh—pochatku 50-kh rr. Dokumenty, materialy, spohady u tr'okh tomakh*, vol. 1, 1939–1945 rr. (Lviv, 1996), p. 154.
- ²⁵ Oleh Romaniv and Inna Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraïns'ka trahediia 1941* (Lviv and New York, 2002).
- ²⁶ *Amliches Material zum Massenmord von Winnica* (Berlin, 1944), p. 124; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton and Oxford, 2001), p. 67, n. 73; Mykhailo Seleshko, *Vynnytsia. Spomyny perekkladacha komisii doslidiv zlochyniv 'Krakivs'ki visti' v 1937–1938*, ed. Vasyli' Veryha (New York, 1991), p. 92.
- ²⁷ See the following articles, all published in *Krakivs'ki visti*: "Bol'shevyts'kyi pohrom u L'vovi," 6 July 1941; "Podiï na zakhidn'o-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh (Interviu z dots. d-rom H. I. Baierom)," 6 July 1941; Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Pered maïestatom nepovynnoi krovy," 8 July 1941; "Zhakhlyvyi pohrom ukraïntsi," 8 July 1941; "Kryvavi bol'shevyts'ki zvirstva u L'vovi," 9 July 1941; "Vistky zi L'vova," 9 July 1941; Gennadii Kotorovych [KTV], "Svit klonyt' holovu pered trahediïeu Ukraïny," 10 July 1941; Joseph Goebbels, "Zaslona opadaie," 10 July 1941 (originally published in *Völkischer Beobachter*, no. 188, as the lead article); "1500 ukraïntsi zamorduvaly bol'shevyky u Kremiansi," 6 August 1941; "Vistky z kraiu. Masakra viazniv u Chortkovi," 7 August 1941; "Masove vbyvstvo ukraïntsi bilia Vynnytsi," 23 June 1943; Mariian Kozak [mk], "Bez niiakykh oman," 27 June 1943; "30 masovykh hrobiv bilia Vynnytsi," 9 July 1943; "Dokumenty bol'shevyts'-koï zhado by nyschennia," 10 July 1943; "Vynnyts'ki mohyly," 11 July 1943; "Oburennia i vidraza u vsikh ukraïntsi," 11 July 1943; Ivan Lysiak [P.H.], "Nad vidkrytymy mohylamy u Vynnytsi," 13 July 1943; "Dal'shi podrobytsi pro masovi mohyly u Vynnytsi," 13 July 1943; D-r H. K[urz], "Na mistsi zlochyntsi," 30 July 1943; A. Kurdydyk, "Vynnytsia i chuzhozemna presa," 31 July 1943; Ievhen Onats'kyi, "Vynnyts'ki strakhittia v italiis'kii presi," 3 August 1943.
- ²⁸ *Krakivs'ki visti* first reported on Katyn in its issue of 16 April 1943; its last report was in the issue of 6 June 1943.
- ²⁹ Romaniv and Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraïns'ka trahediia*, p. 335.
- ³⁰ Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London and New York, 2002), p. 188. On the promotion of the famine in the diaspora, see Georgii Kasianov, "Razrytaia mogila: Golod 1932–1933 godov v ukraïnskoï istoriografii,

- politike i massovom soznanii,” *Ab Imperio*, 2004, no. 3: 1–31; also David Marples, “Stalin’s Emergent Crime: Popular and Academic Debates on the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (summer–winter 2004): 295–309.
- ³¹ Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).
- ³² Sorokowski, “Telling the Untold Story.”
- ³³ John-Paul Himka, “*Krakovski visti* and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, no. 1–2 (summer–winter 1996): 81–95. See also *Krakovski visti*’s reporting on the NKVD murders and Vinnytsia exhumation, where the perpetrators are falsely identified as mainly Jews.
- ³⁴ John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors,” in *The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency*, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York and Oxford, 1997), *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 13 (1997): 179.
- ³⁵ Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*, pp. 54–67; Andrzej Zbikowski, “Local Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Occupied Territories of Eastern Poland, June–July 1941,” in *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945*, eds. Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (Armonk, NY, and London, 1993), pp. 173–79.
- ³⁶ Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven and London, 2003), pp. 154–78.
- ³⁷ Ibid., p. 164; Jeffrey Burds, “AGENTURA: Soviet Informants’ Networks and the Ukrainian Rebel Underground in Galicia, 1944–1948,” *East European Politics and Societies* 11, no. 1 (winter 1997): 110.
- ³⁸ Sorokowski (“Telling the Untold Story”) makes a similar criticism, but with reference to the UPA’s parent organization, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists: “The heroism of its members is beyond question. But the OUN preached and practiced terrorism. And its relations with the Germans were more ambiguous than the film implies.” On UPA cooperation with the Germans, see Burds, “AGENTURA,” pp. 92–93; also Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, p. 287.
- ³⁹ Cited in Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, p. 222.

On the Relevance and Irrelevance of Nationalism in Contemporary Ukraine¹

Yaroslav Hrytsak

Theories Never Run Smoothly

Only a few decades ago, a historian of Ukraine resembled the protagonist of the Beatles' song "Nowhere Man," "sitting in his nowhere land" and "making all his nowhere plans for nobody." Ukraine was a "nowhere land," unknown to a larger audience.² In West and East alike, Ukrainian history had apparently been dissolved in Russian or, as the case may be, Soviet history. Ukraine was thus largely ignored in the large theoretical schemes and grand narratives of nationalism produced by Eastern and Western scholars in the course of the Cold War.³ The breakup of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the academic landscape. With the emergence of independent Ukraine, the Ukrainian case became not only legitimate but even fashionable in studies of nationalism.⁴ Still, the sharp increase of academic production in this field has not yielded a satisfactory explanation of the current Ukrainian situation. Post-communist developments in Ukraine present a set of paradoxes that seriously undermine the major theories prevailing in nationalism studies.

Consider, for instance, Ernest Gellner's theory. According to his famous definition, nationalism is both an ideology and a political movement devoted to the proposition that the nation and the state should be congruent.⁵ At first glance, independent Ukraine meets these criteria: it hosts a large Ukrainian ethnic majority that has increased significantly (from 72.7 percent in 1989 to 77.8 percent in 2001).⁶ The ethnic landscape changes, however, when the linguistic component is introduced. According to the indicator of language spoken in public, Ukraine's population is split between Ukrainian and Russian speakers.⁷ These ethnic and linguistic differences have regional dimensions and are correlated with political preferences: in the early 1990s, while the Ukrainian-speaking west preferred total independence, the Russian-speaking east stood for a closer alliance with Russia.⁸

The early record of Ukrainian independence showed that the idea of a Ukrainian nation-state as the embodiment of Ukrainian nationalism has serious intrinsic flaws. As the British historian Andrew Wilson put it, Ukrainian nationalism is a “minority faith.” It has been and remains the preoccupation of small and politically rather insignificant groups of intellectuals. Contrary to the claims of Ukrainian historiography, Ukrainian nationalists have rarely managed to mobilize significant numbers of inhabitants of any region—with the sole exception of western Ukraine, which was formerly Polish (1340–1772 and 1919–39) and Austrian (1772–1918).⁹

The deep cleavages within Ukrainian society after 1991 raised concerns about the future of the Ukrainian state. Suffice it to say that by the end of 1993 the CIA came up with the prognosis of a possible breakup of Ukraine along ethnic, political, and regional lines.¹⁰ Fortunately, this scenario, which was reminiscent of the fate of Yugoslavia, never came to pass. To be sure, Ukraine is not an efficient state, but at least it is relatively stable,¹¹ with a very low incidence of ethnic conflict, especially when compared with neighboring Russia, the Baltic states, and the Caucasus. From this one may conclude that perhaps there is something essentially wrong with the formula that connects a nation with a state as the essence of nationalism.

Rogers Brubaker sought to revise this formula in the 1990s, offering the reminder that nationalism “was not only a cause but also a consequence of the break-up of old empires and the creation of new nation-states.” According to him, nationalism should not be conceived as essentially or even primarily state-seeking. Brubaker distinguishes three types of non-state-seeking nationalism. The first is what he calls the “nationalizing” nationalism of newly independent states. Considering the core (i.e., state) nation weak in cultural, economic, and demographic terms, it embarks on a “remedial” or “compensatory” project to promote that nation’s specific interests. The main consequence is that minorities are suppressed by a centralized state. Directly challenging this variety of nationalism are two rival types. One is the nationalism of a national minority that has become a primary target of a “nationalizing” project. The other is the so-called transborder nationalism of a neighboring state claiming to defend the rights of a minority presumably composed of its ethnonational kin.

Brubaker’s scheme is based on Central and East European history. His two favorite cases are interwar Poland and post-communist Russia, both of which bear directly on Ukrainian history. In the first case, Ukraini-

ans were a primary target of the Polish “nationalizing” project, and in reaction they developed a strong “minority” nationalism. As for post-communist Russia, its “transborder” nationalism seeks to vindicate the rights of Russian minorities in newly independent neighboring states, such as Ukraine, which are implementing policies characteristic of “nationalizing” states.¹²

Dominique Arel has applied Brubaker’s theory to the Ukrainian case.¹³ It proved useful for explaining the dynamics of the 1994 presidential election, when Ukraine was clearly split between the Ukrainian-speaking west and the Russian-speaking east. The latter was deeply frustrated with the nationalizing policies of the new Ukrainian state and voted for Leonid Kuchma, who promised to make Russian an “official” language (thereby depriving Ukrainian of its special status) and to establish closer relations with Russia.¹⁴ This voting preference conformed to Brubaker’s pattern of a non-state nationalism reacting to being targeted by a “nationalizing” project. Once elected, however, Kuchma made a U-turn, reneging on his electoral promises and embarking on policies that defended Ukrainian “national interests” vis-à-vis Russia.

To be sure, this is nothing unusual: electoral promises are rarely kept, and the state apparatus has its own logic. Nevertheless, the relative ease with which most of the Russian-speaking population accepted the new rules of the game is rather surprising. In contrast to “nationalizing” interwar Poland, which gave rise to a strong Ukrainian nationalism, there is no strong Russian nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine. This might be considered a consequence of the Soviet effort to produce citizens with a Soviet, not a Russian identity. Even so, the absence of a politicized Russian national movement is remarkable in view of the powerful nationalism that emerged in other post-imperial contexts, e.g., after 1918 in various European countries. If one recalls, for example, the nationalism of the German-speaking population in Czechoslovakia or in Austria itself after the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire,¹⁵ then one might expect a potent Russian nationalism among the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. But the next (1998) parliamentary elections that followed after the 1994 crisis revealed a weakening of the previous correlation along ethnic/linguistic lines and political preference, notwithstanding the economic turmoil and persistent political crises in Ukraine after 1991.¹⁶ In the Ukrainian case, then, theories of nationalism do not work smoothly, even if state-seeking nationalism is replaced by the non-state-seeking types.

The Ukrainian data show Gellner's equation of nation with state to be questionable. The second part of his formula, which associates nationalism with modernity, also does not seem to work. Gellner considered nationalism a modern phenomenon that emerges during the transition from agricultural to industrial society. According to him, nationalism is closely intertwined with industrialization: as Benedict Anderson put it, for Gellner "industrialism was a piece of machinery that needed the oil of nationalism to function."¹⁷ On the one hand, Ukraine is a highly modernized society. Some forty to fifty years ago, it crossed the "threshold of modernization," with the urban population constituting a majority.¹⁸ On the other hand, eastern Ukraine, the most industrialized and heavily Russified part of the country, displays no strong nationalism, whether Ukrainian or Russian. Ukraine seems to fit the pattern that some theorists of nationalism have called "the curse of rurality," in which the highest level of national mobilization is attained not in industrial but in traditionally agricultural regions.¹⁹ In fact, the case of western Ukraine in the first half of the twentieth century proves the validity of this argument.

Attempts have been made to fit the Ukrainian case into theories of modernization. One of the most consistent interpretations of this kind was advanced by Bohdan Krawchenko. Working in the tradition of Karl Deutsch and Miroslav Hroch, he argued that the intrinsic weakness of Ukrainian nationalism resulted from the great under-representation of Ukrainians in strategic political, economic, and cultural sectors. The Soviet regime modernized Ukrainian society, calling new types of administrative and economic elites into existence. At the same time, it placed some impediments in their way, fearing the danger of Ukrainian nationalism. Thus the regime sowed the seeds of social conflict. Krawchenko therefore believed that political development in Ukraine would necessarily take the form of ethnic rivalry between Ukrainians and Russians.²⁰

Krawchenko's book was published in 1985, the year that marked the beginning of Soviet perestroika. From then until the collapse of communism, Ukraine witnessed the dramatic growth of Ukrainian nationalism, which displayed at least some anti-Russian attitudes. Post-Soviet developments in Ukraine did not eliminate social differences between Ukrainians and Russians. The share of Ukrainian speakers remains inversely correlated with urbanization: they constitute a majority in the countryside and in small towns (80 percent) and make up about half the population of middle-size towns, but they are a minority in the large cities.²¹

Throughout Ukraine, Russians are more socially advanced than Ukrainians: they are better educated and watch television more often, listen to the radio, and read newspapers.²² Ukrainians are greatly underrepresented in the country's administrative apparatus, making up only 24 percent of their work force. In this respect, they lag behind Jews (63 percent) and Russians (32 percent), ranking with Belarusians (25 percent) and Poles (23 percent).²³ Yet, contrary to what Krawchenko had predicted, the first post-Soviet decade was not characterized by ethnic conflict based on *social* differences between Ukrainians and Russians or, for that matter, between Ukrainians and other ethnic groups.

Finally, there has been an attempt to interpret Ukrainian nationalism in terms of postcolonial discourse. This was undertaken recently by the Ukrainian literary critic Mykola Riabchuk.²⁴ His book on the subject was praised, *inter alia*, for his authoritative contribution to a correct understanding of Ukrainian nationalism.²⁵ Drawing on elements of postcolonial studies, Riabchuk creates an image of "two Ukraines": "Ukrainian Ukraine," which roughly corresponds to a Ukrainian-speaking community with a clear-cut national identity, and "Creole Ukraine," a strange hybrid of imperial (Russian and Soviet) and Ukrainian national projects. This hybrid is perhaps best depicted on the cover of Riabchuk's book, which shows two lesbians sharing an affectionate kiss. The picture represents eternal love between two East Slavic sisters, Ukraine and Russia—an image coined and insistently popularized by Soviet propaganda. Creole Ukraine is the illegitimate postcolonial offspring of that incestuous union. Politically it is fairly loyal or neutral toward the idea of Ukrainian statehood, but in cultural terms it is strongly Russian. And it is precisely this "second" Ukraine that wields political power in the Ukrainian state. The "Creoles" are responsible for the prevailing ambivalence in Ukrainian politics. Thus Ukraine claims to adhere to democratic values but remains highly authoritarian; it seeks to enter the European Union but maintains close ties with Russia, and so on and so forth. "Ukrainian" Ukraine seemingly evinces a more democratic and Western orientation and opposes the culture of the Creoles. It does not, however, challenge their political dominance for fear of losing Ukrainian statehood.

Riabchuk's main arguments are based on a dichotomy between Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. And, again, this cannot be validated. As the tables appended to this article and the results of many other surveys show, distinctive patterns of political mobilization and preferences cannot be conceptualized in terms of a dichotomy between

Ukrainian and Russian speakers and their respective communities. The main distinctions are regional, not ethnic or linguistic.²⁶

All the interpretations discussed so far tend to present a rather alarmist scenario of Ukraine's future. At the very least, they treat the national question in Ukraine as a problem that may disastrously affect the country's stability or even bring about its collapse in a time of crisis. And yet this has not happened, although Ukraine experienced several deep economic and political crises in the 1990s. In the words of Simon Heemans, who was the British ambassador in Kyiv amid the deepest crises of 1994, the Ukrainian case proves the famous "bumblebee paradox": "an engineer of aerodynamics will tell you that a bumblebee cannot fly, but it does."²⁷

This brings us back to the starting point of the present article. If, according to some theories, Ukraine cannot and should not exist, yet in fact it can and does, then the "bumblebee" probably is not to blame. Evidently, there is something wrong with the laws of aerodynamics.

Post-Soviet Ukraine: Some Empirical Data

Most discussions of Ukrainian nationalism focus on narratives produced by its adherents and opponents, that is, people already engaged in nationalist discourse. This may be accepted as a legitimate approach to the intellectual history of any nationalism. One cannot, however, escape the feeling of being trapped in a revolving door when new narratives replace old ones with no shift in discursive practice. That discourse stubbornly maintains that nationalism and national identity constitute the central axis around which the whole modern world revolves. Or, as Ernest Gellner would put it, "[a modern] man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars... is... a disaster of a kind."²⁸

Students of nationalism are often blamed for presenting a restricted scholarly agenda by failing to locate national identity within a range of possible types of collective identity.²⁹ There is an alternative approach that offers a more nuanced picture of the role and relevance of nationalism in post-communist Ukraine. Such an approach—or, better, set of approaches—was developed by an interdisciplinary and international team to which I belonged. Between 1994 and 2004 the team compared the two largest cities of western and eastern Ukraine, namely Lviv and Donetsk. They represent opposite poles of political mobilization in Ukraine, and, as some authors suggest,³⁰ two extremes between which

the post-Soviet Ukrainian nation is taking shape. A project of this kind may therefore prove very useful for exploring the possible limits of national cohesion. To minimize the risk of loose generalization, we tried, as much as possible, to correlate our data with other projects carried out on a much larger, all-Ukrainian and/or East European scale.

The project focused on the hierarchy and dynamics of group identity in both cities. Questions about respondents' identities were formulated in two different ways. In both cases, the respondents were asked to choose an identity that best described them. In the first case, they were given a list of twenty-eight possible answers covering a variety of national, social, gender, age, professional, and religious identities (the range of identities was based on discussions in focus groups that took place before the actual opinion poll was carried out). Persons interviewed were asked to choose as many identities as they wished to describe how they thought about themselves. In the second case, the range of possible answers was limited to four identities. Besides Ukrainian, Russian and "other," we decided to introduce the category of Soviet identity, which was not based on ethnic or linguistic difference. Some earlier research suggests that Russians in large cities outside the Russian Federation tend to identify themselves in just such terms.³¹ It was therefore natural to expect that such an identity would also find adherents in these two cities.

In the case of Donetsk, this expectation was greatly exceeded by the survey results. Indeed, in 1994 Soviet identity proved most popular, certainly more so than Ukrainian or Russian identity. That was not the case in Lviv, where Ukrainian identity topped the list. A comparison of data on ethnicity and language in the two cities (see Table 1) shows that of all the identities established in the survey, only Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians make up a coherent group. Generally, it would appear that both the Russian and Russian-speaking groups are more fragmented than their Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking counterparts.

The data collected in the course of this project undermine the notion that issues of identity in Ukraine should be perceived only in terms of a Russian/Ukrainian dichotomy. Because of their linguistic and cultural proximity, both Russians and Ukrainians are undergoing an identity crisis; hence neither group is homogenous. Most analysts focus on the Ukrainian part of this story (i.e., on differences between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians), largely ignoring the fact that Russian nationalism is facing a serious dilemma of self-identification.³²

The crisis of Russian identity in Ukraine is deeper than that of Ukrainian identity. This becomes most apparent when one includes national identity within a broader range of social identities (see Table 2). If Ukrainian identity appeared among the “top ten” in both cities in 1994, Soviet identity did so only in Donetsk, while Russian identity ranked quite low in both cities. Another important observation is that national identity was considered crucial only in Lviv. In Donetsk, that role was assumed mainly by social identities (“workers” and “pensioners”). Regional and gender identities also rank high in both cities.

These findings do not imply that language and ethnicity play no role in determining political and national preferences. One of the greatest differences between Lviv and Donetsk lay in the attitude toward the assertion that “Those who live in Ukraine must learn to speak and use Ukrainian in public.” Most respondents in Lviv agreed with that statement, while most of those in Donetsk disagreed. As noted above, both cities exhibit the clear dominance of a particular language, Ukrainian in Lviv and Russian in Donetsk. This linguistic contrast is matched by striking differences in political attitudes. While a majority (74.4 percent in 1994) in Lviv regard the political changes that have taken place since Ukrainian independence positively or very positively, in Donetsk a majority (88.2 percent in 1994) consider them negative or highly negative. For 62 percent of respondents in Lviv, the most desirable political option was Ukrainian independence. In Donetsk, more than half (57 percent) dreamt of a “new union” with Russia. If communists were the group most disliked in Lviv, Ukrainian nationalists were so identified in Donetsk.

Numbers always offer broad prospects for speculation. To reduce this risk, we supplemented our sociological survey with focus-group discussions and in-depth interviews. This helped us express the differences that we found in the words of the respondents themselves. The discussions in focus groups suggested that the animosities and antagonisms between the two cities are milder than one might imagine on the basis of the survey data (or, for that matter, on the basis of mass-media reports). Some of those interviewed in Donetsk were prepared to accept the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian state as attributes of a “strong master” capable of taking control of Ukrainian affairs.

In any case, the language criterion does not seem to be the most important determinant of political difference. A regression analysis of the 1994 survey data on how people react to issues that are considered crucial to national identity—issues of language, history, territory, politi-

cal independence, and economics³³—shows that region of residence is the most important predictor of people's attitudes.³⁴ Subjective (self-) identity is next in importance. Least significant, though still important, is the mixed language/nationality indicator. Or, to put it figuratively, if you ask the man or woman in the street a political question, the reply you are most likely to get depends mainly on where the interview is held, in Lviv or Donetsk, then on self-identity (Ukrainian, Russian, or Soviet) and, lastly, on the language of the response (Ukrainian or Russian). This runs counter to the presumption of some analysts that the last indicator is most important in determining mass attitudes.

The Lviv-Donetsk Case in Broader Context

To what extent are Lviv and Donetsk representative of Ukraine as a whole? It must also be noted that the survey was taken in 1994, at the height of the political crisis—about the time when the CIA made its gloomy prediction about a possible breakup of Ukraine as a result of civil war. The question should therefore be reformulated as follows: to what extent are the 1994 results generally representative of the dynamics of Ukrainian nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine?

Fortunately, three other surveys designed along similar lines have been carried out over the last several years. Their data offer a fairly good basis for larger comparisons and tentative generalizations. The first of these surveys was contemporaneous with the 1994 Lviv-Donetsk project, including the same set of questions on identity, but carried out on a national scale. This first national survey (see Table 3) basically confirms the hypothesis that Lviv and Donetsk constitute two opposite poles of political mobilization in Ukraine. Another revealing point is that Ukrainian identity is among the most popular group identities, matched only by the social identity of “worker.” Considered regionally, Ukrainian identity is less popular than others in southern and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is the strongest national identity, even in the east, and it comes second to Russian identity only in the south.

The survey data also revealed that Russian identity in Ukraine was less intensive or embedded than Ukrainian identity. In approximate terms, every third Ukrainian considered his or her Ukrainian identity most important, while the same held true of Russian identity only for every fourth Russian. In a sense, the data both confirm and deny the validity of Andrew Wilson's point: Ukrainians really are a “minority” in

their own country, but theirs is the *largest* minority. No other national identity comes close to it on an all-Ukrainian scale.

Two other projects were carried out in Lviv and Donetsk in 1999 and 2004 to monitor any significant changes in ways people feel about themselves (see Table 2). In the case of Lviv there is a rather striking stability in the hierarchy of group identities, which is crowned by Ukrainian identity. It reaffirms the image of Lviv as a “nationalized” city where people think of their national identity as most important.³⁵ Donetsk proved different in two ways. First, the hierarchy of identities there is not so stable; they are in flux. Especially striking is the decline of “worker” and “Soviet” identities.³⁶ Although Ukrainian identity ranks relatively high in Donetsk, it would be hard to argue that the city has a “national” character, as Lviv does: only slightly less than half the population considers its national identity very important. The picture might change dramatically if Russians (as defined by passport identity) felt the same way, but they do not: Russians as defined by the “objective” nationality noted in their passports make up about 50 percent of the city’s population, and only half (24.3 percent) consider their national identity most important.

In the 1990s there was yet another project that provided a broader spatial and temporal framework for comparison. This was a large ongoing survey of group identities in post-Soviet Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. It revealed a general tendency toward the decline of national identity and an increase of social identity throughout this large region. This tendency, however, is less applicable to Lithuania and western Ukraine, where national identity is considered most important.³⁷ Naturally, Lviv, as the largest city in western Ukraine, falls into the latter category both geographically and mentally.

More broadly, the differences between Lviv and Donetsk would appear to represent a larger dividing line in the former Soviet Eastern Europe. One may take this a step further and speculate about the meaning of that line in historical terms. From one perspective, it reflects a difference between the so-called seventy- and fifty-year zones of Sovietization in Eastern Europe. Western Ukraine, like Lithuania, came under Soviet rule only during and after World War II, in contrast to other territories whose experience of Soviet rule began after World War I. But then one wonders whether twenty years make a crucial difference. Suffice it to say that western Belarus, which formally falls into the same category of the “fifty-year zone,” does not seem to exhibit a high level of national mobilization, as Lithuania and western Ukraine do.³⁸ A glance

at a European barometer of nationalism (Table 4) creates the impression that, on the eve of the collapse of communism, Eastern Europe was relatively less “nationalized” than other regions of the USSR. One is tempted to conclude that Lviv and Donetsk or, broadly speaking, the western borderlands and the rest of the former Soviet Union fall into two different zones of intensity of nationalism. But this hypothesis requires much more study in order to be properly tested.³⁹

What Does This Have To Do with History?

The author of this paper is a historian, not a social or political scientist. If the latter were the case, a correlation analysis could be applied to establish any relation between social and demographic data on the one hand and political attitudes and national orientations on the other. Still, such an analysis would not render a historical explanation invalid,⁴⁰ especially when it comes to explaining the factor of nationalism. It proved a strong mobilizing force in regions that had long been beyond the sphere of influence of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, as was the case with Lviv and western Ukraine.

A further search for an explanation may move us beyond recent history. Some time ago John Armstrong, a leading specialist in modern East European history, suggested a scheme of nation-building that highlights the role of major urban centers such as Lviv. Long before modern times, in his opinion, local ethnic and religious groups were indistinguishable by national identity. Most of them spoke mutually comprehensible patois and had a diffuse historical memory of their common descent, as well as a sharper sense of religious distinction along Western/Eastern Christian/non-Christian lines that did not necessarily coincide with future national cleavages. Only gradually, under the centrifugal influence of large cultural centers, such as Kyiv, Lviv, and Vilnius, did distinctive national identities emerge.⁴¹

This scheme helps us understand why there is no strong Russian nationalism in Donetsk. Founded in the late nineteenth century under imperial Russian rule, it remained a center of heavy industry.⁴² Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, it never distinguished itself in terms of cultural production. In sharp contrast, Lviv has been a major cultural center since early modern times. Through the agency of cultural artifacts and the alumni of local schools, Lviv’s cultural influences radiated throughout Eastern and Central Europe. In the nineteenth century, under the auspices of the Habsburg regime, three local ethnic groups, the

Poles, Jews, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians), managed to develop a dense network of cultural, academic, and educational institutions. Suffice it to say that if, by some chance, Lviv had been annexed by the Russian Empire in the 1880s, it would have been the third major center of print production after St. Petersburg and Warsaw, surpassing the much larger cities of Moscow, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Kyiv,⁴³ to say nothing of Yuzovka (the nineteenth-century name of Donetsk).

One may extend the scope of this comparison. Book printing is considered a major tool of national identity formation. Does it matter, then, that the Western and Eastern Christian realms differed so greatly in terms of book production? By the beginning of the seventeenth century, two hundred million volumes had been published in the Western Christian territories, while in the Eastern Christian realm of Eastern Europe no more than forty to sixty thousand appeared.⁴⁴ This situation changed significantly in the nineteenth century, especially with the explosion of book production in the Russian Empire under Alexander II (1855–81). Still, differences persisted: by 1880, Russian book production had not yet reached the level attained in Germany before 1848, and there were fewer bookshops in the Russian Empire than in the Netherlands.⁴⁵

How far back should one go to identify factors that might help explain different patterns of identification in Lviv and Donetsk? This question cannot be answered within the scope of a single paper. The examples adduced here attest, however, that *longue durée* factors should not be ignored. But history reveals itself in a variety of ways, both in “things” that can be translated into quantifiable data and then calculated, weighed, and compared, and in “minds,” or ways in which actors construe the social realities that they confront.⁴⁶

To illustrate the latter point, I would like to refer to an essay written by Rogers Brubaker and published in a collection devoted to the memory of Ernest Gellner. The essay focuses on several myths and misconceptions that have gained wide currency in studies of nationalism since the fall of communism. The data cited above basically corroborate at least two of the points raised by Brubaker. First of all, it makes sense to reject an analytical perspective that “sees nationalism as the central problem in Eastern Europe, and sees national identities as strong and salient.” In contrast to this, Brubaker asserts that national identities and national politics do not play a central role in the functioning of local political regimes. Secondly, he clearly reveals the problematic character of our understanding of nations as real enduring entities, “as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary

collective actors with common purposes.”⁴⁷ Nations, as well as other social categories, such as class, gender, empire, and so on, are in the first instance, or at least to a large extent, subjective constructs. It is important to recognize that the distinction between various ethnic groups, nations, centers, peripheries, and the like depends on who draws the dividing lines—a factor scarcely less important than any “objective” set of characteristics. In other words, the distinction between “them” and “us” often depends on who is making the distinction and how he or she happens to imagine it.

Academic research may contribute to such processes. Even though scholars may not take sides overtly, they can help draw distinctions by emphasizing the importance of nationalism. This is particularly true of historical writings. The national paradigm, with its insistence on the nation as the central unit of research, remained, in words of Ronald Suny, “a powerful frame for the practice of history-writing through the most of the twentieth century.”⁴⁸ This is still very true of Ukrainian historiography at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Ukrainian historians cannot escape the gravitational field of the national paradigm, partly because of their fear that the Ukrainian nation-building project may fail. Within the specific Ukrainian context, there are additional academic reasons to work within that paradigm. For several decades, Ukrainian historians were deprived of their right to produce a national history. Accordingly, most of them are now taking up the missed opportunity, shifting from the Soviet (i.e., vulgar Marxist) emphasis on class to the Ukrainian national paradigm. Finally, there is a smaller group of scholars who are trying to align their research agenda with recent developments in the Western academic world. But they do not deny the validity of the national paradigm: they are merely rewriting it according to recent theories of nationalism.⁴⁹

Paradoxically, in order to obtain an adequate understanding of Ukrainian identity-making, one has no choice but to move “beyond the national.” One has to see the other factors that were at work: geopolitical setting and social transformation, the interplay of various political actors who were not necessarily engaged in nation-building or, by the same token, were active in nation-destroying. This is an academic agenda that some historians of Ukraine in the West were trying to formulate in the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁰ Such efforts became more intense in the 1990s, when the emergence of postmodernist and postcolonial interpretations detracted from the prestige of the national paradigm. Along with these changes, other developments suggest that probably even going

“beyond the national” is not enough. One must also move beyond the interpretations of modernity that were dominant in the Western academic world from the 1950s to the 1980s. They were constructed according to an essentially WASP formula (White, Anglo-Saxon, and, later on, Protestant)⁵¹ that claims, among other things, the centrality of national identity.

Major works on national identity in Asia underscore the need to understand national identity as an essentially Western construction.⁵² This fits well with Liah Greenfeld’s assertion⁵³ that early modern England served as the first proto-model of a nation, later to be emulated by others. The idea of the English nation as a prototype has recently been corroborated by Adrian Hastings. In his vigorous attack on the modernist orthodoxy of theories of nationalism that claim universal applicability, he considers nations and nationalism to be characteristically Christian phenomena.⁵⁴ One may ask, however, whether this works for the whole Christian world or only for its Western realm. In Eastern Christian Europe, Polish nationalism seems to have played a role similar to that of English nationalism in Western Europe. If one were to draw the historical zones of the Polish *Drang nach Osten* on a map of contemporary Ukraine, they would coincide with the zone of intense Ukrainian identity and spread of the Ukrainian language.⁵⁵ The Polish factor also helps explain why, in the European part of the former Soviet Union, the axis of national identification is the most salient in Lithuania and western Ukraine.⁵⁶ These were the two most “Polish” borderlands within the Russian and Soviet empires.

One may risk a broader generalization and think of these differences in patterns of identification as one more proof of the theory of “multiple modernities.” This theory denies the existence of a normative concept of modernity. It holds instead that if modernity is to be considered a distinctive mode of constructing the boundaries of collectivities and collective identities, then there are various ways of “being modern,” depending on the cultural traditions and religions operative in particular cases.⁵⁷ In other words, Lviv and Donetsk may represent two different patterns of modern identification—one that emphasizes national identity and another that does not. Both may be considered valid.

Sometimes the lack of right answers may be due to the lack of right questions. It would appear that Ukrainian historians need to start asking new set of questions. In any case, they have been presented with a unique opportunity. Until recently, theories of nationalism did not take account of Ukrainian historical material; hence Ukrainian scholars are

now in a position to revise those theories and offer new interpretations. To meet this challenge, they should be prepared to take issue with dominant academic discourses. They would do well to heed the good advice offered by Ernest Renan in his famous 1882 lecture “What Is a Nation?”: “The best way of being right in the future is, in certain periods, to know how to resign oneself to being out of fashion.”⁵⁸

Table 1. National Identities in Lviv and Donetsk, 1989–1994

	Nationalities by 1989 census	1994 list of multiple identities*	1994 list of four identities (in 1994)
<i>Lviv</i>			
Ukrainian	79.1	73.1	78.5
Russian	16.1	13.6	8.3
Soviet	not applicable	7.4	4.9
Other	4.8	2.3	4.1
<i>Donetsk</i>			
Ukrainian	39.4	39.3	25.9
Russian	53.5	30.0	22.9
Soviet	not applicable	40.0	45.4
Other	7.1	2.1**	4.7

* Provided that respondents were allowed to choose more than one identity. The total in this column is not meant to equal 100.

** In both cities, this is the Jewish identity—no other identity scored on the list of multiple identities.

Table 2. Identities Most Preferred in Lviv and Donetsk. “Top Ten,” 1994–2004

	<i>Lviv, 1994</i>	<i>Lviv, 1999</i>	<i>Lviv, 2004</i>	<i>Donetsk, 1994</i>	<i>Donetsk, 1999</i>	<i>Donetsk, 2004</i>
1	Ukrainian (73.1)	Ukrainian (76.0)	Ukrainian (74.8)	Donetskite (55.6)	Donetskite (54.9)	Donetskite (69.5)
2	Lvivite (69.6)	Lvivite (74.3)	Lvivite (74.3)	Woman (48.8)	Ukrainian (43.6)	Woman (46.6)
3	Woman (46.0)	Woman (45.3)	Woman (43.2)	Soviet (40.0)	Woman (41.4)	Ukrainian (42.7)
4	Greek Catholic (38.4)	Greek Catholic (37.5)	Westerner (36.9)	Ukrainian (39.3)	Orthodox (35.1)	Man (34.4)
5	Westerner (38.1)	Westerner (37.3)	Greek Catholic (36.3)	Worker (36.6)	Man (30.8)	Retired (29.3)
6	Man (37.1)	Man (32.8)	Young (29.2)	Man (33.0)	Pensioner (30.6)	Young (28.2)
7	Worker (36.1)	Worker (31.0)	Man (28.2)	Orthodox (31.2)	Young (28.8)	Orthodox (27.2)
8	Democrat (32.2)	Orthodox (29.8)	Democrat (26.3)	Pensioner (30.2)	Intellectual (28.3)	Worker (25.2)
9	Orthodox (31.7)	Young (28.8)	Orthodox (24.9)	Russian (30.0)	Russian (24.3)	Elderly (24.2)
10	Young (27.9)	Democrat (26.8)	Intellectual (24.9)	Elderly (27.7)	Elderly (23.1)	Russian (21.1)

Table 3. Percentage Sharing "Most in Common" with a Specific Group (1994)

Group	REGIONS				Ukraine average	Cities		
	West	Center	East	South		Kyiv	Lviv	Donetsk
<i>Political</i>								
Communists	0.0	1.7	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.0	0.3	1.4
Ukr. nationalists	2.4	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.9	1.9	3.4	0.0
Reformers	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.9	0.8
<i>National</i>								
Ukrainians	42.1	40.3	18.5	12.2	28.5	39.7	33.4	11.6
Russians	3.5	2.7	4.3	20.2	6.1	3.6	3.6	11.4
Soviets	2.7	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.5	0.0	0.5	16.4
Jews	0.4	0.0	0.2	1.2	0.4	0.0	1.0	0.2
<i>Social</i>								
Business(wo)men	2.4	1.6	1.6	2.8	2.1	3.6	3.3	1.0
Rich	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.5	1.8	3.1	2.1
Housewives	5.0	5.6	7.2	11.3	7.0	7.0	6.5	3.3
Retired	9.2	13.8	21.1	14.6	15.6	13.8	10.9	19.0
Workers	19.9	16.3	35.5	21.9	25.3	20.7	27.5	27.9
<i>Religious</i>								
Greek Catholics	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	4.8	0.2
Orthodox	3.8	1.2	2.4	6.4	3.2	5.2	1.3	3.9
No. of respondents	261	258	438	181	1141	58	387	419

Source: Oksana Malanchuk, "Social Identification versus Regionalism in Contemporary Ukraine," paper presented at a conference on "Local Troubles, Global Problems: Social Problems and Transition around the Baltic Sea" (26–28 August, 1999, Helsinki, Finland, and Tallinn, Estonia)

Table 4. Eurobarometer of Nationalism, 1991

	US	Great Britain	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Bulgaria	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
<i>I am very patriotic</i>	88	72	74	69	70	70	75	75	60	62	63
<i>We have to fight for our country whether it is right or not</i>	55	58	31	16	28	30	47	53	42	36	39
<i>There are parts of other countries that belong to us</i>	–	20	43	25	39	68	60	52	22	24	46
<i>We must limit immigration to our country</i>	–	79	70	70	65	68	58	38	45	31	54

Sources: Times-Mirror: Center for the People and the Press (1991); Klaus von Beyme, "A New Moment in an Ideological Vacuum: Nationalism in Eastern Europe," in *Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies*, ed. Gregory Andrusz, Michael Harloe, and Ivan Szelenyi (Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1996)

Notes

- ¹ This article is largely based on a previous publication of mine, "Ukrainian Nationalism, 1991–2001: Myths and Misconceptions," in *CEU History Department Annual 2001–2002*, eds. Jaroslav Miller and István György Tóth (Budapest, 2002), pp. 233–50, and summarizes points made in my essay collection *Strasti za natsionalizmom. Istorychni eseï* (Kyiv, 2004).
- ² See the telling title of a long article by Jack F. Matlock, "The Nowhere Nation," *The New York Review of Books* 47, no. 3 (24 February 2000): 41–45. Although the author noted in a letter to the editors (*The New York Review of Books* 47, no. 6 [13 April 2000]) that he had submitted his article under another title and did not favor the change, the editors evidently considered their title more appropriate.
- ³ In a letter to the author of this paper (Prague, 31 December 1992), Miroslav Hroch confessed that the authorities of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences strongly "suggested" to him not to include the Ukrainian case in his book *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985; originally published in Prague in 1968) (the letter is preserved in the archive of the Institute of Historical Research, Lviv National University). For a general discussion, see Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (fall 1995): 658–73. For a very suggestive comparison with the Polish case, see Michael D. Kennedy, "Poland in the American Sociological Imagination," paper presented at the XII Polish Sociological Congress in Poznań, Poland, 18 September 2004.
- ⁴ For a critical overview, see Jarosław Hrycak, "Die Formierung der modernen ukrainischen Nation," *Österreichische Osthefte* 42, nos. 3–4 (2000): 189–210.
- ⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), p. 1.
- ⁶ "Pro kil'kist' ta sklad naselennia Ukraïny za pidsumkamy Vseukraïns'koho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku. Povidomlennia Derzhavnoho komitetu statystyky Ukraïny" (<http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/Perepis/PidsPer.html>, last visited on 6 February 2004).
- ⁷ For different patterns of correlation between language and ethnic identity in Ukraine, see Andrew Wilson, "Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-National Identities," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 1 (2002): 33–36.
- ⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability," in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY, 1998), pp. 30–31; Viktor Nebozhenko and Iryna Bekeshkina, "Politychnyi portret Ukraïny (skhid, pivden)," *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny* 9 (1994): 44–45.
- ⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, 1997).
- ¹⁰ D. Williams and R.J. Smith, "U.S. Intelligence Sees Economic Flight Leading to Breakup of Ukraine," *Washington Post*, 25 January 1994, p. A7.

- ¹¹ William Zimmerman, "Is Ukraine a Political Community?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 1 (1998): 43–55.
- ¹² Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996).
- ¹³ Dominique Arel, "The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, NY, 1995), pp. 157–88.
- ¹⁴ V. Khmel'ko, "Tretii god nezavisimosti: chto pokazali vtoroye prezidentskie vybory" [The Third Year of Independence: What the Second Presidential Elections Have Revealed], *Sovremennoe obshchestvo* 4 (1994): 17–18.
- ¹⁵ On this, among many other publications, see Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton, N. J., 2002).
- ¹⁶ Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 40, no. 1 (1999): 1–26.
- ¹⁷ See his recent interview in *Ab Imperio* 3 (2003): 64–65.
- ¹⁸ Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 495.
- ¹⁹ Tom Nairn, "The Curse of Rurality: Limits of Modernization Theory," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 107–34.
- ²⁰ Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London, 1985).
- ²¹ *Den'* 56 (9 April 1998), p. 1.
- ²² Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 266.
- ²³ Tetiana Rudnyts'ka, "Etnichni osoblyvosti profesiinoi 'tabeli pro rangy.' Prosvannia sluzhbovuiu drabynoiu i natsional'nist'" [Ethnic Peculiarities of the Professional "Table of Ranks": Promotion on the Service Ladder and Nationality], *Den'* 91 (19 May 1998), p. 4.
- ²⁴ Mykola Riabchuk, *Vid Malorosii do Ukraïny: paradoksy zapizniloho natsi-ietvorennia* (Kyiv, 2000).
- ²⁵ See the review by Vitalii Ponomariov in *Suchasnist'*, 1999, no. 1, as reproduced on the back cover of Mykola Riabchuk's book.
- ²⁶ See my review of this book: "Dylemy ukraïns'koho natsiotvorennia, abo shche raz pro stare vyno u novykh mikhakh" [Dilemmas of Ukrainian Nation-Building: Once More about Old Wine in New Skins], *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* 4 (2000): 11–33.
- ²⁷ "Where the wild things are," *Economist*, 7 May 1994.
- ²⁸ It should be acknowledged, however, that this statement was not normative but analytical (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 6).
- ²⁹ For the most recent criticism, see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter, "Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities—A Comparative View," *Daedalus* 127, no. 3 (summer 1998): 14 (issue titled *Early Modernities*).

- ³⁰ Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1 July 1994, p. 7; Louise Jackson, "Identity, Language, and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine," in *Contemporary Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, pp. 100–101; Roman Solchanyk, "The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability," *ibid.*, pp. 17–40. For a more dramatic comparison, one might focus on western Ukraine and the Crimea; still, for many reasons, the Crimea is a special case that cannot be discussed here.
- ³¹ *Russkie. Ėtno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki* (Moscow, 1992), p. 415.
- ³² Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), *passim*; Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," *Problems of Communism* 38, no. 4 (July–August 1989): 15–35.
- ³³ See Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno, Las Vegas, and London, 1991), pp. 8–15.
- ³⁴ I am greatly indebted to Dr. Oksana Malanchuk, who carried out the analysis and explained its results to me. The results of our findings were summarized in Yaroslav Hrytsak and Oksana Malanchuk, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk" (unpublished paper, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997).
- ³⁵ On Lviv as a "nationalizing city," see my article "Crossroads of East and West: Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv on the Threshold of Modernity," *Austrian History Yearbook* 34 (2003): 103–9.
- ³⁶ The decline of the "worker" identity may reflect social and demographic developments in Donetsk since 1994, including the closure of mines and industrial enterprises, as well as the striking disappearance of the once very vital local worker movement that strengthened this identity. See Kerstin Zimmer, *Machteliten im ukrainischen Donbass. Bedingungen und Konsequenzen der Transformation einer alten Industrieregion* (Berlin, 2006), pp. 119–34.
- ³⁷ Arthur H. Miller, Thomas F. Klobucar, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Social Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, no. 3 (1998): 248–86.
- ³⁸ See Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1979): 76–98; Steven L. Guthier, "The Belorussians: National Identification and Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 1977): 270–83.
- ³⁹ For a recent discussion, see *Nationalism in Europa. West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich*, eds. Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard (N.p. [Göttingen], 2001).
- ⁴⁰ See, e.g., a book based largely on the Lviv–Donetsk project: Martin Åberg and Mikael Sandberg, *Social Capital and Democratisation: Roots of Trust in Post-Communist Poland and Ukraine* (Ashgate, 2003).
- ⁴¹ John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 129–30.

- ⁴² Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, vol. 1, *Life and Work in Russia's Donbass, 1869–1924* (Princeton, NJ, 1989).
- ⁴³ Korneli Heck, “Bibliografia Polska z r. 1881 w porównaniu z czeską, węgierską i rosyjską,” *Przewodnik naukowy i literacki. Dodatek miesięczny do “Gazety Lwowskiej”* 10 (1882): 1096–97.
- ⁴⁴ Markus Osterrieder, “Von der Sakralgemeinschaft zur modernen Nation. Die Entstehung eines Nationalbewußtseins unter Russen, Ukrainern, Weißruthenen im Lichte der Thesen Benedict Andersons,” in *Formen des nationalen Bewußtseins im Lichte zeitgenössischer Nationalismustheorien*, ed. Eva Schmidt-Hartmann (Munich, 1994), p. 207. In his discussion of the Eastern Christian Slavic region, Osterrieder mistakenly refers to “twenty copies” rather than “twenty books.” If the total number of book titles printed in that region was no more than three or four thousand, then the maximum number of copies could not have exceeded forty to sixty thousand.
- ⁴⁵ Andreas Renner, *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855–1875* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2000), pp. 119–20.
- ⁴⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago, 1992), p. 127.
- ⁴⁷ Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” in *The State of the Nation*, ed. John A. Hall, pp. 281–85; 292–98. Brubaker refers specifically to the late Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian cases, stating that “[t]he very categories ‘Russian’ and ‘Ukrainian,’ as designators of putatively distinct ethnocultural nationalities, are deeply problematic in the Ukrainian context” (ibid., p. 297).
- ⁴⁸ See Ronald G. Suny, “History and the Making of Nations,” in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28 (1998): 585.
- ⁴⁹ Since the publication of Heorhii Kasianov’s book on modern theories of nationalism (*Teorii natsii ta natsionalizmu* [Kyiv, 1999]) and a reader on nationalism, nationalism studies in Ukraine have become one of the few branches of historiography that display the broadest range of research and are both empirically and theoretically oriented. On the current state of Ukrainian historiography, see Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukrainian Historiography, 1991–2001. The Decade of Transformation,” *Österreichische Osthefte* 44, nos. 1–2 (2003): 107–26.
- ⁵⁰ Oleksander Ohloblyn, “Problemy skhemy istorii Ukraïny 19–20 stolittia (do 1917 roku)” [Problems of the Scheme of Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Ukrainian History (to 1917)], *Ukraïns’kyi istoryk*, 1971, nos. 1–2 (29–30): 5; *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. I.L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1981).
- ⁵¹ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Die Gegenwart als Geschichte* (Munich, 1995), p. 24.
- ⁵² Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ, 1993); Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago and London, 1995).

- ⁵³ In her monograph *Nationalism: Five Ways to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).
- ⁵⁴ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1997). There are two recent examples of the “return of religion” leading to a serious reconsideration of nineteenth-century Ukrainian nation-building: Ricarda Vulpius, *Nationalisierung der Religion. Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische Nationsbildung 1860–1920* (Wiesbaden, 2005); Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001).
- ⁵⁵ Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West* (Edmonton, 1996); Roman Szul, “Perspektywy regionalizmu galicyjskiego w Polsce na tle tendencji międzynarodowych,” in *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 2, *Spółeczeństwo i gospodarka*, ed. Jerzy Chłopiecki and Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska (Rzeszów, 1995), p. 80.
- ⁵⁶ See n. 37 above.
- ⁵⁷ See: S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (winter 2000): 1–29 (issue titled *Multiple Modernities*).
- ⁵⁸ Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in *Becoming National: A Reader*, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York and Oxford, 1996), p. 54.

The Making of Modern Ukraine

The Western Dimension

Roman Szporluk

More than sixty years ago, in February 1948, the British historian Lewis Namier (1888–1960) delivered a lecture commemorating the centennial of the European revolution of 1848.¹ His lecture has been published many times since then as “1848: Seed-plot of History” in, among other places, a volume titled *Vanished Supremacies*.²

Namier’s choice of 1848 as a point of departure was well founded. There is a tired cliché that 1848 was a turning point in history when history failed to turn, but that is wrong. The year 1848 saw the first European revolutions: France was at the center, and there were also revolutions in Palermo, Naples, Vienna, Berlin, Buda, and Poznań, to name a few. It was also the year of nationalist revolutions in Central Europe and the year of the publication of *The Communist Manifesto*, which predicted that an international proletarian revolution would abolish capitalism, the state, nations, and nationalism.

In 1848, as Kathleen Burk writes in her study of A.J.P. Taylor, the Austrian, or Habsburg, Empire “was a German as well as a Balkan Power, the keystone of the Concert of Europe; there was the German nation, but no Germany; there were Italian states, some of which belonged to the Austrian Empire, and two Italian kingdoms, but no Italy; France was still perceived by all the others as the most powerful, or at least the most threatening, of the continental Powers; and Russia was predominantly a European, not an Asiatic, Power...”³

A central theme of Namier’s lecture was that “every idea put forward by the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848 was realized at some juncture, in one form or another” during the next century. Namier concluded: “1848 remains a seed-plot of history. It crystallized ideas and projected the pattern of things to come; it determined the course of the following century. It planned, and its schemes have been realized: but—*non vi si pensa quanto sangue costa*.”

According to Namier, the solution of the German Question—that is, “What is Germany?”—was and would remain the central national problem in Central and Eastern Europe for the next hundred years: beginning in 1848 and continuing through World War I and World War II, the history of Germany defined the entire region’s history. It is clear from Namier’s formulation that other cases he named and reviewed (Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Ukrainian) were directly related to the German story. As one of the nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy that put forward their programs in 1848, Ruthenians or Ukrainians were also a part of Namier’s scheme. West Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovina) was the easternmost extension of the European revolutions of 1848–49, and for modern Ukrainian history 1848 was a turning point.

I choose Namier’s “German-centered” schema as a point of departure for the Ukrainian nation-building story because his approach helps to see better the larger stage on which Ukrainian history was made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Namier draws the attention of the historian of Ukraine to the fact that at the very core of the Habsburg monarchy there grew and intensified a conflict—a “dialectical contradiction,” to use a popular Marxist phrase—between the dynasty and its principles, on the one hand, and *German* nationalism, the German national question, on the other. The tension and conflict between “Empire” and “Germany,” as I shall show, influenced how the imperial government treated other nationalities, Ukrainians included. (Something similar can be said about the Ukrainians under the Russian Empire, which was also being challenged from within by its dominant nationality as it was dealing with its non-Russian nationalities.)

I will outline Namier’s ideas about Germany and then expand on them to discuss the emergence or the making of Ukraine as part of an international, historical process, one involving the German Question as well as the programs of other Central and East European nationalities. Ukrainians should be seen as actors in a number of international plots—and not only as an object of actions by others. My main focus will be on that historical juncture or conjuncture when traditional empires and other premodern polities (the system of *Agraria*, to use Ernest Gellner’s terminology) began to face the challenges of nationalism, and the process of modern nation-building began.⁴ Bringing the German story into a Ukrainian narrative will allow us to correct the common view that presents Ukrainian nation formation as a delayed or retarded process, while tacitly assuming that the Germans were among the advanced cases.

A closer look at the German story as presented by Namier makes one wonder whether the Germans qualify for that distinction.

Before proceeding with my story, I will make a brief digression in order to clarify my use of certain concepts, such as nation, nationalism, and nation-building, by drawing on the ideas of those scholars that are especially helpful for my argument.

John A. Armstrong defines nationalism as

the contention that the organizing principle of government should be the unification of all members of a nation in a single state. Although not unknown in earlier centuries, as a dominant credo and organizing principle this principle did not become salient until the generation of 1775–1815. These dates therefore constitute, in my opinion, the single decisive watershed in the historical development of ethnicity and nationalism.⁵

Armstrong's work helps me to set my story in time. The time frame he marks (1775–1815) corresponds to the end of old Poland (the partitions) and the birth of a new Polish nationalism. In order to understand Namier's story about what happened in 1848, I will need to go back half a century in time to this period when the stage was set for the developments that entered the public arena in 1848. This background will be especially important for a proper understanding of the Ukrainian case: the late eighteenth century saw two events that defined the course of Ukrainian history for the next one hundred fifty years. The first was the abolition of the Hetmanate's autonomy in the Russian Empire, which occurred at virtually the same time as the beginning of a Ukrainian cultural and literary revival there. The second was the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795. In the first partition (1772) Austria took Galicia, of which the western part was Polish-speaking and the eastern part Ukrainian-speaking. Prussia took Poland's Pomerania, and Russia took what is now Belarus. In the 1793 and 1795 partitions Russia took Right-Bank Ukraine, Lithuania, and the rest of Belarus, while Prussia and Austria divided between themselves the remaining core Polish territory (Warsaw went to Prussia; Kraków, to Austria). The former Polish territories that now found themselves in Russia formed the stage on which the Ukrainian movement would coexist and compete with both Polish and Russian power.

Among many other definitions of nationalism, a point made by Adrian Hastings will also be important for my arguments. In clarifying the relation between nation and state, and answering the question "When

does a nation exist?" Hastings proposed this definition: "Even when it is the state which has created the nation, it is not a nation until it senses its primacy over and against the state."⁶ Hastings's point is very important for a better understanding of the Russian nation-building case, and I shall return to his idea in the closing part of this essay.

Finally, I feel that it is especially helpful—in view of the extraordinary complexity in the process of modern Ukraine's formation (and no less with regard to the Czech, German, Russian, or Polish nations)—to cite Eugen Weber, who in his work *Peasants into Frenchmen* stresses that the nation is not "a given reality" but "a work in progress."⁷ The story of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries substantiates Weber's idea.

The Seed-plot in Brief

Germany played the most important role in Namier's scheme. He wrote that during the revolutions of 1848 four different models of Germany had been proposed and each of them was realized, at one time or another, between 1848 and 1945. After the Habsburg defeat of 1848–49 came: (1) the Greater Austria of 1850; (2) in 1866, after the Prussian-Austrian war, a Greater Prussia emerged (Germany being partitioned in 1866); this was followed by (3) the Lesser Germany (Klein-Deutschland) of 1870–71; and, finally, (4) Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany created in 1938–39—a Germany that included Austrian and Czech provinces and that was one of the radical ideas of the 1848 revolution (and Karl Marx's preferred German state).

According to Namier, several other nationalities of the Habsburg Empire realized their ideas in the century following 1848. The Hungarians' 1848 program was achieved in the Compromise of 1867, which transformed the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary. That arrangement constituted a defeat for the "non-historic" peoples for whom the Greater Austria of 1850 had promised a better deal. The Italians also had some of their claims satisfied during 1866–67: Vienna was forced to give up most of its Italian possessions to the new Kingdom of Italy. The Poles also gained: Galicia became autonomous in 1868, and the Polish nobility there became its real master, though under a constitutional regime. Thus, the removal of Austria from Germany—which David Blackbourn has rightly called "the partition of Germany"⁸—had immediate negative consequences for the Galician Ruthenians, who were the losers in Vienna's deal with the Poles. After 1866–67, Vienna

granted Galicia certain rights, especially in the educational sphere, that no other land of the monarchy enjoyed. It was after (and largely because of) what happened in 1867 that many Ruthenians, feeling betrayed by the monarch in Vienna, adopted a pro-Russian orientation.

"In 1918–19 came the time for the subject races of the German and Magyar spheres," Namier continues. The Czechs and Slovenes won their independence from the Germans; and the departure of the Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs reduced the Greater Hungary of 1867. I add to Namier's account the facts that Hungary's Ukrainians became citizens of Czechoslovakia, and twenty years later, after the Sudetenland crisis in 1938, Prague granted autonomy to Czechoslovakia's "Ruthenian" province, which at the same time began to call itself "Carpatho-Ukraine." The events of 1938 and 1939 (when Hungary annexed that area with Hitler's approval) illustrate the connection between the unfolding of the Namierian German agenda and Ukrainian history.

The post-World War I period was also "the time" for the Poles: they and the Italians fully realized the goals they had set while living under the Habsburgs. In 1918–21 the Poles were able to assert their power by taking physical control of Ruthenian territory in Galicia and claiming all of Galicia as Polish. The Italians were able to do the same with respect to the Yugoslavs—meaning Slovenes and Croats. (Namier says Yugoslavs: in 1948 Yugoslavia's survival seemed secure.)

The last act of the 1848 drama for Namier took place in 1939–45, when "the time came" for the Yugoslavs and Ruthenians. The Ruthenians completed their 1848 agenda with respect to the Poles, and the Yugoslavs completed their agenda in the Italian sphere. In consequence of World War II the Ruthenians finally disentangled themselves from the Polish bond—a legacy of 1848 and 1918–19. Namier did not elaborate on the meaning of the term "came the time" as it applied to Ruthenians. Although Polish rule over Ukrainians ended by 1945, national independence did not follow (thus, the 1848 agenda was *not* realized in 1945).

Namier's story ends in 1948, but I will continue it to 1991. I will also expand on his schema and provide a background to 1848. For a historian of Ukraine, Namier's lecture serves as a very clear point of departure for a review of Ukraine's European or Western connection. Germans were involved in Ukrainian affairs after 1914 and again after 1939; and in 1991, only one year after German unification—the concluding act of the German story from my point of view today—Ukraine finally gained its independence.

German Nationalism and the Habsburg Empire

In 1797, the German poets Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller asked the famous question: “Germany? But where is it? I do not know where to find such a country.” Without answering it, they proceeded to explain what the source of their difficulty was: “Where the cultural [Germany] begins, the political ends.”⁹

Fifty years later, in 1848, Germans remained deeply divided about the question of what Germany was. In 1848, the German nationalists’ program was to create a unified Germany as a nation-state that would embrace all German kingdoms and principalities. The “Greater Austria” that emerged in 1850 dominated politics in all German lands, but it also included such countries as Hungary, which German nationalists were not ready to accept. Namier’s listing of different models of Germany is a useful reminder that the German nation, which some old-style studies classify as a “historic” and thus well-defined nation, was itself undergoing complex processes of making, remaking, and unmaking during its transition to the age of nationalism. The new idea of a single, united German nation-state was revolutionary: it called for the destruction of the historic states of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and dozens of others, and it challenged the integrity of the hereditary dominions of the house of Habsburg that lay within the Holy Roman Empire.

We can understand why the partitions profoundly influenced Polish, Ukrainian, and German history. They transformed Prussia and Austria and thus helped to “de-Germanize” these two states by adding substantial Polish populations and territories. The Polish question became a problem in Prussia’s internal politics, and the inclusion of Polish territories into the Habsburg monarchy moved Vienna’s center of attention east into the Slavic world. Thus, post-1815 Austria was less German than it was before 1772. This shift influenced the balance between Germans and Slavs in favor of the latter.¹⁰

When Austria took Polish territories (Galicia), it had to deal with a Polish nation that was more advanced in nation-building than the Germans. Compared with Polish developments, German nationalism was still largely an intellectual phenomenon, not only in Napoleon’s time, but even after 1815 and until 1848. Polish nationalism had inspired wars and uprisings in 1794, 1807, 1809, 1812, and 1830. Even when there was no Poland on the map, not a single Polish poet—let alone two!—would have answered the question “Where is Poland?” the way Goethe and Schiller answered the question about Germany. According

to Armstrong's definition, therefore, the Poles were ahead of the Germans (as well as the Russians) in nation-building at this time—a fact that would also greatly influence Ukrainian nation formation, since the Poles constituted a major part of Ukraine's "Western dimension."

Some Polish historians have claimed that Vienna practiced a "Germanization" of Galicia after 1772, but that is not true. At the time the Habsburg Empire was engaged in building an imperial Austrian nation. The addition of Galicia to the empire fostered the de-Germanization of Austria because it further diverted Vienna's attention from the German national scene into the Slavic world. Any Germanization that the Habsburgs practiced was motivated by bureaucratic needs and was not part of German nation-building. Vienna did not tell the Ukrainians (or Czechs, Slovenes, and others) that they were really German. And, as I noted earlier, German nationalism came into conflict with the Habsburg Monarchy: by 1848 German revolutionaries wanted to dissolve it.

Not only Germans were divided and confused about what their country was or should be. Other nationalities had problems deciding how to define their countries. The Czech historian Jiří Kořalka has shown that Vienna wanted to create a multi-ethnic "imperial people," in opposition to German and other ethnic nationalities. Kořalka writes that the Czechs faced no less than five concepts of nation by 1848: Austrian, Pan-German, Slavic, Bohemian, and Czech. He notes the efforts of the Josephinian system "to create an Austrian state nation, whose main support was to come from the enlightened *homo austriacus* (Austrian man) in the Austrian state administration and school system, in the army and in the church, guided by the state."¹¹ Kořalka distinguishes two forms of "Austrianism" (*Rakušanství*): supra-ethnic and multinational, or multi-ethnic. Until approximately 1860, Vienna was still trying to create an Austrian imperial national identity, which was just as anti-Czech or anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish as it was anti-German.¹²

The Ruthenians (or West Ukrainians) in Galicia were also confused about their identity in 1848. Ruthenians had had a long relationship with the Poles. Galicia was the first Ukrainian-inhabited area to find itself under Polish kings and was under their rule uninterruptedly from the middle of the fourteenth century until 1772. Following the 1772 partition, Germany (as "Austria") entered into the Polish-Ukrainian connection in Galicia as a third force during a period of intellectual and political revolution. Galicia was drawn into the world of German problems, and the imperial government began to participate in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

The empire's policy aimed at creating a *homo austriacus* explains why even though Austria's entry into Ukrainian lands made possible the rise of a political community, Ruthenian peasants and Greek Catholics (Uniates) there did not become "Ukrainians." Their first political consciousness was imperial—that is, what Thomas Masaryk, writing in the late nineteenth century, ironically called "Viennism." (Masaryk used this term to describe the continuing loyalty of the Czechs to the monarchy.) In general, even after subjects of the monarchy had adopted a modern national self-identification (as Czechs, Ukrainians, Slovenes, and so forth), as a rule they retained their loyalty to the emperor until the end of the monarchy.

At the time of the partitions, Austria failed to carry out its centralizing Enlightenment-influenced reforms in Hungary and Bohemia, but it was more successful in Galicia. In the long run it was the Poles who benefited most from the reforms. Ruthenian Galicia became integrated with the other ex-Polish regions now under Vienna and acquired an even more Polish character. Despite its loss of independence after the partitions, Poland remained a key presence and powerful factor in Ukraine's history, and its relative strength increased during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Polish nobility continued to dominate the Ukrainian peasantry by controlling the relations of production and information (culture and education). Until the revolution of 1848 the Poles had generally believed, as did most politically aware Ruthenians, that Ruthenians were Polish. The dialect spoken by ethnically Polish peasants in Western Galicia was different from that spoken by the peasants of Eastern Galicia, but nationhood was considered a matter of politics, not ethnography. Choosing to be Polish meant choosing the Polish heritage as one's own, regardless of one's ethnic or religious background. In this connection Jerzy Jedlicki speaks about "the metaphoric understanding of heritage": "it... encompassed the adopted members of the national community. Thus the Polish peasant, the Polonized Jew, Ruthenian or German became the heir of the Polish nobility and of the entire history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth."¹³

The Polish nation-building project was helped by the fact that for a long time the Ruthenians maintained their loyalty to the monarchy and had a theological outlook. When some of the more educated Ruthenians abandoned their faith in the imperial state and adopted modern ideas, they did so by becoming Polish. Becoming Polish at that time and place was the only way for educated Ruthenians to be European in the new post-1789 sense. Before 1848, the Greek Catholic Church played an

enormous role in preserving the distinct identity of Ruthenians, but it did not offer any modern or secular political alternative to Polonism. That alternative to Polonism would eventually be inspired by currents coming to Galicia from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire and to some extent from Prague. The publication in 1837 in Buda of *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, a slim collection of folk songs and poems written in the vernacular, was a landmark in the history of Galician Ruthenians, but as its contents reveal, its authors had been inspired by their East Ukrainian brothers. The young men who put it together were consciously looking to East Ukraine and at the same time were responding to the Slavic revival among the Czechs and Southern Slavs within the Habsburg monarchy. But this was a slow process—we can better understand this slowness when we remember how much trouble the more highly educated Germans had with choosing their own national identity. Not only in 1848, but for many years after, most Ruthenians were not thinking in terms of a Ukrainian nation.

For Austria's Ukrainians, relations with the Poles were the key issue in 1848. Their national revolution was a declaration of secession from the Polish nation and was not directed against the monarchy; it was a break with "Polonism," not with "Viennism," let alone with any of the currents of German nationalism. The Poles, in contrast, were in conflict with the monarchy because of their goal of independence or at least autonomy for Galicia, which they considered a Polish land, and with the German nationalists who wanted the Prussian-held ex-Polish provinces to belong to a future united Germany. Since the monarchy for its own reasons also opposed German nationalism, it became possible for it to make a deal with the Poles after Prussia's defeat of Austria in the war of 1866—a deal in which the Ruthenians proved to be the losers.

During the revolutionary year of 1848, even though they were still torn between different national alternatives, some Ruthenians appeared for the first time on the stage of modern European history as Ukrainians. Vasyl Podolynsky, whose national self-identification before becoming a Ukrainian had been Polish, in a short Polish-language book printed in 1848—titled *Słowo przestrogi* (A Word of Warning)—identified and examined four national orientations current among his Ruthenian compatriots in 1848: Ruthenian/Austrian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian.¹⁴ Thus, although Namier was right to speak of the events of 1939–45 as marking the realization of the Ruthenian program of 1848, it would have been more historically accurate to say that 1939 marked the real-

ization of *one* of the four national orientations the Ruthenians had professed in 1848.

The Ukrainian option was not the only one that the Ruthenians entertained in 1848. Some Ruthenians remained loyal imperial subjects; others thought that their future was with Poland, and still others looked to Moscow and St. Petersburg for their national identity. Indeed, there would be periods between 1848 and 1918 when the pro-Russian option prevailed, and there were always times when educated Ruthenians, without making any declarations about what they were doing, were becoming integrated and assimilated into the Polish nation.

Nevertheless, one of the main goals of a small group of Ruthenians in 1848 was to become accepted as a distinct Slavic nationality. In 1848, these Ruthenians declared that they were not Polish or Russian and that their nationality was not confined to the Austrian Empire. While proclaiming its full loyalty to the emperor, the Ruthenian Main Council proclaimed national unity with its conationals who lived in the southern part of the Russian Empire. In their vision, their homeland extended as far east as the Don River. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak has noted that the Main Council declared the Ruthenians of Galicia to be part of a larger nation numbering fifteen million, one that was “distinct from both the Russians and the Poles.”¹⁵ However, as Yaroslav Hrytsak points out, an earlier draft by the Main Council cited a different number: “We belong to the Galician-Ruthenian people, which numbers two and half million.” The assertion could mean only that the Ruthenians were a nation also different from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. Only upon the insistent demands of Yulian Lavrivsky, a member of the council who was not a clergyman, was the declaration revised to state that the Galician Ruthenians were part of a fifteen-million-strong Little Russian (Ukrainian) nation.¹⁶

The fact that Lavrivsky was not in the clergy was very important: one needed a secular view of politics to be able to declare that the Greek Catholics of Galicia belonged together with a nation that was overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox. However, when one remembers how the Czechs were torn between different political loyalties and national identities—not to mention the conflicting German answers to the question “What is Germany?”—the confused state of the Ruthenians is understandable. In the end, which came only in the early twentieth century, the Ruthenians opted for the Ukrainian answer. They did not replicate the nation-building model of the Slovenes or the Croats, who rejected the idea of a common South Slav nation that would also

embrace the Orthodox Serbs. The idea of a Ukraine existing across historic political, cultural, and religious boundaries (the unity of Ruthenians in Austria with Ukrainians in Russia) was one thing, however, and the actual realization of unity another.

Because his lecture was limited to the centrality of the German Question, Namier left out the Russian dimension in the making of the Ukrainian nation, a dimension with its own Western connections. The transition from Ruthenia in 1848 to Ukraine in 1939–45 had a Western dimension beyond the frame of “Vienna.” Ukrainian nation formation was an internal, but not self-contained, Ukrainian process; and it reflected the Russian-Ukrainian relationship as well as the Polish-Ukrainian one in Galicia. The Ukrainian culture that the Galician Ruthenians had adopted from Ukrainians in Russia had itself taken form in the encounter of East Ukrainian awakeners with Polish culture in the Russian Empire. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship was not self-contained either: (1) it took place within the Polish-Russian-Ukraine nexus in the space that the Russian Empire acquired after the partitions of Poland, and (2) it was a reflection of Russia’s direct relations with Europe (that is, apart from the Polish link). Thus, even Russia was part of Ukraine’s Western dimension during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In order to understand the Ruthenian declaration of unity with Russian Ukraine in 1848, we need to look at intellectual and political developments in the Russian Empire prior to 1848—in particular, the larger Polish and Ukrainian schemes in their connections to what I call the “seed-plot of Russian history.”

Between Russians and Poles: Ukrainians in the Russian Empire

While the Ruthenians of Galicia entered the European stage in 1848 through their experiences in that revolution, their ethnic kinsmen in the Russian Empire participated in a very different kind of opening to Europe that was launched during the reign of Peter I (1689–1725) and continued under his successors, most notably Catherine II (1762–96). From the perspective of Ukrainian history, Russia’s “Europeanization” fostered the acculturation and assimilation of “Little Russia” into a common imperial culture and polity. This story has been covered extensively in historical literature. However, as I shall argue in this essay, the processes that were making Russians European—while turning “Little Russians” into European Russians—also created conditions that facili-

tated the emergence of the modern idea of a distinct Ukrainian nation. In other words, those who embraced the Ukrainian idea did not want to go to “Europe” the Russian way but to follow their own route. Eventually they managed to draw their own road map and even persuade the Ruthenians in Galicia to join them.

For help in explaining the complex problem of how the Little Russian-Russian split arose during the process of Russia’s Europeanization and territorial expansion westward during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I shall turn to the works of Liah Greenfeld and Martin Malia. In her study of nationalism, Greenfeld argues that Russian nation formation was a direct consequence of Russia’s opening to the West, and she offers a theoretical-comparative perspective in which to interpret it. She asserts that in order for nationalist ideas to spread (a prerequisite for nation-building projects), “a supra-societal system,” or shared social space, has to exist. “Borrowing presupposed the existence of a shared model, and such a model could exist only for societies which were explicitly relevant for each other. It is probable that initially such shared social space was created by Christianity and, perhaps, the Renaissance.”¹⁷ Considering that from the eighteenth century Russia’s rulers were trying to define their state in a European context, Greenfeld’s concept of “shared social space” (perhaps in considering the role of ideas in the history of nations, it would be better to say “shared cultural or mental space”) supports Russia’s inclusion in Europe.

This does not mean that in the end Russians were successful in winning such a recognition from the Europeans (or, for that matter, were being supported in this venture by all of their own subjects). The question of “Russia versus Europe” has remained on the political and cultural agenda to the present day, and scholars have offered a variety of proposals on how one might approach it. Writing in the 1990s, after the collapse of Soviet Communism, Martin Malia argues that the “possibility of a new convergence with Russia” was related “to the problem of Europe’s own essence.” He states that it is misleading to view Russia, as it has been common to do, as an entity in opposition to another entity called “Europe.” Instead he proposes “to transcend habitual essentialist thinking,” which “presents geographic Europe” as “two cultural zones—a West and an East,” suggesting that instead of doing this one should view Europe “as a spectrum of zones graded in level of development from the former to the latter.” For support he refers to German historians who, in their attempts to situate Germany in a broader European setting, developed a concept of “*das West-östliches Kulturgefälle*, the

West-East cultural gradient or declivity.” In his own study of Russia, Malia says he is following “this perspective... with Russia at the bottom of the slope to be sure, but part of Europe nevertheless.”¹⁸ Malia explains that not only Germans view “modern Europe in terms of such a gradient; it comes quite naturally to citizens of any of the nations between the Rhine and the Urals, from the Czechs and Hungarians to the Poles to the Russians.”¹⁹ While agreeing with Malia that Russia should be considered part of Europe, I feel that he does not go far enough in defining the different gradients. He fails to recognize the existence of the “Ukrainian gradient” between Poland and Russia—a failure that I regret. For many Western experts, however, Ukraine remains a *tabula russa*, an *unsuspected* nation, in part because the space where Poland and Russia once co-ruled has been ignored.

As a case study of nation formation, Ukraine provides especially convincing evidence to support Dominic Lieven’s broader statement on the role of ideas in the realm of power politics. According to Lieven, “the rise and fall of empires has much to do with the history of ideas: it is very far from being the mere story of power defined in crudely material terms.”²⁰ When imperial Russia first opened itself to the West, then, it was reasonable to expect that “Little Russia” would become integrated into the new St. Petersburg-centered and Europe-oriented state and society that was then emerging. Marc Raeff has summed up the dynamics of Ukraine-assimilation as an aspect of Russia’s European engagement:

The more successful and dynamic Enlightenment culture, in direct contact with the world of European ideas, had its center in Russia proper; the educational and cultural institutions of St. Petersburg (and to a lesser extent those of Moscow) set the tone and pace: it was they that now influenced the Ukrainians. All seemed to conspire to bring about the integration of the Ukrainian elite and its culture into that of the empire, leading, in fact, to russification, since Russian political culture had achieved dominance and monopoly in the empire.²¹

Raeff’s formula is supported by concrete data about the behavior of members of the Ukrainian educated class. In her study mentioned above, Greenfeld notes the high proportion of natives of Ukraine among the educated elites in the Russian capitals during Catherine II’s reign. This was understandable because Ukraine had a much better developed network of schools during Catherine’s reign, and educated individuals from Ukraine were willing to serve in St. Petersburg in various govern-

mental, educational, and other institutions. They were among the most enthusiastic participants in the construction of an imperial Russian national identity. I might add that the Ukrainians were becoming “russified” because that was also a way for them to become European.

There were limits to Russia’s Westernization or Europeanization, however. Russia’s state-sponsored “opening” to Europe was closely controlled and very selective and did not provide for the adoption of modern political ideas and institutions of the West, such as representative government, an independent judiciary, or freedom of the press. This refusal by the tsarist state to evolve in the Western direction became especially evident during the final phase of Catherine II’s reign and under her two immediate successors, emperors Paul (1796–1801) and Alexander I (1801–25). All doubts on this score were removed during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55), with its declaration of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and *narodnost’* as the fundamental principles of Russian statehood. If one accepts Hastings’s definition of nation as an entity independent of the state, then the tsarist ideology and policies opposed the formation of a modern Russian nation.

For self-evident reasons, this turn in the empire’s evolution was especially unwelcome in that area from which so many enthusiasts of Russia’s Europeanization had come two or three generations earlier. The upper class of “Little Russia,” or Left-Bank Ukraine, constituted a social stratum that in some respects was similar to the Polish nobility—even though it consisted largely of descendants of Cossack officers who had fought against Poland in the seventeenth century—in that it thought of itself as the carrier of Little Russia’s traditions and liberties. These traditions and institutions, needless to say, were a heritage of Ukraine’s past under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Ukraine did not share them with Great Russia or “Muscovy.” Thus, even after its submission to the tsars, Little Russia retained a system based on the rule of law, and many of its offices were at least formally elective. Catherine’s modernization brought an end to this tradition when she extended the Russian administrative system to the area. Despite these changes, the Little Russian elite remained loyal to the state and adopted the official, imperial Russian identity, but it was individuals belonging to that social class—members of its cultural milieu—who in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries produced the idea that Ukraine was a nation and as such was equal to Russia and Poland. This development took place precisely during the decades in which Armstrong places the beginning of the age of modern nations and nationalism. During the late eigh-

teenth century, in John LeDonne's apt phrase, while "the autonomy of Little Russia was indeed being curtailed, [...] a larger Ukraine was coming into being..."²²

Perhaps it would be more precise to say that at first *the idea* of a larger Ukraine was being formulated. But thoughts about a Ukraine that was much larger than the just dissolved "Little Russia" were finding support in the geopolitical changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Thus, from the perspective of Ukrainian history, it is possible to conclude that after Russia annexed Right-Bank Ukraine, subjecting many parts of the Commonwealth to Russian rule, the tsarist state unintentionally created conditions that helped the Ukrainian national cause. The partitions of 1793 and 1795 brought Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine together under one government. In Kyiv, which until then had been a border town and after the partitions became again a central place in which the Left- and Right-Bank elites could meet, Ukrainians from beyond the Dnipro once more found themselves face to face with the Poles, although this time the Poles were the tsar's subjects. Members of the emergent Ukrainian intelligentsia established direct, and even personal, contacts with Polish cultural and political activists. They discovered that besides the window to Europe represented by St. Petersburg, there was a *shorter* road to Europe via Poland. Moreover, unlike the partly Europeanized Russia under traditional tsarist autocracy, the Poles included Western liberal and democratic ideas and institutions in their program. (Russia's conquest of the northern coast of the Black Sea also provides material for thinking about Ukraine, but this is a theme outside our agenda.)

The Poles were not simply one of "the nationalities" in the multinational Russian Empire. John LeDonne writes that: "Poland was not a frontier but a core area—this alone renders inept the often made comparison between Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. As a core area, Poland was an irreducible social, religious, and cultural complex possessing remarkable energy and restrainable only by the application of superior force."²³

LeDonne's argument is convincing when one remembers that while the so-called Kingdom of Poland—created in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna out of parts annexed by Prussia and Austria in 1795—could be compared to Finland, the Polish-dominated social and cultural space extended far to the east, up to the 1772 border of the Commonwealth. In the case of Kyiv, which underwent a "Polonization" of a kind *after* 1795, Polish influence extended even beyond the old border. Not only

Vilnius, with its Polish university, but also Kyiv was in many ways a Polish city under tsarist rule: its university, which the tsarist regime founded in 1834 to promote de-Polonization, had more Polish students in the middle of the century than Russian and Ukrainian students combined. Even the university in Kharkiv, which was founded in 1804 with the help of Adam Czartoryski, maintained contacts with Polish and other European schools and libraries, thus forming a direct link to Europe that bypassed St. Petersburg.

These examples may serve as concrete illustrations of LeDonne's point. Although Russia's annexation of so much Polish territory brought it closer to "Europe," that did not help Russia's "Europeanization." Vera Tolz has noted that in consequence of the incorporation of Polish lands, Poland became "Russia's internal 'West.'" The Russian-Polish conflicts within the state complicated Russia's own problems and tended to reveal the differences between Russia and Europe.²⁴

By the 1820s the new ideas of nationality, increasingly popular in German and Slavic lands under the Habsburgs, were also being promoted by Polish writers and scholars in places such as Warsaw and Vilnius. One consequence of this new trend was the birth of interest in the Lithuanian and Belorussian languages and folklore, as well as history, and this led some to the conclusion that the Belorussians and Lithuanians were separate nationalities and not branches of the Polish nation, as the Poles believed. Thus the presence of the Poles may well have stimulated the rise of nationalism among those peoples of the Russian Empire who lived in the area contested by the Poles and the Russians. I tend to agree with the Polish historian Aleksander Gieysztor, who calls the Ukrainians and other non-Polish peoples along with the modern Poles the "successor nations" of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.²⁵

One may certainly say that the Ukrainian national "awakening" took place in an area that both the Poles and the Russians, each for reasons of their own, considered to be Polish or Russian, respectively. The emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia rejected the Polish claims to Ukraine as a land that was to become part of a restored Poland one day, just as it refuted the similar Russian claims; however, it was receptive to Polish—that is, Western or "European"—ideas. This was most notably the case in Kyiv, where the first significant Ukrainian intellectual and political circle, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, existed in the mid-1840s. The Brotherhood embraced many of the ideas circulating among the Poles, and it was very much in sympathy with the ideas that Adam Mickiewicz was preaching in exile in Paris. Its activities would end

with the arrests of its leaders, including Taras Shevchenko. The main message of the Brotherhood—the most subversive from the viewpoint of imperial ideology—was that within the Slavic community of nations, which also included the West and South Slavs beyond Russia's borders, there existed a Ukrainian nation that should be recognized as an equal of the Poles and Russians.²⁶

At the same time, there were limits to how far the early Ukrainian activists could open up to the Poles. As I noted, the Poles did not accept Ukrainians as a separate nation, and they wanted to restore Poland in its pre-partition borders. This was something Ukrainians found unacceptable, even if they were disillusioned with what Russia had to offer. And even though Russia had taken Poland's commanding place in the former Commonwealth territory, for all practical matters in daily life Polish rule continued over Ukrainians—as it did in the territory taken by the Austrian Empire. Polish landlords continued to dominate the masses of Ukrainian peasantry (a surviving element of the declining world of Agraria). In due course the Ukrainian-Polish national conflict would emerge there, with a strong social component (peasants against landlords). While recognizing the severity of the social and national antagonism, I agree with the Polish historian Jan Kieniewicz when he argues more generally that

The Polish-Ukrainian conflict, it seems, reaches as far as the eastern expansion of Europe, and the prejudices that arise on both sides make it hard to recognize the nature of this conflict. In particular, both sides find it hard to see that the conflict is taking place WITHIN the same civilization. Owing to the nature of this geographical area, the parties in the conflict are inclined to view each other as members of an alien civilization [Poles and Ukrainians see each other as alien and not behaving as Europeans]... The dramatism and emotional tension of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict are thus also a consequence of its intra-European character.²⁷

The Ukrainian-Polish case as interpreted by Kieniewicz supports Greenfeld's argument that nation formation takes place in a shared social (I add cultural) space, and it brings a corrective to Malia's remarks on the Polish and Russian "gradients." If Kieniewicz is right, one also needs to recognize a Ukrainian gradient between those two.

Let me turn now to the Russian side of the Ukrainian "gradient." As is well known, for much of the nineteenth century Russian officials and Russian-educated society viewed the Ukrainian phenomenon, or *ukraino-*

fil'stvo, as a regional, cultural phenomenon, and this view was consistent with the common treatment of “Little Russians” as a branch of a greater Russian nation that also included Great Russians and Belorussians. It was not until the 1860s, during and under the impact of the Polish 1863 insurrection, that *ukrainofil'stvo* was officially recognized as an attempt to break the unity of Russia.²⁸

Some Russian enemies of tsarism recognized much earlier, however, that *ukrainofil'stvo* carried a political message even though it was disguised as an interest in local history, folklore, music, and literature. Among those Russians who saw “Ukrainianism” as a vehicle for the promotion of political values that the tsarist state had suppressed was Kondratii Ryleev (1795–1826), one of the leading members of the Decembrist conspiracy and uprising. Ryleev lived for some time in Ukraine and developed an interest in Ukrainian history and ethnography, and his writings include a poem titled “Mazepa.” The émigré historian Nikolai Ulianov, the author of a polemical work exposing Ukrainian nationalism that was published in the 1960s, refers to the Ryleev case in order to make a broader generalization on how “Russian cosmopolitan liberalism was transforming itself on Ukrainian soil into local autonomism.” “The Decembrists were the first to identify their cause with Ukrainianism and created a tradition [in this respect] for the Russian revolutionary movement that followed.” To support his argument, Ulianov quotes the Ukrainian scholar and activist Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), who wrote that “the first attempt in poetry to link European liberalism with Ukrainian historical traditions was not undertaken by Ukrainians but by the Great-Russian (*velikoross*) Ryleev.”²⁹ If Ulianov, and Drahomanov before him, have interpreted Ryleev’s position correctly, then we may conclude that for the Decembrists—and, we may presume, even more so for the “Ukrainophiles”—the Ukrainian “project” was a Ukrainian “road map” to Europe, a map that had been drawn in intellectual encounters with the Poles and that constituted an alternative to the official position on Russia’s relations with Europe.

Gradually, the “European” theme became dominant in Ukrainian discourses on the nature of Ukrainian distinctiveness from Russia. The thesis that the Ukrainians’ historical ties to “Europe” distinguished them from the Russians became an article of faith in Ukrainian national ideology. In his essay “The Ukrainian-Russian Debate over the Legacy of Kievan Rus’, 1840s–1860s,” Jaroslaw Pelenski reviews the writings of leading spokesmen of the Ukrainian position and cites the statement of Mykola Kostomarov, according to whom “the basic differences between

Ukrainians and Russians rested more on socio-political factors than on ethnicity, language or religion.” (As one would expect a historian to do, Kostomarov believed that those differences had already been apparent in the Middle Ages, but he also admitted that the Novgorodians—that is, one branch of the Great Russians—had had more in common with the Ukrainians than with the other Great Russians who preferred “centralized rule.”) As Pelenski notes, in his historical reflections Kostomarov employed the concept of society that in Western terminology is known as an open society—or even civil society. In this respect, Kostomarov not only laid the foundations for the Ukrainian-Russian political dialogue from the Ukrainian perspective but also initiated the modern analysis of the differences between the traditional socio-political systems of the two countries.³⁰

Ukrainian intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even when they disagreed on many political questions of the day, retained views formulated by their predecessors in the 1840s–1860s. Thus, the leading spokesman of Ukrainian populism, Drahomanov, to whom I referred earlier, stressed that “the preponderance of national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century Ukraine was more closely bound to Western Europe,” and the conservative ideologue Viacheslav Lypynsky insisted that “The basic difference between Ukraine and Muscovy is not the language, nor the tribe [ethnicity], nor the faith... but a different political system which had evolved over the centuries, a different method of organizing the ruling elite, a different relationship between the upper and lower classes, between the state and society—between those who rule and those who are ruled.”³¹

The first decades of the twentieth century created situations in which arguments of intellectual historians and nationalist thinkers could be tested in political practice. There is room in this brief essay for mentioning only the most basic facts of Russian history at that time: the preparations for the Great War, the war itself, the fall of the tsar and the rise of the Provisional Government, the fall of that government, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, and their victory in the civil war. For the meaning of what happened, however, I shall turn to several authoritative interpreters who put those events in a broad historical and comparative perspective. The contemporary historian Dominic Lieven offers a concise formula that may serve as an epitaph to the story examined by scholars such as Greenfeld and Malia: “Even in 1914 the Russians were not really a nation.”³² Early in 1918, Thomas Masaryk reached the same

conclusion as he observed the unfolding Russian events. Of both the Russian revolutionaries and the Russian masses Masaryk said: "They rid themselves of the Tsar, but they have not yet ridden themselves of tsarism."³³ In 1935, Petr Struve, who was a leading ideologist and advocate of Russian nation-building along Western lines and an active participant in politics before and after 1914, described the revolution of 1917 as "the *political suicide of a political nation*" and called it "the most *destructive* event in world history."³⁴

This wide-ranging "detour" from Namierian Galicia in 1848 provides a broader context in which to view the Ruthenians' move toward a common nationality with Russia's Ukrainians. Conversely, it also offers a perspective on the failure of the Russophile project in Galicia. Between 1848 and 1914 there were times when a majority of nationally aware Ruthenians professed their desire to be members of a nation that was to be composed of Great Russians, Belorussians, and Little Russians. To note their defeat does not imply that it was historically inevitable. In light of my discussion, one of the causes of the eventual defeat of the Russian option in Galicia may have been the fact that the autocratic tsarist state sought to prevent the formation of a Russian nation that was liberal, Western, and "European." Internal Russian politics had its repercussions in Austria: supporters of the Russian idea there depended on the support of Russian official circles; therefore they had to abstain from criticizing Russia's autocratic regime. The Russophiles were constrained to promote the idea of a Russian nation that was dependent on the tsarist state and its official church, and such a national project became increasingly outdated and less attractive to Austria's Ruthenians, who were becoming accustomed to living in a constitutional and liberal Austria. The outcome of the struggle between these two national projects in Galicia may have been significantly influenced by what happened or, better still, what did not happen, in St. Petersburg in 1825, or in the 1860s, or even in the 1880s. Would things have turned out in Lviv the way they did had Russia acquired an elected parliament in the 1860s rather than after the revolution of 1905, or if the Russians *had* become a nation by 1914, perhaps even *before* 1914?

Paradoxical as this may appear, in 1914 the "stateless" Ruthenians of Galicia were a nation in a sense in which the Russians in "their own" empire were not. By then it was evident that a Ukrainian subject of the Austrian monarchy enjoyed more personal and political freedom than a Ukrainian, as well as his *Russian* counterpart, did in Russia. The Ukrainian national idea and the political ideas of the Ukrainophiles were com-

patible with the legal and political system and values of “Europe” as exemplified by Austria: what the Ukrainians wanted was more of “Europe”—further democratic reforms, greater national rights, especially the grant of autonomy to the Ukrainian part of Galicia, and certainly not the introduction of autocracy, even if it was *Russian* autocracy.

Choosing the Ukrainian identity meant that the Galician Ruthenians declared themselves not to be a nation in their own right but a part of a much larger nation, one whose main body lived in Russia. By so doing they recognized the intellectual lead of the East. They adopted the conception of Ukrainian history formulated by “Easterners” as their historical legacy. As Serhii M. Plokyh puts it, the idea of Ukrainian nationhood was based “on two main myths: that of Ukraine as the direct and only successor to medieval Kievan Rus’, and the myth of the Ukrainian Cossacks.” It was the “East Ukrainian” Mykhailo Hrushevsky who was especially influential in making these two myths central elements of Ukrainian history, says Plokyh, and I might add to this that the Kyiv University graduate Hrushevsky wrote his most important works when he was a professor at the University of Lviv in 1894–1914.³⁵ While they were open to the ideas and leadership coming from the East (before Hrushevsky, Drahomanov had exerted great political influence among the Galicians), the more the Galicians advanced in their own region, the more they wanted to reciprocate by helping their compatriots within the Russian Empire. Their contributions were especially appreciated after the 1905 revolution, when the East Ukrainians finally were able to establish their own press, various cultural societies, cooperatives, and so forth. After the outbreak of the war in 1914, “Ukrainian-Ukrainian” relations achieved a qualitatively new level, especially after the fall of tsarism and then the proclamation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in November 1917. It seemed for a brief moment, between March and November 1917, that the forces of Russian democracy and the advocates of Ukrainian autonomy would be able to reach a *modus vivendi* satisfying both parties. Had this happened, one may speculate further, the Ukrainian part of Galicia would have joined Russian Ukraine after the fall of the Habsburg monarchy (which would have been caused by the Allied victory), and together they might either have become an autonomous member of a democratic multinational federation with Russia or perhaps achieved independence as a sovereign Ukrainian state.

But a democratic Russia did not survive. It committed “suicide,” according to Struve, and in the civil war that followed, both the “Reds” and the “Whites” fought against the Ukrainians. In the end, the Reds

defeated the Whites and the Ukrainians. The Poles occupied all of Galicia by the summer of 1919, and the border established after the 1920 war between Soviet Russia and Poland left Galicia on the Polish side. It is possible to argue that the outcome of the Polish-Ukrainian war over Galicia in 1918–19 had been greatly influenced by the events in Petrograd in November 1917: the Russian “suicide” contributed to the Ukrainian failure to win independence and thus prevented the unification of Galicia with Russian Ukraine.

Whereas for Russian liberals, “1917” stood for Russia’s break with “Europe” and its turn toward “Asia,” for the Communists the same year represented Russia’s assumption of leadership in humanity’s march toward a new Communist civilization, the realization of another “seed-plot” of 1848—the one formulated in *The Communist Manifesto*. Instead of catching up with Europe, Russia became a model for Europe to emulate. The dissolution of “Russia” as an empire and a nation in the bourgeois sense was more than adequately compensated for by the creation of a new historical community, what during the final decades of the Soviet system the official ideologists called “the multi-ethnic Soviet people.” In the long run, however, over the course of seven decades the Soviet system repeated the failure of its imperial predecessor. According to Johann P. Arnason, the Soviet “counter-paradigm of modernity, arguably the most important of its kind,” failed to realize the Marxist grand design and instead “brought the imperial order back to life in a new shape.” In the course of its history it also reactivated the empire’s “self-destructive dynamic.”³⁶

The Last Act of “1848”: 1945–1991

Over seventy years had to pass for Communism’s “self-destructive dynamic” to run its course, and it was only concurrently with the collapse of the Soviet “counter-paradigm of modernity” that the former “Ruthenians” of the Habsburg Galicia—by then quite sure that they were Ukrainians—could freely declare their wish to live together with their compatriots in the east in an independent state called Ukraine. They did this on two occasions in 1991. First, in March, in the popular referendum about the future of the Soviet Union that Mikhail Gorbachev organized in order to save the Soviet Union as a single state, the three West Ukrainian regions constituting the Soviet part of once-Austrian Galicia overwhelmingly voted for Ukraine’s independence. (In March 1991, an option to vote for independence was not available to

voters anywhere else in Ukraine.) These regions confirmed their choice in the Ukraine-wide referendum of 1 December 1991, in which all of Ukraine could vote for or against independence—that is, secession from the USSR. (Overall, more than ninety percent voted for independence.)

More than seventy years separate the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the dissolution of the USSR (and thus also the Russian Empire). What appeared to Namier as the realization of the Ruthene program of 1848 was in reality the result of a secret deal made in August 1939 by Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's "Greater Germany," a deal that in its basic features was subsequently ratified by the Soviet Union's wartime allies and was finally confirmed in the Soviet-Polish border treaty of 1945. None of these arrangements was an expression of the wishes of the people living there.

Namier had been right to think that "1945" inaugurated a new era in European history. Indeed, the post-1945 era *was* a new epoch, and the German Question and matters related to it evolved in a new historical setting. On the one hand, the process of European unification began with the Community of Coal and Steel, the Common Market, NATO, and most recently the European Union. On the other hand, there was the Soviet Bloc, the "Socialist Commonwealth." However, not only the Ukrainian but also other "questions" inherited from 1848 remained after the defeat of the "Greater German Reich," and of these the most important was the German Question. As we shall see, the history of Ukraine remained linked to the history of Germany until the last decade of the twentieth century.

The postwar German story is well known. Germany suffered huge territorial losses to Poland and to a smaller extent to the USSR (Königsberg becoming Kaliningrad). On the ruins of Gross-Deutschland there was at first something one might call "Kein-Deutschland" under a joint administration of the four great powers, and then even that remaining Germany was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet-controlled "German Democratic Republic." There was also a divided Berlin, and Austria was restored as a separate country after its seven years as part of Hitler's Germany.

It took almost fifty years for this new version of the "German question" to be solved to everybody's satisfaction. This time the solution was directly connected to political change within the USSR and the processes of internal liberalization in East European states and their emancipation from Moscow's control. In 1990, the GDR dissolved and its "lands" joined the Federal Republic. The famous question "What is

Germany?” received an answer nobody had anticipated in 1848, but it seemed that finally everybody was happy. Those pleased certainly included Poland and Czechoslovakia because the Federal Republic recognized the 1945 borders, thus putting an end to Polish-German and Czech-German conflicts of the past. While the postwar dependence of East and Central European states on the USSR was being covered up ideologically by invoking their shared commitment to building socialism and communism and their membership in the “socialist camp,” another, more persuasive argument was often heard: at least the Soviet Union protected Poland and Czechoslovakia from the threat of “West German revanchism.” When the Federal Republic renounced any “revanchist” claims prior to German unification, it became easier for the Poles (and others) to press for democracy at home and for independence from the USSR. But the end of the German threat did not guarantee the survival of all states that we might, with some justification, call successors of the Habsburg monarchy. The unification of Germany was soon followed by the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and in both cases it is possible to see echoes of 1848.³⁷

It is certainly possible to see a continuity between the events of 1848 and those of the late twentieth century in Ukrainian history. Ukraine’s independence followed the unification of Germany within one year. Whereas Germany had played a very negative role in Ukrainian history in 1941–45, the “intersection” between the histories of Ukraine and Germany in the late 1980s–early 1990s proved helpful to the Ukrainians. All agree that the resolution of the German question was made possible by the politics of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR, in which Mikhail Gorbachev played a central role. There is less clarity, to quote Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, on “how to weigh the role of the unification of Germany in the collapse of the Soviet Union.” Zelikow and Rice agree, however, that Gorbachev’s German policy undermined his political base at home and emboldened nationalists throughout the USSR, and that this policy in turn helped to end the Soviet Union’s control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union fell apart shortly after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian Federation found itself within the “approximate frontiers of Peter the Great’s Russia.”³⁸

Along with the newly independent Russia and thirteen other new post-Soviet states, there was an independent Ukraine. As they watched this new entity’s first months, some Western (and Russian) analysts and scholars were predicting that Ukraine would break up the way Yugoslavia had. They pointed out several fault lines along which the break might

occur. One possibility was along the old boundary between Austria-Hungary and Russia; another, following the divide between the mainly Catholic West and the Eastern Orthodox East (the “clash of civilizations” school of thought drew attention to this element of Ukrainian disunion); and, finally, a break into Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking regions, reflecting the widely held interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict as one based on “ethnicity.” (Some observers expected Crimea to break away first, with the Donbas and Odesa region to follow.)

None of these scenarios materialized. Admittedly, the Ukraine that became independent in 1991 was hardly a well-integrated country. It included, besides Galicia, two other territories that the Soviet Union annexed after World War II: the so-called “Trans-Carpathian Ukraine,” for twenty years a part of Czechoslovakia (and before that of Hungary), and the northern portion of the old Austrian province of Bukovina, under Romania between the two world wars. Their populations had lived for several generations under the Habsburgs and then for another twenty years under their successors—who, despite their many shortcomings, differed markedly from Stalin’s Soviet Union in the 1930s. Although Lviv and Uzhhorod and Chernivtsi found themselves in the same Soviet republic as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Poltava, the eastern and western parts of Ukraine had little in common. The making of Ukrainians into one nation, first placed on the agenda as a Romantic idea in 1848, would have been a complex, painful, and challenging process under the best of circumstances, but after 1945 Ukrainians were not free to work on it. Instead, they all became objects of Sovietization. While the war was still on, in anticipation of such a situation even before the Soviets occupied all of Ukraine, one Western observer, William Henry Chamberlin, acknowledged the “strong sentimental and cultural ties between these two branches of the Ukrainian people” and asked whether the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina would become Sovietized or whether the Westerners’ “stubborn adherence to nationalist and religious ideals” would “cause embarrassment to the Soviet rulers and perhaps affect their blood brothers, the Soviet Ukrainians.”³⁹

It took many years before we got an answer to the Chamberlin question. The western regions of Ukraine became Sovietized to a greater extent than their people perhaps like to admit, but they also “affected” the eastern part of the country, and without any doubt they caused “embarrassment to the Soviet rulers” during the final years of the USSR, when they voted for secession. There was a remarkable unity of action

at least between Lviv and Kyiv in 1989–91, and this certainly mattered when the independence question was on the agenda.

Among other significant factors that helped to shape Ukrainian events during the period of the USSR's breakup and the unification of Germany, one must include the changed Polish-Ukrainian relationship. Long before 1991, the democratic forces in Poland had decided to support Ukrainian national aspirations. It is most unlikely that Stalin—or his successors—could have imagined that the USSR's territorial gains of those parts of pre-1939 Poland populated by Ukrainians would make it possible to end the old historic relationship between these two nations and would one day make it possible for the Poles to support the Ukrainians in their resistance to Moscow. Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence—just one day after the referendum of 1 December 1991—and Poland also supported the Lithuanians and Belorussians in their striving for independence despite the memories of past antagonisms between these “successor nations” of the Commonwealth. For many years Polish politicians and writers complained about how fatal their country's geopolitical situation was: by the early 1990s, they saw Poland in a wholly redrawn geopolitical setting, as all of the states Poland had had as its neighbors until then were gone. For Ukraine the change was no less dramatic: not only was it independent, but it found itself for the first time in several centuries with a friendly power on its western border. The historic transformation of the Ukrainian-Polish relationship into one of good neighbors placed the Ukrainians in an unprecedented position versus Russia: for the first time, Ukraine did not have to be concerned with a threat from another power when it faced Russia.

An Epilogue—and a Prologue?

Let me recapitulate the argument about the “European dimension” of the emergence of modern Ukraine and explain why this essay focuses on the Austrian or “Viennese” connection, whereas the other two elements of what I call the “European dimension” receive a more cursory treatment. Ukraine's Russian connection is widely known—who has not heard about the “three hundred years” of Ukraine's being part of Russia?—and, to a lesser degree, the Polish connection is also known. I do not need to explain in this essay how in reality only a small part of Ukrainian territory was connected to Russia for so long, and I have noted earlier that even after most of Ukraine found itself within the Rus-

sian Empire, the Polish presence survived and extended to a much wider territory than is commonly acknowledged. The early formulation of modern Ukrainian identity began under the Russian Empire, in the historic “Hetmanate” or “Little Russia,” and continued not only in Russian but also in that Polish-dominated cultural and social space. However, while it acknowledges the role of St. Petersburg and Warsaw, this essay argues that Ukraine’s “Vienna” connection to Europe deserves more recognition than it usually receives and that the legacy of 1848 is not merely a matter of history but has a special relevance for Ukraine today, in the early years of the twenty-first century.

The Habsburg monarchy was not simply an anachronistic continuation of an even more antiquated “Holy Roman Empire.” Students may be amused when they learn that the emperor of Austria also called himself king of Hungary, king of Bohemia, king of Croatia, archduke of Austria above Enns, *and* archduke of Austria *below* Enns, not to mention that he was also margrave of Moravia and grand duke of Kraków, and more. Some Ukrainians may think it very odd that until the end in 1918, the Austrian monarch also styled himself “king of Galicia and Lodomeria”—that is, the successor of medieval princes of Halych and Volodymyr. But these medieval titles bore some relation to modern realities. When we look at the map of Europe in the 1840s, we see that Bratislava and Prague, Buda and Pest and Zagreb, Dubrovnik and Kraków, Ljubljana and Lviv, Venice and Ternopil, Milan and Chernivtsi—I call them by their current names, some of which in 1848 were still to be invented—were all governed from one center, though, admittedly, not all in the same uniform way.⁴⁰ A resident of Chernivtsi who could afford it was free to go to Milan or Venice without crossing international borders. While not many Austrian Ruthenians went to La Scala or the Dalmatian coast, we know that one, Yurii Fedkovych (1834–1888), “wrote his first poem in Ukrainian” when doing his military service in northern Italy. “Up to that time he wrote in German,” the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* informs us.⁴¹ Would one be mistaken to think that the founder of modern *Ukrainian* literature in Austrian Bukovina was inspired to switch to the language of Kotliarevsky and Shevchenko by his encounters with Italians? If such was the case, then his biography illustrates what Greenfeld and Malia tell us about those wider social and cultural spaces in which people were developing modern national consciousness.

Turning from geography to history, we are reminded that in 1848, when serfdom was finally abolished in the monarchy, Austria’s Ukrain-

ian serfs were also freed, and that Ukrainians, including those freed peasants, voted in 1848 to elect the constituent assembly of the monarchy, the *Reichstag*. Indeed, among those they elected as deputies were several former serfs. They voted together with Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Slovenes, Germans, and Italians, for all of whom this was also their first experience of this kind. However critical one may be of the actual conditions under which they lived after 1848, until the end of the monarchy the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina knew the rule of law (the monarchy was a *Rechtsstaat*), were free to develop their own associations of all kinds, including political parties, participated in politics at local, provincial, and state-wide levels, and their language was recognized by the state in education, administration, and the courts of justice. In short, for those Ukrainians Europe did not mean just abstract and noble ideals but was, however imperfect in practice, something they experienced in real life. One example will help explain this point. Whereas under the repressive tsarist regime Russian populism was increasingly turning to violence and revolution, Drahomanov, born and educated in Russian Ukraine, was able to win support for his ideas in Galicia, where his disciples were free to apply his “Euro-Populism” in social and political activities and to build social and cultural institutions.

It should be evident by now that it is not my intention to suggest that the Ruthenians of Galicia and Bukovina were somehow better Europeans or better Ukrainians than their cousins in Ukraine under Russia. On the contrary, I argue that the transformation of “the Ruthenians into Ukrainians,” the formation of their Ukrainian national identity—which also meant their self-definition as a European nation—was the result of an interaction across imperial borders in which Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kyiv had played the role of initiators and, for a time, leaders. Because they knew this, as they looked at Galicia on the eve of the war of 1914, Ukrainian activists in the tsarist state treated the achievements of their Austrian compatriots as their own, too. They attributed the differences between the condition of two Ukraines to the fact that one of them was part of a European state. They expected that the eastern core of their country would do just as well, if not better, given the opportunity. But, as we know, “1917” and its aftermath brought not only the destruction of a “European” Russia but also the defeat of a democratic Ukraine.

The subject of this paper, I would like to suggest, is not only of historical interest. The anti-Communist revolutions of 1989–91 and the collapse of the Russian/Soviet empire gave the nations of East Central Europe the opportunity to join a new kind of Europe, the European

Union, which Western Europe has been building since the end of World War II. They responded eagerly to this chance. All of those nationalities about which Namier wrote, and several others not under the Habsburgs in 1848 (Bulgaria and the Baltic states), are scheduled to become members or are recognized as candidates for the European Union. Leaders of Ukraine also profess their country's "European orientation," and many people, especially but not only in the old "Austrian" areas, would like their country to go to Europe via the route that is being taken by Ukraine's neighbors. But this is not the only, or even the prevailing, view in Ukraine today. Some other people oppose Ukraine's European ties, whereas still others insist that unlike the Poles or the Lithuanians the Ukrainians should go "to Europe—with Russia." It is not only people who are engaged in the practice or study of politics and international relations who are participating in these controversies. As a Warsaw scholar, Ola Hnatiuk, shows in her recent book *Farewell to Empire: Ukrainian Debates on Identity*, the cultural elite, in particular writers and scholars of literature, are also engaged in highly charged debates about Ukrainian identity, in which one of the major themes is post-Soviet Ukraine's stand versus Europe. As Hnatiuk rightly points out, the Ukrainians are trying to find their way in the post-imperial world.⁴²

Perhaps the advocates of the "To Europe—with Russia" option do not believe that Ukraine has left the empire for good. They do not explain why it is necessary for Ukraine first to attach itself to Russia and only then to try joining Europe. Why not go to Europe directly, like all the other nations? Those familiar with the history of both Ukraine and Russia can easily recognize in this slogan something that Ukraine experienced three hundred years earlier, when Peter I opened his famous "window to Europe" by building St. Petersburg. They also know that Russia's love-hate relationship with Europe ended in the catastrophe of 1917. So one may ask whether the call for Ukraine's closer ties with Russia is motivated by a desire to help both nations join Europe or whether it represents something different, namely an attempt to restore the old imperial pattern in Ukraine-Russia relations, in short, to deprive Ukraine of its independence.

One's answer to these questions depends in large part on how one diagnoses the present condition of Russia. Geoffrey Hosking argues that while "Britain *had* an empire... Russia *was* an empire—and perhaps still is." For the British people the empire was distant from the homeland (Ireland was the exception), so when the time came for the empire's end they were able to detach themselves from it "without

undue distress,” says Hosking, but for the Russians, the “Russian empire was part of the homeland, and the ‘natives’ mixed inextricably with the Russians in their own markets, streets and schools—as indeed they still do.”⁴³ In 1991 it seemed that the Russians would follow the British and accept (“without undue distress”) the breakup of their empire. The leaders of the Russian Federation played a crucial role in the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and Ukraine’s gain of independence. It seemed then that the post-Soviet Russians had become a nation in a sense in which they were not a nation in 1914. Moreover, a dozen years ago Russia, as a free nation and a democratic state, recognized Ukraine’s national independence. However, can one confidently say today that the Russian nation is sufficiently independent of the state to satisfy Hastings’s definition of what makes a nation a nation? Can one say today that the leaders—and the people—of Russia do not want to restore the empire, in some form or another, that they not only have abandoned the goal of imperial restoration but also have rejected an authoritarian form of government for Russia? As we saw, it took plenty of “distress,” over more than one hundred fifty years, before the Germans gave up their imperial ambitions and became a “normal” European nation. Have the Russians freed themselves from their imperial outlook, and do they now agree that Russia should be a “normal” nation-state, not an empire? And, finally, do the Russian state and Russian society want *Russia* to join Europe?

It is too early to answer these questions about Russia with any degree of certainty. Russian history has its own dynamics, its own dimensions, as one would expect of a country extending from the Baltic to the Pacific. For the time being, however, regardless of what Russia does or says, in Ukraine the cultural elite and the political class need to bear in mind Ukraine’s direct cultural and political connections to Europe in the past. Is it naïve to hope that if Ukrainian intellectuals and policy makers reflect on the actual record of the Ukrainian experience in Europe, they will agree that Ukraine’s future should be with Europe?

A Postscript 2008

The final pre-publication version of this chapter, written in 2003, appeared in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* in March 2004. A year later, a shorter German version appeared in *Transit: Europäische Revue*.⁴⁴ For that edition I wrote the following new conclusion:

When it won independence in 1991, Ukraine was not a democratic

state, but it escaped the fate of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia and remained one country. Only in 2004, some fifteen years after the Central European revolutions of 1989–90, did the Ukrainians, in their Orange Revolution, make an attempt to “catch up” with their former fellow Habsburg nations. The new generation was especially aware that Ukraine’s revolution had not been completed. As a young man at Independence Square told a foreign correspondent: “In 1991 we became independent, now we want to be free.” The fundamental issue in the Orange Revolution was a stand against corruption and for human dignity and human rights. The most popular slogan—“We are many, we cannot be defeated” (*Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty*)—recalls slogans of East German demonstrators in 1989–90: “Wir sind das Volk” and “Wir sind ein Volk,” as well as Solidarity’s call in 1980: “Nothing that concerns us—without us” (*Nic o nas bez nas*). The year 2004 was also remarkable for the help European neighbors gave Ukraine. In Kyiv hundreds of thousands cheered “Poland, Poland” when Lech Walesa addressed them, and there were declarations of support and solidarity from Prague and other capitals. However, by 2004 it was also clear that the breakup of the USSR had not conclusively solved the “Russian Question,” in particular in the area of Ukrainian-Russian relations. In 1991, the Russian Federation had played a crucial role in the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and in Ukraine’s gain of independence, and it seemed then that its leaders and its people had abandoned the goal of imperial restoration and an authoritarian form of government; in short, had agreed to become a “normal” nation, similar to other “post-imperial” nations. Today, the picture is much less clear. President Vladimir Putin’s open interference in the Ukrainian election process shows that Russia prefers not to view Ukraine as a truly independent country. Lilia Shevtsova recently noted the survival of “nostalgia for the imperialist [i.e., imperial] past” among Russia’s political elites, and their hope, shared by Putin, that Russia will be able “to join the West on their own terms—that is, while preserving at least some elements of the Russian System.”⁴⁵ Whatever choices Russia makes, they will reflect the European and Eurasian dimensions of its history, as one would expect of a country extending from the Baltic to the Pacific, and will directly influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign affairs—despite its choice for Europe in the election of 2004.

Several years have passed since I wrote that new conclusion. I have continued to work on the main themes of the original article, but rather

than revising it now or even updating the closing section for this publication, I refer the interested reader to newer essays in which I examine, from various angles, my main theme: the making of modern Ukraine. The subject of one of these, “Lenin, ‘Great Russia,’ and Ukraine,” appears self-explanatory, but in the Lenin paper I manage to offer my own comment on Semen Divovych’s 1762 poem, “A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia,” to which Andreas Kappeler refers in his study *‘Great Russians’ and ‘Little Russians’: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective*.⁴⁶ In “Mapping Ukraine: Identity Space to Decision Space” I attempt to locate in time and space the first formulation of the idea of Ukrainian ethnic territory as distinct from the historical Little Russian one, while “Publish or Perish: Texts and Peoples” offers a political reading of Ivan Kotliarevsky’s contribution to the “secession” of a segment of the Little Russian elite from imperial to Ukrainian identity.⁴⁷

Notes

- ¹ Namier was born Ludwik Bernsztajn (Bernstein) in what was then the Russian partition of Poland. The family bought an estate in eastern Galicia in what is now the Ternopil region of Ukraine and changed its name to Niemirowski. Although his father was a fervent Polish nationalist, young Ludwik, who spent his childhood among Ukrainian village children, would later take the side of the Ukrainians during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. After a brief period at Lviv University, Namier moved to Lausanne for one term and from there went to Balliol College, Oxford, beginning his studies there in 1908 and graduating with a first-class degree in history in 1911. See Mark Baker, "Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 2 (winter 1998): 59–63, for an outline of Namier's biography to 1914. Cf. Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier: A Biography* (Oxford, 1971), p. 31: "But Ukrainian was to him [Lewis's father] no language at all. To make this clear he strictly forbade his children to pick it up from anyone, especially from the servants whose native language it was. [Lewis] traced to those years his passionate siding with the 'Ruthenians,' or Ukrainians... in 1919." For some important biographical facts and for Namier's views on the nationalities question, see Amy Ng, "Nationalism and Political Liberty: Josef Redlich, Lewis Namier, and the Nationality Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe" (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 2001).
- ² "1848: Seed-plot of History," in Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812–1918* (New York and Evanston, 1963), pp. 21–30.
- ³ Kathleen Burk, *Troublemaker: The Life and History of A.J.P. Taylor* (New Haven, 2000), p. 270.
- ⁴ For a full exposition of Gellner's view on the transition from Agraria to Industria, see his *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983). I speak of junctures or conjunctures in the sense in which Leon Wasilewski uses the word *konjunktura* in his book *Kwestja Ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe* ("The Ukrainian Question as an International Problem"), in which he argues that for a stateless nation trying to win independence it is not enough just to fight for it: what is also indispensable is a favorable international "conjuncture." See Leon Wasilewski, *Kwestja Ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe* (Warsaw, 1934), pp. 142–43. I quote relevant passages from this book in *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 2000), pp. xli and xlviii–xlix.
- ⁵ John A. Armstrong, "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity," in *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities*, ed. Alexander J. Motyl (New York, 1992), p. 29.
- ⁶ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationhood* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 25.
- ⁷ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (London, 1977), p. 493, quoted by Hastings, *Construction of Nationhood*, p. 26.

- ⁸ David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918* (New York and Oxford, 1998), p. xvi: “What we call the unification of Germany was actually a partition.”
- ⁹ For reference to this Goethe-Schiller “epigram” and its English translation (but without the last part), see James J. Sheehan, “What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the *Nation* in German History and Historiography,” *Journal of Modern History* 53, no. 1 (March 1981): 1–23. Klaus von Beyme, “Shifting National Identities: The Case of German History,” *National Identities* 1, no. 1 (March 1999): 39–52, also includes the post-1945 period in his discussion of the German problem, treating the reunification of Germany in 1990 and later. (The original version of the Goethe-Schiller quotation reads: “Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es? Ich weiss das Land nicht zu finden. Wo das gelehrte beginnt, hört das politische auf.”) David Blackbourn, who quotes the two authors and discusses their question, observes that “unification meant that there was now a Germany on the map as well as a Germany in the head” (*The Long Nineteenth Century*, p. xvi). As we know, the post-1871 Germany on the map did not correspond to the Germany in *everybody's* head, as demonstrated by the rise of the Third Reich.
- ¹⁰ Horst Glassl, *Das österreichische Einrichtungswerk in Galizien (1772–1790)* (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 9–18, criticizes those German historians who have neglected the impact of the incorporation of Polish territories such as Galicia on the empire’s administrative system and on the course of German history itself.
- ¹¹ Jiří Kořalka, *Češi v habsburské říši a v Evropě 1815–1914. Sociálně-historické souvislosti vytváření novodobého národa a národnostní otázky v českých zemích* (Prague, 1996), p. 20.
- ¹² Jiří Kořalka, *Češi*, p. 19. Because the imperial response to ethnic nationalisms failed in the long run to produce an “imperial-Austrian” nationality, this should not mean that it was a total failure: after all, whatever their nationalist declarations may have been, many if not most subjects of the emperor remained loyal to his state almost until the end. The Austrian counterpart of the “Official Nationality” doctrine in Russia under Nicholas I appealed to the historical experience of the peoples in a common Habsburg state, rather than to ethnicity and language. Special institutions were established, such as the Institute for Austrian History at the Academy of Sciences and at the University of Vienna, to promote the study of *vaterländische Geschichte*, literally “history of the Fatherland.” (Its later Soviet counterpart was called *otechestvennaia istoriia*.) That history was meant to prove that Greater Austria was “a providential necessity.” For how serious these imperial “nation-building” efforts were, see Walter Leitsch, “East Europeans Studying History in Vienna (1855–1918),” in *Historians as Nation-Builders, Central and South-East Europe*, eds. Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (London, 1988).
- ¹³ Jerzy Jedlicki, “Heritage and Collective Responsibility,” in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore, and Peter Winch (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 53–76. The quoted passage is on p. 55.

- ¹⁴ Vasył Podolynsky (1815–1876) was a Greek Catholic who before 1848 had belonged to a Polish secret society and in 1848 supported the Hungarian revolution, but he opted for Ukrainian nationality and wanted Ukrainians to be a member nation of the Slavic federation.
- ¹⁵ Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 29–30.
- ¹⁶ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys istorii Ukraïny. Formuvannia modernoi Ukraïns'koï natsii XIX–XX stolittia* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 52.
- ¹⁷ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 495. It is to be regretted that Greenfeld does not consider the Polish case, which is surprising, given the importance of the Polish factor in the history of Russian nation formation and Poland's role in the history of nationalism in general.
- ¹⁸ Martin E. Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 12–13. For a discussion of Malia's ideas by a number of American and European scholars, see *The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991*, eds. Catherine Evtuhov and Stephen Kotkin (Lanham, 2003).
- ¹⁹ Malia, *Russia*, pp. 439–40.
- ²⁰ Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (London, 2000), p. xvi.
- ²¹ Marc Raeff, "Ukraine and Imperial Russia: Intellectual and Political Encounters from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, eds. Peter Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 69–85; quoted passage is on p. 78.
- ²² John P. LeDonne, *Ruling Russia: Politics and Administration in the Age of Absolutism, 1762–1796* (Princeton, 1984), p. 305.
- ²³ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford, 1997), p. 76.
- ²⁴ Vera Tolz, *Russia* (London and New York, 2001), pp. 88–9. In making her argument, Tolz includes the opinions of nineteenth-century Russian commentators.
- ²⁵ Aleksander Gieysztor, "Imperia, państwa i narody sukcesyjne w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej," in *Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine: The Foundations of Historical and Cultural Traditions in East Central Europe*, eds. Jerzy Kłoczowski et al. (Lublin and Rome, 1994), pp. 7–16. In *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, 2003), Timothy Snyder offers a broad synthesis of the Polish "dimension" of Ukrainian and East European history extending to the beginning of the post-Communist era.
- ²⁶ Some of the more acute observers abroad noticed that between the Poles and Russians there were Ukrainians. Thus, the Czech writer and journalist Karel Havlíček-Borovský, in an article entitled "The Slav and the Czech" (*Slovan a Čech*), criticized the Russian oppression of the Poles, and he was also critical of the Poles, stressing that "the main bone of contention which has divided every generation of Poles and Russians is the possession of the

- Ukraine.” In Havlíček’s opinion the Russian-Polish conflict over Ukraine was “a fable of two wolves”: “If there is a lamb in the picture, it is the Ukrainian.” See Karel Havlíček, *Politické spisy*, ed. Z. Tobolka (Prague, 1900–1903), 1:70; quoted in Barbara K. Reinfeld, *Karel Havlíček (1821–1856): A National Liberation Leader of the Czech Renaissance* (Boulder, 1982), p. 25. What the Czech journalist knew in the 1840s, the leading British statesman was totally unaware of in the 1860s. In his long essay entitled “Poland,” published during the Polish insurrection of 1863, Lord Salisbury argued that the European public was one-sided in its support of the Poles in their struggle against what it perceived, mistakenly in the lord’s opinion, as Russian oppression. What Europe did not see, Salisbury said, was that the Poles were not simply fighting for the freedom of their own people but were also attempting to annex purely Russian lands and thus to destroy Russia as a nation. Those purely Russian lands were, of course, what we now call Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. But there is no sign in the long essay that its author considered it possible that the eastern territories he denied to the Poles might one day declare themselves to be neither Polish nor Russian. See “Poland,” in *Essays by the late Marquess of Salisbury, K.G., Foreign Politics* (London, 1905), pp. 3–60.
- ²⁷ Jan Kieniewicz, “Polska-Ukraina: dialog w strefie pogranicza,” *Przegląd Powszechny*, no. 10 (1996): 65–73; quoted passage is on pp. 67–68.
- ²⁸ For a recent study of the subject focusing on responses to the Ukrainian phenomenon from the side of government and society, see Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest and New York, 2003). The title of the earlier Russian edition of this work reveals more accurately what it is about: “*Ukrainskii vopros v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)*” (St. Petersburg, 2000).
- ²⁹ Nikolai Ul’ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma* (New York, 1966), p. 156. The quotation from Drahomanov is on p. 146.
- ³⁰ Jaroslav Pelenski, “The Ukrainian-Russian Debate over the Legacy of Kievan Rus’, 1840s–1860s,” in *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus’* (Boulder, 1998), p. 222.
- ³¹ Viacheslav Lypynsky, cited in Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus’*, p. 223.
- ³² Lieven, *Empire*, p. 384.
- ³³ Thomas G. Masaryk, *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*, eds. W. Preston-Warren and William B. Weist (Lewisburg, 1972), p. 123.
- ³⁴ Petr Struve, quoted in Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 301. Italics in the original.
- ³⁵ Serhii M. Plokhyy, “Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute,” in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY, 1994), pp. 150–51. By accepting “the Cossack myth” as a constituent element of their identity, and thus agreeing to forget what the Cossacks’ relations with the Uniates had been, Galician Ruthenians were

practicing what Ernest Renan said about the important role in nation building of not only shared memories but also of a mutual agreement to forget the past: “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century” (Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha [London, 1990], p. 11). Benedict Anderson says that according to Renan’s wording “every French citizen” is “*obliged to have forgotten*” the Saint Bartholomew massacre and comments that “in effect, Renan’s readers were being told to ‘have already forgotten’ what Renan’s own words assumed that they naturally remembered!” (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. [London, 1991], p. 200). History provides examples of how the memories of religious conflict carried their power to divide into the age of nationalism—in other words, how certain people refused “to have forgotten.” The result was either a profound political crisis that took time to solve or a break into separate nations along religious lines. For the former kind of crisis, see David Blackbourn’s reminder that in Germany after 1871 the *Kulturkampf* was “literally a struggle of civilizations” (*The Long Nineteenth Century*, p. 261). Hastings cites the case of “Holland [which] was created in its separateness by a religious struggle.” He adds that “once established, nationalism largely took over from religion” (*The Construction of Nationhood*, p. 28).

³⁶ Johann P. Arnason, *The Future That Failed: Origin and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London, 1993), pp. 87–88. In other words, the Soviets repeated the story of their tsarist predecessors, about whose efforts Simon Dixon wrote: “The more Russian rulers tried to modernise their state, the more backward their empire became” (*The Modernisation of Russia 1676–1825* [Cambridge, 1999], p. 256). In comparison with Russia, the Habsburgs were more successful at modernizing, but they, too, failed to create a monarchy-wide nationality.

³⁷ According to E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1992), p. 164: “In Europe, the outburst of separatist nationalism has even more specific historical roots in the twentieth century. The eggs of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are still hatching... The explosive issues of 1988–92 were those created in 1918–21.” The same point is repeated on p. 165: “The simplest way to describe the apparent explosion of separatism in 1988–92 is thus as ‘unfinished business’ of 1918–21.” In my view, it is the “eggs” of the 1848 revolution that were still hatching in the 1990s. For a curious view of Ukraine’s path to independence, see Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 166: “Ukraine... did not *resign itself* to separation until after the failed coup of August 1991 destroyed the USSR” (italics—RS).

³⁸ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 369. Elsewhere Zelikow

and Rice write that the Soviets were opposed to German reunification, believing that it “would rip the heart out of the Soviet security system” and undo all the gains of World War II (pp. 125–6). (The Soviets were right.)

- ³⁹ William Henry Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York, 1944), pp. 83–84.
- ⁴⁰ Indeed, today, when Brussels is the capital of the European Union, which Ukraine says it eventually hopes to join, it is interesting to recall that between 1772 and 1797 both Lviv and Brussels were under the authority of Vienna: Brussels as the capital of Austrian Netherlands; Lviv as the capital of Austrian Galicia. (This ended in 1797, when Napoleon occupied the former, but, alas, not the latter.) Whether this bit of information will impress anyone in Brussels is another matter.
- ⁴¹ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1984), vol. 1, p. 871.
- ⁴² Ola Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium: Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin, 2003).
- ⁴³ Geoffrey Hosking, “The Freudian Frontier,” *Times Literary Supplement*, 10 March 1995, p. 27.
- ⁴⁴ “Die Entstehung der modernen Ukraine—die westliche Dimension,” *Transit: Europäische Revue* 29 (summer 2005): 50–71.
- ⁴⁵ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin’s Russia*, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (Washington, D.C., 2003), pp. 265–266.
- ⁴⁶ Roman Szporluk, “Lenin, ‘Great Russia,’ and Ukraine,” in “Rus’ Writ Large: Languages, Histories, Cultures: Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday,” edited by Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann, special issue, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, nos. 1–4 (2006): forthcoming. In it I refer to Andreas Kappeler, “Great Russians’ and ‘Little Russians’: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective (Seattle, 2003), pp. 7–8, according to whom Divovych’s “dialogue” did not reflect “the reality of political interrelations between Russia and the Ukrainian hetmanate... but, rather, the wishful thinking of the Cossack elite.” While I agree, I add that such a talk could not have taken place in the first place because no Great Russia existed to ‘talk’ with Little Russia—there was only the empire, with no Great Russia in it that had an identity comparable to England within the United Kingdom or Poland proper (the Korona) within the Commonwealth of the Two Nations following the Union of Lublin (1569). It was Lenin who made the distinction between what he considered Russia proper and called Great Russia, and the empire—and accordingly created the RSFSR as a constituent member of the USSR and, as such, a legal equal of Ukraine.
- ⁴⁷ “Mapping Ukraine” is my contribution to a festschrift in honor of Frank E. Sysyn, to be published as a special issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* in 2009. “Publish or Perish,” written for a festschrift for George G. Grabowicz, is forthcoming in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

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